CONDITIONAL
SENTENCES IN THE
NEW TESTAMENT
by
William
E. Elliott
Submitted in partial
fulfillment of requirements
for the degree of
Doctor of Theology in
Grace
Theological Seminary
May 1981
Digitized by Ted Hildebrandt, Gordon
College 2006
Title: CONDITIONAL SENTENCES IN THE GREEK NEW
TESTAMENT
Author: William E. Elliott
Degree: Doctor of Theology
Date: May
1981
Committee:
Dr. Charles R. Smith, Dr. John A. Sproule, Dr. Homer A. Kent, Jr.
Increasing interest in the grammar of
the Greek New Testament
has
focused attention upon aspects of the language that have, for the
most
part, been passed over by past grammarians. Among these topics
is
that of conditional sentences. A superficial survey of the lit-
erature
indicates that most writers seem to have the data confidently
in
tow, but closer inspection shows that this is not the case. Modern
grammarians
are, for the most part, content to follow the lead of A.T.
Robertson
and classify these clauses in terms of First, Second, Third,
and
Fourth Class conditions. Others, dissatisfied with Robertson's
system
and the extension of it by his followers, have returned to the
terminology,
if not the principles of Classical Greek. The situation
is
uncoordinated at best, for even in Classical Greek studies there
is
significant disagreement upon the classification of these sentences.
The historical background to the study
of conditional sentences
is
presented from both the Classical and the Koine Greek standpoints.
Suggested
systems of classification include Time, Fulfillment, Form
and
Determination. The latter, championed by B.L. Gildersleeve, is
the
preferred system. Determination is indicated by the mood of the
verbs
employed in the protasis. Gildersleeve's system entered Koine
studies
primarily through the work of A.T. Robertson. He employes
four
classes into which he places these conditional sentences.
The Simple Condition, using the
indicative mood, states the
condition
as an assumed reality. There is no necessary connection
between
actuality and the statement. This condition merely presents
the
conclusion as a necessary corollary of the condition.
The Contrary to Fact Condition also
uses the indicative mood
to
present the condition as one that is assumed not true, i.e., con-
trary
to fact. Again, there is no necessary connection between
actuality
and the conditional statement.
The Probable Condition presents the
condition as one assumed
probable,
i.e., one that could easily be fulfilled. The hypothetical
nature
of this condition requires the use of the subjunctive mood.
The Possible condition states the
condition as one that is
assumed
possible, i.e., little likelihood of fulfillment. This con-
dition
utilizes the optative mood, and there is no complete example
of
it in the New Testament.
Two basic concepts underlie all
conditional sentences. First,
the
determining factor is the mood of the verb, not the particle em-
ployed.
Second, all conditional sentences state their case as an
assumption,
never as a direct statement of reality.
Accepted by the Faculty of Grace
Theological Seminary
in partial fulfillment of
requirements for the degree
Doctor of Theology
Examining
Committee:
Charles R. Smith
Homer A. Kent Jr.
John A. Sproule
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 1
CHAPTER
I. A HISTORICAL SURVEY 4
Conditional Sentences in General 4
Conditional Sentences in Classical
Greek 8
The Importance of Classical
Greek 10
Suggested Classification
Systems 10
Classification According
to Time 11
Classification
According to Fulfillment 18
Classification
According to Form 20
Classification
According to Determination 23
Conditional Sentences in Koine Greek 33
Early Grammarians 34
George Benedict
Winer 34
Alexander Buttmann 37
Samuel G. Green 40
Ernest DeWitt
Burton 42
James Hope Moulton 46
Modern Grammarians 49
Archibald Thomas
Robertson 49
William Douglas
Chamberlain 55
Charles Francis
Digby Moule 57
Friedrich Blass -
Albert Debrunner 60
Nigel Turner 62
H. E. Dana and
Julius R. Mantey 65
Robert W. Funk 67
William Sanford La
Sor 65
Summary of Koine Grammarians 71
II. THE SIMPLE CONDITION 73
Introduction 73
The Conditional Particle ei
75
The Significance of ei 75
The Significance of ei
with other Particles 77
The Negative Particles in Simple
Conditions 81
Ean with the
Indicative Mood 84
Significance of Moods and Tenses 88
i
ii
Meaning of the Simple Condition 95
Particular and General
Conditions 95
Degree of Reality 98
Translation of the Simple Condition 105
III. THE CONTRARY TO FACT CONDITION 106
Introduction 106
Significance of Tense 110
Imperfect Tense 110
Aorist Tense 113
Pluperfect Tense 115
The Use of An
in Contrary to Fact Conditions 116
The Meaning of the Contrary to Fact
Condition 121
The Translation of the Contrary to
Fact Condition 123
IV. THE PROBABLE CONDITION 129
Introduction 129
Analysis of the Probable Condition 131
The Protasis 131
The Apodosis 141
Meaning of the Probable Condition 148
Review of the Grammarians 148
Evaluation of the
Grammarians 151
Relationship with the Simple
Condition 156
Summary 163
Translation of the Probable Condition 165
V. THE POSSIBLE CONDITION 169
Introduction 169
The Optative Mood in General 170
The Optative Mood in Conditional
Sentences 174
The Construction 175
The Significance 178
The Grammarians 178
The Specific Examples 180
Those with the
Protasis Implied 180
Those with the
Protasis Stated 184
Translation of the Possible Condition 191
VI. CONCLUSION 193
Simple
Conditions 194
Unreal
Conditions 195
Probable Conditions 195
Possible Conditions 196
Summary 196
iii
APPENDICES 198
Appendix I: Occurrences of the Simple
Condition 198
Appendix II: Occurrences of the Unreal
Condition 211
Appendix III: Occurrences of the
Probable Condition 215
BIBLIOGRAPHY
226
INTRODUCTION
God created man with the potential for abstract reasoning,
and
his many languages
reflect this through their use of the subjunctive
mood: the mood of
contingency or possibility. Posing questions,
exploring possibilities
and analyzing logical connections are part of
man's reasoning
capabilities, and his languages reflect these skills.
Among the syntactical
tools which accomplish these are conditional
sentences. These
sentences, usually consisting of two clauses,
state a hypothesis and
give a conclusion. In English this corres-
ponds to the "If .
. . then" formula.
This type of sentence, while prevalent in English, is
usually
listed as one of
several subordinate clause relationships.1 By
contrast, the Greek
language presents a more fully developed system
of conditional
sentences by means of which a remarkable degree of
precision may be
obtained in expressing conditional thought. The
Greek conditional
sentence presents both the condition and certain
specific implications
about it in one sentence whereas English needs
both the conditional
statement and qualifying sentences to communicate
the same concept. This
compactness lends itself to greater precision
1 Porter Perrin and George
H. Smith, Handbook of Current
English, third edition,
edited by Jim W. Corder (
Scott, Foresman and
Company, 1968), 48-56, 120-121.
2
in the statement of
conditional concepts.
Since conditional sentences are basic to the material of
the
Greek New Testament, a
detailed understanding of conditional sentences
is vital for an
accurate interpretation of its contents. This, then,
is the goal of this
study: to explore conditional sentences so that the
message of the New
Testament may be better understood.
Though all students of Greek, both Classical and Koine,
agree
on the importance of
conditional sentences, few agree on the analysis
of them. A. T.
Robertson aptly describes the situation in Koine studies
when he writes,
"In truth the doctors have disagreed themselves and the
rest have not known how
to go."1 The Classical scene is likewise
muddled, as
Blass-Debrunner notes, "The classical grammars are also hope-
lessly at
variance."2
Some of this confusion is due to the absence of a standard
by
which to classify
conditional sentences. Time, degree of reality and
construction have all
been suggested by various grammarians as possible
classification systems.
Further, each grammarian seems to have developed
his own terminology in
discussing the subject, and each argues that his
is best. Indeed, it is
possible to trace the influence of major
grammarians through
succeeding generations by noting who adopts their
terminology in dealing
with conditional sentences.
1 A. T. Robertson, A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the
Light of
Historical Research
(
1934),
p. 1004.
2 Friedrich Blass and
Alvert Debrunner, A Greek Grammar of the
New Testament
and Other Early Christian Literature, translated and
revised
by Robert W. Funk (
1961), p. 189.
3
Another reason for the lack of standardization may be the
inherent flexibility of
the language itself. Though Classical and Koine
Greek may be considered
fossilized ancestors of Modern Greek, they were
living, functioning
languages, complete with the internal syntactical
elasticity found in
living languages today. Greek, like English, developed
through usage, and
patterns so developed may refuse to be forced into a
logically consistent
mold. So, whether through lack of a standard, or
lack of accepted
terminology, or through syntactical flexibility,
conditional sentences
have provided grammarians with a fruitful area of
contemplation, and
students with a frustrating area of concentration.
This study seeks to offer help to those involved in the
analysis of conditional
sentences by summarizing the work of previous
grammarians and giving
a detailed analysis of each type of conditional
sentence in the New
Testament. The work of past and contemporary
scholars will be
surveyed to give an overview of their studies, agree-
ments, and
disagreements. Then the conditional sentences in the Greek
New Testament will be
identified and analyzed with the help of principles
obtained from the
grammatical survey. Finally, observations will be
offered on the
important matters of translation and interpretation.
The result should be a
small but positive step in gaining further insight
into the meaning of
conditional sentences in the Greek New Testament.
CHAPTER I
A HISTORICAL SURVEY
Since any study necessarily builds upon the work of others,
a
survey of previous
studies of conditional sentences is basic to a
thorough understanding
of the topic. This study will include the work
of both Classical and
Koine scholars.
Conditional
Sentences in General
A brief survey of the technical details of conditional
sentences
will set the scene for
the succeeding discussion and evaluation.
The Definition of
Conditional Sentences
A conditional sentence is a two-clause sentence in which
the
first clause states a
supposition or hypothesis and the second clause
states the results if
that condition is met. The hypothetical clause
which states the
condition ("If this . . .") is termed the protasis
and the conclusion
clause is called the apodosis
(". . . then this.").
Herbert Weir Smyth
explains it this way:
A condition is a supposition on which
a statement is based.
A
conditional sentence commonly consists of two clauses:
The protasis: the conditional, or
subordinate, clause,
expressing
a supposed or assumed case (if).
The apodosis: the conclusion, or
principal, clause, expressing
what
follows if the condition is realized. The truth or fulfillment
of
the conclusion depends on the truth or fulfillment of the
conditional clause.1
1 Herbert Weir Smyth, Greek Grammar for Colleges (
American Book Company,
1920), p. 512.
5
The Construction of Conditional
Sentences
The Protasis
As Smyth stated, the protasis stands as the subordinate or
dependent clause,
setting forth the condition. The term protasis comes
from prosta<sij,
"lit. stretching forward, that which
is put forward
(in logic, a premise).1 While the formal sequence is the standard
"If . . .
then," English, as well as Greek, varies the sequence in
usage: "You will
receive the reward if you do a good job."
The form of the protasis in Greek involves a conditional
particle (ei] or e]a<n) and a verb.
The various combinations of particles
and verbs will be
discussed later. Though the mood of the verb is the
key element in
identifying the type of condition, certain constructions
are fairly standard.
Again, these will be presented later. This
combination of
particles and moods enables Greek to express conditional
thought with a compact
precision lacking in English. The thought of
a few Greek words may
take a few English sentences to be communicated.
The Apodosis
The main or independent clause in a conditional sentence is
termed the apodosis.
This term comes from "a]podo<sij,
lit. giving back,
return;
i. e.
the resuming or answering clause."2 The apodosis may
employ verbs in any
tense or mood, and frequently, in the Koine at
1 Smyth, Grammar, p. 512.
2 Ibid.,
p. 512.
6
least, uses the
particle a@n
with moods other than the indicative.1 Taken
together, then, the protasis
and apodosis constitute a conditional
sentence.
The Conditional
Particles
The origin of the Greek conditional particles is as obscure
as
their usage is
important. Goodwin, one of the leading Classical Greek
grammarians, succinctly
states:
It is impossible to discuss
intelligently the origin of the
conditional sentence until the etymology
and original meaning of
the particles ei], a@n, and ke< are determined.
On these questions
we have as yet little or no real
knowledge.2
He then gives a brief
summary of what is known about these particles
and concludes:
But here we are on purely theoretical
ground; and we must content
ourselves practically with the fact, that
in the earliest Greek
known
to us ei was fully established in its
conditional sense,
like our if and Latin si.3
1 H. E. Dana and Julius R.
Mantey, A Manual Grammar of the
Greek New Testament (New York: The
MacMillan Company, 1966), p. 288.
2 William Watson Goodwin, Syntax of the Mood and Tenses of the
Greek Verb (Boston: Ginn &
Company, 1893), p. 142.
3 Ibid.,
p. 143.
7
ei]
Liddell and Scott trace the origin of ei] back to its use in
Homer where it is
sometimes replaced by the Doric ai].1 It introduces
either conditional
clauses or questions and is regularly used with the
indicative mood.2 Its consistent translation in conditional
clauses is
"if." The
relationship of this particle, the indicative mood and the
assumed reality of the
condition will be discussed later.
e]a<n
Ean
is a combination of ei
and an, according to Dana and
Mantey.3 Smyth remarks that "The etymology of e]a<n is uncertain:
either from h] + a@n or from ei] + a@n.”4 This particle introduces
conditions in the
subjunctive mood, though it is not limited to this
mood:
The difference between ei]
and e]a<n has been considerably lessened
in Hellenistic as compared with earlier
Greek. We have seen that
e]a<n can even take
the indicative; while (as rarely in classical
Greek) ei] can be found with the subjunctive.5
1 Henry George Liddell and
Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon,
Vol.
I, edited by Henry Stuart Jones and Roderick McKenzie (
At
the Clarendon Press, 1951), p. 480. See also William Watson
Goodwin,
An Elementary Greek Grammar (Boston:
Ginn Brothers, 1872),
p.
263.
2 Dana and Mantey, Grammar, p. 246.
3 Ibid., p. 245.
4 Smyth, Grammar, p. 512.
5 J. H. Moulton, A Grammar of New Testament Greek, Volume
I:
Prolegomena, third edition
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1908), p. 187.
8
This caution should
guard against absolute rules, but the general
principle is that e]a<n utilizes the
subjunctive mood while ei]
employs
the indicative. Again,
the specific implications of this regarding the
assumed reality of the
condition will be discussed later.
These conditional particles are similar to particles of
interjection in Homeric
Greek and related languages. N. D. Coleman
suggests that the
conditional particles "appear to have been inter-
jections in the first
place."1 J. B. Greenough
tries to push the
origin of the
conditional sentence and its attendant particles back into
the frontiers of the
Indo-European linguistic heritage: "We are
naturally led to
conclude that this [conditional] construction was in
use more or less in
Indo-European times and was received by each of the
languages as a part of
the original inheritance."2 Whatever the source
of these particles,
conditional sentences were a vital part of the
language of both
Classical and Koine Greek and play a vital role in the
Greek New Testament.
Conditional Sentences
in Classical Greek
Prior to the discovery of the papyri and the comprehension
of
their linguistic
significance, Biblical Greek was considered to be
1 N. D. Coleman, "Some
Noteworthy Uses of ei] in Hellenistic
Greek
with a Note on St. Mark viii 12," The
Journal of Theological
Studies, 27:1 (April,
1976), p. 159.
2 James B. Greenough,
"On Some Forms of Conditional Sentences
in
Latin, Greek and Sanskrit," Transactions
of the American Philo-
logical
Association, 2:2 (June, 1871), p. 164.
9
a unique species of
that language, sometimes referred to as "Holy Ghost
Greek."1
This was, of course, a false position,
for the Greek of the
New Testament was
simply the language of the common man as found in
"the street and
market place."2 This was
distinguished from Hellenistic
Greek, a direct
descendant of Attic or Classical Greek. While some
New Testament writings
show distinct Hellenistic influence, such as
Luke, Acts and Hebrews,
others are distinctly Koine. This is not
because the writers,
according to Moulton, used Greek "as foreigners,
Aramaic thought
underlying Greek expression."3 Rather it is due to
the individual writers
using the language closest to them, each reflecting
their own blend of
Hebrew and Hellenistic cultures. As the result of
pioneering efforts by
men like Adolf Deismann in analyzing the papyri,
"Biblical"
Greek became identified as the language of the common man,
the Koine Greek. To be
sure, it still reflected the Hebrew idiom of
the authors, but it was
Koine none the less. A. T. Robertson sums up
the current
understanding of New Testament Greek:
The Greek of the New Testament that
was used with practical
uniformity over most of the Roman world
is called the Common Greek
or koinh<. Not that it was not good Greek, but rather the
Greek
in common use. There was indeed a
literary koinh< [Hellenistic
Greek] and a vernacular koinh<. Plutarch is
a good specimen of the,
literary koinh< while the
papyri are chiefly in the vernacular koinh<
like most of the New Testament.4
1 Dana and Mantey, Grammar, pp. 9-15.
2 W. White, Jr.,
"Greek Language," The Zondervan
Pictorial
Encyclopedia of
the Bible,
5 vols., Merrill C. Tenney, editor (Grand
Rapids:
Zondervan Publishing House, 1977), II, pp. 827-828.
3 Moulton, Prolegomena, p. 3.
4 A. T. Robertson, A Short Grammar of the Greek New Testament
(New York: A. C.
Armstrong E. Son, 1908), p. 6.
10
The Importance of
Classical Greek
If the Koine of the New Testament is in the mainstream of
linguistic development
and expression, does it have any significant
connection with the
literary history of the language as a whole, and
with Classical Greek
specifically? Yes, answers Robertson:
This
koinh< was itself the heir of the past. The various Greek
dialects blended on an Attic base. The koinh< was thus richer in
expression as to words and forms than
any of the older dialects.
Compare the relation of modern English to
the various tongues that
have contributed to its power and
expansion. Ionic, Doric, Aeolic,
North West Greek and other dialects have made
some contribution to
the common result. The use of nominatives
in the midst of accusa-
tives in the Boeotian, for instance, is
strangely like the Book of
Revelation. So the absence of the future
participle is like the N.T.1
This heritage, then, is sufficient justification for
beginning
the study of
conditional sentences in Classical Greek, the language
of the period from
Homer to the Alexandrian conquests (c. 330 B.C.).2
This language
constituted the "chief basis of New Testament Greek,"3
thus its handling of
conditional sentences has important effects on
the Koine Greek.
Suggested
Classification Systems
How, then, did Classical Greek scholars classify
conditional
sentences? In general,
they seemed to follow one of three systems.
C. D. Chambers outlines
them as follows:
1 A. T. Robertson, A Short
Grammar, p. 6.
2 Dana and Mantey, Grammar,
p. 6.
3 Ibid., p. 6.
11
There are three possible ways of
classifying conditional
sentences, viz. (i) by time, (ii) by
fulfillment, (iii) by form.
The first is the system of Prof. Goodwin,
the second is proposed by
Mr. Donovan . . . and the third that of
Mr. Sonnenschein.l
Though the situation is
not as absolute as Chambers suggests, his
comments serve as a
useful guide to the discussion of conditional
sentences in Classical
Greek.
Classification
According to Time
The classification most familiar to American students of
Classical Greek is that
of William Watson Goodwin. As Professor of
Greek Literature at
ficant influence on
Greek studies in the
book, Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek
Verb, was published in
1860 when he was
twenty-nine years of age. Ten years later he published
An
Elementary Greek. Grammar.2 The importance of these works may be
judged by the fact that
both are still in print. His influence
extended into New
Testament studies through the work of Ernest DeWitt
The statement of the system.--Goodwin sets forth his
system in
terms of past, present
and future conditions:
1 C. D. Chambers, "The
Classification of Conditional Sentences,"
The Classical
Review,
9:2 (May, 1895), pp. 293-294.
2 Chalmers G. Davidson,
"Goodwin, William Watson," Dictionary
American Biography, Vol. IV,
edited by Allen Johnson (
Scribner's Sons, 1957),
pp. 411-413.
12
The most obvious natural distinction
is that of (a) present
and past conditions and
(b) future conditions. Present and
past
conditions (a) are divided into two
classes by distinguishing (1)
those which imply nothing as to the
fulfillment of the condition
from (2) those which imply that the
condition is not or was not
fulfilled. Future conditions (b) have two
classes (1, 2), distin-
guished by the manner in which the
supposition is stated. Class 1
of present and past conditions is further
distinguished on the
ground of the particular or general
character of the supposi-
tion . . . .1
Goodwin also includes the concepts of (a) fulfillment or
non-
fulfillment and (b)
particular and general characteristics as other
features by which
conditional sentences may be classified. The first
leads him to identify
conditional clauses as (1) those which imply
nothing as to the
fulfillment of the condition, (2) those which imply
fulfillment of the
condition and (3) those which imply the nonfulfillment
of the condition.
He explains the particular and general characteristics:
A particular supposition refers to a
definite act or to several
definite acts, supposed to occur at some
definite time (or
times) . . . .
A general supposition refers
indefinitely to any act or acts
of a given class which may be supposed to
occur or to have
occurred at any time . . . .2
The form of the conditional sentence may serve as a guide
to
its identification and
classification under these headings. A later
edition of his grammar
summarizes this:
I. Present and past suppositions implying nothing as to
ful-
fillment or
condition:
(a) Chiefly particular:
(protasis)
ei] with indicative
(apodosis)
any form of the verb
1 Goodwin, Syntax of Moods, p. 139.
2 Ibid.,
p. 141.
13
(b) General:
1. (protasis)
e]a<n with subjunctive
(apodosis) present indicative
2. (protasis)
ei] with
the optative
(apodosis) imperfect indicative
II. Present and Past suppositions implying that
the condition is
not fulfilled:
(protasis)
ei]
with past tense of indicative
(apodosis) past
tense of indicative with a@n
III. Future
suppositions in more vivid form:
(protasis)
ei]
with subjunctive (sometimes ei] with future
indicative
(apodosis) any
future form
IV. Future suppositions in less vivid form:
(protasis)
ei]
with optative
(apodosis)
optative with a@n1
Smyth also adopts this
system of classification.2
The evaluation of the system.--The first point in
evaluating
Goodwin's system is
that of time. He seems to make time a basis of
classification when
absolute time is of secondary importance in the
Greek verb system.
Goodwin himself notes that relative time is far more
prominent in Greek
verbs than in English: "It is a special distinction
between the Greek and
the English idioms, that the Greek uses its verbal
1 William Watson Goodwin, Greek Grammar, revised by Charles
2 Smyth, Grammar,
pp. 513-516.
14
forms much more freely
to denote merely relative time."1 A. T. Robertson,
noting that absolute
time is limited to the indicative mood, warns that
"even in the
indicative the time element is subordinate to the kind of
action expressed."2
While his reference to "kind"
of action may be
questioned, his
observation on time is helpful.
But is Goodwin basing his classification on time as
indicated
by the verb itself, or
on absolute time as indicated by the sentence as
a whole? The examples
he offers as illustrations seem to place the
emphasis upon the verb
rather than the syntax. Thus he presents: "Ei]
pra<ssei
tou?to, kalw?j e@xei, if
he is doing this, it is well; ei] pra<ssei
tou?to,
h[marthke<n, if he is doing
this, he has erred; ei]
pra<ssei tou?to,
kalw?j
e@cei, if he is doing
this, it will be well."3 One may well argue
that the syntax of a
verb does assign it absolute time in any given
context. But Goodwin
does not stress the role of syntax in establishing
the time of his verb.
One must therefore question any system of
classification which
makes absolute time as found in the verb itself a
foundation criterion.
Second, his distinction between particular and general
conditions
may be questioned as an
objective standard of classification. Goodwin
argues that
1 Goodwin, Syntax of Moods, p. 8.
2 A. T. Robertson, Grammar, p. 825.
3 Goodwin, Syntax
of Moods, p. 139.
15
When the apodosis has a verb of
present time expressing a
customary or repeated action, the
protasis may refer (in a general
way) to any act or acts of a given class
which may be supposed to
occur at any time within the period
represented in English as
present. Thus we may say:--
Ea@n
ti<j kle<pth, kola<zetai, if (ever) any one steals, he is
(in
all such cases) punished . . . .1
Goodwin's concept of a present general condition seems to
fit
conditional sentences
in the New Testament, such as I John 1:7: e]a<n
de>
e]n
t&? fwti> peripatw?men. . . , koinwni<an e@xomen -
but if (whenever) we
walk in the light . . .
we have (in such cases) fellowship. But what
about conditions such
as Luke 5:12? Here the apodosis uses a present
tense, but the
condition must be considered a particular one, limited
to the historical
situation: ku<rie, e]a<n qe<lhj, du<nasai<
me kaqari<sai -
Lord, if you are
willing you are able to cleanse me.
What is the difference between these two sentences? Simply
that the apodosis of I
John 1:7 contains a present tense verb which
expresses a
"customary or repeated action," while that of Luke 5:12
does not. There can be
no question that the condition in I John 1:7
states a general
situation that is presently true for all believers,
but such identification
depends upon the interpretation of the action
represented by the
verb. Could it be possible for interpreters to
disagree over the
interpretation of a given verb? Yes, it could.
Should the basis of
classification be a point that is interpretative
in nature? It seems
reasonable to answer in the negative. Since, then,
there is no objective
way of determining if a verb is referring to a
1 Goodwin, Syntax
Mood's, p. 141.
16
general or a particular
act, the final determination becomes one of
interpretation rather
than form. The concept of general versus particular
may serve as an
interpretative guideline, but it is not distinguished by
form. "That point
[of present or general conditions]," writes A. T.
Robertson ,"has no
bearing on the quality of the condition."1 Though
several modern New
Testament grammarians continue this terminology,
it must be questioned
as a criterion to the objective analysis of
conditional sentences.
Another point to consider in evaluating Goodwin's
classifica-
tion system is his
concept of fulfillment or non-fulfillment as found
in the condition.
Robertson has particular problems with Goodwin's
concept that conditions
employing the indicative mood in the protasis
imply nothing as to the
fulfillment of the condition. This, as
Robertson sees it,
violates the very nature of the indicative mood:
The words to which I object, besides
"particular," are "implying
nothing as to the fulfillment of the
condition." This condition
pointedly
implies the fulfillment of the condition. It is the
condition of actuality, reality, Wirklichkeit, and not mere
"possibility" as Farrar has it
. . . a la Goodwin.2
Robertson claims that
Goodwin "confuses the 'fact' with the 'statement'
of the fact."3
This seems a bit harsh, for Goodwin himself writes:
"The Greek has no
form implying that a condition is or was fulfilled,
and it is hardly
conceivable that any language should find such a form
1 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1006.
2 Ibid., p. 1006.
3 Ibid.,p.
1006.
17
necessary or
useful."1 This would
amount to a direct statement, for
if the condition is
fulfilled, then the results are realized. Such a
statement would not be
a conditional statement at all, but a statement
of actuality. While the
specific topic of reality in conditional
sentences will be
examined in detail later, the important point is that
Robertson had serious
doubts about the validity of Goodwin's classifica-
tion scheme.
Another minor point of criticism leveled against Goodwin is
that of terminology. J.
W. Roberts notes that "Others have attacked
Goodwin's terms 'more'
and 'less vivid' as describing the significance
of his third and fourth
class conditional sentences," but gives no
supporting references.2
Robertson did not use this terminology,
and
those who followed have
also set it aside. Some contemporary grammarians,
though, are returning
to it. Both Robert W. Funk and William S.
La Sor speak of
"vivid" and "less vivid" concepts when discussing
conditional sentences
in their grammars. This point is not foundational
to the analysis of
Goodwin's system, and will be discussed later.
1 Goodwin, Syntax of Moods, p. 140.
2 J. W. Roberts, "The
Use of Conditional Sentences in the Greek
New
Testament as Compared with Homeric, Classical and Hellenistic
Uses,"
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, the
1955,
p. 20.
3 Robert W. Funk, A Beginning-Intermediate Grammar of Hellenistic
Greek (Missoula,
Montana: The Society of Biblical Literature, 1973),
p.
684; and William Sanford La Sor, Handbook
of New Testament Greek,
vol.
II (Grand. Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1973),
pp. 221-225.
18
In summary, then, Goodwin is the main proponent of
Chamber's
first suggested
criterion for classifying conditional sentences: Time.
The main point of
Goodwin's system is the classification of these
sentences into past, present
and future conditions. Some of these
categories are further
divided into "particular" and "general" condi-
tions, and some of
these are subdivided by "vividness."
Criticism of his system has focused on (1) his use of time
as
a main dividing point,
(2) the characteristics of particular and
general, (3) the
implication of fulfillment and (4) his terminology.
The majority of Koine
grammarians today, operating under the influence
of A. T. Robertson, do
not follow Goodwin's system, though some show
signs of returning to
it.
Classification
According to Fulfillment
The second criterion suggested by Chambers for classifying
conditional sentences
is that of fulfillment, i.e. cataloging them
according to the
fulfillment or non-fulfillment of the condition.
The statement of the system.--Herbert Wier Smyth
follows this
system, noting that
conditional sentences may be classified according
to form and function.
Among the functions he lists is "fulfillment or
non-fulfillment."1
J. Donovan also champions this method of
classifica-
tion, and his argument
is worth pursuing. He uses a book review essay
as an opportunity to
argue his case in The Classical Review.
The grammar
1 Smyth, Grammar,
p. 514.
19
he is reviewing argues
for the position of classification by form, and
Donovan rejects this
approach. He argues that different meanings may
have the same form. He
concludes by writing: "What is wanted is not that
there should be a
search for 'would be' or 'should be' or 'might be'
or other variations;
but recourse should at once be had to the universal
canon of fulfillment or
non-fulfillment."1
Further, recognizing that his position had already been
challenged, he adds a
note of defense:
After the campaign recently conducted in
the pages of this Review
against the very principle of fulfillment
as a basis of classifica-
tion, one point is now clear, if it was
not so already, namely,
that to be regarded as unfulfilled, a
condition need not necessarily
be so actually,
but that it is enough that it should be assumed
to be such.2
Thus Donovan elevates
the concept of fulfillment or non-fulfillment to
the status of a
"universal canon" for the classification of conditional
sentences.
The evaluation of the system.--Donovan's review
brought a rapid
response from Chambers
who defended the position in question. His
rebuttal begins with a
summary of Donovan's principle:
Therefore the universal canon resolves
itself into this: Conditions
are to be divided into (i) those which
imply or assume without
implying that the condition is not
fulfilled, and (ii) those which
do not assume or imply that the condition
is not fulfilled.3
1 J. Donovan,
"Sonnenschein's Greek Grammar," The
Classical
Review, 9:1 (January,
1895), p. 64.
2 Ibid., p. 64.
3 Chambers, "Classification," pp.
293-294.
20
He then offers three
serious objections to Donovan's position. First,
Chambers observes that
this produces an imbalance in grammar. Condi-
tions implying
non-fulfillment are relatively rare in the language and
should not be the basis
of classification. Second, the terminology is
awkward at best and
hardly fits the need of the beginning composition.
Since Chambers is
speaking of English to Greek composition, his comment
has little reference to
this study. Third, and more to the point,
Donovan's scheme does
not fit all cases. The majority of grammarians
have not followed his
suggestions. The concept of fulfillment does, as
Goodwin notes, play a
role in our understanding of conditional sentences,
but it does not provide
a sufficiently applicable standard upon which to
classify them.1
Classification by Form
The third criterion Chambers suggests is classification by
the
form of the conditional
sentence. Among the classical grammarians who
have followed this
approach is E. A. Sonnenschein, professor of Greek
and Latin at
The statement of the system.--Sonnenschein writes:
To me the ordinary forms of
Conditional Sentences, whether in
Latin, Greek or a modern language,
present themselves in two great
1 Goodwin, Syntax of Moods, p. 139.
2 S. B. Sedwick,
"Sonnenschein, Edward Adolf," Dictionary
of
National Biography, 1922-1930, edited by J. R. H. Weaver (
21
classes, the distinction between which is
marked by certain well-
defined differences both of meaning and of
linguistic form.1
Form, for him, helps
determine the meaning, for in his classification
"there is a coincidence between distinctions of form
and distinctions of
meaning."2
Chambers supports this principle, noting that "It is
axiomatic that the
division by form, and not by sense, is the truly
scientific one, because
like forms must (originally at least) have like
meanings, but like
meanings need not have like forms."3
Smyth notes that several possibilities exist with regard to
classification
according to form:
Classified according to form, all
conditional sentences may be
arranged with regard to the form of
the protasis or of the apodosis.
Protasis: ei] with the
indicative.
e]a<n (rarely ei]) with the
subjunctive.
ei]
with the optative.
Apodosis: with a@n, denoting
what would (should) be or have been.
without a@n,
not denoting what would (should) be
or
have been.4
Which of these possibilities should be followed if
conditional
sentences are to be
classified by form? "Ought we to classify according
to the Protasis
(Subordinate Clause) or according to the Apodosis
1 E. A. Sonnenschein,
"Horton-Smith's Conditional
Sentences,"
The Classical.
Review,
9:2 (April, 1895), p. 221.
2 Ibid., p. 221, italics added .
3 Chambers,
"Classification," p. 294.
4 Smyth, Grammar,
p. 513.
22
(Principal Clause), or
according to both at once?"1 Sonnenschein opts
for the Apodosis as the
standard. Roberts outlines his system so:
I.
Type One: Sentences without a@n in the
apodosis: the protasis
expressing no implication of
fulfillment.
ei] with a Past
Indicative expressing what was
ei] with a Present
Indicative expressing what is
e]a<n with a
Subjunctive expressing what is or what will be
Also e]a<n
h] – e@stai "If A is B," followed by a command or
wish.
II. Type Two: Sentences with ay in the apodosis:
the protasis
expressing some sort of implication as
to fact or fulfill-
ment.
ei] with the
Optative--Optative with a@n expressing what would be
ei] with a Past
Indicative--Past Indicative with a@n expressing
what would be
III. Type Three: ei] ei@h
. . . e@stai
(or e@sti) expressing in the
protasis some sort of mental reservation.2
Evaluation of the system.--Donovan, as indicated
above, claims
that this system leads
to more problems than solutions in application.
Even Chambers wonders
"whether this was the original principle of
division, or only its
accidental final result."3 The basic problem is
the occasional
divergence between form and meaning. Although the use of
form does offer an
objective standard of classification, is it reasonable
to pursue it when it
does not coincide with the real world? As will be shown
Sonnenschein is on the
right track, but the emphasis requires a slight
1 Sonnenschein,
"Horton-Smith," p. 220.
2 Roberts,
"Conditional Sentences," p. 12.
3 Charmers, "Classification," p. 294.
23
shift in order to be
workable.
Classification by
Determination
Chambers omitted a fourth basis of classification of
conditional
sentences, that of
determination. This approach, popularized by B. L.
Gildersleeve and
followed by many other grammarians, was first published
in 1876 and again in
1882.1 It seems strange that
Chambers, writing in
1895, was unaware of
it.
The statement of the system.--Gildersleeve states
his case so:
In common with most grammarians, I
divide the conditional
sentences into four classes, for which I
have been in the habit of
using the designations
"Logical," "Anticipatory," "Ideal,"
"Unreal." If nothing more can be
said in behalf of this nomenclature
than that it saves time, something at
least has been said; and I am
glad to learn that a part of this
nomenclature, as applied to the
Latin language, has found favor among
teachers. Logical, Ideal, and
Unreal conditions occur in Latin also. The
Anticipatory is
peculiar to Greek.2
He describes the Logical Condition as one that
. . . states the elements in question. It
is used of that which
can be brought to the standard of fact; but
that standard may be
for or against the truth of the postulate.
All that the logical
condition asserts is the inexorable
connexion [sic] of the two
members of the sentence.3
1 B. L. Gildersleeve,
"On ei] with the Future Indicative and ean
with
the Subjunctive in the Tragic Poets," Transactions
of the American
Philological
Association,
7:1 (January, 1876), pp. 2-23; and “Pindaric
Syntax,”
pp. 434-445.
2 Gildersleeve, "On ei],"
pp. 5-6.
. 3 Gildersleeve,
"Pindar," p. 435.
24
This type of condition
corresponds to Robertson's First Class condition.1
The Anticipatory Condition involves e]a<n in the
protasis, and thus
corresponds to
Robertson's Third Class condition. Interestingly enough,
Gildersleeve agrees
with Goodwin in his concept of particular and
general
("generic"), noting that "The anticipatory condition is
particular or generic
according to the character of the apodosis . . .,
just as any other
conditional sentence."2 The
key element is the
use of the present
indicative in the apodosis. Such a condition "is
regularly generic."3
Gildersleeve's Ideal Condition employs the optative mood
and
"seems to have
been developed out of the wish, just as the anticipatory
was developed out of
demand."4 This corresponds to Robertson's Fourth
Class condition. Since
the New Testament has no complete sentence of
this type, his comments
on it are beside the point of this study.
His fourth type of condition is termed the Unreal
Condition,
corresponding to
Robertson's Second Class condition. Rather than use
the term
non-fulfillment as does Goodwin, he speaks of it as
"futureless."
The Unreal. Condition, 'the hypothesis
contrary to fact,' seems
to be related to the hopeless wish, as
the ideal condition to the
wish pure and simple . . . . A wish may
be madly impossible, but
1 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1007.
2 Gildersleeve,
"Pindar," p. 436.
3 Ibid., p. 435.
4 Ibid.,
p. 436.
25
if it belongs to the domain of the future
it is optative. Now the
hopeless wish is hopeless because it is
futureless . . . .1
In simple language,
this condition states a condition as though there
is no hope whatsoever
of its being fulfilled. It implies its non-
fulfillment.
Thus Gildersleeve divides conditional sentences into two
broad
catagories: the first
containing those which imply something about the
determination of the
condition, and the second containing those which
imply nothing about its
determination. The first catagory is subdivided
into two classes: those
which imply positive fulfillment of the condi-
tion and those which
imply negative or non-fulfillment of the condition.
The second catagory
also is subdivided into two classes: those
conditions with a
greater degree of probability and those with a
lesser degree of
probability.
Roberts summarizes this
in outline form:
I. Condition determined
A. As
fulfilled - the Simple or Logical Condition
past
Protasis: ei]
with an indicative present
future
Apodosis: Any form of verb
B. As
unfulfilled - the Unreal Condition
Protasis: ei]
with a past indicative
Apodosis: Past indicative with a@n
1 Gildersleeve, "Pindar," p. 437.
26
II. Condition undetermined
A. With greater prospect of
fulfillment - The Anticipatory
Condition
Protasis: e]a<n
with the subjunctive
Apodosis:
Usually future, except for the general, which has
the present indicative
B. With less prospect of fulfillment - The Ideal Condition
Protasis: ei]
with the optative
Apodosis: Optative with a@n1
The comparison of the system.--A comparison of this
outline with
that of Goodwin's
system on pages 12-13 or with the chart in Smyth's
grammar will indicate
Gildersleeve's points of departure.2
These may
be listed as:
1. No attempt is made to utilize the time of the condition
as a
guide to the
classification of the sentence.
2. No attempt has been made to divide them into particular
or general on the basis
of the protasis. Each of these may, in
Gildersleeve's opinion,
be particular or general, depending on the
apodosis, but that is
not a basis of classification.3
3. Mood, rather than tense is emphasized as one of the
important
features of the
protasis.
1 Roberts,
"Conditional Sentences," p. 22.
2 Smyth, Gammar, p. 516.
3 He does approve of such a
distinction as a guide to interpre-
tation.
See "On ei]," p. 7.
27
4. No attempt is made to distinguish general and particular
conditions by form,
though he does recognize that the Anticipatory
condition (e]a<n with the
subjunctive in the protasis) is more often than
not a general
condition.
5. The Future Condition (called by Smyth the "Future
Emotional"1)
is identified as a
simple or logical condition on the basis of the
indicative mood.
This system has been followed by a significant number of
Koine
grammarians, including
men such as Winer,2 Buttman,3 Robertson,4 and
Blass-Debrunner.5
The evaluation of the system.--There are three
points which need
to be considered in
evaluating his system. First, the above-mentioned
1 Smyth, Grammar, p. 516.
2 G[eorge] Benedict] Winer,
A Grammar of the Idiom of the New
Testament, seventh
edition, revised by Gottlieb Lunemann, translated
and
edited by J. H. Thayer (
Publisher,
1893), p. 291.
3 Alexander Buttmann, A Grammar of the New Testament Greek,
translated
and edited by J. H. Thayer (
Publisher,
1873), p. 220.
4 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1004.
5 F[riedrich] Blass and
Albert] Debrunner, A Greek Grammar of
the New Testament
and Other Early Christian Literature, translated and
revised
by Robert W. Funk (
1961), pp. 188-189.
28
point regarding present
and general conditions needs to be summarized.
Gildersleeve maintains
that any conditional sentence may be particular
or general
"according to the character of the apodosis."1 The
particular character he
looks for is the use of the present tense. This
is true, according to
him, of all conditions, including the Logical and
Anticipatory
conditions:
Hence when [the logical condition] has its
apodosis in the present,
it has a double meaning, which adapts it admirably
to personal
argument. So especially when the form ei] tij is used, which may
point either to a definite or to an
indefinite person, the Logical
condition is a two-edged sword, often
wielded in the keen encounter
of Attic wit. But as the e]a<n conditional with a present indicative
apodosis is regularly generic, it is not
without reason that this
form should be preferred, when distinctly
generic action is to be
expressed.2
New Testament examples which illustrate his point include
Matthew 19:10 (ei] ou!twj e]sti<n h[ ai]ti<a
tou? a]nqrw<pou meta> th?j gunaiko<j, ou] sumfe<rei gamh?sai
- if this is the case of the man with his wife,
it is better not to
marry), a logical condition which is obviously
a general one, and John
11:9 (e]a<n tij peripath? e]n t^?
h[me<r%, ou]
prosko<ptei
- if anyone walks in the day he does not stumble), an
anticipatory condition
which is also general. Whether this holds as
a uniform rule (present
tense in apodosis = a general condition)
deserve detailed
treatment and will receive it at a later point in
this study. For now, it
is sufficient to note that Gildersleeve's
suggestion does fit
some passages in the Koine of the New Testament.
1 Gildersleeve,
"Pindar," p. 435.
2 Gildersleeve, "On ei," p. 6.
29
The second point of evaluation also relates to a
distinction
between Gildersleeve
and Goodwin. Gildersleeve's system relegates the
present general
condition of Goodwin to the anticipatory class because
of its subjunctive
mood. Conditions employing future indicative verbs
are classed as simple
or logical conditions. But what is the difference
between these two? Does
not the future indicative convey the same concept
as the present
subjunctive, for all practical purposes?
Gildersleeve answers that there is a distinction between
the
two, one which he feels
has been overlooked by many grammarians. First,
he notes, the normal pattern
for future conditions is e]a<n
with the
subjunctive: "The
fact then is patent enough to every one who will be
at pains to count, that
for model Greek prose e]a<n
with the subjunctive
is preferred to ei] with the future
indicative."1 The reason for this,
he writes,
. . . seems to be to a considerable
extent the greater temporal
exactness, the same greater temporal
exactness which has wholly
displaced the future indicative with the
temporal particles, the same
greater temporal exactness which has given
so wide a sweep to the
optative with a@n as a sharper form of
the future.2
If e]a<n with
the subjunctive is the normal form in Attic prose,
what is the role of ei] with the future
indicative? It shows
. . . a certain coldness, a certain
indifference; and this added to
the general rigor of the logical
condition, which faces fact in all
its grimness, gives a stern, minatory,
prophetic tone to the future
1 Gildersleeve, "On ei],"
p. 9.
2 Ibid.,
p. 9.
30
indicative, which commentators and
grammarians have noticed, but
noticed only in passing.1
Though Gildersleeve is speaking of conditions in Attic
Greek,
his observations give
an added dimension to the force of such conditions
in the New Testament,
such as Matthew 6:23 (e]a<n
de> o[ o]fqalmo<j sou
ponhro>j
h#, o!lon to> sw?ma< sou skoteino>n e@stai
- but if your eye is evil,
your whole body will be
darkness) and Luke 13:3 (a]lla<
e]a<n mh> metanoh?te,
pa<ntej
o[moi<wj a]polei?sqe - but unless you repent, you will all
likewise
be destroyed).
Thus Gildersleeve uses the mood of the verb as the guiding
principle of his
classification. The present general conditions as
identified by Goodwin
simply follow the pattern of Attic prose and should
be considered as a type
of anticipatory or future conditions. Further,
the use of the future
indicative not only classes the condition as a
logical condition, but
stresses the inescapable nature of the apodosis.
A third point arises over the distinction between the
indicative
and subjunctive moods.
Contrary to Gildersleeve, Goodwin maintains that
there is no distinction
between these two moods in conditional sentences
except that of time. He
devotes an entire paper to the defense of his
position and offers the
following observation:
The idea of "possibility" or
something of the kind being attached
to the subjunctive, it was naturally
supposed that the simple
indicative in protasis must have a
corresponding idea at its
foundation, and that of
"certainty" or "reality" has generally been
assigned to it.2
1 Gildersleeve, "On ei],"
p. 9.
2 "William Watson
Goodwin, "On the Classification of Conditional
Sentences
in Greek Syntax," Transactions of
the American Philological
Association,
6:1 (March, 1873), pp. 61-62.
31
He then gives several reasons for questioning that this
distinction holds up in
conditional sentences. In concluding his
argument he writes:
After the most careful study that I have
been able to give to the
subject, and especially after a comparison
of several thousand
classic examples, I am convinced that no
such principle [of
distinction] can be found. Every example
that I have met with has
only confirmed the opinion, which I can
now express with the
greatest confidence, that there is no
inherent distinction between
the present indicative and the present
subjunctive in protasis
(between ei] boule<tai and e]a<n boulh?tai)
except that of time.1
Robertson, writing some years later, defends Gildersleeve's
position against
Goodwin by pointedly hinging the meaning of the logical
condition (ei] with the indicative in
the protasis) on the significance
of the indicative mood.2 This mood, according to him, is characterized
as:
. . . the "modus rectus." It
does express "l'affirmation pure
et simple." The indicative does state a thing as true, but does not
guarantee the reality of the thing. In the nature of the case only
the statement
is under discussion. A clear grip on this point will
help one all along. The indicative has
nothing to do with reality
("on sich"). The speaker presents something as true. Actuality is
implied, to be sure, but nothing more.
Whether it is true or no is
another matter.2
Concerning the subjunctive mood, Robertson notes two
things.
First, it is probably
impossible to identify a single root-idea for
this mood. He accepts
Brugmann's identification of "three uses of the
subjunctive (the volitive, the deliberative, the futuristic."3
Thus
1 Goodwin,
"Classification," pp. 64-65.
2 Robertson, Grammar, p. 915.
3 Ibid.,
pp. 926-927.
32
the subjunctive does
not necessarily imply a specific time.
Second, there is a close connection between the aorist sub-
juctive and the future
indicative:
These [the aorist subjunctive and the
future indicative] are closely
allied in form and sense. It is quite
probable that the future
indicative is just a variation of the
aorist subjunctive . . . .
The subjunctive is always future, in
subordinate clauses relatively
future. Hence the two forms continued
side by side in the language.
There is a possible distinction.
"The subjunctive differs from the
future
indicative in stating what is thought likely to occur, not
positively what will occur."
[quoting Thompson, A Syntax of Attic
Greek, p. 133].1
Thus Robertson offers support for Gildersleeve's position
by
holding, first, to a
uniform distinction between indicative and sub-
junctive moods, and,
second, to a non-chronological significance for
the subjunctive mood
itself. The particular case of the future
indicative and the
aorist subjunctive may show a blurring of this
otherwise sharp
distinction, but Robertson will not concede confusion
in the essential modal
significance, even in conditional sentences.
It would seem, then, that the major objections against
Gildersleeve's system
raised by Goodwin can be answered. Indeed, some
of the answers are
directly related to the objections raised against
Goodwin's own approach.
Most Koine grammarians have been convinced of
the superiority of
Gildersleeve's approach and have adopted it, via
Robertson, with some
notable exceptions.
1 Robertson, Grammar,
pp. 924-925.
33
Summary of Classical
Greek Classification Systems
This somewhat detailed review of the work of Classical
gram-
marians has shown that
there is, in truth, significant disagreement
among them. Goodwin
classifies according to time, Donovan according to
fulfillment or,
non-fulfillment, Sonnenschein and Chambers according to
form, and Gildersleeve
according to determination. In terms of a
majority vote,
classical grammarians usually follow Goodwin and Koine
grammarians generally
follow Gildersleeve (or Robertson who follows
Gildersleeve).
Conditional
Sentences in Koine Greek
It is impossible to separate the advances in Koine grammar
from those of Classical
Greek, for they have moved hand-in-hand. At
times, Koine
grammarians took the work of the Classical scholars and
brought it directly
into New Testament studies, as
Goodwin's
classification of conditional sentences. Robertson is
representative of those
Koine scholars who were conversant with Classical
studies, but saw fit to
reject some of them and sharpen the focus of
others, as he did with
Gildersleeve's work on these sentences.
Nigel Turner has done the historian of grammatical studies
a
great favor by publishing
a chronological bibliography of all major
Greek works, beginning
with the first New Testament grammar published
in 1655 and ending with
the latest edition of Bauer's Worterbuch
in
1958.1
1 Nigel Turner, A Grammar of New Testament Greek. Volume III:
Syntax
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1963), pp. vii-x.
34
This discussion will limit itself to the major Koine
grammarians
appearing on his list,
including those who have published since he
compiled his catalog.
For organizational purposes they will be divided
into "Early"
and "Late" grammarians, with A. T. Robertson being the
dividing point. Just as
the survey of Classical grammarians illustrated
the wide range of
opinion on conditional sentences in the classic
writings, so this
survey will demonstrate that Koine studies are in a
similar state of flux.
Early Grammarians
George Benedict Winer
George Benedict Winer is identified by Dana and Mantey as
the
first grammarian to
operate with the concept that the Greek of the New
Testament is the Greek
of the common people, not a special, Holy Ghost
language.1 In the preface to the Sixth Edition of his
grammar Winer
writes:
The fundamental error--the prw?ton yeu?doj--of the Biblical
philology and exegesis to which we refer,
consisted ultimately in
this, that neither the Hebrew nor the
language of the N.T. was
regarded as a living idiom . . . designed
to be used by men as the
medium of intercourse.2
From this basis he
develops his analysis of the Koine grammar, including
that of conditional
sentences.
1 Dana and Mantey, Grammar, p. 9.
2 Winer, Grammar,
p. v.
35
Statement of His
Position
Winer applies the results of the "enlightened
philology" of his
day to New Testament
Greek and offers this analysis of conditional or
hypothetical sentences:
In HYPOTHETICAL sentences four kinds
of construction occur:
a. Pure condition: If thy friend come, give him my regards
(the case is put as real). Here the
Indicative is used with
ei]. . . .
b. Condition with assumption of objective possibility (where
experience will decide whether or not it
is real): If thy friend
should come (I do not know whether he will come, but the
result
will show). Here e]a<n . . . with the Subjunctive is used.
c. Condition with assumption of subjective possibility, the
condition existing merely in thought: If thy
friend come (the case
being conceivable and credible) I should
be pleased to present my
respects to him. Here ei]
with the Optative is used.
d. Condition believed to be contrary
to the fact: were there a
God, he would govern (but there is
not). Had God existed from
eternity, he would have prevented evil (but he has not
existed).
Here ei] with the
Indicative is used,--the Imperf. in the first case,
the Aor. or (much more rarely) the Plup.
in the second . . .; in the
conclusion likewise one of these two
tenses.1
Summary of His Position
Winer's optimistic statement that "the diction of the
N.T. will
be found entirely in
accordance with the preceding rules" indicates his
confidence in these
four basic divisions.2 Though this has not been
fulfilled to the degree
he predicted, Winer has anticipated the major
system used by Koine
grammarians today. It is apparent that he is
following
Gildersleeve's system, though using slightly different termin-
ology. He makes no
reference to Gildersleeve, but it is possible that he
1 Winer, Grammar, p. 291.
2 Ibid.,
p. 292
36
was familiar with
Gildersleeve's work. Like him, Winer distinguishes
between ei] and the future
indicative verb in the protasis and e]]a<n
with
the subjunctive, though
he acknowledges that "such construction with the
Fut. would approximate
most nearly to that with e]a<n
. . . ."1 He
illustrates the
difference between the two in this way:
. . . but if all shall be offended in thee is a more decided
statement than if all should be offended. In the latter, it is
still altogether uncertain whether they
will be offended; in the
former, this is assumed as a future fact .
. . .2
Winer notes that "the exceptions to these rules in the
N.T.
text are but very few,
and occur for the most part only in particular
Codd."3
He discusses two types of exceptions: the
use of ei] with the
subjunctive and e]a<n with the
indicative. He does not discuss mixed
conditions, concessive particles or elliptical conditions.
Evaluation of His
Position
It is difficult at best to read many last-century
grammarians
with any degree of
comprehension. They wrote "for another eye, another
mind and another
time." He further complicates the issue by trying to
illustrate Greek
concepts from English. The difference between "If thy
friend come" and
"If thy friend should come" hardly conveys the
difference between the
indicative and subjunctive moods. His
explanatory comments
are far more helpful than his examples, which tend
to confuse the points
he tries to make.
1 Winer, Grammar, p. 293.
2 Ibid., p. 294.
37
Winer did, however, establish a significant precedent by
considering the Koine
Greek to be just that, the language of the common
man. By bringing the
concept of simple observation and induction to
bear upon the New
Testament he advanced the understanding of its
structure and pointed
the way for others to follow.
Alexander Buttmann
Alexander Buttmann followed the general rules of Winer in
his
treatment of
conditional sentences. Rather than expanding the rules at
length, Buttmann
concentrated on the deviations found in the New Testa-
ment. By this time it
was fairly evident that Winer's confident asser-
tion that all New
Testament forms were covered by his four rules was
overstated. Buttmann's
work, though, shows that Winer's four classifica-
tions are generally
true and accurately describe the majority of
conditional sentences
in the New Testament.
Statement of His
Position
Buttmann observed that the first two forms of conditional
sentences (ei] with the indicative
and e]a<n with the
subjunctive) are by
far the most frequent
forms in the New Testament.1 He also stressed the
importance of mood as
the determining factor in evaluating the kind of
condition:
The difference between them [the two
types of conditional
sentences] . . . is plainly to be
recognized in sentences where
both are used in close proximity; as Gal.
i. 8,9, where the
1 Buttmann, Grammar,
p. 220.
38
hypothesis expressed in the 8th verse by e]a<n with the Subjunctive
is resumed or repeated in the 9th verse
with greater energy and
definiteness by ei] with the Indicative.
So in Acts v. 38, 39.1
Comparison of His
Position
Buttmann's analysis of the exceptions to Winer's rules
centers
on two areas: the use
of ei] and e][a<n with the indicative
and subjunctive
moods respectively, and
the use of a@n
in conditions contrary to fact.
Particles and moods.--His analysis of the particles
and their
corresponding moods is
one of the first treatments of the topic that
discusses the problem
of variant readings.
Of the first case, the use of ei]
with the Subjunctive, we find, to
be sure, accidentally . . . no example
which is quite certain; for
in some of them the readings vary, some
are set aside by the MSS.
(as Rev. xi. 5 [but cod. Sin. qelh?sh the second time]), some are
capable of a special interpretation.2
He also lists I
Corinthians 9:11 and Luke 9:13 as possible examples of
this exception.
Regarding the use of e]a<n with the indicative he
notes that this
"is given so
frequently, that it is to be eliminated as little from the
writings of the N.T. as
of the Old."3 Buttmann
does concede that most of
these examples may be
questioned upon textual evidence, but argues
that the variants were
introduced when the copyists altered the original
and more difficult
indicative.
1 Buttmann, Grammar, p. 220.
2 Ibid., p. 221.
3 Ibid.,
p. 222.
39
It is, indeed, not to be denied that
the instances in question
almost disappear amid the multitude of
those that are grammatically
regular, and suspicion may also be raised
by the circumstance that
hardly a single passage with the
Indicative is completely beyond
question critically. Yet when we consider
that in countless
passages with the Subjunctive not the
smallest variation is found
(which would not be the case if the
Indicative were chargeable solely
to the copyists), it is far more probable
that, where a diversity of
readings occurs in such a number of
instances, this fact results
from the circumstance that the copyists,
commentators, etc., early
altered the Indicative which gave them
offence.1
Specific examples will
be considered in a later section of this study,
but Buttmann's
consideration of variant readings marks a significant
advance in the detailed
study of conditional sentences.
Conditions contrary to fact.--The second area of
deviation
Buttmann examined was
the use of a@n
in the fourth class of conditions:
conditions contrary to
fact. He noted that the apodosis regularly
included a@n, but recognized that
this was not an absolute principle.
He listed four rules to
explain the disappearance of a@n
from these
apodoses:
a) When a@n has already
been expressed previously in the same
connection with another predicate. This
instance, which often occurs
in the classics and is found in the
nature of the case, is acci-
dentally not to be met with in the text
of the N. T. . . .
b) When the predicate (or the copula)
to which it belongs is
also dropped, as I Cor. xii. 19 . . . .
c) Where the apodosis contains such a
predicative term as e]dei>,
kalo<n h#n, h]du<nato, etc. This
omission . . . is so necessary
according to Greek habits of thought, that
it is only by way of
concession to our usage that we can speak
of supplying a@n.
d) Lastly, a@n
is dropped for rhetorical reasons: where,
though the fact itself is impossible or
improbable, the orator in
the vivacity of his thought desires to
represent it as actually
1 Buttmann, Grammar,
p. 222.
40
having occurred, or at
least as almost taken place.1
Most modern grammarians dispense with these rules, simply
noting that a@n usage is at best
unpredictable. Robertson, for example,
simply states that
"There is no principle involved in a@n,
simply custom."2
Buttmann was willing to
recognize that the particle may be absent from a
condition without
upsetting the force of that sentence, and this is the
emphasis of modern
grammars.
Evaluation of His
Position
Buttmann gets credit for a more thorough study of the
conditional
sentence than that of
Winer. He accepted Winer's four categories, but
noted several major
exceptions to them, especially in the variant
readings. Buttmann and
Winer both placed emphasis upon mood as the
determining factor in
classifying conditional sentences rather than the
particles or tense. It
remained for other grammarians to state this
principle in more
formal terms.
Samuel G. Green
Published around 1887, Samuel G. Green's Handbook of the Greek
Testament
presents an analysis of conditional sentences that follows the
patterns of Winer and
Buttmann.3
1 Buttmann, Grammar, pp. 225-226.
2 Robertson, Grammar. p. 1007.
3 Samuel G. Green, Handbook to the Grammar of the Greek Testament
(
41
Statement of His
Position
Briefly, Green identifies four kinds of conditions or
hypotheses:
a. The
supposition of a fact.
b. “
“ of a possibility.
g. “ “ of uncertainty.
d. “ “ of something unfulfilled.1
These four types of
conditions are indicated by four distinct
forms:
a. The
conditional particle ei], if,
with the Indicative in the
protasis, assumes the hypothesis as a
fact. The apodosis may have
the Indicative or Imperative.
b. Possibility or
uncertainty with the prospect of decision, is
expressed by e]a<n = ei] a@n (very rarely by
ei]
alone [He lists I Cor. 14:5,
Phil. 3:12, and a few various readings,
such as in Rev. 11:5, as
examples.] with the Subjunctive in the
conditional clause, and the
Indicative or Imperative in the apodosis.
g. The Optative
in a conditional sentence expresses entire
uncertainty--a supposed case. Here the
particle ei] is always used.
d.
When the condition is spoken of as unfulfilled, the
Indicative is used in both clauses, with
the particle ei] in the
protasis, and a@n in the apodosis.2
Evaluation of His
Position
As is evident, Green's system of analysis is the same as
those
already discussed: four
types of condition, each identified by a
particular combination
of particles and moods, and each conveying a
different concept.
Winer, Buttmann and Green all seek to analyze
conditional sentences
in terms of form, especially that of mood. They
differ little from the
popular scheme of Robertson.
1 Green, Grammar, p. 317.
2 Ibid.,
pp. 317-319.
42
Ernest DeWitt Burton
Ernest DeWitt Burton was both a scholar and an
administrator,
having served as the
chairman of the Department of New Testament and
Early Christian
Literature and later as the president of the University
of Chicago.1
In his major Greek work, Moods and Tenses of New Testament
Greek,
he adopts Goodwin's analysis of conditional sentences and applies
it to the New
Testament.2
Statement of His
Position
His specific position, following Goodwin, is:
A. Simple Present or Past Particular
Supposition. The protasis
simply states a supposition which refers
to a particular case in
the present or past, implying nothing as
to its fulfillment. The
protasis is expressed by ei]
with a present or past tense of the
Indicative; any form of the finite verb
may stand in the apodosis.
John 15:20; ei]
e]me> e]di<wcan, kai> u[ma?j diw<cousin, if they have persecuted
me, they,will also persecute you.
Gal. 5:18; ei]
de> pneu<mati a@gesqe, ou]k e]ste> u[po> no<mon, but if ye are
led by the Spirit, ye are not under
the law.
See also Matt. 4:3;
Luke 16:11; Acts 5:39;
B. Supposition Contrary to Fact. The
protasis states a supposi-
tion which refers to the present or past,
implying that it is not or
was
not fulfilled.
The protasis is expressed by ei]
with a past tense of the
Indicative; the apodosis by a past tense
of the Indicative with an.
John 11:21; Ku<rie,
ei] h#j w$de ou]k a@n a]pe<qanen o[ a]delfo<j mou, Lord, if
thou
hadst been here, my brother would not have died.
Gal. 1:10;
ei] e@ti a]nqrw<poij h@reskon,
Xristou? dou?loj ou]k a@n h@mhn, if I
were still pleasing men, I should not
be a servant of Christ.
See also John 14:28; Acts 18:14; Heb. 4:8; 11:15.
1 Charles Thwing, "
Dictionary of
American Biography,
ed. by Allen Johnson and Dumas Malone
(New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), pp. 341-342.
2 Ernest DeWitt
Greek
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1897), p. 101.
43
C. Future Supposition with More
Probability. The protasis
states a supposition which refers to the
future, suggesting some
probability of its fulfillment.
The protasis is usually expressed by e]a<n (or a@n) with the
Subjunctive; the apodosis by the Future
Indicative or by some other
form referring to future time.
Matt. 9:21; e]a<n mo<non a!ywmai tou? i[mati<ou a]tou?
swqh<somai,
if I shall
but touch his garments, I shall be
made whole.
John 12:26; e]a<n tij e]moi> diakonh? timh<sei au]to>n o[
path<r,
if any man
serve me, him will the Father honor.
John 14:15; e[a<n
a]gapa?te< me, ta>j e]ntola>j
ta>j e]ma>j thrh<sete, if ye
love me, ye will keep my commandments. See also Matt.
5:20;
I Cor. 4:19; Gal. 5:2; Jas. 2:15,16.
D. Future Supposition with Less
Probability. The protasis
states a supposition which refers to the
future, suggesting less
probability of its fulfillment than is suggested
by e]a<n with the
Subjunctive. There is no perfect example
of this form in the New
Testament.
The protasis is expressed by ei]
with the Optative; the apodosis by
the Optative with a@n.
I
Pet. 3:17; krei?tton ga>r a]gaqopoiou?ntaj, ei]
qe<loi to> qe<lhma tou?
qeou?,
pa<sxein h@ kakopoiou?ntaj, for it is
better, if the will of
God should so will, that ye suffer for
well doing than for evil
doing.
See also I Cor. 14:10; 15:37; I Pet. 3:14.
E. Present General Supposition. The
supposition refers to any
occurrence of an act of a certain class in
the (general) present,
and the apodosis states what is wont to
take place in any instance
of an act of the class referred to in the
protasis.
The protasis is expressed by e]a<n with the Subjunctive, the
apodosis by the Present Indicative.
John 11:9; ea]<n
tij peripath? e]n t^? h[me<r%, ou] prosko<ptei, if a man
walk in the day, he stumbleth not.
2 Tim. 2:5; e]a<n de> kai< a]qlh? tij, ou]
stefanou?tai e]a<n mh> nomi<mwj
a]qlh<sh, and if also a man contend in the games, he
is not
crowned, unless he contend lawfully. See also Mark
3:24; John
7:51; 12:24; I Cor. 7:39, 40.
F. Past General Supposition. The
supposition refers to any
past occurrence of an act of a certain
class, and the apodosis
states what was wont to take place in any
instance of an act of the
class referred to in the protasis.
The protasis is expressed by ei]
with the Optative, the apodosis
by the Imperfect Indicative.
44
There is apparently no instance of
this form in the New Testa-
ment.1
In addition to these general classifications,
interesting
observations regarding the specific classes. He notes that
in the first type
. . . the Future Indicative may stand in
the protasis of a conditional
sentence of the first class when reference
is had to a present
necessity or intention, or when the writer
desires to state not what
will take place on the fulfillment of a
future possibility, but merely
to affirm a necessary logical consequence
of a future event.2
This differs from
Goodwin's position that the future indicative and the
subjunctive may have
the same significance in conditional sentences.
The third class of conditional sentences may also have
these
constructions in the
protasis: (a) ei]
with the Subjunctive, (b) ei]
or
e]a<n
with the Future Indicative, and (c) ei]
with the Present Indicative.3
Conditions of this last
form are apparently first class conditions, but
"are distinguished
by evident reference of the protasis to the future."4
Concerning the fifth class, the Present General
Supposition, he
notes that some
conditions using ei]
with the indicative "apparently
express a present
general supposition," which does not fit his rule that
such conditions use e]a<n with the
subjunctive.5 He explains
that it is
1 Burton, Syntax,
pp. 102-106.
2
Ibid., p. 103.
3 Ibid., pp. 104-105.
4 Ibid., p. 105.
5 Ibid.,
p. 107.
45
difficult to
distinguish between this form of a present general condition
and that of a simple
condition:
Yet in most New Testament passages of
this kind, it is possible that
a particular imagined instance in the
present or future is before the
mind
as an illustration of the general class of cases . . . . It is
scarcely possible to decide in each case
whether the supposition was
conceived of as general or particular
Luke 14:26; ei@ tij e@rxetai pro<j me kai> ou] misei? . . . th>n
yuxh>n
e[autou?,
ou] du<natai ei#nai< mou maqhth<j, if
any man cometh unto
me,
and hateth not . . . his own life, he cannot be my disciple.
Cf. John 1:51; 12:26; where in
protases of apparently similar
force e]a<n with the
Subjunctive occurs, and the apodosis refers to
the future.
Rom. 8:25; ei] de> o! ou] ble<pomen e]lpi<zomen,
di ] u[pomonh?j a]pekdexo<meqa,
but if we hope for that which we see not,
then do we with
patience wait for it.
See also Jas. 1:26.1
According to form, such
conditions are simple conditions, but according
to interpretation, they
may be considered a variety of present general
conditions. The
distinction, it must be stressed, is one of interpreta-
tion, not form.
Classification should be on an objective basis, such
as form, not upon a
subjective one, such as interpretation.
Summary of His Position
In addition to these details,
peculiarities of
conditional sentences. He lists nine of these, including
(1) mixed forms, (2)
multiple protases, each with its unique emphasis,
(3) the use of a
participle, an imperative or other form of expression
"suggesting a
supposition" to supply the protasis, and (4) the observation
that sometimes either
the protasis or the apodosis may be omitted.2
1 Burton, Syntax,
pp. 107-108.
2 Ibid., pp. 109-112.
46
One final comment:
of "reality"
or "unreality" in these conditions as that of the speaker or
his hearers, not in the
external situation:
It should be observed that the titles
of the several classes
of conditional sentences describe the
supposition not from the
point of view of fact, but from that of
the representation of the
case to the speaker's own mind or to that
of his hearers.1
Conditional sentences
do speak of many things that are objectively true,
but the demonstration
of their factuality lies in the external world,
not in the internal
world of the conditional statement.
James Hope Moulton
The Prolegomena
to James Hope Moulton's A Grammar of the
New
Testament
was the first major grammar to utilize the newly discovered
evidence from the
papyri.2 This work was
followed by his Introduction to
the
Study of New Testament Greek, a formal grammar.3
Moulton had
originally conceived of
his major work, A Grammar of the New
Testament,
in terms of three
volumes. He published Volume I:
Prolegomena in 1906,
and it quickly went
through three editions in two years. He produced
the rough draft for
parts I and II of the second volume, but was not
permitted to finish it.
While at sea he died "in the
1
2 James Hope Moulton, A Grammar of New Testament Greek. Volume I:
Prolegomena, third edition
(Edinburgh: T. S T. Clark, 1908), p. 4.
3 James Hope Moulton, An Introduction to the Study of New Testa-
ment
Greek (
47
in April, 1917, a
victim of the ruthless submarine campaign."1 Nigel Turner
continues the
interesting story:
His pupil, Dr. W. F. Howard, saw that
volume through the press in
parts, from 1919 to 1929, but before he
had opportunity to lay many
plans for Volume III he himself died in
1952; and then, on condition
that he had the assistance of someone who
would collect the necessary
material, Dr. H. G. Meecham assumed
responsibility for the syntax.
It was on Dr. G. D. Kilpatrick's
suggestion that I was permitted to
help at this point, and we had done no
more than compile a provisional
bibliography when Dr. Meecham died in
1955. By the kind invitation of
the publishers I then worked alone and
broke the spell by living to
complete Volume III.2
Since he was anticipating two more volumes, Dr. Moulton did
little
more than mention a few
aspects of conditional sentences in the Prolegomena.
Fortunately, his Introduction to the Study of New Testament
Greek gives
a relatively complete
presentation of his views on the classification of
these clauses.
Statement of His
Position
First, the general comments from his Prolegomena will be
presented. To begin
with, he notes that the distinction between ei]
and e]a<n
. . . has been considerably lessened in
Hellenistic as compared with
earlier Greek. We have seen that e]a<n can take the indicative; while
(as rarely in classical Greek) ei] can be found with the
subjunctive.3
Regarding
the constructional distinctions of conditional sentences,
Moulton makes the
following observations:
1 James Hope Moulton and W.
F. Howard, A Grammar of New Testament
Greek. Volume
II: Accidence and Word Formation (
1929),
p. v.
2 Nigel Turner, A Grammar of New Testament Greek. Volume
III:
Syntax
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1963), p. v.
3 Moulton, Prolegomena,
p. 187.
48
The differentation of construction remains
at present stereotyped:
ei] goes with
indicative, is used exclusively when past tenses come
in (e.g. Mk 326), and uses ou]
as its negative; while e]a<n, retaining
mh< exclusively,
takes the subjunctive almost invariably, unless the
practically synonymous future indicative
is used. Ea@n and ei] are both
used, however, to express future
conditions . . . The immense
majority of conditional sentences in the NT
belong to these heads.1
Moulton opts for Blass's principle as opposed to Goodwin's
to
explain the use of the
optative mood in these sentences:
Meanwhile we may observe that Blass's
dictum (p. 213) that
ei] c. opt. form is
used "if I wish to represent anything as generally
possible, without regard to the general
or actual situation at the
moment," suits the NT exx. well; and
it seems to fit the general
facts better than Goodwin's doctrine of a
"less vivid future"
condition (Goodwin, Greek Grammar, 301).2
He specifically
identifies Acts 8:31 as an example of a conditional
sentence employing a@n with the optative to
which Goodwin's "less vivid"
form does not apply.
3
However, he does follow Goodwin's general system for the
overall
classification of
conditional sentences. Three general classes are
recognized:
Simple Conditions in present or past
time.
Protasis,
ei] with
indicative; Apodosis, generally
indicative, always
without a]n.
These sentences merely
join together a condition and a result without
any indication as to
the probability or improbability of the condition.
1 Moulton, Prolegomena, p. 187.
2 Ibid., p. 196, note.
3 Ibid., pp. 198-199.
4 Ibid.,
p. 199.
49
Unfulfilled Conditions in present and
past time.
Protasis,
ei]
with indicative, imperfect for present time, aorist for
past.
Apodosis,
indicative with a@n,
imperfect for present time, aorist for
past.
Future Conditions.
Protasis,
e]a<n with subjunctive (rarely indicative, or ei]
with subjunc-
tive).
Apodosis,
future indicative, sometimes the imperative.1
He classifies the optative condition, Robertson's Fourth
Class
Condition, as a special
form of the Future Condition, noting that its
full expression has
vanished in the Koine and only parts of such conditions
appear in the New
Testament.
Modern
Grammarians
Archibald Thomas
Robertson
Of all modern Koine grammarians, none has exerted the
influence or
achieved the status of
Archibald Thomas Robertson. As professor of New
Testament at the
Southern Baptist Theological Seminary from 1890 to
1934 he helped form
modern opinion about Koine Greek. With few exceptions
contemporary
grammarians have adopted his terminology and viewpoint,
especially on
conditional sentences. Thus his position requires detailed
study in order to fully
comprehend the current majority view of
conditional sentences
in the New Testament.
Statement of His
Position
His system of analysis basically follows that of
Gildersleeve
in Classical Greek by
identifying four types of conditions, each
1 Moulton, Introduction
to New Testament Greek, pp. 210-213.
50
determined by the mood
of the protasis.
His summary.--Robertson first summarizes the
importance of mood
in conditions:
The indicative mode in the condition
always makes a clear-cut
assertion one way or the
other [fulfilled or unfulfilled]. If the
subjunctive or the optative is used in the
condition (protasis) a
doubtful statement is made
whatever may be the actual fact or truth
in
the case. By these modes of doubtful statement the condition
puts it as doubtful or undetermined (not put in a clear--cut way).
If the subjunctive is used, there is less
doubt than if the optative
is used, precisely the difference between
these two modes of doubtful
statement.1
This distinction in mood (indicative = fulfilled or
unfulfilled,
subjunctive = doubt,
optative = more doubt) leads to the natural
conclusion that there
are four types of conditional sentences:
(a) First Class: Determined as Fulfilled
(ei],
sometimes e]a<n,
with any tense of the indicative in
condition. Any tense of the
indicative in the conclusion).
(b) Second Class: Determined as Unfulfilled
(ei]
and only past
tenses of the indicative in condition.
Only past tenses in the
conclusion, usually with a@n
to make clear the kind of condition
used).
(c) Third Class: Undetermined with Prospect
of Determination
(e]a<n or ei]
with the subjunctive in the condition, usually future
or present indicative or imperative in
the conclusion, much variety
in the form of the conclusion).
(d) Fourth Class: Undetermined with
Remote Prospect
Determination (ei] with
the optative in the condition, a@n and the
optative in the conclusion).2
1 A. T. Robertson and W.
Hersey Davis, A New Short Grammar of
the Greek
Testament
(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1933), p. 349.
2 Ibid.,
pp. 349-350.
51
His Defence.--In defending this analysis, Robertson
speaks
against the popular
forms of classification, especially that of Goodwin.
First he rejects the
concept of particular and general as a basic
principle of
classification. Actually the concept of time was the key
principle of Goodwin,
but the particular-general division was important.
In any event, Robertson
points to the work of Gildersleeve and says of
Goodwin's distinction:
"This is a false step in itself."1 He accepts
Gildersleeve's position
that any condition may be particular or general,
depending upon the type
of verb used in the protasis.
Robertson then raises his next and most serious objection
to
Goodwin and those
following him: they refuse to recognize the basic
significance of the
mood in conditions. Goodwin's first class of
conditions utilizes the
indicative mood and, he says, "simply states a
present or past
particular supposition, implying nothing as to the
fulfillment of the condition
. . . .2 Robertson strongly
objects to
this interpretation,
claiming that "This condition pointedly
implies the
fulfillment of the
condition."3 Robertson
hinges his argument on the
basic significance of
the indicative mood which, he claims, has its usual
meaning in conditions
as well as normal clauses. This is, as he says,
"the crux of the
whole matter."4 Goodwin's classification seems to
1 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1005.
2 Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, p. 145.
3 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1006.
4 Ibid.,
p. 1006.
51
place emphasis on
things other than mood, relegating it to a position
of lesser importance.
For Robertson, mood is all-important. He
pursues his analysis on
this assumption.
One specific detail of his system needs further comment:
the
first class condition
labeled as "Determined as Fulfilled."
Robertson
quotes Gildersleeve as
identifying this condition as "the favorite
condition," though
he is talking about classical poets, especially
Pindar.1 The question already raised by Robertson
relates to the
degree of determination
implied by the condition. Is the speaker
presenting the
condition as something that is objectively true
(ei@ tij qe<lei o]pi<sw mou
e@rxesqai, a]rnhsa<sqw e[auto<n - Since someone
does wish to come after
me, let him deny himself. Luke 9:23)? Or
is the
speaker assuming the
truth of the condition without committing himself
to a position one way
or the other, such as might be done "for the
sake of the
argument" (ei]
de> a]na<stasij nekrw?n ou]k e@stin, ou]de> Xristo>j
e]gh>gertai
-
But if there is no resurrection of the dead, then Christ
is not raised. I Cor.
15:13)? This point will receive a more detailed
treatment later, but it
is important to note that some commentators
have understood
Robertson to say that the first class condition actually
affirms the objective
reality of the condition. Perhaps his statements
could have been more
precise, but common sense will suffice to show
that this cannot be the
case in all situations. If it were, then
Christ would have been
operating in the power of the Devil (Matt. 12:27)
1 Robertson, Grammar,
p. 1007.
53
and would not be
resurrected (I Cor. 15:13). Yet writers continue to
to read objective
reality into the first class condition. An extreme
example is the
statement of Jerome Moore:
The first class condition implies
truth or reality. If . . .
and it is true. Colossians 1:23 . . . is
an example of this. The
idea there is, "If ye continue in
the faith grounded and settled,
and
ye shall!" There is no doubt
implied here. This is a condition
of reality. No need to doubt the security
of your salvation or any-
one else's, for if here in the Greek does not imply doubt.1
Were the situation not so serious, it would be funny. No
one can guarantee the
salvation of anyone else. Certainly Paul
challenged the
Corinthians to test and examine themselves (2 Cor. 13:5).
Obviously some contexts
permit the English "since" with its implication
of objective reality,
but many, indeed, a majority, do not. To make
such claims is to
ignore common sense, the teaching of Robertson and
the clear statements of
Scripture.
In his doctoral dissertation John Battle describes
Robertson
as "difficult to
read."2 Perhaps the
wordiness of his Historical
Grammar
led to some contradictory statements in the minds of some, but
in the first edition of
his Shorter Grammar, he clearly
states:
This condition does assume the reality of the condition. Take
Matt. 12:27. Christ did not cast out
demons by Beelzebub, but
in argument he assumes it. The indicative
mode determines the
condition as fulfilled, so far as the
statement is concerned.3
1 Jerome Moore, "
45:1
(June, 1979), p. 11.
2 John A.
Exegesis,"
unpublished Th.D. dissertation, Grace Theological Seminary,
1975,
D. 170.
3 A. T. Robertson, A Short Grammar of the Greek New Testament
(New York: A. C.
Armstrong & Son, 1908), p. 151.
54
At times this
assumption is parallel with the objective reality of
the statement, as in I
Thessalonians 4:14 – ei]
ga>r pisteu<omen o!ti
]Ihsouj
a]pe<qanen kai> a]ne<sth . . . ; for if we
believe that Jesus died and
rose again. In other
contexts the assumption is counter to the
objective reality, as
in Matthew 12:27 – kai>
ei] e]gw> e]n Beezebou>l
e]kba<llw
ta> daimo<nia . . . ; and if I by the power of
Beelzebub cast out
the demons. In still
other situations (probably the majority of those
in the New Testament)
the assumption is neither parallel nor counter
to objective reality,
for the reality cannot be determined from the
information at hand.
This is the situation in Colossians 1:23 – ei@
ge
e]pime<nete
t^? pi<stei . . .; if you continue in the faith. The best
English word to use in
all three situations is "if," and all major
English translations of
the New Testament uniformly translate the
first class condition
this way.
Evaluation of His
Position
A. T. Robertson's analysis of conditional sentences has
blazed
a trail that many have
followed in New Testament studies. His
terminology has become
almost universal, and his rejection of Goodwin's
system has been
accepted by almost all who have followed him. Unfortun-
ately, some have taken
Robertson too simply and have read verification
(or non-verification)
of external or objective reality into his First
and Second Class
conditions. One could wish that he had been more
precise in his
statements, but such difficulties are no excuse for
the misuse of his
concepts one finds in the literature.
55
William Douglas
Chamberlain
As a professor at Louisville Presbyterian Seminary, William
Douglas Chamberlain
first published his Greek grammar in 1941: His
analysis is a concise summary
of Robertson's work. Only a few remarks
need be made to
indicate additional information he provides.
Statement of His
Position
Accepting Robertson's terminology, he affirms that in first
class
conditions "The
protasis has to do with the way the statement is made, and
not with the truth or
falsity of it."1 Untrue
conditions may be assumed
to be true for the sake
of the argument. Matthew 12:27 is presented as
an example of this
situation.
In second class conditions he, like Robertson, identifies
the
tenses used as past
tenses: imperfect, aorist or pluperfect. It is
possible to have
different tenses in the protasis and the apodosis, as
in John 14:28. While
"the viewpoint is changed between the protasis and
the apodosis," the
entire sentence is still a second class condition:
"These are not
'mixed conditions."'2
He identifies the third class conditions as those which are
"stated as a
matter of doubt, with some prospect of fulfillment."3
The fourth class is
"even more doubtful than the third class."4 While
1 William
New Testament (New York: The
MacMillan Company, 1952), p. 195.
2 Ibid., p. 197.
3 Ibid.,
p. 198.
4 Ibid.,
p. 199.
56
he finds no complete
example of this condition in the New Testament, he
does identify fragments
in I Peter 3:14, I Corinthians 15:37, Acts 17:27,
and Acts 27:39.1
Chamberlain discusses two other aspects of conditional
sentences which are
also mentioned in Robertson, though not in so
succinct a manner:
Mixed Conditions and Elliptical Conditions. The
first involves a change
in class of condition between the protasis and
the apodosis, for the
"writer changes his viewpoint between the protasis
and the apodosis."2
Luke 17:6 is listed as an example.
The second topic, elliptical conditions, involves
conditional
sentences in which the
apodosis is expressed and the protasis is simply
implied. He lists four
ways this is accomplished:
1. By the participle: Rom. 2:27.
2. By a verb in the imperative mode: Mark 1:17.
3. The protasis may be abbreviated to the vanishing point
as with
ei]
mh>
in the case of 'except': Mt. 11:27.
4. The apodosis may be omitted: Luke 19:42.3
Chamberlain also notes
that the Hebraistic use of ei]
in oaths
(Mark 8:12), and its
use to introduce direct questions (Acts 1:6) are
not conditional
sentences.4
Evaluation of His
Position
Chamberlain's little grammar provides a very readable
synthesis
of Robertson's position
without going into the fine details of historical
1 Chamberlain, Grammar, p. 199.
2 Ibid., p. 199.
3 Ibid., p. 199
4 Ibid., p. 200.
57
analysis. Mood is the
key factor in determining the type of conditional
sentence, and the
indicative mood identifies sentences which present
the condition as true.
Charles Francis Digby
Moule
The English scholar C. F. D. Moule, publishing in 1953,
follows neither
Robertson nor Goodwin in his analysis of conditional
sentences. He presents
a unique system of both construction and
application, setting
aside many of the chief dicta of other grammarians.
Statement of His
Position
He summarizes the various conditions under three headings:
1. Past or present conditions, possible or actual.
2. Recurrent or future conditions, whether real or hypothetical.
3. Past or present conditions, only hypothetical.1
In outline form his
system looks like this:
1. Past or present conditions,
possible or actual.
Protasis: ei] with the
indicative in the appropriate tense.
Apodosis: another indicative
or its equivalent [an imperative,
as in Col. 4:10, or conceivably a participle] in the appro-
priate tense.
2. Recurrent or future conditions,
whether real or hypothetical.
Protasis: ei] (or
o!te)
with a@n (making e]a<n,
o[ta<n)
with the
subjunctive in the appropriate tense.
Apodosis: Indicative or its
equivalent [imperative or
participle] in
the appropriate tense.
3. Past or present conditions, only hypothetical.
1 C[harles] F[rancis]
D[igby] Moule, An Idiom Book of New Testa-
ment
Greek (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953), p.
148.
58
Protasis:
ei]
with a past tense of the indicative.
Apodosis:
a past (but not necessarily the same) tense of the
indicative, usually with a@n.1
He sums up his concept of conditional sentences by stating:
Thus the form of a conditional
sentence is largely determined
by two main factors—time (past, present,
future) or Aktionsart
(instantaneous, protracted, recurrent,
etc.) and the degree of
reality (impossible, improbable, possible,
probable, actual).2
Specific factors which
help determine the mood of conditional sentences
include:
(a) Any past condition introduced by if
must, in the nature of the
case, be hypothetical, if not definitely
unreal: otherwise there
would be nothing conditional about the sentence. Therefore there
appears to be no need to vary the mood,
and it is regularly
Indicative.
(b) But present, future, or recurrent conditions may vary widely
in their degree of actuality: hence
(perhaps) the variation in
moods. In general, the Indic. represents
certainty, while the
Subj. represents something more
hypothetical or uncertain.3
Moule thus recognizes
the basic significance of these moods, but he
employs them in a
unique system of analysis.
Evaluation of His
Position
Two observations may be made about this analysis. First,
Moule maintains that
the apodosis is always in the indicative mood
regardless of the mood
of the protasis. The specific examples will
be discussed in the
next chapter, but this is an over-simplification, as
Galatians 5:25
demonstrates. Second and more important, this approach
1 Moule, Idiom Book, pp. 148-149.
2 Ibid., p. 150.
3 Ibid.,
p. 149.
59
seems to produce
sentences that are one class by form and another by
meaning. Moule thinks
that this is a problem:
The difficulty of classifying is
illustrated by sentences which
belong by meaning in one class, but by form
in another; e.g.:
(1) in form, (2) in meaning: II Tim.
ii:12 ei] u[pome<nomen, kai>
sunbasileu<somen; II John 10 ei@ tij
e@rxetai pro>j u[ma?j kai> tau<thn
th>n didaxh>n ou] fe<rei, mh> lamba<nete au]to>n. Both these
might well
have had ean with Subj. in the
protasis. (1), in meaning, (2) in
form: I Cor. ix. 16 e]a>n ga>r eu]aggeli<zwmai, ou]k e@stin moi
kau<xhma . . . .1
But is this really a problem? The two examples listed as
being class 1 (possible
or actual) by form and class 2 (recurrent or
future conditons) by
meaning, 2 Tim. 2:12 and 2 John 10, are straight-
forward first class
conditions in both form and meaning. It is futile
to suggest what
"might well" have been written, for the text has been
set down as God wanted
it given. One might feel that an exegetical
problem could be solved
by treating 2 Tim. 2:12 as a hypothetical
condition, but such is
not the case. It is a first class and needs
to be interpreted as
such. So with 1 Cor. 9:16; it is
presented as
a hypothetical condition,
even though facts outside the condition
establish that it is an
actual situation. There is no need to rewrite
the statement.
It seems reasonable to ask, If one's analysis produces such
apparent contradictions
as Moule felt his did, should the analysis be
pursued? It
seems-unlikely that such diverse situations would arise in
the normal development
of a language. Significant also is the fact that
no other grammarian has
followed Moule in this approach. All seem to
1 Moule,
Idiom Book, p. 149.
60
have recognized the
weakness in his system.
Friedrich Blass -
Albert Debrunner
In 1911 Friedrich Blass published his Grammar of New Testament
Greek.
It passed through several editions and translations and was
continued after his
death by Albert Debrunner, a professor of Indo-
European and classical
Philology at the
W. Funk of the
revision of this work
as a companion grammar to Arnt and Gingrich's
Lexicon.
Funk's revision is the one under consideration.
Statement of His
Position
Blass-Debrunner recognizes five forms of conditional
sentences
in Classical Greek,
four of which are present in the New Testament:
(1) Ei] with the
indicative of all tenses denotes a simple
conditional assumption with emphasis on
the reality of the assump-
tion (not of what is being assumed): the
condition is considered
'a real case.'
(2) Ei] with the
optative presents something as thought of,
without regard for reality or unreality,
and emphasizes the
hypothetical character of the assumption:
'a potential case.'
(3) Ei] with an
augmented tense of the indicative marks the
assumption as contrary to fact: 'an
unreal case.'
(4)
]Ea<n with the subjunctive
denotes that which under certain
circumstances is expected from an existing
general or concrete
standpoint in the present: 'case of
expectation.'
(5) Ei] with the
optative also specifies repetition in past
time.1
Of these five forms, (2) has almost disappeared from the
New Testament
and (5) has completely
disappeared. Blass-Debrunner thus comes close
to Robertson's (and
Gildersleeve's) four conditions. Indeed, Funk
1 Blass-Debrunner, Grammar, p. 188.
61
speaks of Robertson's
organization as "especially lucid."1 Unfortunately,
neither
Blass-Debrunner's nor Funk's comments have the same quality, so
some explanatory
comments are necessary.
The first group, the "real case," speaks of
. . . a present reality = 'if . . .
really' (as you say, as is
believed, as you see, etc.) or = 'if
therefore' (resulting from
what has been said), often closely
bordering on causal
'since' . . . .2
Were one to change the
adverb "often" to "infrequently," he would be
closer to the truth of
the New Testament. He comes closer in his
first statement that
this condition places emphasis on "the reality of
the assumption (not of
what is being assumed)." This distinction between
the statement of a
situation and the actual situation itself must be
maintained. In Matthew
12:27, for example, Jesus speaks of His
exorcism in a way that
is directly counter to the reality of the situa-
tion. This fits
Blass-Debrunner's statement.
The third group, ei]
with an augmented indicative verb,
indicates a condition
that is contrary to fact. Unlike Classical Greek,
the "addition of a@n to the apodosis is no
longer obligatory."3 These
conditions are
"remarkably scarce in Paul."4
1 Blass-Debrunner, Grammar, p. 189.
2 Ibid., p. 189.
3 Ibid., p. 182.
4 Ibid.,
p. 182.
62
The fourth group, e]a<n
with the subjunctive, refers to future
situations. These
situations may be of a general or specific nature
("general or
concrete standpoint"), corresponding to the often-mentioned
present general
condition. The use of e]a<n
with the subjunctive to
refer to future time is
normal. "There is," he notes, "no certain
example of e]a<n with the future
indicative in the NT."1 This
is not
unexpected, for there
has always been a close affinity between the
future indicative and
the subjunctive. Indeed, the origin of the future
indicative may well
have been a mixture of "the Indo-European future,
which denoted future
time, and the subjunctive of the sigmatic aorist."2
This close relationship
has been noted before.
Evaluation of His
Position
Blass-Debrunner agrees with Robertson in his stress upon
the
limitation of the
reality of the first class condition to the statement,
not the situation.
Although Funk respects Robertson's analysis, he
retains the original
terminology of Blass's work. While there may
not be general
agreement between this grammar and that of Robertson on
titles, there is on the
forms and their significance.
Nigel Turner
Nigel Turner's role in finishing the grammar started by
Moulton
has already been set
forth. His volume on syntax represents conditional
1 Blass-Debrunner, Grammar, p. 190.
2 Ibid.,
p. 166.
63
sentences under their
respective parts: moods, tenses, etc. Only
towards the end does he
summarize his conclusions.
Statement of His
Position
In outline form his analysis is:
(i) ei]
with indic., representing the simple assumption . . .
(ii) ei]
with opt., representing the "potential" conception . . . .
(iii) ei]
with aor. or impf. indic., representing an assumption as
not corresponding with
reality . . . .
(iv) e]a<n with subj., indicating an expected result based on
the
present general or particular circumstance . . .
.1
Turner presents a
system of analysis that combines features of Moulton
along with some of
Goodwin. It is instructive to see what new insights
this gives for each of
these conditions.
Details of His Position
Turner does not give a detailed discussion of the first
type
of condition except to
note that ei]
with the future indicative,
unlike e]a<n with the
present subjunctive, calls attention to "The
feeling of definiteness
and actual realization [that] accompanies it.
It is almost
causal."2 He recognizes
the problem posed by 2 Timothy
2:12, but offers no
suggested answer: "The difficulty about this view
is 2 Ti 212 ei] a]parnhso<meqa,
where the condition was surely conceived
as no more than
hypothetical."3
1 Turner, Syntax, p. 319.
2 Ibid., p. 115.
3 Ibid.,
p. 115.
64
Turner notes that in the third group of conditional
sentences,
the "unreal"
conditions, the past tenses are used and retain their
proper Aktionsart. Thus the imperfect stands
for "what should be now"
and the aorist for
"what should have been."1
In both cases, reality is
not found in what the
speaker wants it to be or to have been.
His discussion of the fourth group of conditions (protasis
=
e]a<n
with the subjunctive) includes the concept of particular and
general as defined by
the Aktionsart (as he understands it)
of the
verbs employed:
(1) Present: very common in Koine. In a general and iterative
sense, as "condicio universalis"
. . . , the pres. subj. denotes a
hypothesis which can occur over and over
again (present Aktionsart).
The most common example of this condition
in the Ptol. Pap. is
stereotyped phrases in decrees and
punishments, having a continual
validity.
(2)
Aorist: This represents a definite event as occurring
only once in the future, and conceived as
taking place before the
time of the action of the main verb. It
is expectation, but not
fulfillment as yet.2
Here he evidences the
common, though erroneous, view of the significance
of the aorist tense.
Further, he does not make the concept of particular
and general a basis of
classification, only of interpretation.
Not all conditional sentences fit neatly into this
four-group
package, and Turner
speaks of "a liberal mixing in the various categories
of conditional
sentences."3 The specifics remain to be explored, but
1 Turner, Syntax, p. 91.
2 Ibid., p. 114.
3 Ibid.,
p. 319.
65
it would seem, as with
Moule, that any system that produces such
results needs to be
reexamined.
H. E. Dana and Julius
R. Mantey
The appearance of Dana and Mantey's Manual Grammar probably
accounted for the
disappearance of Robertson's Shorter
Grammar of the
Greek
New Testament as a standard intermediate text.1
In their book
these authors summarize
Robertson's analysis and add some interesting
terminology and
explanations of their own.
Statement of Their
Position
The basis upon which they classify conditional sentences is
"the attitude that
they express with reference to reality."2 This is
expressed through the
mood of the protasis. The indicative points to
a condition from the
viewpoint of reality. The subjunctive and
optative moods point to
a condition from the viewpoint of probability.3
Those conditions which
use the indicative mood are divided into
two sub-classes. The
first, termed the "simple condition," presents
"one fact as
conditioning another." In this form "nothing is implied
as to whether or not
this fact actually exists."4 The second sub-class
1 Now available as a
reprint: A. T. Robertson and W. Hersey Davis,
A New Short
Grammar of the Greek Testament, 10th edition (
Baker
Book House, 1977).
2 Dana and Mantey, Grammar, p. 287.
3 Ibid., p. 287.
4 Ibid.,
p. 287.
66
implies that "this
fact has not been realized, and therefore does not
exist. This we call the
contrary to fact condition."1
These two types,
then,
. . . assume that the premise is either
true or untrue. The speaker
takes for granted that which he assumes is
true, as in the simple
condition; or that it is known not to be
true, as is the case in the
contrary to fact condition. The
indicative, being the mood for
reality, is regularly used in this type of
sentence.2
Using Matthew 12:27 as
a test case, it is clear that their first state-
ment (The condition
implies nothing about the actual facts of the case.)
is more accurate than
the second one. Jesus did take His assumed link
with Beelzebub for
granted, but only for the sake of the argument.
Conditions utilizing the subjunctive mood are termed the
"more
probable future
conditions," and those with the optative are the "less
probable future
conditions."3 All of these conditions utilize the
particle a@n whether by itself or
in combination with ei]
(ei] + a@n =
e]a<n).4
Evaluation of Their Position
Their observations on the construction of the four types of
conditional sentences
are identical to Robertson's. They identify three
types of irregular
forms of conditional sentences: (1) mixed conditions,
1 Dana and Mantey, Grammar, p. 287.
2 Ibid., p. 288.
3 Ibid., p. 287.
4 Ibid.,
p. 288.
67
(2) implied conditions
"in which the apodosis is expressed and the protasis
implied in a participle
(I Tim. 4:4), imperative (Mk. 1:17), or question
(Mt. 26:15)," and
elliptical conditions.1
Although their terminology is somewhat different than that
of
Robertson, the
closeness of their position to his places them under
the same evaluation.
Robert W. Funk
As Professor of Religious Studies at the
Robert W. Funk has not
only translated and enlarged the standard
grammar of
Blass-Debrunner, but has produced one of his own. His
discussion of
conditional sentences reflects the basic system of
Robertson, but with
significant comparisons to Classical grammars,
especially the work of
Smyth.
Statement of His
Position
The first class condition presents "a simple
conditional
assumption with
emphasis on the reality of the assumption (but not on
the reality of what is
being assumed)."2 This is the same statement he
used in his revision of
Blass-Debrunner, and the same clarification is
necessary. By
"assumption" he means the statement of the situation,
and by "what is
being assumed" he means the situation itself. The use
of the future tense in
both the protasis and apodosis is the equivalent
1 Dana and Mantey, Grammar, p. 291.
2 Funk, Grammar,
II, p. 680.
68
of Smyth's "future
most vivid" condition, but Funk recognizes it as a
special form of the
first class condition.1
His analysis of the second class is the same as Robertson.
The
third class of
conditions utilizes the subjunctive mood in the protasis
and is called "a
probable case."2 The use
of the present tense in the
apodosis "often
gives the condition a generalizing force (indicated
by event in the
translation)."3 This is
what Smyth termed the "future
more vivid"
condition.
Evaluation of His
Position
Funk demonstrates the advantages of classification by
reality
as expressed in the
mood of the protasis. He is able to present a
simple, easily
comprehended, system and account for the many subspecies
recognized by other
grammarians. His improvement upon Robertson's
system is more in terms
of organization than content.
William Sanford La Sor
William Sanford La Sor is more familiar to scholars for his
work
in Hebrew rather than
Greek, for he is Professor of Old Testament at
Fuller Theological
Seminary. He has, however, published a two-volume
handbook of Greek
grammar based on an inductive study of Acts. In this
work he follows a
system unique to modern Koine grammarians: that of
1 Funk, Grammar, II, p. 684.
2 Ibid., p. 683.
3 Ibid.,
p. 683.
69
Goodwin.
Statement of His
Position
The outline of his position is almost identical to that of
Goodwin:
Simple Condition,
Protasis = ei]
+ indicative
Apodosis = indicative or equivalent
Unreal Condition
Protasis = ei]
+ past indicative
Apodosis = (a@n)
+ past indicative
Present General Condition
Protasis = e]a<n + subjunctive
Apodosis = present indicative
More
Vivid Future Condition
Protasis = e]a<n + subjunctive/other
Apodosis = future indicative
Less Vivid Future Condition
Protasis = ei] +
optative
Apodosis = a@n
+ optativel
This classification is based upon time and reality, as was
that of Goodwin. La Sor
states that:
Present conditions can be only
noncommittal or general . .
Past conditions can be noncommittal or
contrary to fact . . . .
Future conditions can be only probable.
But the degree of probability
in the speaker's mind is variable. There
is a more probable (or
"more vivid") future condition.
. . and a less probable (or "less
vivid") future condition . . . .2
He offers some interesting comments on the various types of
conditions. For
example, he says that the simple condition [obviously]
1 William Sanford La Sor, Handbook of New Testament Greek, 2
volumes
(Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1973), II,
p..
225.
2 Ibid.,
p. 222.
70
may refer to past time
by using a past tense in the protasis. This
form is very similar to
that of the unreal condition, which also uses
a past (augmented)
tense in the protasis. Further, he notes that the
regular negative
particle for the protases of past simple conditions
is mh<, even with the
indicative tense: "Where ou]
is used, it probably
negates a word in the
protasis and not the entire protasis."1 He also
identifies mh< as the negative
particle of unreal conditions, "even though
it [the verb] is
indicative."2
Evaluation of His
Position
La Sor evidences the same problem that Goodwin does in his
analysis:
classification more by interpretation than by form. He notes,
for example, that the
present general condition, which uses e]a<n
and the
subjunctive mood, is
often "close to, if not identical with the simple
condition . . . except
for the use of e]a<n + sbjtv. [sic]"3
The more vivid future condition "is expressed by using
say in
the protasis, generally
with the subjunctive, and a future indicative or
equivalent in the apodosis."4
La Sor then remarks that "there is
considerable variation
in the protasis of this type of condition: and
offers these examples:
1 La Sor, Grammar, II, p. 223.
2 Ibid., p. 224.
3 Ibid., p. 224.
4 Ibid., p. 224.
71
With ei] + subjtv: Lk.
9:13; I Cor. 14:5.
With ei] or e]a<n + fut. ind.: Ac. 8:31; 2 Tim. 2:12.
With ei]
+ pres. ind.: Matt. 8:31; I Cor. 10:27.1
Again, it would seem
that interpretation more than form is the guiding
principle of
classification. The specific verses will be analyzed in
the following sections
of this study. La Sor's position will have to
be carefully evaluated,
for he represents a unique position among
modern Koine
grammarians.
Summary of Koine
Grammarians
The twelve Koine grammarians discussed in this section may
be
classified into two
groups: (1) those who do not follow Robertson: Moule
and La Sor, and (2)
those who do: all the rest. The first group pursues
either their own
approach, such as Moule, or follow most Classical
grammarians, as La Sor
does. They are a decided minority among Koine
grammarians, both early
and modern.
The second group follows the system presented by Robertson
in
Koine studies and
Gildersleeve in Classical grammar. These classify
conditional sentences
according to the reality of the condition as
expressed by the mood
of the protasis. The first group basically follows
the time of the
condition as the principle of classification.
The relation of the condition to reality is either actual
or
potential. The moods
utilized in the protasis indicate these relation-
ships: indicative =
actual, subjunctive or optative = potential. The
1 La Sor, Grammar,
II, p. 224.
72
first group of
conditions, those using the indicative mood, may be real
or unreal. The speaker
may assume that the condition is a real condition,
or he may assume that
it is not. In either case the indicative mood is
used, and in both cases
the reality is limited to the statement, not
the situation. The
second group, those conditions presented as
potential, involve two
degrees of potentiality. Here the grammarians
struggle with
terminology. Dana and Mantey are the least ambiguous with
their terms "more
probable" and "less probable." The degrees of
probability are
indicated by the subjunctive and optative moods,
respectively.
CHAPTER
II
THE SIMPLE
CONDITION
A survey of the various grammarians and their attempts to
classify conditional
sentences is helpful, but not determinative. Only
an inductive analysis
of the New Testament examples can offer definitive
evidence for one system
over another. Such an inductive study is the
goal of the next four
chapters.
Introduction
The following steps were taken to achieve this goal: (1)
All
conditional sentences
were identified and entered on index cards. This
was accomplished by
looking at every reference containing a conditional
particle as listed in Englishman’s Greek Concordance. Each
card showed
the protasis, apodosis
and verb parsings of every condition. Supplied
verbs were entered
based upon context and reference to the New
American
Standard
Bible.
(2) This information was then entered on punch cards for
ease
in mechanical sorting.
The cards were then sorted into the various groups
as indicated in the
following chapters. This arrangement also facilitated
rapid cross-checking of
the various types of conditions.
(3) The information on each punch card was again verified
from
the Greek New Testament
and the lists were prepared. There are no
complete listings of
all conditional sentences in the New Testament.
73
74
Robertson offers a
full, albeit incomplete listing in the Appendix of his
grammar,1
and J. W. Roberts has even more extensive lists in his disser-
tation.2 After the author had completed his lists, he
compared them
to Robertson and
Roberts and made the necessary adjustments. Since
Roberts' were more
complete, they were usually consulted. Careful
study showed that while
they were extensive, they were not perfect. The
results, it is hoped,
will be even more extensive.
It is readily acknowledged that these lists are not perfect.
Many apodosis verbs
have to be supplied from the context, and honest
differences of opinion
exist as to what tense and mood is to be
inserted. Also, in a
study of this magnitude, omissions and errors
are possible, although
every effort has been made to keep such to a
minimum. Individual
questions about specific conditions, though, will
not affect the general
picture that emerges from the data, and this is
the desired goal.
In order to avoid problems with certain incorrect
implications
drawn from A. T.
Robertson's terminology and its inadequacies, the
"neutral"
terminology of Dana and Mantey will be employed. Again, their
definition of a simple
condition:
1 A. T. Robertson, A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the
Light of
Historical Research
pp.
1416-1419.
2 J. W. Roberts, "The
Use of Conditional Sentences in the Greek
New
Testament as Compared with Homeric, Classical and Helenistic Uses,"
unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, the
75
This condition was used when one wished to
assume or to seem to
assume the reality of his premise. Ei]
occurs regularly in the
protasis, with any tense of the
indicative. There is no fixed
form for the apodosis--any mood or tense
may occur.1
Appendix I lists the occurrences of the simple condition,
and
verifies their
observation: most moods and tenses do appear. The summary
of these occurrences
is:
Protasis using ei]
with the present indicative . . 221
examples
Protasis using ei]
with the aorist indicative. . . 56
examples
Protasis using ei]
with the future indicative. . . 22
examples
Protasis using ei]
with the perfect indicative . . 12 examples
311
examples
The Conditional
Particle Ei]
The discussion of the simple condition begins with a brief
analysis of its
components. Taking them in order of appearance, the
first subject is the
condition particle ei].
The
Significance of Ei]
When used by itself, ei]
may be several things, including
(1) a conditional
particle, (2) a type of aposiopesis (a sudden breaking
off of what is stated),
especially as a replacement for the Hebrew Mxi
and (3) an
interrogative particle.2
1 H. E. Dana and Julius R.
Mantey, A Manual Grammar of the Greek
New Testament (New York: The
MacMillan Company, 1966), p. 289.
2 William F. Arndt and F.
Wilbur Gingrich, A Greek-English
Lexicon of the
New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature,
second
edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), pp. 219-
220.
76
As a Conditional
Particle
Ei]
regularly appears with the indicative mood to indicate the
simple condition. It
also occurs with the subjunctive mood in Luke 9:13;
Romans 11:14; I
Corinthians 9:11 (T.R.), 14:15; Philippians 3:11,12;
I Thessalonians 5:10;
and Revelation 11:5. Since the mood of the
verb determines the
type of condition, not the particle employed,
these specific passages
are discussed in the next chapter. Ei] also
appears with the
optative in the less probable future conditions.
As an Interrogative
Particle
Not all occurrences of ei]
mark conditional sentences, for it is
used to indicate
questions, especially indirect ones. Robertson notes
that its use with direct
questions is close to an elliptical condition
and suggests Mark 15:44
and Luke 23:6 as examples.1 This is parallel
with its use in marking
out direct quotes, frequently serving as
quote marks in English
(e.g. Matthew 12:10). Robertson further
suggests that this use
may be due to the fact that the Septuagint
utilizes ei] at times to translate
the h-interrogative, as here
in
Matthew 12:10.2 This usage is a change from the usual
Classical use of
ei].
One cannot automatically think "conditional sentence" whenever
he observes this
particle in the text.
1 A. T. Robertson, Grammar, p. 916.
2 Ibid.,
p. 916.
77
In Aposiopesis
A third important use of ei] is in aposiopesis,
. . . the sudden breaking off of what is
being said (or written),
so
that the mind may be more impressed by what is too wonderful,
or solemn, or awful for words: or when a
thing may be, as we some-
times say, "better imagined than
described."1
In this construction,
the protasis is stated and the writer drops the
sentence, letting the
reader draw his conclusion, as in Luke 19:42.
A related use is to
translate the Hebrew particle Mxi.
This is a
recognized Hebraism and
is not a conditional sentence.
Ei]
does have a number of uses, but the most important one is
that of the conditional
particle. Before pursuing its most common
use, brief mention
should be made of its appearances in combination with
other particles.
The Significance of Ei] with Other Particles
Ei]
a]ra<
There are only two New Testament examples of ei] a@ra: Mark 11:13
and Acts 8:22. This
combination emphasizes the assumption: "When placed
after pronouns and
interrogative particles, it refers to a preceding
assertion or fact, or
even to something existing only in the
mind . . . ."2 Acts 8:22 (deh<qhti tou? kuri<ou ei] a@ra a]feqh<setai< soi)
1 E. W. Bullinger, Figures of Speech Used in the Bible
(Grand
Rapids:
Baker Book House, 1968 reprint of 1898 edition), p. 154.
2 Joseph Henry Thayer, Thayer's Greek-English Lexicon of the New
Testament, reprint of
Corrected Edition (
National Foundation for
Christian Education, n.d.), p. 71.
78
is translated by Thayer
as "If, since thy sin is so grievous, perhaps
the thought etc."1
This usage is similar to ei] pw?j, as will be
seen
below.
Ei]pe<r
Six undisputed examples of ei]pe<r are found in the New Testament:
Romans 8:9,17; I
Corinthians 8:5, 15:15; 2 Thessalonians 1:6 and
I Peter 2:3. I 2 Corinthians 5:3 B, D. E. and G support ei]pe<r.
Ei] ge< is
the accepted reading,
supported by x,
C, K, L and P.2 This
combination
emphasizes the concept
under discussion: the particle per
means "to do
a thing to the limit
(beyond), thoroughly."3 Suggested
translations of
ei]pe<r
include "if indeed, if after all, since."4 Use of this particle
combination emphasizes
the veracity of the condition being discussed.
Interestingly, only
Paul employs this construction.
Ei]
ge<
The combination of ei]
ge<
is represented by five New Testament
examples: 2 Corinthians
5:3; Galatians 3:4; Ephesians 3:2, 4:21; and
Colossians 1:23. This
combination emphasizes the conditional nature of
1 Thayer, Lexicon, p. 71.
2 W. Robertson Nicoll,
editor, The Expositor’s Greek Testament,
5
volumes (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1967), II, p. 66.
3 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1154.
4 Arndt and Gingrich, Lexicon, p. 219.
79
the thought. Commenting
on ei] ge< kai> ei]kh?
in Galatians 3:4 Lightfoot
remarks:
Ei@
ge<
leaves a loophole for doubt, and kai< widens this,
implying
an unwillingness to believe on the part
of the speaker. Hermann's
distinction . . . that ei@ ge< assumes the truth of a proposition
while ei@per leaves it
doubtful, requires modifying before it is
applied to the New Testament, where ei@per
is, if anything, more
directly affirmative than ei] ge<.1
Arndt and Gingrich suggest "if indeed, inasmuch
as" as possible
translations of this
combination and render Galatians 3:4 as "have you
experienced so many
things in vain? If it really was in vain . . . .”2
The particle ge< performs its
usual emphatic function, strengthening the
word to which it is
attached, and stresses the conditional nature of
the concept.
Ei]
kai<
The combination ei]
kai<
is used to introduce concessive clauses,
and is usually
translated "even if." Robertson represents the majority
opinion when he writes
that concessive clauses "are really just
conditional clauses with the addition of kai<."3
Blass-Debrunner agrees
with this evaluation.4
distinction between
conditional and concessive clauses:
1 J. B. Lightfoot, The Epistle of
(Grand
Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1966 reprint of 1866 edition),
pp.
135-136.
2 Arndt and Gingrich, Lexicon, p. 152.
3 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1026.
4 Friedrich Blass and
Albert Debrunner, A Greek Grammar of the
New Testament
and Other Early Christian Literature, translated and revised
by Robert W. Funk
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), p. 190.
80
The force of a concessive sentence is
thus very different
from that of a conditional sentence. The
latter represents the
fulfillment of the apodosis as
conditioned on the fulfillment of
the protasis; the former represents the
apodosis as fulfilled in
spite of the fulfillment of the protasis.1
He does recognize, though, that there are times when the
two
clauses become almost
identical:
Yet there are cases in which by the
weakening of the character-
istic force of each construction, or by
the complexity of the
elements expressed by the protasis, the
two usages approach so
near to each other as to make distinction
between them difficult.2
Few Koine grammarians follow
purposes of
classification, concessive clauses were omitted from the
lists of conditional
sentences in the appendices. Including them would,
of course, alter the
total number of examples, but would not affect
the general
conclusions.
Ei]
pw?j
The last particle combination is ei] pw?j. This occurs three
times with the
indicative mood (Romans 1:10, 11:14 and Philippians
3:11), twice with the
subjunctive (Romans 11:14 and Philippians 3:11),
and once with the optative
mood (Acts 27:12). This combination, like
ei]
a@ra,
serves to heighten the question involved. It is uniformly
translated in the
Authorized Version as "if by any means."
While each of these particle combinations has its special
point
of emphasis, it is the
conditional use of ei]
that is the center of
attention. The next
area of discussion will be that of the negative
1 Ernest DeWitt
Testament Greek (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1897), p. 112.
2 Ibid.,
p. 112.
81
particles employed in
the simple condition.
Negative Particles in
Simple Conditions
The topic of negative particles in conditional sentences
shows
how far Koine Greek has
moved from Classical Greek, for the divergence
in form and style is
marked.
The Classical Pattern
W. W. Goodwin will serve as the standard for presenting the
classical pattern of
negative particles in conditional sentences:
The negative particle of the protasis
is regularly mh<, that
of
the apodosis is ou].
When ou] is found in a
protasis, it is generally closely connected
with
a particular word (especially the verb), with which it forms a
single
negative expression; so that its negative force does not (like
that of mh<) affect the
protasis as a whole.1
Though there are, of
course, exceptions, Goodwin's rule states the
general case for the
Classical literature. The Koine situation is
quite different.
The Koine Pattern
Statement.--Alexander Buttmann, an early Koine grammarian,
recognized the
distinction between Koine and Classical Greek on this
point:
The use of ou]
in the protasis of a conditional sentence occurs
in the N.T. relatively very often; so
that we are
1 W. W. Goodwin, Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek
Verb
(Boxton: Ginn and Company, 1893), p. 138.
82
justified in inferring a difference in
usage, since in classical
writers this use is only exceptional.1
A later writer, J. H. Moulton, approvingly quotes Blass's
rule for
the negative particles
in Koine: "'All instances,' he says, 'may
practially he brought
under the single rule, that ou]
negatives the
indicative, mh< the other
moods, including the infinitive and
participle."2
Robertson agrees, noting that "The negative of the
protasis in
the first class
condition is practically always ou]
in the N.T. We have
ei]
ou]
as a rule, not ei]
mh<."3
This rule is not absolute, and he
identifies five
exceptions, listed in the next section. Both he and
Moulton see the simple
absolute rule of ou]
with the indicative and mh
with the other moods as
a goal "not yet reached in the N.T." but almost
completely met in
Modern Greek.4
Specific examples.--The authorities list different
totals for
the various
combinations. Moulton finds thirty-one examples of ei] ou]
in simple condition
protases,5 Robertson thirty-four,6 and Roberts
1 Alexander Buttmann, A
Grammar of the New Testament Greek, trans-
lated
and edited by J. H. Thayer (
1873),
pp. 344-345.
2 J. H. Moulton, Grammar of New Testament Greek. Volume I:
Prolegomena, third edition
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1908), p. 170.
3 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1101.
4 Ibid., p. 1101, Moulton, Prolegomena,
p. 170.
5 Moulton, Prolegomena, p. 171.
6 Robertson, Grammar,
p. 1111.
83
thirty-five.1
Whatever the discrepancies, the
preponderance of this form
is clear when compared
to only five examples of ei]
mh<: Mark 6:5,
I Corinthians 15:2, 2
Corinthians 13:5, Galatians 1:7 and I Timothy 6:3.
Of these five, only
Mark 6:5 and I Timothy 6:3 have unanimous acceptance
as examples of the
classical pattern.
Godet considers I Corinthians 15:2 "a pleonasm arising
from the
mixing of the two
following constructions: excepting if (e]kto<j
ei])
and: if not (ei] mh<).2 Lenski agrees with this identification.3
Lightfoot explains Galatians 1:7 so:
Ei]
mh<
seems always to retain, at least in this stage of the
language, its proper exceptive sense, and
is not simply oppositive,
though it frequently approaches nearly to a]lla< . . . .4
This construction
"may either state an exception to the preceding
negative clause (= except, save) or merely qualify it (= but only),
as it does in Luke iv.
26 . . . and in Gal. 1. 7 . . . ."5 The same
basic construction is
found in 2 Corinthians 13:5 – ei]
mh<ti a]doki<moi e@ste.
The ratio of five to thirty-five examples gives credence to
Buttmann's claim that
the Koine shows a wide divergence from the
Classical usage in the
negative particles in the simple condition. The
presence of a
relatively few examples of mh<
show that the Classical
heritage has not been
completely lost in the New Testament.
1 Roberts,
"Conditional Sentences," p. 153.
2
3 Lenski, Corinthians, p. 629.
4 Lightfoot, Galatians, p. 77.
5 Nicoll, Testament,
III, p. 156.
84
]Ea<n
with the Indicative Mood
Although, the general principle of simple conditions is
that the
protasis consists of ei] with the indicative
mood, there are exceptions.
A few such conditions
employ ean with the indicative in
an apparent
contradiction to this
principle: Mark 8:3; Luke 19:40; John 8:54,
21:22,23; Acts 8:31; I
Thessalonians 3:8; I John 5:15 and Revelation
2:22.
Explanation of the
Form
While these nine exceptions are a small percentage of the
total,
they are a phenomenon
that needs explanation. Several explanations may
be offered.
Development of the
Language
First of all, Koine Greek represents a stage in the
historical
development of the
language. As the language progressed from Classical
through Koine to
Modern, the distinction between ei]
and
e]a<n faded,
especially in respect
to their respective moods. In the later Koine
"the use of e]a<n with the ind.
is rather more frequent . . .
Finally
ei]
came
to be 'a mere literary alternative.'"1 Blass-Debrunner also
recognizes this
consequence of linguistic development.2
The New
Testament, therefore,
represents a period in which the general principle
is operative, but a
transition is evident. Robertson summarizes: "In
general, the difference
between ei] and e]a<n is considerably
lessened
1 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1009.
2 Blass-Debrunner, Grammar, p. 190.
85
in the koinh<, though it must
be remembered that e]a<n
was never confined
to the subj. nor ei] to the ind. and
opt."1
Textual Emendations
While the development of the language may be one
consideration
in explaining these
apparent exceptions, textual emendations are
another. Buttmann
raises this observation and caution:
It is, indeed, not to be denied that
the instances in question
almost disappear amid the multitude of
those that are grammatically
regular, and suspicion may also be raised
by the circumstances
that hardly a single passage with the
Indicative is completely
beyond question critically. Yet when we
consider that in countless
passages with the Subjunctive not the
smallest variation is found
(which would not be the case if the
Indicative were chargeable solely
to the copyists), it is far more probable
that, where a diversity
of readings occurs in such a number of
instances, this fact results
from the circumstance that the copyists,
commentators, etc., early
altered the Indicative which gave them
offence.2
Winer also notes the significance of textual variations in
his comments on the
subject.3 Both grammarians,
however, recognize the
legitimate
identification of e]a<n
with the indicative in the New Testa-
ment in spite of the
fact that most of the examples show textual
variants.
How wide-spread is this textual difficulty? A review of the
available evidence
supports the claim of Buttmann: such constructions
1 Robertson, Grammar, pp. 1009-1010.
2 Buttmann, Grammar, p. 222.
3 G. B. Winer, A Grammar of the Idiom of the New Testament,
seventh
edition, revised by Gottfried Lunemann, translated by J. H.
Thayer (Andover: Warren
F. Draper, Publisher, 1893), p. 294.
86
are part of the original
text. Robertson discusses several passages which
have been challenged,1
and Roberts lists the textual evidence for
some of them and adds a
few examples of his own.2
Thus two things seem to be born out: (1) there has been
some
alteration of the text in
apparent attempts to bring specific passages
into conformity with
the general rule and (2) e]a<n
was used with the
indicative mood in some
passages of the original text of the New
Testament.3
Significance
of the Form
If the use of e]a<n
with the indicative is part of the original
text, then what is its
significance? Specific answers vary: Robertson,
of course, sees no
special significance. The key for him is the mood,
not the particle.
Therefore he sees no basic difference between the
two types of protases,
for each uses the indicative mood.4
Both
represent simple
conditions.
dogmatically:
In a few instances say is used with
the Present Indicative in
the protasis of a conditional sentence,
apparently to express a
simple present supposition. I Thess. 3:8,
I John 5:15.5
1 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1010.
2 Roberts, "Conditional Sentences," pp. 146-149.
3
Moulton, Prolegomena, p. 168.
4
Robertson, Grammar, p. 1007.
5 Burton, Syntax, p. 103.
87
Blass-Debrunner offer no comment either
way.1
Roberts approaches the subject from the historical side and
discusses the use of e]a<n in conditional
sentences in the Septuagint.
In this section of his
dissertation he relies upon the work of James
Sterenberg who wrote a
dissertation for the
1908 entitled "The
Use of Conditional Sentences in the Alexandrian
Version of the
Pentateuch." This work was not
available to the author,
so Roberts' conclusions
will have to be accepted at face value:
It will be remembered that Sterenberg
noted that the construction
is used in the LXX (where it occurs with
the perfect, present,
imperfect, and the aorist indicatives)
mostly in laws in the protases
of which transgressions and the like are
minutely defined and that it
is used to render the original thought
more exactly to avoid
ambiguity; e.g., where the verb in the
protasis is thought to
precede in time the event or the
immediately preceding verb, or in
one verb when the event may be supposed as
a possible event,
requiring the indicative, but where both
verbs are governed by e]a<n.2
This, though, is the sense of the construction in the
Septuagint.
New Testament examples
are not, as Roberts notes, "so related to laws."3
It would seem that the
observations based upon the Septuagint do not
fit the New Testament
examples.
Neither do the commentators offer much help. Lenski
identifies
the ean of I Thessalonians 3:8
as "looking to the future."4 Lightfoot,
1 Blass-Debrunner, Grammar, p. 190.
2 Roberts,
"Conditional Sentences," p. 149.
3 Ibid., p. 149.
4 R. C. H. Lenski, The Interpretation of
the Corinthians
to the Thessalonians, to Timothy, to Titus and to
Philemon
(Minneapolis:
Augsburg Publishing House, 1961), p. 291.
88
after defending the
indicative in the same verse, equates doubt with
the particle:
fast.'
Their faith was not complete (ver. 10). There was enough
in the fact that they had been so
recently converted, enough in
the turn which their thoughts had
recently taken, absorbed so
entirely in the contemplation of the future
state, to make the
Apostle alarmed lest their faith should
prove only impulsive and
transitory.1
The
Expositor's Greek Testament notes that the future indicative
in
Revelation 2:22
"expresses rather more probability than the subj. with
e]a<n
mh<.”2
What, then, can be said about a distinction in meaning
between
e]a<n
with the indicative and ei]
with the indicative? Nothing, really.
There are too few
examples upon which to build rules, and the distinction,
if any, is nebulous at
best. Roberts accurately states the case: "This
writer is able to
discover no distinction which can be put in a rule."3
Neither is this one.
Significance of
Moods and Tenses
Since the deciding factor in identifying a simple condition
is the indicative mood
in the protasis and not the conditional particle,
the next step in
discussing the simple condition is to evaluate the
significance of the
various moods and tenses in the protasis and apodosis.
1 J. B. Lightfoot, Notes on the Epistles of
Zondervan
Publishing House, 1957 reprint of 1895 edition), p. 46.
2 Nicoll, Testament, V, p. 361.
3 Roberts, "Conditional Sentences," p.
150.
89
Moods and Tenses in
the Protasis
General Observations
The simple condition is, by definition, limited to the
indicative mood, for it
assumes the reality of the condition. The
particle e]a<n does occur, but
the key is the mood. A few examples of ei]
with the subjunctive
mood are found in the New Testament, but these are
identified as more
probable conditions and discussed under that
heading. The simple
condition is limited to the indicative mood in the
protasis.
This mood may be used with any tense. The specific data for
New Testament tense
usage is listed below:
Present tense =
69.0%
Aorist tense =
17.5%
Future tense =
6.9%
Perfect tense =
3.8%
Each of these tenses
brings with it the usual verbal significance as
described in the
grammars. Which one is used in a given condition
depends upon the action
involved in the protasis.
While there is no rule governing the type of tense used in
any
given protasis except
the desire of the author, it is clear that the
present tense is used
far more than all others combined.
Future Indicative
One particular combination calls for specific discussion: ei]
with the future
indicative. Two things should be noted. First is its
90
use in Classical Greek,
especially by the poets, in threatening or
warning (minatory or
monitory) statements. Second is its use in
emphatic assertions or
oaths.
Minatory or Monitory
Use
Gildersleeve has called attention to this special use of
the
simple condition.
Working within the framework of a comparison between
ei]
and the future indicative and e]a<n
with the subjunctive, he first
notes that the latter
is by far more frequent. The distinction between
the two is seen
. . . whenever it is important to
distinguish continued from
concentrated action, whenever it is
important to distinguish over-
lapping from priority, e]a<n with the
subjunctive is preferred.
He continues,
Now the neglect of this distinction in ei]
with the future
indicative shows a certain coldness, a
certain indifference; and
this added to the general rigor of the
logical condition, which
faces fact in all its grimness, gives a
stern, minatory, prophetic
tone to the future indicative, which
commentators and grammarians
have noticed, but noticed only in passing
. . . .2
Gildersleeve then proceeds to illustrate this from the
tragic
poets, showing that the
device is frequently employed by them in such
settings.
The New Testament, though, stands in contrast to the tragic
poets of Classical
Greek, for there is only one example of this
1 B. L. Gildersleeve,
"On ei] with the Future Indicative and ean
with
the Subjunctive in the Tragic Poets," Transactions
of the American
Philological
Association,
7:1 (January, 1876), p. 9.
2 Ibid.,
p. 9.
91
construction in its
pages.
Of the New Testament instances of ei]
followed by a Future (about
twenty in number), one, 2 Tim. 2:12,
illustrates the minatory or
monitory
force attributed to such clauses by [Gildersleeve].1
The phrase under discussion, ei] a]rnhso<meqa, ka]kei?noj a]rnh<setai,
is the third line of
what may be four lines of an early Christian hymn.2
The fact is stated
"in all its grimness" that "If we shall deny Him,
He also will deny
us." Certainly this must be understood as a stern
warning, for eternity
seems to hang in the balance. But, it should be
asked, a warning of
what to whom?
Commentators are, as usual, divided on the passage. Some
seem
to imply loss of
salvation resulting from a believer's turning against
his Lord and denying
Him. Hendriksen's words seem to allow for this:
When a person, because of unwillingness to
suffer hardship for
the sake of Christ and his cause, disowns the Lord ("I do not know
the man!"), then, unless he repents, he will be disowned by the
Lord in the great day of judgment ("I
do not know you.").3
general and, assuming
that some may prove their true colors by denying
Him, warns them of
their fate.4 Hiebert agrees
with
the idea that this
denial refers to "a temporary weakness of faith," but
1
2 Homer A. Kent, Jr., The Pastoral Epistles (
1958),
p. 271.
3 William Hendriksen, 1 - II Timothy and Titus (
Baker
Book House, 1965), p. 259.
4 Kent, Pastoral
Epistles, p. 272.
92
as the conclusion
shows, to deny Him "as a permanent fact."1
Certainly, though, Gildersleeve's identification of this
construction as one
presenting grim fact in a coldly logical way aptly
describes Paul's words.
Emphatic Assertions
The second and more common use of ei] with the future
indicative
is in emphatic
assertions or oaths. This is especially true in quotes
from the Old Testament
where ei] translates the Hebrew
particle Mxi.
The
four examples of this
are Mark 8:12, Hebrews 3:11, 4:3 and 4:5.
Mark 8:12, ei] doqh<setai th? genea? tau<th
shmei?on,
is not an
"official"
oath like the examples in Hebrews, but it fits the same
pattern: "No sign shall be given to this
generation." As already
indicated, Robertson
identifies this as an elliptical condition lacking
the apodosis. Further,
he says that this is "really aposiopesis in
imitation of the Hebrew
use of im."2 Other grammarians recognize this
construction, including
Winer,3 Buttmann,4 and Blass-Debrunner.5
1 D. Edmund Hiebert, Second Timothy (Chicago: Moody Press,
1958),
pp.
63-64.
2 Robertson, Word Pictures, IV, p. 331.
3 Winer, Grammar, p. 500.
4 Buttmann, Grammar, pp. 358-359.
5 Blass-Debrunner, Grammar, p. 189.
94
The references in Hebrews (3:11, 4:3 and 4:5) are all
quotations
from the Septuagint
version of Psalm 95:11 – ei]
ei]seleu<sontai ei]j th>n
kata<pausi<n
mou.
The Hebrew version introduces this with the particle
Mxi,
whose use in oaths is a normal structure of the language.1 The
Septuagint regularly
uses ei] in these situations.
The Authorized
Version correctly
renders 3:11 as "They shall not enter into my rest,"
while 4:3 and 4:5 are
translated, "If they shall enter into my rest."
Modern versions
correctly translate all of them the same way: a statement
of warning, "They
shall not enter into my rest."
Thus ei] with the indicative is
used in sentences of emphatic
negation, though few of
them are found in the New Testament. The
conditional particle is
a straight-forward translation of the Hebrew
and is a proper
Hebraism.
Moods and Tenses in
the Apodosis
There is no specific relationship between the moods and tenses
of the protasis and the
apodosis in simple conditions. Robertson
summarizes this point
well when he states:
The apodosis varies very greatly. It all
depends upon what one is
after, whether mere statement,
prediction, command, prohibition,
suggestion, question. Hence the apodosis
may be in the indicative
(any tense) or the subjunctive or the
imperative. There is no
necessary correspondence in tense between
protasis and apodosis.
The variation in the mode of the apodosis
has no essential bearing
on the force of the condition.2
1 E. Kautzsch, ed., Gesenius' Hebrew Grammar, revised by A.
E.
Cowley
(London: Oxford University Press, 1910), pp. 471-472.
2 Robertson, Grammar,
p. 1008.
95
While there is no essential correspondence between the
protasis
and the apodosis, there
is a preference for the indicative mood in
the apodosis. The
tables in Appendix I yield the following data:
Apodoses with indicative mood = 205 or 67.3% of the total.
Apodoses with imperative mood = 84 or 28.4% of the total.
Apodoses with subjunctive mood = 7 or 2.4% of the total.
Again, no rule may be
fixed, but the distribution is most reasonable.
Protases which speak in
real terms would normally imply apodoses which
also speak in real
terms. But language is flexible, and all moods are
possible and do occur.
Meaning of the
Simple Condition
Now that the details of amount and construction have been
considered, the way is
cleared for a consideration of the basic meaning
of the simple
condition. This will cover two areas: (1) particular
and general conditions,
and (2) the degree of reality implied by the
protasis.
Particular and General
Conditions
The terminology if not the concept of particular and
general
conditions has entered
Koine studies through the work of Goodwin, hence
his definitions will be
the starting point.
The Position of Goodwin
Goodwin defines particular and general thusly:
A particular supposition refers to a
definite act or to several
definite acts, supposed to occur at some
definite time (or
times) . . . .
96
A general supposition refers
indefinitely to any act or acts
of a given class which may be supposed to
occur or to have occurred
at any time . . .1
This particular
distinction is seen "in all classes of conditions,"
but in some of them it
may be distinguished by construction:
When the apodosis has a verb of
present time expressing a
customary or repeated action, the
protasis may refer (in a general
way) to any act or acts of a given class
which may be supposed to
occur at any time within the period
represented in English as
present.
When the apodosis has a verb of past time
expressing a customary
or repeated action, the protasis may refer
(in a general way) to any
act or acts of a given class which may be
supposed to have occurred
at any time in the past.2
The key point in the construction of the conditional
sentence
is the tense of the
apodosis, not the protasis. Goodwin is simply
attributing to the
present and imperfect tenses their continual or
repetitive
significance.
The Evaluation of
Goodwin
As mentioned earlier, Funk has also noted that "The present
tense in the apodosis
often gives the condition a generalizing force
(indicated by ever in the translation)."3
Funk, though, simply notes it
as an observation
without making it a rule of classification. In this
he follows
Gildersleeve, who notes that all classes of conditional
sentences may be either
general or particular, "according to the
1 W. W. Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, p. 141.
2 Ibid., pp. 141-142.
3 Robert W. Funk, A Beginning-Intermediate Grammar of
Hellenistic
Greek, 3 volumes (
1973), II, p. 683.
97
character of the
apodosis."1
Robertson rejects Goodwin's use of this concept as a means
of
classification:
This theory calls for
"particular" and "general" suppositions as a
fundamental element. This is a false step
in itself. As Gilder-
sleeve shows, each of the four classes of
conditions may be parti-
cular or general. That point has no
bearing on the quality of the
condition.2
Does this agree with the facts of the case? Can simple
conditional sentences
be particular or general, depending upon the
context as Gildersleeve
and Robertson maintain? The answer, of course,
is Yes. A few examples
will suffice.
Romans 4:14 uses two perfect tenses in the apodosis of its
condition and speaks of
one past historical event: the giving of the
law – ei] ga>r oi[ e]k no<mou
klhrono<moi, keke<nwtai h@ pi<stij.- "for if those
who are of law are
heirs, then faith has no value." This fits the
pattern of Goodwin as a
particular condition.
I Corinthians 15:2, however, uses a present tense in the
apodosis
and speaks of the
specific situation of the Corinthian believers and
their relationship to
the gospel – di ] ou$ kai>
sw<zesqe, ti<ni lo<gw
eu]hggelisa<mhn
u[mi<n ei] kate<xete - "By this (gospel) you are
saved, if you
hold fast to the word I
preached to you." This does not agree with
Goodwin, for the
present tense (sw<zesqe)
should make this condition
a general one.
1 B. L. Gildersleeve,
"Studies in Pindaric Syntax," The
American
Journal
Philology,
3:4 (December, 1882), p. 435.
2 Robertson, Grammar,
pp. 1005-1006.
98
Matthew 12:26 – kai>
ei] o[ stana?j to>n satana?n e]kba<llei, e]f ]
e[auto<n
e]meri<sqh - "And if Satan casts out Satan, he is divided
against
himself" - may be
taken as a general condition, referring to any time
Satan works against
himself. Yet the apodosis uses the aorist e]merisqh,
contrary to what
Goodwin would predict.
Thus the simple condition may be either particular or
general
with no special
significance attached to the tense of the apodosis.
Funk's point should not
be overlooked, though, for the concepts of
particular and general
are a legitimate part of interpretation and
translation.
Degree of Reality
One of the most important questions about simple conditions
is:
What do they imply
about the condition they state? The indicative mood
communicates objective
reality, but how is that communicated and
wherein does the reality
lie?
Review of the
Grammarians
The various grammarians approach this question in various
ways,
but most have arrived
at a similar position.
Classical Grammarians
Goodwin stated his opinion that simple conditions are those
which
imply nothing as to the
fulfillment [reality] of the condition . . ,”1
He rejects the idea
that language should even have a form which implied
1 Goodwin, Moods
and Tenses, p. 139.
99
the objective reality
of a condition: "The Greek has no form implying
that a condition is or was fulfilled, and it is
hardly conceivable that
any language should
find such a form necessary or useful."1
Gildersleeve agrees with Goodwin:
The Logical Condition [simple
condition] states the elements in
question. It is used of that which can be
brought to the standard
of fact; but that standard may be for or
against the truth of the
postulate. All that the logical condition
asserts is the inexorable
connection of the two members of the
sentence.2
His point is that the
factuality of the postulate is limited to its
statement, for it is
presented as something that can be considered as
fact but not
necessarily is fact. The Classical grammarians are in
agreement on this
point.
Koine Grammarians
Early Koine grammarians followed this approach. Green
states,
"The conditional
particle ei],
if with the Indicative in the
protasis,
assumes the hypothesis
as a fact."3 Winer
reflects Gildersleeve's view
by identifying the
simple condition as the "Pure Condition."4 Even
Turner, a more recent
scholar, uses the general language of "simple
assumption."5
1 Goodwin, Mood's and Tenses, p. 140.
2 Gildersleeve, "Pinder," p. 435.
3 Samuel G. Green, Handbook to the Grammar of the Greek
Testament
(London:
The Religious Tract Society, [1886]), p. 317.
4 Winer, Grammar, p . 291.
5 Turner, Syntax,
p. 319.
100
More recent grammarians continue this same general
approach.
Blass-Debrunner states,
somewhat confusingly, "Ei]
with the indicative
of all tenses denotes a
simple conditional assumption with emphasis on
the reality of the
assumption (not of what is being assumed): the
condition is considered
'a real case.'"1 The
confusion results from
the distinction between
the assumption and "what is being assumed."
The assumption
corresponds to the statement, "What is being assumed"
corresponds to the
situation. In Matthew 12:27, Jesus offers the
statement with an
assumption that it is a real case. He assumes it
to be true. He is not,
however, stating the situation as true. The
distinction
Blass-Debrunner draws is between these two: the statement
and the situation.
Dana and Mantey are clearer when they identify the simple
condition as the one
that "was used when one wished to assume or to seem
to assume the reality of
his premise."2 Funk
expands this description:
In
a first class condition the protasis is a simple conditional
assumption with emphasis on the reality of
the assumption (but
not on the reality of what is being
assumed) [reality of statement,
but not the situation]. It is therefore
taken to be a real case
though it may, in fact, be an unreal case
[as in Matthew 12:27].
Robertson's position is basic to this discussion, since he
is
most often quoted in
support of one position or another. To show the
development of his
thought two statements will be given, one from the
1 Blass-Debrunner, Grammar, p. 188.
2 Dana and. Mantey, Grammar, p. 289.
3 Funk, Grammar,
II, p. 680.
101
first and one from the
tenth edition of his Short Grammar:
The indicative states the condition as a fact. It may or may not
be true in fact. The condition has nothing to do with that, but
only with the statement. . . . This condition does assume the
reality of the condition.1
Then, from the tenth
edition:
This condition assumes the reality of the condition. The indicative
mode states
it as a fact. The condition has
nothing whatever to do
with the actual fact or truth. It is just
here that some of the
grammars have erred in failure to
distinguish clearly between the
statement
and the reality. It is the condition
taken at its face
value without any insinuations or
implications. The context, of
course, must determine the actual
situation. The indicative mode
determines only the statement.2
It is evident in the latter statement that he is trying to
avoid
the impression that he
considers the simple condition one that affirms
the reality (or
actuality) of the situation as an objective fact. It
does affirm the reality
of the speaker's assumption or statement, i.e.,
the speaker really
assumes (though he may believe otherwise) that the
condition (statement)
is true. The statements in his Historical
Grammar,
offered in response to Goodwin, are not as clear:
This condition pointedly implies the fulfilment of the condition.
It is the condition of actuality, reality,
Wirklichkeit, and not
mere "possibility" as Farrar has
it . . . a la Goodwin. This is
the crux
of the whole matter. Once see [sic]
that the first class
condition with the ind. implies the
reality of the premise, all
else follows naturally.3
1 A. T. Robertson, A Short Grammar of the Greek New Testament
(New
York: A. C. Armstrong & Son, 1908), p. 161.
2 A. T. Robertson and W.
Hersey Davis, A New Short Grammar of
the Greek
Testament
(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1933), p. 350.
3 Robertson, Grammar,
p. 1006.
101
It seems, then, that the grammars present a unified view
concerning the degree
of reality in the simple condition: It presents
the statement of the
condition as true, but without affirming any-
thing about the reality
of the actual situation.
Review of the Problem
The unanimous opinion of the grammarians is not reflected
by
some writers and
speakers who claim that the simple condition
guarantees the reality
of the situation. They suggest the translation
"since,"
rather than "if." In English this presents the situation
as true, both in the
speaker's statement and in objective fact. An
extreme, but by no
means isolated example of this has already been
given: "The first
class condition implies truth or reality. If . . .
and
it is true."1 Sometimes Kenneth Wuest is implicated in this
view
on the strength of
translation such as Romans 6:5 -
The Word "if" in the Greek is
not the conditional particle of
an unfulfilled condition. It is a
fulfilled condition here, its
meaning being, "in view of the
fact."2
He did not adopt this
as a uniform principle of translation, though,
and limited such
renderings to places where the context justified them.
This, of course, is at
the heart of the situation. There are several
passages where the
reality of the statement is in keeping with the
reality of the
situation. But many times it is not, e.g. Matthew 12:27.
1 Jerome Moore, "
45:1
(June, 1979), p. 11.
2 Kenneth S. Wuest, Treasures From the Greek New Testament
(Grand Rapids: Wm. B.
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1957), p. 89.
103
One cannot generalize
from a context where this is true to all uses of
the simple condition.
Objections to this view.--Several objections may be
raised to
this position. First, a
little mature reflection will cause one to be
cautious about agreeing
with Moore and others. In his example he
claims, on the basis of
a simple condition in Colossians 1:23, that
there is no need to
doubt the security of anyone's salvation. This
is not supported from
Scripture, for certainly the false teachers of
Acts 20:30 looked and
acted like believers before their true colors were
flown. Those in I John
2:19 must have looked like believers before
they went out and
demonstrated that they were not. Would Paul have
been so quick to affirm
the absolute salvation of all those in the
church where he had not
visited (Colossians 1:4, 9)? Probably
not.
Second, and more significant, the pattern of translating ei]
by "since"
does not hold in all cases. James Boyer shows that Wuest
changes his translation
between John 10:35 ("since") and 10:37, 38
("assuming
that"), as required by context.1 John Battle has listed all
simple conditions
which, in his opinion, present data in the protasis
that are contrary to
fact and known to be so by the speaker.2 It is
impossible to use
"since" in such verses as I Corinthians 15:13 and
1 James L. Boyer,
"Semantics in Biblical Interpretation,"
Grace Journal, 3:2 (Spring,
1962), p. 33.
2 John A.
Exegesis,"
unpublished Th.D. dissertation, Grace Theological Seminary,
1975, pp. 166-168.
104
still maintain
orthodoxy.
to do is insert
"since" in place of "if" in the verses to realize the
error of this concept.
J. Harold Greenlee shows the variety of
situations one
encounters in the simple condition:
Moreover, 2) the speaker may believe that
the condition is true:
"if they have persecuted me (and they
have done so) [John 15:20a];
or 3) he may believe that the condition is
not true: "if they have
kept my word" (but they have not done
so) [John 15:20b]; or 4) he
may be uncertain as to whether it is true:
"sir, if you have
carried him away" (she does not know
whether he had or not) [John
20:15]; or 5) the speaker may even be
mistaken in his assumption:
"if he is sleeping" (but he was
in fact dead) [John 11:12].1
Justification for the translation of e]i by "since,"
must come
from the context, not
the condition. This is an interpretation,
not a translation.
The correct view.--The simple condition, through the
indicative
mood, offers a
conditional statement presented as real. It makes no
attempt to speak to the
actual situation. If the exegete will maintain
this distinction
between statement and situation, then he will not err
in handling this
condition. A good summary of this point of view is
found in The Bible Translator:
When ei] with the
indicative is used, it implies that the truth or
otherwise of the condition is regarded as
in principle "determined,"
i.e. is represented as a fact (although
the speaker does not commit
himself as to whether he believes the
condition is true or not.2
1 J. Harold Greenlee,
"'If' in the New Testament," The
Bible
Translation, 13:1 (January,
1962), p. 40.
2 John Kinje, Jr., "Greek
Conditional Sentences," The Bible
Translator,
13:4 (October, 1962), p. 223.
105
Translation of the
Simple Condition
How, then, should the simple condition be translated? The
uniform rule of all
grammarians surveyed is to use the English conditional
construction,
"if." All major English versions so translate this
condition. Should one
want to paraphrase the concept, then the phrase,
"If, as I am
assuming . . ." might be employed. The statement of the
simple condition may be
in accord with the reality of the situation,
it may be contrary to
it, or it may be unknown. All that can be said
is that the speaker is
presenting the condition as true in his
statement.
CHAPTER III
THE
CONTRARY TO FACT CONDITION
Introduction
The
Concept
The simple condition states the matter directly by assuming
it
to be true. This, as
has been discussed, is an assumption of reality.
But the assumption can
also work the opposite way. The speaker can
present the situation
and assume it to be false or contrary to fact.
Such a condition is
termed the Contrary to Fact condition and is the
subject of this
chapter.
The
Construction
These conditions follow a standardized construction: ei]
with
a past (augmented)
tense in the indicative mood in the protasis, and
another past
(augmented) verb in the apodosis, usually with a@n. This is
as would be expected,
for both the simple condition and the contrary to
fact condition are
making definite statements; the former assumes them
to be true, the latter
false. Robert W. Funk describes them so:
The assumption is taken to be untrue
in the protasis of a second
class condition [contrary to fact]; it is
considered an unreal case
(whether it is, in fact, is another
matter). The conclusion
follows from the premise.
The protasis consists of ei]
plus a past (augmented) tense of
the indicative; the apodosis also has a
past tense of the indicative,
usually with a@n.1
1 Robert W. Funk, A Beginning-Intermediate Grammar of
Hellenistic
Greek, 3 vols. (
1973), II, p. 681.
106
107
In this format the use
of the imperfect tense in both clauses refers to
present or past time,
and that of the aorist to past time only. This
basic scheme is the
same as that of Robertson,1 Winer,2 and Goodwin.3
Blass-Debrunner
recognizes these general principles, but does not
relate the condition to
time: "The tense (imperfect, aorist, plu-
perfect . . .) retains
its Aktionsart; the imperfect is
temporally
ambiguous."4
List of Contrary to
Fact Conditions
Appendix II gives a Listing of the contrary to fact
conditions
in the New Testament.
There are some apparent exceptions. Buttmann
lists four which he
feels should be classed as contrary to fact condi-
tions even though they
use present tenses: John 8:39, 14:28; Luke 17:6
and Hebrews 11:15. He
calls them exceptions to the rule.5
John 8:39.—ei] te<kna
tou? ]Abraa<m e]ste, ta> e@rga
tou? ]Abqaa<m
poiei?te
(if you were Abraham's children, then you would do the works
1 A. T. Robertson, A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the
Light of
Historical Research
(Nashville: Broadman Press, 1934), p. 1013.
2 G. B. Winer, A Grammar of the Idiom of the New Testament,
7th
edition,
revised by Gottlieb Lunemann, translated by J. H. Thayer
(Andover,
Massachusetts: Warren F. Draper, Publisher, 1893), p. 291.
3 W. W. Goodwin, Syntax of Moods and Tenses (
Company,
1893), p. 147.
4 Friedrich Blass and
Albert Debrunner, A Greek Grammar of the
New Testament
and Other Early Christian Literature, translated and revised
by
Robert W. Funk (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), p. 182.
5 Alexander Buttmann, A Grammar of New Testament Greek,
translated
and
edited by J. H. Thayer (Andover: Warren F. Draper, Publisher, 1873),
pp. 224-225.
108
of Abraham). Buttmann
observes that
Most of the interpreters and editors,
indeed, have taken offence
at this reading [e@ste
in John 8:39], and have adopted into the
text instead the very weakly-attested h@te
(and thus restored the
construction to the ordinary form),
explaining to themselves the
origin of este in various ways . . . .1
Este
is supported by x,
B, D, and L. ]Epoiei?te
is supported by
B, D, E, F, and G.2
Westcott and Hort have present tenses in
both the protasis and
apodosis,3 and the United Bible Societies' text
has the imperfect in
the apodosis.4 The question, then, is not
e@ste
versus h@te, but e]poiei?te
instead of poiei?te.
There seems to be little or no support for Buttmann's claim
that this represents a
contrary to fact condition, for the present
tense in the protasis
affirms Christ's assumption that His listeners
were Abraham's children
. The imperfect indicates that He expresses
doubt as to their
ability to prove it. This is the view of Godet.5
Such an interperetation
makes this a mixed condition. The protasis
is that of a simple
condition, and the apodosis that of a contrary to
fact condition.
1 Buttmann, Grammar., p. 225.
2 W. Robertson Nicoll, ed.,
The Expoisiton'is Greek Testament
(Grand
Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1967), I, p. 778.
3 Brooke Foss Westcott and
Fenton John Anthony Hort, The New
Testament in the
Original Greek
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1941),
p.
208.
4 Kurt Aland, et. at.,
eds., The Greek New Testament (
United
Bible Societies, 1966), p. 359.
5
(Grand
Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, n.d., reprint of 1893 edition),
II,
p. 112.
109
John 14:28.—ei]
h]gapa?te me, e]xa<rhte a@n (if you loved me, you would
have rejoiced).
Although Buttmann claims that there is manuscript
evidence for a present
tense in this condition, neither he nor anyone
else gives the data for
it.
Luke 17:6.—ei]
e@xete pi<stin w[j ko<kon sina<pewj, e]le<gete a@n
(if
you had faith as small
as a mustard seed, you could say). Here the
present e@xete is supported by
x, A, B, L, X and
others, while the
imperfect ei@xete shows up in D
and the rest of the Byzantine manuscript
tradition.1 This, like John 8:39, is in reality a mixed
condition.2
Hebrews 11:15.—kai>
ei] me>n e]kei<nhj e]mnhmo<neuon a]f ] h$j e]ce<bhsan
ei#xon
a@n kairo>n a]naka<myai (if they had been remembering the
country they
had left, they would
have had opportunity to return). The only
significant problem is
the presence of mnhmoneu?ousin
in the apodosis
instead of e]mnhmo<neuon.
The evidence for this present tense is so
slight, though, that it
is only mentioned in a footnote in Lange's
Commentary.3 Thus this is taken as a regular contrary to
fact condition.
Buttmann's apparent
exceptions, then, are either non-existent or are
to be considered mixed
conditions.
1 Nicoll, Testament, I, p. 592.
2 R. C. H. Lenski, The Interpretation of St. Luke's Gospel
(Minneapolis:
Augsburg Publishing House, 1964), p. 867.
3 John Peter Lange, editor,
Commentary on the Holy Scriptures,
24
volumes reprinted in 12 (
1960), XI, p. 187.
110
Significance
of the Tense
The mood employed in the contrary to fact conditions is the
indicative. The only
variety comes in the tenses used, and these are
limited to the
augmented ones: imperfect, aorist and pluperfect.
The
Imperfect Tense
The basic significance of the imperfect tense is to
designate
durative or repeated
action in past time.1 This tense
may appear in both
parts of the
conditional sentence, or in either part in combination with
the other augmented
tenses.
Imperfect in Protasis
and Apodosis
When the imperfect is used in both the protasis and
apodosis,
it implies that the
condition and conclusion both involve durative acts.
The time of the
actions, though, is present, rather than past. Robertson
states this as a
general rule of these conditions: "An unfulfilled condi-
tion about the present
time was expressed in terms of the imperfect
must be determined from
the context: "The Imperfect denotes continued
action; the Aorist a
simple fact; the Pluperfect completed action.
The time is implied in
the context, not expressed by the verb."3 This
1 H. E. Dana and Julius R.
Mantey, A Manual Grammar of the Greek
New Testament (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1966), p. 186.
2 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1013.
3 Ernest DeWitt Burton, Syntax Moods and Tenses in New
Testament
Greek (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1897), p.
103.
111
is the more applicable
view, for even Robertson notes that in Hebrews
11:15 the imperfect is
used of continual action, but in past, not
present time.1 The equation of present time with the
imperfect tense,
while not an absolute
rule, does fit most of the examples in Appendix II.
Westcott summarizes:
In this case the hypothetic
unfulfilled [contrary to fact]
condition and the consequence of its
non-fulfillment are both
regarded (a) generally as present or (b),
if not as present, as
continuous and not definitely complete in
a specific incident.2
This combination is the most frequent (17 examples) type of
contrary to fact
conditions, and a glance at those listed will confirm
Westcott's
generalization. The actions viewed are considered continual
acts, and in the
present time in most cases. The list of examples
could be expanded at
the expense of the pluperfect, for this tense
can be treated as a
real imperfect. Both Westcott3 and Robertson4
recognize this. The
examples in Appendix II conform to verb structure,
not usage, so such
conditions are listed as pluperfects.
Imperfect in the
Protasis Only
Since the aorist tense is more frequent in the apodosis
than the
pluperfect (22 examples
as opposed to 9), the examples considered will
1 A. T. Robertson and W.
Hersey Davis, A New Short Grammar of the
Greek Testament (New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1933), p. 352.
2 Brooke Foss Westcott, The Epistle to the Hebrews (
Macmillan
and Co., 1889), p. 112.
3 Ibid., p. 113.
4 Robertson, Grammar,
p. 1015.
112
be the imperfect-aorist
combination. Again, Westcott: "The hypothetic
unfulfilled [contrary
to fact] condition is regarded as continuous
and not definitely
complete in the past, while the consequence of its
non-fulfillment is
specific and past."1 The imperfect in the protasis
emphasizes continual or
durative action while the aorist in the apodosis
indicates a specific
action.
The New Testament has four examples of this
imperfect-aorist
combination, all of
them in John's Gospel: 11:21, 11:32, 14:28 and 18:30.
In 11:21 (ei] h#n w$de ou]k a@n a]pe<qanen o[
a]delfo<j mou) Martha's sorrowful
statement illustrates
these two ideas. The presence of Jesus, considered
in a durative way,
would have prevented the specific act of Lazarus'
death. In 14:28 (ei] h]gapa?te< me e]xa<rhte a@n)
the imperfect protasis
implies failure on the
part of the disciples to be loving Jesus as they
ought to at that time
("If you loved me"). The aorist in the apodosis
points to the expected
but lacking joy at His statement of return to the
Father. Robertson
explains this in some detail.2 18:30 (ei] mh> h#n ou$toj
kako>n
poiw?n, ou]k a@n soi paredw<kamen au]to<n) follows the
same pattern, for
the imperfect h#n in the protasis refers
to the continual character of
Jesus as perceived by
His accusers, and the aorist paredw<kamen
refers
to the specific, and
historically past act of delivering Him to Pilate.
1 Westcott, Hebrews, p. 117.
2 A. T. Robertson, Word Pictures in the New Testament, 6
vols.
(Nashville: Broadman
Press, 1930), VI, p. 256.
113
Imperfect in the
Apodosis Only
The combination of aorist in the protasis and imperfect in
the
apodosis is one where
"The hypothetic unfulfilled [contrary to fact]
condition is placed as
a definite incident in the past, while the
result of the
non-fulfillment is regarded as continuous in the present."1
Westcott translates
Hebrews 4:8 (ei] kate<pausen .
. . ou]k a@n e]la<lei) as
"if rest had been
given at the entrance into
continued to speak as
He does now."2 John
15:22—ei] mh> h#lqon kai>
e]le<lhsa
au]toi?j, a[maqti<an ou]k ei@xosan--("if I had not
come and spoken to
them, they would not
have had sin") combines an aorist in the protasis
with an imperfect
apodosis, placing the protasis in the past and the
apodosis in the
present, as Lenski explains.3
The
Aorist Tense
The basic significance of the aorist tense is to denote
"an action
simply as an event,
without in any sense defining the manner of its occur-
rence."4
Robertson terms this the basic tense of the language and says
"A statement in
the indicative would naturally be in the aorist unless
there is reason to put
it in some other tense, and so of the other modes."5
1 Westcott, Hebrews, p. 113.
2 Ibid., p. 113.
3 R. C. H. Lenski, The Interpretation of
(Minneapolis:
Augsburg Publishing House, 1961), p. 1060.
4 Dana and Mantey, Grammar, p. 194.
5 Robertson and
114
Aorist in the Protasis
and Apodosis
The general concept of the aorist tense continues in the
contrary to fact
conditions. When used in both the protasis and apodosis
it speaks of "a
past and completed result which would have ensued if
the unfulfilled
condition had been realized."1 Westcott further
emphasizes the past
time concept by describing the aorist-aorist form of
this condition as one
where "The hypothetic unfulfilled [contrary to
fact] condition and the
result of the non-fulfillment are regarded as
definite incidents
wholly within the past."2 In Classical Greek
conditions the aorist
could refer to events in present time, but this
has not carried over
into the Koine.3
The New Testament contains nine examples of this
construction.
There are two sets of
parallel passages (Matthew 24:22 - Mark 13:20
and Matthew 11:21 -
Luke 10:13). Romans 9:29 is a quote from
the
Septuagint. Westcott illustrates his position by
translating I Corin-
thians 2:8 (ei] e@gnwsan . . . ou]k a@n
e]stau<rwsan) as "if at the crisis of
their trial they had
known . . . they would not have crucified."4 The
phrase "crisis of
their trial" is reading too much into the aorist, for
1 Westcott, Hebrews, p. 111.
2 Ibid., p. 113.
3 Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, p. 151
4 Westcott, Hebrews,
p. 113.
115
it simply denotes an
event without specifying anything about the action,
especially durative or
punctiliar characteristics. But the actions
are both restricted to
past time by this tense in the protasis and
apodosis of this
condition.
Of the examples listed in Appendix II, all are referring to
past
events with the
possible exception of Matthew 24:22. But here the
aorist indicative is
used with its normal force, for the point of view
is that prophetic
judgments are past. This is in keeping with "the
genius of
prophecy."1
Aorist in Either the
Protasis or the Apodosis
The specific references and discussion given above
regarding
the aorist-imperfect
combinations may be repeated here. Each of these
examples follows the
general rule already stated: The aorist, whether
in the protasis or
apodosis, considers the event simply as an act in
past time without indicating
anything about how that act was carried
out. This contrasts
with the imperfect which states continual
action in the present
time (usually).
The
Pluperfect Tense
Robertson calls the pluperfect or past perfect a
"luxury in
Greek," noting
that its use in the New Testament is "current, but not
common."2
As a tense it emphasizes a blend of aorist and imperfect
1 Nicoll, Testament, I, p. 293.
2 Robertson, Grammar,
p. 903.
116
concepts:
As the present perfect is a blending in
idea of the aoristic
(punctiliar) and the durative present (a
sort of durative aoristic
present combined), so the past perfect is
a blend of the aorist and
the imperfect in idea. It is continuance of the
completed state in
past time up to a prescribed limit in the
past.1
Though the usual form of the contrary to fact condition
utilizes
the aorist, the
pluperfect sometimes appears. Eight examples of this
tense in either the
protasis or apodosis or both are given in Appendix
II. Again, these
examples are listed by form, not use.
I John 2:19 may serve to illustrate the distinction between
the
aorist and the
pluperfect (ei] h#san . . .
memenh<keisan a@n), "if they
were . . . they would
have remained." Westcott identifies this verse as
one "where the
pluperfect suggests a continuous state limited at a point
in the past."2
This certainly fits the context of this verse. Since
the important detail
involves the time element, and the pluperfect
as well as the aorist
both indicate actions in the past, no further
discussion of the
pluperfect will be given.
The Use of a@n
in Contrary to Fact Conditions
One of the key characteristics of the contrary to fact
condition
is its use of a@n in the apodosis. This
particle usually appears, but
there are a significant
number of exceptions. Robertson, in fact,
1 Robertson, Grammar, p. 903.
2 Westcott, Hebrews,
p. 112.
116
rejects a@n as an essential part
of any conditional sentence.1 What,
then, is the situation
of this particle?
The Classical
Usage
Since Buttmann notes that the "N.T. writers have in
the main
adhered strictly to the
grammatical model" for this condition, it seems
reasonable to begin
with that usage.2 Goodwin states the form:
“ . . . the past tenses
of the indicative are used in both protasis and
apodosis, and the
apodosis contains the adverb a@n.3
Only certain,
specific exceptions are
permitted:
A peculiar form of potential indicative
without a@n consists of
an infinitive depending on the imperfect
of a verb of
propriety, or possibility, like e@dei, xrnh< or e]xrh<n, ei]ko>j h#n, or
proshke<n.4
All other forms of this
condition use a@n
in the apodosis.
The Koine Usage
As with other points of grammar and syntax, the Koine has
moved from the
Classical usage in the case of a@n.
Although the
sampling represented in
the New Testament is small compared to all of
Koine literature, most
of which has been lost, enough representation is
given to offer some
detailed observations.
1 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1007.
2 Buttmann, Grammar, p. 224.
3 Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, p. 147.
4 Ibid.,
p. 151-152.
117
Verses Omitting a@n
Where does a@n
occur and where does it not? Moulton
states that
there are forty-two
occurrences of a@n
with imperfect, aorist and plu-
perfect indicatives in
the apodoses of contrary to fact conditions.1
Since he only states
the number and gives no specific references, cross-
checking is impossible.
Of the forty-nine contrary to fact conditions
listed in Appendix II,
only ten do not have a@n
in the apodosis: Matthew
26:24; Mark 14:21; John
9:33, 15:22, 15:24, 18:36, 19:11; Acts 26:32;
Romans 7:7 and
Revelation 20:15. This is not an impressively long list,
but sufficient to show
that such absence is more than an accidental
phenomenon. Roberts
adds to the list by listing the following verses
which omit a@n in some manuscripts:
John 8:19, 9:41; Acts 18:14; Hebrews
4:8 and 11:15.2
Unfortunately, he does not give any
indication of the
manuscript evidence,
and this author was unable to identify the variants.
Grammatical
Observations
The grammars recognize that Koine Greek exhibits the
absence of
a@n
far more frequently than does Classical Greek.
this fact in passing,3
while Buttmann states:
1 J. H. Moulton, A Grammar of New Testament Greek. Volume I:
Prolegomena, third edition
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1908), p. 166.
2 J. W. Roberts, "The
Use of Conditional Sentences in the Greek
New
Testament as compared with Homeric, Classical and Helenistic Uses,"
unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Texas, 1955, p. 184.
3
119
. . . such an omission is allowable only
in fixed cases, which
are observed also in the N.T., and may be
reduced to the four
classes that follow.
That is to say, the omission of an
occurs:
a) When a@n has already
been expressed previously in the same connec-
tion with another predicate. This
instance, which often occurs in
the classics and is founded in the nature
of the case, is accidentally
not to be met with in the text of the
N.T.; but it occurs once
only as a various reading of cod. A in
Luke xvii. 6.
b) When the predicate (or the copula) to
which it belongs is also
dropped, as I Cor. xii. 19 . . . .
c) Where the apodosis contains such a
predicative term as e@dei,
kalo<n h#n, h]du<nato etc
d) Lastly, a@n
is dropped for rhetorical reasons: where, though the
fact itself is impossible or improbable,
the orator in the vivacity
of his thought desires to represent it as
actually having occurred,
or at least, as almost taken place.l
Blass-Debrunner notes
that "the addition of a@n
to the apodosis is no
longer
obligatory."2 Robertson
summarizes the discussion:
Sometimes, again, a@n
was not employed because the context made it
plain that it is the second-class
condition, as in Jo. 15:22 . . .
So also as to verse 24. In the same way
the absence of a@n with ou]k
ei@xej in Jo. 19:11 still leaves it clear by
the following clause
that we have a second class condition. So
again verbs of fitness
or propriety like kalo<n h#n (Matt. 26:24) and ou] kaqh<ken (Acts 26:32),
and obligation like e@dei (Matt. 23:23).3
Where does this leave the question? First of all, the
omission
of a@n is admitted by all
grammarians. The particle is not essential
for the formation of
the contrary to fact condition. Second, there are
suggested rules
regarding its absence. Buttmann lists four, Robertson
two. Do the observed
examples fit these rules? Matthew 26:24, Mark
1 Buttmann, Grammar, pp. 225-226.
2 Blass-Dehrunner, Grammar, p. 182.
3 Robertson, Shorter
Grammar, p. 352.
120
14:21, John 9:33 and
Acts 26:32 agree with the rules of both Buttmann
and Robertson. John
15:22 and 24 surrender to Robertson's rule that
context makes clear
what condition is intended. This leaves John 19:11,
Romans 7:7 and
Revelation 20:15. Buttmann explains Romans 7:7 as an
omission for rhetorical
reasons, but does not explain the other two.1
Rather than pursue an explanatory rule for all cases, it
seems
more reasonable to
admit that there is no universal principle accounting
for the omission of a@n.
Though stated in another context, Robertson's
observation that
"There is no principle involved in a@n,
simply custom"
may well describe the
situation in the New Testament.2
The
Significance of a@n
Since most of the contrary to fact conditions use a@n in the
apodosis, it is
necessary to consider the significance of this particle.
Moulton puts it this
way:
The addition of a@n
to an indicative apodosis produced much the
same effect as we can express in writing
by italicising "if":
if
he had anything, he gave it. Or "if he had anything, in that
case (a@n) he gave
it," alike suggest by their emphasis that the
condition was not realized.3
Robertson finds the New Testament in agreement with this
observation.4 @An, then, strengthens the
"if" aspect of the apodosis,
1 Buttmann, Grammar, p. 226.
2 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1007.
3 Moulton, Prolegomena, p. 200.
4 Robertson, Grammar,
p. 1014.
121
and would naturally be
superfluous when the apodosis verb contained that
significance within
itself. This, then, is the basis for the grammarians
identifying certain
types of verbs as ones which are used without a@n.
The Meaning of the Contrary to
Fact Condition
General
Observations
The contrary to fact condition has been given many
different
titles as grammarians
have tried to encapsulate its significance:
"Condition
Determined as Unfulfilled,"1 "Condition with Supposition
Contrary to Fact,"2
"Condition Contrary to the Fact,"3 and "Second
Class Condition."4
Dana and Mantey give the basic meaning
of this
condition as
The premise is assumed to be contrary
to fact in this class,
and only the past tenses of the indicative
are used. As suggested
above, this condition states a thing as if
it were untrue or unreal,
although in actual fact it may be true, as
the first example below
[Matthew 26:24] shows.5
Goodwin presents his view:
When the protasis states a present or
past supposition, implying
that the condition is not or was not
fulfilled, and the apodosis
expresses what would be (or would have been)
the result if that
condition were (or had been) fulfilled,
the past tenses of the
indicative are used in both protasis and
apodosis, and the apodosis
contains the adverb a@n.6
1 Robertson, Shorter Grammar, p. 162.
2 Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, p. 147.
3 Winer, Grammar, p. 291.
4 Robertson, Shorter Grammar, p. 351
5 Dana and Mantey, Grammar, p. 289.
6 Goodwin, Moods
and Tenses, p. 147.
122
Robertson elaborates:
The premise is assumed to be contrary to
fact. The thing in itself
may be true, but it is treated as untrue. Here again the
condition
has only to do with the statement, not with the actual fact . .
. .
Surely the ind. is the mode for positive
and negative statements,
for directness of statement and clarity
of expression. But one must
emphasize the words "statement"
and "expression." The ind. does
not go behind the face value of the
record.1
The actual facts of the
case, whether the supposition is true or not,
"is a more difficult
matter. This idea has to be conveyed by suggestion."2
Specific
Examples
Some examples may suffice to illustrate these concepts in
action. First, Jesus'
statement to His detractors in John 5:46
represents a contrary
to fact condition in present time: ei]
ga>r
e]pisteu<ete Mwu*sei?,
e]pisteu<ete a@n e]moi<. The
statement refers to the
current state of
affairs concerning the belief of the Jews, and the
imperfect tense shows.
Jesus' statement assumes that they were not
believing Moses, hence
they were not believing Him. It may be para-
phrased, If you were
believing Moses, which you are not, then you would
be believing Me, which
you are not."
Galatians 4:15 uses aorist indicatives in both parts of the
condition, and omits a@n in the apodosis: ei]
dunato>n tou>j o]fqalmou>j
u[mw?n e]coru<cantej e]dw<kate
moi. Paul
is reflecting upon the Galatians'
previous attitude
toward him. The contextual time is past, and the
1 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1013.
2 Ibid.,
p. 1014.
123
suggested action
clearly impossible. "If it were possible, which it
wasn't, you would have
given my your eyes after you took them out, which
you didn't."
Luke 7:39 is presented by Robertson as an example where the
assumption goes contrary
to the actual facts: ou$toj
ei] h#n o[ profh<th,
e]gi<nwsken
a@n.
He points out that the Pharisee was
assuming that Jesus
was not the prophet and
thus ignorant of the moral nature of the woman.1
In point of fact, Jesus
was the prophet and did know about the woman.
He was not ignorant,
the Pharisee was. This illustrates Robertson's
observation that the
actual situation must be determined by data outside
the condition. The
condition only presents the statement, not the
situation.
The Translation of the Contrary to Fact
Condition
General
Observations
Robertson termed the contrary to fact condition a
"somewhat
difficult
condition."2 The
difficulty to which he referred was not the
construction, which is
quite regular, but the translation. It is hard
to communicate both the
force of the condition (the assumption that the
condition is contrary
to fact) and the tense of the verb (imperfect,
aorist or pluperfect).
One of the most concise attempts at defining
the meaning and
translation of this category of conditions is found in
1 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1013.
2 Ibid.,
p. 1012.
124
Westcott's commentary
on Hebrews. First, he explains the meaning of the
condition:
Two main cases arise. In one (1) the
protasis expressed by ei]
with the indicative is followed by the
imperfect indicative with a@n.
The thought here is of a present or
continuous result which would
have been seen now if the unfulfilled
supposition had been realized.
In the other (II), the protasis expressed
by ei] with the indicative
is followed by the aorist indicative
with a@n. The thought here is
of a past and completed result which
would have ensued if the
unfulfilled condition had been realized.1
Westcott obviously is dealing with the apodoses rather than
the protases, but this
is where the results are stated. The key problem
in rendering the entire
sentence into English is the precise statement,
not only of the supposition,
but of the anticipated results. He
continues, noting some
serious problems confronting the translator:
No uniform rendering in English is
able to give the exact
force of these two different forms of
expression. It has become
common to translate (1) by if (he) had . . . (he) would . . .; and
(II) by if (he) had . . . (he) would have . . . . But if this
rendering is adopted, the definite
negation of the fact in the
apodosis of (I) is commonly lost or
obscured, and the statement
appears to be simply hypothetical and to
suggest a possible ful-
filment in the future. On the other hand
if (I) and (II) are
translated in the same manner, the
suggestion of the present or
continuous fact in (I) is obliterated.4
Is Westcott's observation correct? Is it impossible to
accurately
convey both aspects of
the contrary to fact condition? If one is
looking for a simple
translation formula into which the various parts
of the condition are
inserted to find the correct English equivalent,
1 Westcott, Hebrews, p. 111.
2 Ibid.,
p. 112.
125
then he will be
frustrated. Such a translation formula does not exist
in this case, nor in
any other situation. In some cases, the translator
may have to sacrifice
either the concept of assumed negation or the
Aktionsart
of the verb. But in others, each may be preserved through a
judicious choice of
English phrasiology.
Four such examples are given in Westcott's commentary on
Hebrews:
Hebrews 8:4 (both
protasis and apodosis = imperfect), Hebrews 4:8
(protasis = aorist,
apodosis,= imperfect), John 14:28 (protasis =
imperfect, apodosis =
aorist) and I Corinthians 2:8 (protasis and
apodosis = aorist). The
major versions used for comparison of his
translations are the, Authorized Version, the New American Standard Bible,
the New International Version, and the
Hebrews 8:4
ei]
me>n ou#n h#n e]pi> gh?j, ou]d ] a}n h#n i[ereu<j
Westcott.--"if he had been now invested with
such an office . .
he would not be as he
now is . . ."1
Authorized Version.--For if he were on earth, he
should not be
a priest.
New American Standard Version.--Now if He were on
earth, He
would not be a priest
at all.
New International Version.--If he were on earth, he
would not be
1 Westcott, Hebrews,
p. 112.
126
a priest.
be a priest at all.
Hebrews 4:8
ei] ga>r
au]tou>j ]Ihsou?j kate<pausen,
ou]k a@n peri> a@llaj e]la<lei
meta> tau?ta h[me<raj
Westcott.--"if
rest had been given at the entrance into
God would not have
continued to speak as He does now . . ."1
Authorized Version.--For if Jesus had given them
rest, then
would he not afterward
have spoken of another day.
New American Standard: Bible.--For if Joshua had
given them
rest, He would not have
spoken of another day after that.
New International Version.--For if Joshua had given
them rest,
God would not have
spoken later about another day.
not have spoken of
another day later on.
John 14:28
ei]
h]ghpa?te< me, e]xa<rhte a}n o!ti poreu<omai pro>j to<n
pate<ra
Westcott.--"if ye had now been loving me . . .
ye would at the
1 Westcott, Hebrews,
p. 113.
127
moment of my saying . .
."1
Authorized Version.--If ye loved me, ye would
rejoice.
New American Standard Bible.--If you loved Me, you
would have
rejoiced.
New International Version.--If you loved me, you
would be glad
that I am going to the
Father.
to the Father.
I Corinthians 2:8
ei]
ga>r e@gnwsan, ou]k a}n to>n ku<rion th?j do<chj e]stau<rwsan
Westcott.--"if at the crisis of their trial
they had known . . .
they would not have
crucified. . . “2
Authorized Version.--for had they known it, they
would not have
crucified the Lord of
glory.
New American Standard Bible.--for if they had
understood it,
they would not have
crucified the Lord of Glory.
New International Version.--for if they had
[understood it], they
would not have
crucified the Lord of glory.
1 Westcott, Hebrews, p. 113.
2 Ibid.,
p. 113.
128
crucified the Lord of
glory.
Conclusion
What does this comparison demonstrate? Several things;
first,
the problems raised by
Westcott need not interfer with an accurate
translation. English
communicates a significant amount of information
by context, and that
fact helps translators handle both aspects of
the contrary to fact
condition. The clear implication of the context
of I Corinthians 2:8
underscores the negative assumption of the
condition. Further, the
use of the English pluperfect assists this
idea, as well as
reflecting the aorist verbs. Other English tenses
adequately reflect the
imperfect tense, as the examples show. Westcott's
general observation
accurately sums up the situation: "Each case there-
fore must be considered
by itself in order that the translator may
convey the truest
impression of the original with regard to the context."1
1 Westcott, Hebrews,
p. 112.
CHAPTER IV
THE
PROBABLE CONDITION
Introduction
The next two types of conditional sentences represent the
second
half of the entire
collection: the undetermined conditions. These
present their
conditions as undetermined or doubtful, but with a varying
degree of possible
fulfillment. The previous conditions, the simple
condition and the
contrary to fact condition, enable the speaker to
communicate a definite
assumption in his conditional statement. Either
he assumed it was true,
or he assumed that it was not true.
In the undetermined conditions he states it as a
possibility,
not an actuality or an
impossibility. This distinction is accomplished
by using the moods of
possibility: the subjunctive and the optative.
"Naturally the
indicative is not allowed here."1
This large group, the undetermined conditions, may be sub-
divided into two
classes which differ from each other in the degree of
possibility each
expresses. This difference is found in the moods
employed in them, and
it is as large as the semantical gap between
them:
The difference therefore between the
third and fourth class condi-
tions is just that between the subj. and
the opt. They are both
modes of doubtful, hesitating
affirmation, but the optative is more
1 A. T. Robertson, A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the
Light
of Historical Research (Nashville: Broadman Press, 1934),
p. 1004.
129
remote than the subj. In this type the
premise is not assumed to be
either true or untrue. The point is in
the air and the cloud
gathers round it. But there is less mist
over the subj. than the
opt.1
This chapter will focus
on the third group in Robertson's classification:
those conditions
employing the subjunctive mood in the protasis.
The terminology involved in the analysis of this group of
conditional sentences
has not been standardized. Robertson quotes
from different
grammars, illustrating the variety found in the
literature:
La Roche prefers "objektive Molichkeit"
for the third class and
"subjecktive Molichkeit" for
the fourth class (ei] and the opt.).
This is also the language of Winer,
"objective possibility" and
"subjective possibility."
Farrar prefers the words Possibility,
Impossibility, Slight Probability,
Uncertainty. Radermacher . . .
calls ei] with ind.
"objektiv," ean with subj. "an sich
objektiv,"
ei]
with past tense of ind. "Irrealitat." So it goes.2
The list could be expanded by including the terminology
suggested by modern
grammarians. Dana and Mantey provide the best
descriptive title when
the call it "the more probable future condition."3
Rather than their
cumbersome terms "more probable" and "less probable,"
it seems better to this
author to use "probable" and "possible," the
latter being reserved
for ei] with the optative. If
a sentence is
either probable or
possible it is obviously future. Thus the title
suggested is "The
Probable Condition."
1 Robertson, Grammar, pp. 1004-1005.
2 Ibid., p. 1005.
3 H. E. Dana and Julius R.
Mantey, A Manual Grammar of the
Greek
New Testament (New York: The MacMillan Company,
1966), p. 290.
131
Analysis of the
Probable Condition
The probable condition is the second most frequent
conditional
sentence in the New
Testament and certainly the most debated. While
grammarians generally
agree on its basic form, they continue to debate
its meaning in terms of
implication (degree of probability or
vividness), application
(particular or general) and extent (should it
include ei] with the future
indicative). These and other matters will be
considered below. The
specific analysis of this condition will involve
the particles and verb
forms employed in both the protasis and apodosis.
The
Protasis
The general rule regarding the formation of this condition
is
well recognized:
"The protasis is usually expressed by e]a<n
(or a@n) with
the Subjunctive; the
apodosis by the Future Indicative or by some other
form referring to
future time."1 In a few examples ei], rather than e]a<n,
is used with the
subjunctive.2 The discussion
of the protasis, then,
begins with the
particles.
@An
in the Protasis
As indicated in Appendix III, a@n in the protasis is
limited to
the Gospel of
John--5:19, 13:20, 16:23 and 20:23 (2 examples). In
addition to these
verses, Moulton and Geden list John 12:32; Acts 2:45,
l Ernest DeWitt Burton, Syntax of Moods and Tenses in New Testa-
ment Greek (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1897), p. 104.
2 Robertson, Grammar,
p. 1017.
132
4:35 and 9:2 as other
examples of this construction.1 However, John 13:32
and Acts 9:2 read e]a<n in current
critical texts, while Acts 2:45 and 4:35
are identified by Robertson
as the "Regular Greek idiom for comparative
clauses with a@n and imperfect
indicative corresponding precisely with
the three proceeding
imperfects (Robertson, Grammar, p.
967)."2
The use of a@n then,
in these conditions is limited to the
Gospel of John. While
interesting, this observation does not interfere
with the basic meaning
of the condition. Indeed, a@n
is technically
part of all the others,
for e]a<n is simply ei] and a@n.3
Ei]
in the Protasis
Ei]
does occur in the protasis of the probable condition with
verbs in the
subjunctive mood. While unusual, it is not unexpected,
for Koine Greek
represents a stage in the development of the language
in which the absolute
distinctions between ei]
and e]a<n were beginning
to
weaken. "Indeed,
as we sometimes have e]a<n
and the fut.
class condition, so we
occasionally meet ei]
and the subj. in the third
class [probable]
condition."4 As might be expected, the examples are
few; only eight are
listed in Appendix III. Most of these passages may
be questioned on
textual grounds.
1 W. F. Moulton and A. S.
Geden, eds., A Concordance to the Greek
Testament (Edinburgh: T.
& T. Clark, 1967), p. 55.
2 A. T. Robertson, Word Pictures in the New Testament, 6
volumes
(Nashville:
Broadman Press, 1930), III, p. 39.
3 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1007.
4 Ibid.,
p. 1017.
133
Moulton finds only one absolute example:
The latter [ei]
with the subjunctive] occurs only in I Co 145,
where the peculiar phrase accounts for it
. . . . We should hardly
care to build much on Rev 115.
In Lk 913 and Phil 311
we probably
have deliberative subjunctives,
"unless we are to go and buy," and
"if after all I am to attain . . .
to apprehend."1
For the few New Testament instances
there is possibly in each
case a special reason. Thus in Luke 9:13
there is probably a
mixture of a conditional clause and a
deliberative question: unless
indeed—are we to go? i.e., unless indeed we are to go. In I Cor.
14:5 and I Thess. 5:10 a preference for
the more common ei] mh< and
e]a<nte
. . . e]a<nte
over the somewhat unusual e]a<n mh< and e]a<nte . . .
e]a<nte may have led to
the use of the former in spite of the fact
that the meaning called for a Subjunctive
. . . . It is doubtful,
however, whether the discovery of any
difference in force between ei]
with the Subjunctive and say with the
Subjunctive in these latter
passages is not an over-refinement.2
Perhaps
sentence, for Winer
does find a distinction between the two constructions:
The distinction between ei]
with the Subjunctive and ean or an is
thus defined . . .: ei]
puts the condition simply, but when used ,
with the Subjunctive represents it as
depending on the result; e]a<n
also does the latter, but less
decisively, inasmuch as the a@n
represents the condition as dependent on
accidental circumstances,
if
anyhow or perhaps.3
Winer seeks to apply
this to several statements taken from Classical
Greek. He notes that in
the latter, i.e. Byzantine authors, "a fixed
distinction between ei] with the Subj. and the
same particle with the
1 J. H. Moulton, A Grammar of New Testament Greek. Volume 1:
Prolegomena, third edition
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1908), p. 187.
2
3 Winer, Grammar, p. 295.
4 Ibid.,
p. 295.
134
whether Paul had in
view the nice discrimination specified above."1
Winer and
true explanation is
only possible by approach from the Greek standpoint.
And that is by the mode, not by ei] or e]a<n."2
This, then, is where the
matter rests.
The Tenses Used in the
Protasis
Introductory Concepts
Before discussing the specific examples of the New
Testament
it will be advantageous
to survey the significance of the various tenses
in the subjunctive
mood.
The Relationship of Tense to Time.--The concept of
tense
deals with the action
of the verb under two headings: aspect and time.
Aspect refers to the
way the action is stated, which may be undefined
(aorist), continual
(present, imperfect) or completed (perfect). It is
this characteristic
which is dominant, for "time is but
a minor
consideration
in the Greek tenses.”3 Others agree: "One must dismiss
all notion of time if
he wishes to understand the Greek verb."4 "Even
in the indicative the
time element is subordinate to the kind of action
1 Winer, Grammar, p. 295.
2 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1007.
3 Dana and. Mantey, Grammar, p. 171. Italics theirs.
4 A. T. Robertson and W.
Hersey Davis, A New Short Grammar
the Greek
Testament (Baker
Book House, 1977 reprint of 1933 edition),
p. 293.
135
expressed."1
Greek verb tenses are employed to describe the action
involved
in terms of aspect
rather than time. All aspects of action may occur at
any time.
The Relationship of Tense to Mood.--Mood is the term
used to
describe the
relationship of the action of the verb to reality. The
indicative mood affirms
the reality of the action described. The subjunc-
tive, optative and
imperative moods present the action as "objectively
possible,"
"subjectively possible," and "volitionally possible,"
respectively.2 The subjunctive mood, of course, is the
important one in
light of this study.
"if [the action] is viewed as contingent upon
certain existing and
known conditions--being objectively possible--the
subjunctive is
used."3 This is the
situation with the probable
condition. It is stated
as a possibility or probability without any
implication about its
actuality or impossibility.
How does the tense relate to the mood of a verb? The main
concept of tense is
aspect of the action described, and each mood may
express each aspect
without regard to time. Potential moods must, by
definition, refer to an
action yet unrealized, i.e. future. And that
concept is uniquely
common to all the moods.4
1 Robertson, Grammar, p. 825.
2 Dana and Mantey, Grammar, p. 166.
3 Ibid., p. 166.
4 Robertson, Shorter
Grammar, p. 293.
136
The Relationship of Tense to Time.--Absolute time
can only be
assigned to an action
if it is a real entity. Only then may it be spoken
of as past, present or
future. Absolute time, then, may be applied to
those actions described
by the indicative mood only. Potential moods
describe actions not
yet realized, hence no absolute time references may
be assigned to them.
"The time element is entirely absent from the
potential moods."1
Any concept of time connected with a subjunctive verb
will be relative,
implied by the context. There is no time in the
subjunctive.
These concepts are recognized by all grammarians.
example, discusses them
in terms of the three main tenses:
The Present of the Dependent Moods is
used to represent an
action in progress or as repeated. It may
be altogether timeless,
the action being thought of without
reference to the time of its
occurrence; or its time, as past, present,
or future, may be
involved in the function of the mood, or
may be indicated by the
context.
The Aorist of the Dependent Moods
represents the action expressed
by the verb as a simple event or fact,
with reference either to its
progress [or lack thereof] or to the
existence of its result . . . .
The
time of the action, if indicated at all, is shown, not by
the tense, but by some fact outside of it.
The Perfect of the Dependent Moods is
used of completed action.
As in the Indicative, the thought may be
directed both to the action
and its result, or only to the result.
The time of the action is
indicated, as in the Present and Aorist,
not by the tense but by the
context or by the function of the mood.2
The statistics indicate that the New Testament prefers the
three protasis tenses
in this order: Aorist Subjunctive = 177 examples,
1 Dana and Mantey, Grammar, p. 167.
2
137
Present Subjunctive =
105 examples, and Perfect Subjunctive = 7 examples.
This is what one would
expect from this "aorist-loving language."1 The
aorist is preferred by
almost two to one over the present, with the
perfect almost
disappearing from sight.
Tenses Employed in the
Protasis
The Present Tense.--The present tense describes the
action of
the verb in terms of
continual or linear action. The use of this
tense in the protasis
of a probable condition states the condition or
hypothesis as a linear
or progressive action. The examples in the
New Testament should be
seen in this light. Matthew 8:2, for example,
presents the leper as
conditioning his healing upon the continual
attitude of Jesus
toward him, perhaps speaking to his abiding character
rather than a
changeable aspect of His will: e]a<n qe<lhj, du<nasai me
kaqari<sai
("if you are willing, you are able to cleanse me"). Jesus was
referring to His
continual ministry and Messianic claims when He stated
in John 5:31: e]a<n e]gw> marturw? peri>
e]mautou?, h[ marturi<a mou ou]k
e@stin
a]lhqh<j.
Paul speaks of the regular actions of
the church when members
have legal problems
with other believers in the same tense: biwtika> me>n
ou#n
krih<ria e]a<n e@xhte . . . tou<touj kaqi<zete
(I Corinthians 6:4).
Consideration of the
mood of the protasis throws a significant amount
of light upon the
nature of the statement, light which the English often
fails to reflect.
1 Robertson, Grammar,
p. 831.
138
The Aorist Tense.--The aorist tense is used to
present the fact
of an action without
defining anything about it either in terms of aspect
or time. "Action
may be regarded as simple, undefined (aoristic,
a-o]ri<stoj,
from a]ori<zw,
'I do not define') action. The common term for
this is punctiliar
action."1 Chamberlain's
statement introduces a
misconception, for the
term "punctiliar" does define the action. It
would be better to
state it as undefined and leave it at that. "The
aorist denotes an
action simply as an event, without in any sense
defining the manner of
its occurrence."2 It
communicates neither a
specific aspect
(punticiliar or continual) nor a specific time (past,
present or future). It
merely states the action.
This distinction is maintained in the probable condition.
Matthew 5:46, for
example, simply presents the act of love on the
part of Jesus'
listeners without specifying anything about that act:
e]a<n
ga>r a]gaph<shte tou>j a]gapw?ntaj u[ma?j, ti<na misqou> e@xete;
("For if
you love those who are
loving you, what reward do you have?").
A better way of seeing the present contrasted with the
aorist
is to consider several
verses which utilize both types of verbs. First,
Matthew 21:21 uses a
present and an aorist subjunctive in the protasis,
both with a single
particle e]a<n:
e]a<n e@xhte pi<stin kai> mh>
diakriqh<te ("if
you have faith and do
not doubt"). Lenski compares these two verbs so:
1 Wiiam
New Testament (New York: The
MacMillan Company, 1952), p. 67.
2 Dana and Mantey, Grammar, p. 194.
139
The first verb is a present subjunctive,
for to have faith is a
continuous activity, the second verb is an
aorist subjunctive, for
the doubt deals with the single act
regarding which hesitation
occurs. For the moment the doubt blocks
the faith and prevents
the act faith should accomplish.1
Here Lenski, like
others, misses the point of the non-specific meaning
of the aorist and
attributes the concept of singularlity to it. Perhaps
Broadus comes closer to
the concept with his rendering of "undoubting
faith."2
Jesus does speak of their faith as a
continual thing and
states their doubt as
an action, nothing more.
I Corinthians 14:24 uses the same combination of tenses:
e]a<n de> pa<ntej
profhteu<wsin, ei]se<lqh de< tij a@pistoj h} i]diw<thj,
e]le<gxetai.
("but if all prophesy and an
unbeliever or an uninstructed person
comes it, he is
convicted"). Here the two actions are presented, the
first as a regular,
continual one, the second as an undefined one. The
context obviously
assigns an individual, particular meaning to ei]se<lqh,
but the aorist merely
presents the action. Robertson and Plummer
translate the protasis
as "Whereas, if all should be prophesying, and
there should come in
some unbeliever or ungifted person."3 Lenski is
1 R. C. H. Lenski, The Interpretation of St. Matthew's Gospel
(Minneapolis:
Augsburg Publishing House, 1961), p. 824.
2 John A. Broadus, Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew,
volume I
of
An American Commentary on the New
Testament, Alvah Hovey, ed.
(Philadelphia:
The American Baptist Publication Society, 1886), p. 435.
3 Archibald Robertson and
Alfred Plummer, A Critical and Exegetical
Commentary on
the First Epistle of St. Paul to the
Corinthians,
volume 32
of
The International Critical Commentary on
the Holy Scriptures of the
Old and New
Testaments,
edited by Samuel Rolles Driver, Alfred Plummer
and Charles Augustus
Briggs (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1914), p. 318.
140
closer when he writes
The present subjunctive profhteu<wsin, like lalw?si in v. 23,
pictures the action in progress:
"suppose all are engaged in
propheysing." . . . . The aorist ei]se<lqh, like ei]se<lqwsi in
v. 34, merely marks the fact of the
entrance.1
2 Timothy 2:5 combines the present and aorist subjunctive
forms
of the same verb in the
same protasis: e]a<n
de> kai> a]qlh? tij, ou]
stefanou?tai
e]a>n mh> nomi<mwj a]lqh<sh ("And if anyone
competes as an
athlete, he is not
crowned unless he competes lawfully."). Robertson
and Lenski offer
different interpretations of this passage. First
Robertson:
Note the sharp distinction between athlei (present subjunctive,
engage in a contest in general) and athlesei (first aorist active
subjunctive, engage in a particular
contest). Not "except he have
contended," but simply "unless
he contend" . . . . 2
Lenski sees the
emphasis this way:
. . . but we cannot agree with [Robertson]
when he has the latter
mean "engage in a particular
contest." Both verbs refer to a
particular contest. The present
subjunctive = "if one engages in an
athletic event;" this does not assure
him the wreath or garland
"unless
(now effective aorist subjunctive) he lawfully (as the law
of that event prescribes) completes the
event.3
Neither one is clear in their statement, and both miss the
point
of the undefined
aorist. The present tense sets the context and the
aorist follows
naturally within that setting. There is no need to use
a second present; the
naturally employed aorist fits perfectly. No
1 R. C. H. Lenski, The Interpretation I and II Corinthians
(Minneapolis:
Augsburg Publishing House, 1963), p. 603.
2 Robertson, World Pictures, IV, p. 617.
3 R. C. H. Lenski, The Interpretation of
the Colossians,
to the Thessalonians, to Timothy, to Titus and to Philemon
(Minneapolis: Augsburg
Publishing House, 1961), p. 781.
141
special significance is
attached to the aorist.
The
Apodosis
General Observations
The apodosis of the probable condition is, according to
formed by "the
Future Indicative or by some other form referring to future
time."1
One would expect, then, that the most
common form of the apodosis
would involve future
indicative verbs. Such, however, is not the case.
The examples listed in
Appendix III indicate that the present indicative
is preferred to the future
indicative one hundred eleven to ninty-nine.
Thus the present,
rather than the future, is the dominant tense, but
not by much. Is
considerations show.
The Time of the
Apodosis
First, there is no Question that the probable condition is,
in fact, restricted to
the future time.2 It presents
a conclusion that
is conditioned on a
hypothetical situation which is "up in the air" as
the speaker presents
it. Were it referring to an objective reality or
an impossibility, as
assumed by the speaker, then it would refer to a
real time event: past,
present or future, and employ the indicative mood.
The Tenses of the
Apodosis
Actually all tenses, present, aorist, future and perfect,
are
represented in the
apodosis of these conditions. The major tenses,
1
2 Robertson, Grammar,
p. 1018.
142
though, are the present
and future. Statistically, the tables show
133 present tenses, 53
aorists, 99 futures and 5 perfects. These
verbs represent all
moods: indicative, subjunctive and imperative. In
terms of indicative
verbs there are 111 present indicatives, 8 aorist
indicatives, 99 future
indicatives and 5 perfect indicatives. Obviously
there is no general
principle for choosing the apodosis verb except
the action being
described.
Do these facts create a problem in terms of the future time
of the condition? Not
at all, when one remembers that the primary
function of tense is to
describe the aspect of the action, not the
time. One may present
the contingent act as one that is simply stated
without any defined
aspect (aorist), a progressive act (present and
sometimes future) or,
rarely, an act in a state of completion (perfect).
The same observations
may be offered regarding the mood of the verbs.
The contingent act may
be presented by the speaker as one that will be
actualized upon
realization of the stated condition (indicative), one
that may be realized
(subjunctive) or one that must be realized
(imperative). Each of
these moods makes its unique contribution to
the sense of the whole
conditional statement.
Tenses Employed in the
Apodosis
Several examples of tense and mood combinations found in
the
apodoses of these
conditions will be examined to show how they communi-
cate the actions
involved.
143
The Present Indicative
Although the future indicative seems like the obvious
choice
for these apodoses, it
is second to the present indicative. In light
of this fact it is
interesting that Winer should write:
Hence the consequent clause usually,
contains a Fut. . . . or,
what is equivalent, an Aor, with ou] mh< . . . or an Imperat. . . ,
more rarely a Pres., and then either in
the sense of a Fut. . .
or denoting something permanent . . . or
a general truth . . . .1
The wide use of the present, however, is not surprising,
for
it is frequently used
with a future implication. This "futuristic
present" is
discussed by Robertson who correctly notes that time is
not the key issue:
"Since the pres. ind. occurs for past, present and
future time it is clear
that 'time' is secondary even in the
This use of the present
tense projects a progressive or durative
aspect into the future.
"As examples of the durative present in this
[futuristic] sense take
paradi<dotai
(Mt. 26:45), a]nabai<nomen
(Mk 10:33),
u[pa<gw
a]lieu<ein and e]rxo<meqa
(Jo. 21:3), die<rxomai
(I Cor. 16:5), e@xomen
(2 Cor. 5:1)."3
Dana and Mantey read more into this use
of the present
tense then is justified
when they identify it as one that "denotes an
event which has not yet
occurred, but which is regarded as so certain
that in thought it may
be contemplated as already coming to pass."4
1 Winer, Grammar, p. 293.
2 Robertson, Grammar, pp. 881-882.
3 Ibid., p. 882.
4 Dana and Mantey, Grammar, p. 185.
144
The futuristic present, properly understood, gives the
probable
condition a progressive
aspect when used in the apodosis. Sometimes
this is spoken of as a
point of emphasis upon the speaker's present
confidence, but such
statements do not reflect the proper function of
the present tense.
Robertson follows this erroneous concept:
But ofttimes the conclusion [of the
Probable condition] is stated in
terms of the present either as a present
hope or a vivid projection
into the future (futuristic present). So
in 2 Cor. 5:1, e]a<n kataluqh?,
e@xomen.
The condition is future in conception, but the conclusion
is a present reality, so confident is Paul
of the bliss of heaven.1
Additionally, general rules or maxims often use the present
indicative in the apodosis. Robertson quotes Mark 3:27 (ou] du<natai
ou]dei>j
. . . e]a<n mh> prw?ton dh<sh) as an example.2 This fits the continual
aspect of the present
tense.
apodosis as the mark of
the Present General Supposition.3 He makes this
a separate class of
conditions, but previous discussion has shown that
any condition may be
particular or general as the situation demands.
Two examples may be
offered. Mark 3:27 has already been identified as
a passage
statement of a general
truth and does employ the present tense.
But in contrast, consider Matthew 21:26 – e]a>n de> ei@pwmen. e]c
a]nqrw<pwn,
fobou<meqa to>n o@xlon ("but if we say, 'of men,' we
fear the
1 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1019.
2 Ibid., p. 1019.
3
145
the crowd"). The
context marks this conclusion as a definite conclusion,
limited to a historical
situation. Other examples could be offered to
illustrate the same
point. The suggestion of a special catagory of
probable conditions
termed "present general conditions" as a grammatical
point should be
rejected. It is valid, though, as a contextual
consideration.
The Aorist Indicative
The above discussion on the relationship of time and moods
explains the appearance
of the aorist subjunctive verbs in these condi-
tions, but what of the
aorist indicative? What sense does this type of
verb give the
conclusion of a probable condition?
Robertson offers two explanations. First, he notes that the
aorist may be
considered timeless in all the moods, including the
indicative. "The
aor. ind. is sometimes timeless as is always true of
the other modes . . . That
may be the explanation here."1 His
second explanation is
to accept the normal meaning of the aorist indica-
tive and see a dramatic
rhetorical shift in the sense of the condition:
It is possible also to explain it as a
change of standpoint. The
protasis looks to the future, while the
apodosis turns back to the
past. Such vivid changes in language are
due to the swift
revolution in thought.
The text of Matthew 18:15 is e]a<n sou a]kou<sh, e]ke<rdhsaj to>n
a]delfo<n
sou
("if he listens to you, you have gained your brother").
1 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1020.
2 Ibid.,
p. 1020.
146
The aorist indicative
may, according to Robertson, be considering the
desired act so intently
as to see it completed at some future time in
the mind of the
speaker. Elsewhere, though, he backs off from this
position and identifies
it as "a sort of timeless aorist, a blessed
achievement already
made."1 Hendriksen's
translation "you have (meaning
will
have)
won your brother" reflects this emphasis.2 Lenski stumbles
over technical terms,
trying to place the aorist in the future, but
after another future
act:
Here we have a case in which the
condition looks to the future
while the conclusion turns to the past,
which R[obertson] 1020
attributes to the swift leap of thought.
But this past is a past
only to that future: "thou didst
gain" if thy brother "shall hear."
Moreover, the Greek uses the aorist to
express this past, whereas
the English would prefer the perfect
"hast gained"; yet we do not
regard this as a gnomic aorist
(R[obertson] 842).3
It seems best to the author to take the aorist indicative
in the
normal sense of undefined
aspect rather than time, as Lenski does. It
wraps up the result of
the hypothetical a]kou?sh
in a real, albeit undefined
act.
The Future Indicative
The subjunctive mood of the protasis places the probable
condition into future
time, and one would expect the apodosis to follow.
This is exactly what
happens, regardless of the tense employed in the
apodosis. The second
most common verb form is the future indicative.
1 Robertson, Word Pictures, I, p. 148.
2 William Hendriksen, The Gospel of Matthew (
Book
House, 1973), p. 699.
3 Lenski, Matthew,
p. 700.
147
Like the other tenses,
the future states the apodosis as a future act,
contingent upon the
protasis. No special significance should be read
into this combination
other than an emphasis upon the future time which
is already present in
the condition.
The Perfect Indicative
Verbs in the perfect tense describe an action in the state
of
completion. They
combine the sense of punctiliar (it is completed) with
that of continual (it
remains completed).1 These verbs are used in the
apodosis of the
probable condition to emphasize the state of completion,
that is, the continual
aspect. Winer terms the perfects "equivalent to
Presents,"2
and Robertson agrees, especially in the precept or maxim form
of the condition, as in
Romans 14:23 – o[
diakrino<menoj e]a>n fa<gh
katake<kritai
("the one who doubts is condemned if he eats").3 The four
examples of the perfect
tense apodosis fit these observations.
Verbs in the Imperative
Mood
The imperative mood appears forty times in the probable
condition
apodoses: ninteen
present imperatives and twenty-one aorist imperatives.
The imperative mood, of
course, places an action in the future. This
fits the sense of the
condition as a whole, for the protasis has already
placed the entire
thought in the future through the subjunctive mood.
1 Robertson, Shorter Grammar, p. 302.
2 Winer, Grammar, p. 293.
3 Robertson, Grammar,
p. 1019.
148
Imperative verbs are a
natural occurrence in these conditions
Meaning of the
Probable Condition
The study has proceeded to the point where the meaning of
the
probable condition may
be discussed. There has been much dissension
among the grammarians
on this subject, so the procedure will be to
review the opinions of
various scholars, evaluate their position, and
explore the meaning of
this condition as contrasted with that of the
simple condition.
Review of the
Grammarians
This review will follow the pattern of the second chapter:
first the Classical
scholars and then the Koine scholars.
W. W. Goodwin
Writing from the Classical viewpoint, W. W. Goodwin
describes
these conditions as the
"Future suppositions in more vivid form" which
he explains so:
When a supposed future case is stated distinctly and vividly
(as in English, if I shall go, or if I go),
the protasis has the
Subjunctive with e]a<n (epic ei ke<), and the
apodosis has the future
indicative or some other form of future
time.l
By adding the English
"shall" or "will" Goodwin hopes to add more
emphasis to the
condition. Whether it comes across in the English
translation or not, the
Greek, in his opinion, places emphasis upon
the intensity of the
statement.
1 W. W. Goodwin, Greek Grammar, revised by Charles Burton
Gulick
(Boston: Ginn and Company, 1930), p. 300.
149
The speaker, according to Goodwin, makes no implication
about the
degree of probability
assigned to the condition. The speaker's emphasis
is upon the vividness
or intensity of the statement. As will be seen
later, Goodwin terms
conditions which employ the optative mood "less
vivid conditions."
The basis for his view lies in the futuristic use of the
subjunc-
tive mood:
In the Homeric language the
subjunctive (generally the aorist)
may be used in independent sentences, with
the force of a future
indicative. The negative is ou]
. . . .
This Homeric subjunctive, like the
future indicative, is some-
times joined with ke<
or a@n in a potential sense. This enabled the
earlier language to express an apodosis
with a sense between that
of the optative with a@n
and that of the simple future indicative,
which the Attic was unable to do.1
The subjunctive mood,
then, would be making a simple statement about the
future in a way that
would be less emphatic (or vivid) than the future
indicative, but more so
than the optative.
G. B. Winer
Winer, a Koine grammarian, simply states the case of this
type
of condition as one of
probability without any other alternative being
considered:
Condition with assumption of objective possibility (where
experience will decide whether or not it
is real): if thy friend
should
come (I do not know whether he will come, but the result will
show). Here e]a<n . . . with the
Subjunctive is used.2
Later he writes that
this condition is used "if an objective
1 W. W. Goodwin, Syntax Moods and Tenses (
Company,
1893), p. 97.
2 Winer, Grammar,
p. 291.
150
possibility with the
expectation of a decision is to be expressed."1 The
sense of the probable
condition as Winer sees it, then, is one of a
degree of expected (or
implied) fulfillment, rather than one of vividness
of statement.
Normally
sentences, but here he
departs from Goodwin's scheme by identifying the
probable condition as
the "Future Supposition with More Probability."
His explanation is:
The protasis states a supposition which
refers to the future,
suggesting some probability of its
fulfillment.
The protasis is usually expressed by e]a<n (or a@n) with the
Subjunctive; the apodosis by the Future
Indicative or by some other
form referring to future time.2
understanding of the
sense of this condition is the same. The words
"more
probability," if understood from the speaker's point of view,
better describe the
probable condition than "objective probability."
Blass-Debrunner
Blass-Debrunner also supports the concept of anticipated
fulfill-
ment as the basic
significance of this condition:
(4) ]Ea<n with the
subjunctive denotes that which under certain
circumstances is expected from an existing
general or concrete
standpoint in the present: 'case of
expectation' and 'iterative
case in present time.'3
1 Winer, Grammar,
p. 293.
2
3 Blass-DeBrunner, Grammar, p. 188.
151
Here again the basic
concept is anticipation or expectation of fulfill-
ment, not vividness of
statement.
A. T. Robertson
In his Shorter
Grammar Robertson identifies this condition in
this manner:
This
condition states the condition as a
matter of doubt, but with
some expectation of realization. Hence the
subjunctive is the mode
of doubt used, not the optative, the mode
of still greater doubt.
It is undetermined and so does not use the
indicative mode, but
there is more hope and that marks it off
from the optative.l
Concerning the
subjunctive mood in particular he writes:
The chief difference between the
subjunctive and the optative can
be conveyed by our words probablity [subjunctive] and possibility
[optative].
Both are modes of doubtful assertion, but the optative
is more doubtful.2
His term "doubtful" communicates a concept of
negative
thought that the terms
"probable" or "possible" do not. They are to
be preferred. His
overall concept of the sense of the condition is
correct.
Evaluation of the
Grammarians
Vividness versus
Probability
The first question involves the basic emphasis of this
condition.
Does it stress the
vividness of the condition as seen by the speaker, or
does it speak of an
idea of anticipated fulfillment? The underlying
concept, of course, is
one's view of the force of the subjunctive mood.
1 Robertson, Shorter Grammar, p. 353.
2 Ibid.,
p. 309.
152
Goodwin lays stress
upon the vividness of the statement, locating the
subjunctive between the
indicative and the optative. This evaluation
comes from his analysis
of Classical Greek syntax.
Koine grammarians, in general, support the concept that the
subjunctive reflects
probability or anticipation rather than vividness.
This, for example, is
how Robertson speaks of the basic meaning of this
mood. Thus his
terminology "undetermined, but with prospect of
determination" is
applied to this condition.1 Others
have followed
him: Dana and
Mantey--"More Probable Future Condition,"2 Roberts
(following
Gildersleeve)--"Anticipatory Condition,"3 and
"Future
Supposition with More Probability."4 La Sor represents a unique
position among Koine
grammarians with his acceptance of Goodwin's concept
of vividness as the
basic meaning of this condition. Though he seems to
equate probability with
vividness in his discussion, he prefers the
former terminology in
classification:
Future conditions can only be probable.
But the degree of
probability in the speaker's mind is
variable. There is a more
probable (or "more
vivid") future condition ("If you [will] take
me, I shall go"), and a less
probable (or "less vivid") future
condition ("If you would take me, I
would go"). Because the degree
of probability exists only in the
speaker's mind, many grammarians
prefer the terms "more vivid"
and "less vivid," and avoid
reference to probability.5
1 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1016.
2 Dana and Mantey, Grammar, p. 290.
3 Roberts,
"Conditional Sentences," p. 24.
4
5 William
(Grand Rapids: Wm. B.
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1973), II, p. 222.
153
Of course, the degree of vividness is also a product of the
speaker's mind, hence
the argument could be reversed, for the condition
can and usually does
have contact with external facts. More to the
point, though, is the
fact that La Sor seems to miss the significance
of the two terms.
"Vividness" does not avoid a logical or semantic
difficulty, for it is
not interchangeable with the concept of
probability. As
commonly used, the term refers to the drama, the
intensity behind a
statement. "Probability," on the other hand, has
reference to a more
hopeful, anticipatory concept. It brings fulfillment
closer in terms of
objective reality, not dramatic impact. Among Koine
grammarians La Sor's
"many grammarians" are limited to a class of one:
himself. It seems best
to this author to keep it that way.
New Testament Examples
The deciding factor, though, is the text of the New
Testament.
What does it indicate?
Three examples will be evaluated: Matthew 18:15,
Luke 4:7 and I
Thessalonians 3:8.
Matthew 18:15
The text reads e]a<n
sou a]kou<sh, e]ke<rdhsaj to>n a]delfo<n sou
("if he
hears you, you have
gained your brother"). Is this presenting a situation
in a "more
vivid" manner, or is there a degree of expectation or antici-
pation in the
statement? Although the question is beyond the grammar of
the sentence, the
context and direct implication seem clear: there is a
real hope, a definite
prospect of gaining the sinning brother. The
speaker does not give
the condition a sense of sureness, for he uses the
subjunctive mood. But
he expresses optimistic probability of restoring
154
fellowship with the
sinning brother. Willoughby Allen so interprets the
passage,1 as
do Broadus,2 and Lenski.3 Again, the point in question is
the force of the
condition. It is emphasising, not the dramatic aspect
of the situation, but
the hopeful anticipation of realizing the condition.
Thus the term
"probable condition" better describes the condition.
Luke 4:7
The text reads
su> ou#n
e]a>n proskunh<shj e]nw<pion e]mou?, e@stai sou?
pa?sa
("therefore, if you will worship before me, all this will be yours").
Is the Devil making a
vivid statement, or is he speaking so as to
anticipate the
probability of Jesus' positive response? In the context
of the temptation one
would choose the latter alternative. As both
Nicoll4 and
Hendriksen5 note, the emphasis is upon the anticipated
fulfillment of the
condition rather than the vividness of it. This,
too, is a probable
condition.
I Thessalonians 3:8
Paul writes o!ti
nu?n zw?men e]a>n u[mei?j sth<kete e]n kuri<&
("now we
live if you stand fast
in the Lord"). The historical context of this
1
Gospel According
to S. Matthew,
vol. 26 of The International Critical
Commentary,
edited by Samuel Rolles Driver, Alfred Plummer and Charles
Augustus
Briggs (Edinburgh: T. 6 T. Clark, 1907), p. 197.
2 Broadus, Matthew, p. 387.
3 Lenski, Matthew, pp. 699-700.
4 Nicoll, Testament, I, p. 486.
5 William Hendriksen, The Good of Luke (
Book House, 1978), pp.
236-237.
155
passage argues for the
concept of anticipated, probable fulfillment.
Paul had received
confirmation that the Thessalonian believers were
standing firm in
Christ, and he drew significant encouragement from
their faithfulness. His
statement anticipates continued standing on
their part. The present
indicative in the apodosis reenforces this idea,
considering his future
encouragement in a dramatic form. Commentators
favoring this view
include Ellicott1 and Hendriksen.2
While some examples may be understood as vivid, dramatic
statements, it is clear
that some, if not the greater portion, imply a
probable degree of
fulfillment. Robertson's concept of the subjunctive
mood as one of
expectation or anticipation describes the text of the
New Testament better
than Goodwin's concept of vividness.
Since the basic sense of this condition is future, and the
mood
employed presents an
anticipated or probable fulfillment, this author
has selected the title
"probable condition." Probable in this sense is
contrasted with
possible, as will be seen when the optative mood is
discussed.
"Probable" also communicates some degree or amount of
expectation, which this
condition contains. All in all, this term is the
best one for a one-word
description of the significance of this type of
condition.
1 Charles J. Ellicott, Commentary on the Epistles to the Thessa-
lonians (
edition),
pp. 42-43.
2 William Hendriksen, I and II Thessalonians (
Book House, 1964), p.
88.
156
Relationship with the
Simple Condition
A final step in the discussion of the probable condition is
to evaluate its
relationship with the simple condition.
Opinions of the
Grammarians
Goodwin and those following him, it will be remembered,
classify conditional
sentences with respect to the time involved in
them: "The most
obvious natural distinction is that of (a) present
and
past
conditions and (b) future
conditions."1 Gildersleeve, Robertson
and others classify
them in terms of their relationship to reality:
those presented by the
speaker as real, and those presented as potential.
Each of these two
groups may be divided into two. The first divides
into those presented as
actual and those presented as impossible. The
second group divides
into those stated as more likely to be fulfilled
and those presented as
less likely. The suggested terms for these two
concepts are
"probable" and "possible."
Observations of the New
Testament
Enough has been said to suggest that this distinction is
main-
tained in the New
Testament. But does the text itself support such a
conclusion? The answer
is Yes, and a brief consideration of several
passages which use both
conditions will support this conclusion.
John 13:17.--Both a simple and a probable condition
are used
in conjunction with a
single apodosis in John 13:17—ei]
tau?ta oi@date
maka<rioi<
e]ste e]a>n poih?te au]ta< ("if you know
these things, you will be
1 Goodwin, Moods
and Tenses, p. 139.
157
blessed if you do
them"). The simple condition states the matter with
an assumption of
reality, hence Jesus is saying, "If you know these
things, and I am
assuming that you do . . . ." The last member of the
verse is the protasis
of a probable condition. The two protases are
both connected to the
one apodosis makarioi este.
What, then, can be made of this situation? Godet's terminology
is ambiguous: "Ei], if, 'if truly.' as is really the case; it is the
general supposition; e]a<n, in case that; it is the more particular
condition."1
He seems to be using the term
"particular" in the sense
of anticipation or probability,
as his interpretation indicates. But
the specific term is
misleading at best.
Nicoll recognizes the difference: "ei] oi@date,
'if ye know,' as
you do know; e]a<n poih?te,
a supposition." "The knowing is objectively
granted, the doing
subjectively conditioned."2 This, of course, is the
same as Godet. Lenski
argues at length for this distinction:
The first is a condition of reality:
"If you know these things,"
for Jesus rightly assumes that they do
know them . . . .
But,
of course, only "if you keep doing them." Doing is
emphatic over against mere knowing. The
condition is now one of
expectancy, "if you shall be doing
them." Jesus expects it of them,
yet it is possible that they may
disappoint him--will they? the
condition asks.3
Robertson continues this line of reasoning: "Here we
have the
first and third class
conditions happily combined with a clear distinc-
1 Godet, John, II, p. 252.
2 Nicoll, Testament, I, pp. 187-188.
3 R. C. H. Lenski, The Interpretation of
(Minneapolis: Augsburg
Publishing House, 1961), p. 929.
158
tion. Jesus assumes the
knowledge as a fact, but the performance is-
doubtful."1
Roberts accepts this reasoning,2
but
another way. Setting
aside Robertson's comment on "doubtful," he
explains the verse so:
"Jesus regards their present knowledge as either
existing or not--that
matter is settled. But he regards their perfor-
mance as possible or
probable in the future."3 Actually, both Battle
and Robertson are
saying the same thing. The term "doubtful" is used by
Robertson as a contrast
to the factuality assumed in the first statement.
"Doubtful"
does mean "possible or probable."
The comparison of the two conditions illustrates the way
each of them presents
its concept. The simple condition assumes that
the disciples know the
facts under discussion. The probable condition
anticipates their
performance, their application of these facts. But
the speaker does not
assume that such actions will happen.
Acts 5:38-39.--Another interesting combination of
conditions is
found in Acts 5:38-39—o!ti e]a>n h# e]c a]nqrw<pwn, h[
boulh< au!th h} to> e@rgon
tou?to,
kataluqh<setai: ei] de> e]k qeou? e]stin, ou] dunh<sesqe katalu?sai
au]tou<j
("for if this purpose or work is of men, it will be destroyed;
but if it is of God,
you will not be able to destroy these men").
Is Gamaliel stating the
first condition as a vivid future condition and
1 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1019, also Word Pictures, V, p. 241.
2 Roberts,
"Conditional Sentences," p. 226.
3
159
the second as a simple
condition, or is he communicating certain assump-
tions about the infant
Church?
The fact that Gamaliel, a leader of the Pharisees, offers
this
advice and employes a
simple condition in so doing has caused some
commentators to view
him a sympathetic toward Christianity. Alexander
even refers to an
"old opinion" that Gamaliel was a secret believer on
this basis, but he
himself does not hold to that view) Nicoll puts
the case cautiously:
. . . it has sometimes been thought that
the change of mood from
subjunctive to indicative, "but if it
is of God," as if indicating
that the second supposition were the more
probable (c4. Gal. i. 8, 9),
indicates sympathy on the part of
Gamaliel.2
Robertson identifies Gamaliel's motive for changing
conditions
in the politics of the
situation:
Gamaliel gives the benefit of the doubt to
Christianity. He assumes
that Christianity is of God and puts the
alternative that it is of
men in the third class. This does not, of
course, show that
Gamaliel was a Christian or an inquirer.
He was merely willing to
score a point against the Sadducees.3
emphasis of the
conditions in terms of their relationship to reality:
It seems better, rather, to view
Gamaliel's speech from the stand-
point of aspect. Whether the new sect and
its miraculous power were
from God, is a settled fact which nothing
can change. If, on the
other hand, it is of men, then future
events will show it to be so--
an alternative Gamaliel could have
considered probable, even though
he used ei] with the indicative.4
1 J. A. Alexander, Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles
(Grand
Rapids:
Zondervan Publishing House, 1956 reprint of 1875 edition),
pp.
237-238.
2 Nicoll, Testament, II, p. 161.
3 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1018.
4
160
two conditional
clauses. The first one, the probable condition, sets the
tone of the entire
statement. The whole statement is put into future
time. The first
condition is a probable condition; Gamaliel stated the
case so as to imply an
anticipated, probable fulfillment. It will
probably prove to be of
men. The second condition, a simple one,
considers the
connection between Christianity and God. The time is
still future, and the
indicative mood presents the situation in an
aspect of reality. All
things are known to God, and He certainly knows
the truth about this
new sect. Gamaliel does shift to the indicative
mood in his second condition,
not so much to give Christianity the
benefit of the doubt,
but to acknowledge that God certainly knows the
true situation. The
simple condition provides the means to express this
assumption.
I Corinthians 10:27-28.--The general topic of
Christian conduct
in the Corinthian
culture led Paul to discuss the proper response of a
believer if he was
invited to an unbeliever's home and then confronted
with a difficult
situation. These two hypothetical cases are discussed
in two conditional
sentences, the first a simple condition, the second
a probable condition-- (verse 27) ei@ tij kalei ? u[ma?j tw?n
a]pi<stwn kai>
qe<lete poreu<esqai, pa?n to>
paratiqe<menon u[mi?n e]sqi<ete . . . . (verse 28)
e]a<n
de< tij u[mi?n ei@ph: tou?to i[ero<qcto<n e]stin, mh> e]sti<ete.
Again the two
conditions are set side
by side, and again an opportunity is given to
evaluate the relative
meanings of the two. The difference is more than
just time. The first,
the simple condition, presents the invitation as
161
an assumed reality.
Paul states the case, at least for the sake of
argument, that
believers will be invited over to unbeliever's homes
for dinner. But in this
social setting a second situation might arise.
The believer might be
confronted with the fact that his dinner had been
offered to an idol.
This situation, Paul assumes, would be less likely
to confront a Christian
than the invitation. Not every host will raise
the idol question.
The conditions employed reflect these two assumptions. The
first, the simple
condition, has already been discussed. The second,
the probable condition,
presents its condition, as Ellicott says, as
"a case of
distinctly objective possibility."1 Nicoll refers to it
as "a probable
contingency," as contrasted with the first, "an assumed
fact."2
Lenski describes the first as "a
condition that expresses
reality," and the
second as "a condition that expresses expectancy."3
Robertson and Plummer
explain the two conditions as: "'If any one invites
you,' a thing which is
very possible and may have happened. 'If any
one should say to you,'
a pure hypothesis and not so very probable."4
1 Charles J. Ellicott, A Critical and Grammatical Commentary on
Publisher,
1889), p. 203.
2 Nicoll, Testament, II, p. 868.
3 Lenski, I and II Corinthians, p. 421.
4 Archibald Robertson and
Alfred Plummer, A Critical and Exegetical
Commentary on
the First Epistle of
The International
Critical Commentary on the Holy Scriptures of the Old
and New
Testaments,
edited by Samuel Rolles Driver, Alfred Plummer and
Charles Augustus Briggs
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1914), p. 221.
162
The context itself points to the fact that the reception of
a
dinner invitation would
be a normal course of social affairs, offering
insight into the
expected relationship between an individual Christian
and his neighbors. The
confrontation with the dinner's past history
would not be as probable,
but certainly not outside the realm of normal
experience. Thus the
two conditions: the first assumes the invitation
to be real, the second
presents the confrontation as a definite possibility.
Galatians 1:8-9.--His warnings against false teachers
and
gospels bring Paul to
speak against such in the strongest of terms in
Galatians 1:8-9, again
employing the simple and the probable conditions:
(verse 8) a]lla> kai> e]a>n h[mei?j h} a@ggeloj e]c
ou]ranou ? eu]aggeli<shtai . . .
a]na<qema e@stw. (verse 9) w[j proeioh<kamen kai> a@rti pa<lin le<gw,
ei@ tij
u[ma?j eu]aggeli<zetai par ] o! paqela<bete,
a]na<qema e@stw. Here
the sequence
of conditions is
opposite to that of I Corinthians 10:27-28. Paul begins
with the subjunctive
and moves to the indicative. Buttmann identifies
this as an example
where
The difference between [them] is plainly
to be recognized in
sentences where both are used in close
proximity; as Gal. i. 8,9,
where the hypothesis expressed in the 8th
verse by e]a<n with the
Subjunctive is resumed or repeated in the
9th with greater energy
and definiteness by ei] with the Indicative.
So in Acts v. 38-39.1
This sentence [verse 9] differs from that
of v. 8 in two respects
which affect the thought: (1) the element
of concession and impro-
bability disappears in the omission of h[mei?j h} a@ggeloj e]c ou]qanou?;
l Alexander Buttmann, A Grammar of the New Testament Greek,
translated
and edited by J. H. Thayer (
Publisher, 1873), p.
220.
163
(2) the form of the condition that
suggests future possibility is
displaced by that which expresses simple
present supposition, and
which is often used when the condition is
known to be actually
fulfilled. The result is to bring the
supposition closer home to
the actual case, and since it was known
both to Paul and his readers
that the condition ei@ tij . . . parela<bete was at that very time in
process of fulfillment, to apply the a]na<qema e@stw directly to those
who were then preaching in Galatia.1
The shift from the probable condition to the simple
condition
serves to place
emphasis upon Paul's assumption that there were those
at that present time
who were preaching a false gospel in
emphasis moves from the
probable condition with its lack of assumption
as to the reality of
the case to the simple condition which states such
an assumption.
Lenski uses inconsistent terminology when he writes:
"Note the
difference in the
conditional clauses: kai>
e]a<n vividly supposes a case;
ei]
in v. 9 takes up the real case that is now occurring in
Is the first condition
being stated vividly or being stated as a
possibility? Robertson
argues for possibility, even including Paul
himself.3
The better term would be "probability."
Summary
of conditional present
exegesis which this author has found:"4
1 Ernest DeWitt
the Epistle to
the Galatians,
vol. 35 of The International
Commentary, edited by
Samuel Rolfes Driver, Alfred Plummer and Charles
Augustus
Briggs (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1921), p. 30.
2 Lenski, Galatians, p. 38.
3 Robertson, Word Pictures, IV, p. 277
4
164
When ei]. with the
indicative is used, it implies that the truth or
otherwise of the condition is regarded as
in principle "determined,"
i.e. is represented as a fact (although
the speaker does not commit
himself as to whether he believes the
condition is true or not).
When
can with the subjunctive is used, it implies that the truth
or otherwise of the condition is regarded
as in principle "undeter-
mined," i.e. is represented as
uncertain, either because the condition
is conceived as a future occurrence, which
may or may not ever take
place, or because the condition is a general
one which may be
realized at any time.1
This author agrees with
of the distinction
between simple and probable conditions.
A test case may be made of Acts 5:38-39. The first
condition,
e]a>n
h# e]c a]nqrw<pwn h[ boulh> au!ta h} to> e@rgon tou?to,
kataluqh<setai,
regards the source of
the Christian sect as "in principle" undetermined and open
to future evaluation.
This could be paraphrased: "If this counsel or this
work is of men (as the
future may well demonstrate) . . . ." The
second condition, ei] de> e]k qeou? e]stin, ou] dunh<sesqe katalu?sai
au]touj,
represents the
situation "as a fact," one that is presently, in theory
at least, determined.
This may be paraphrased as "but if it is of God
(as may be assumed in
light of the facts) . . . ." The
distinctions
fit the case well, and
do not put Gamaliel on either side of the debate,
for neither condition
of necessity conveys the speaker's true convictions.
By examining these examples it may be seen that a
distinction is
to be drawn between the
simple condition and the probable condition in
terms of probability or
anticipation rather than vividness. The former
states the condition as
an assumed reality, while the latter presents it
as a potential future
reality. This is the basic meaning of this
condition.
1 John Kinje, Jr.,
"Greek Conditional Sentences," The
Bible
Translator,
13:4 (October, 1962), p. 223.
165
Translation of the
Probable Condition
Are there any general principles which can be derived from
this
study to guide
translators in their handling of the probable condition?
In order to answer this
question consideration will be given to the opinion
of the grammars, then
some observations will be made from the New Testa-
ment.
The
Grammarians' Opinions
A few grammarians have ventured opinions on the translation
of
at least some types of
probable conditions. Chief among them is Moulton
who writes:
The verbs are all futuristic, and the a@n
ties them up to particular
occurrences. The present accordingly is
conative or continuous or
iterative: Mt 62 o!tan poih?j e]lehmosu<nhn "whenever thou art for
doing
alms," 616 o!tan
nhseu<hte "Whenever ye are fasting, " Jo 25 o!ti a@n
le<gh
"whatever he says (from time to time)." The aorist, being future by
virtue of its mood, punctiliar by its
tense, and consequently
describing complete action, gets a
future-perfect sense in this class
of
sentence; and it will be found most important to, note this, before
we admit the less rigid translation. Thus
Mt 521 o!j a}n foneu<sh "the
man who has committed murder," 547 e]a<n a]spa<shsqe "if you have only
saluted him," Mk 918 o!pou e]a<n au]to>n kataqa<bh "wherever
it has seized
him;" the cast of the sentence
allows us to abbreviate the future-
perfect in these cases.1
He obviously misses the
point about the aorist. Such verbs are neither
punctiliar because of their
tense, nor are they assigned to the future
by their subjunctive
mood. Were these true, then his suggested transla-
tion might be
reasonable. Moulton does not discuss any exceptions to
this, though he does
raise Matthew 5:21 as an apparent problem. He
answers this by noting
that a]polu<sh
"denotes not so much the carrying
1 Moulton, Prolegomena,
p. 186.
166
into effect as the
determination."1
Thayer agrees with Moulton, noting that e]a<n with the aorist
subjunctive corresponds
to the Latin future perfect. He translates
Matthew 4:9. e]a>n proskunh<shj moi, as
"if thou shall have worshipped me.”2
Interestingly enough,
none of the versions checked adopted this form
of translation,
including the Douay-
Phillip's paraphrase,
the New English Bible, The Revised Standard
Version,
and the New American Standard Bible. All of them translate
these verses (Matthew
4:9, 5:21, 5:47 and Mark 9:18) as English future
tenses. This lends
support to the objections raised by some against
Moulton's position.
The objections come from Robertson mainly and are directed
against Moulton's rule
of using a future-perfect English verb to
translate the aorist
subjunctive in these conditions:
I doubt the propriety, however, of reading
a future perfect sense
a la
Latin into this aorist subj. as Moulton does. He cites Mt. 5:47,
e]a<n
a]spa<shsqe, but surely the simple aorist conception is
sufficient.3
Though he does not
discuss this particular verse in Word
Pictures, he
doubtless would have
followed all major versions by using the English
future and considering
the act as one simply stated by the aorist and
assigned by context to
the future time.
1 Moulton, Prolegomena, p. 186.
2 Joseph Henry Thayer, Thayer's Greek-English Lexicon of the
New Testament, reprint of the
Corrected Edition (
The
National Foundation for Christian Education, n.d.), p. 162.
3 Robertson, Grammar,
p. 1019.
167
offers the best
suggestion:
An Aorist Subjunctive after ean, otan, ewj, etc. is sometimes
properly translated by a Perfect or
Future Perfect., but only
because the Context shows that the action
is to precede that of the
principal verb. In the great majority of
cases a Present Subjunctive
or a Future is the best translation.1
His emphasis upon
context as the deciding factor is the key consideration,
for there are some
probable conditions where the context argues against
a future perfect
translation. As in all cases, the context is the
deciding factor.
New Testament
Observations
The examples in which the context does not fit a future
perfect
translation include
John 14:3, where the emphasis is upon the future
departure of Christ;
John 19:2 where the releasing of Jesus was contemp-
lated as a future act;
and Romans 15:24 where the filling of Paul by the
Roman believers is best
understood as a simple, i.e. undefined, future
act.
The emphasis of the New Testament is that the context
should
decide the specific
translation. The English should represent as far as
possible the sense of
the specific tenses. The translator, though, has
to remember that the
tenses communicate aspect rather than time of
action, hence, any
tense, especially in the subjunctive mood, may be
considered a future
act. There is no uniform rule that will govern the
specific English verb
form selected in each case.
1
168
Summary
The best rule for translation is that of context: each
condition
must be handled on its
own merits and situation. The English should
reflect two things.
First, the aspect of the verb used in the condition.
The undefined aspect of
the aorist tense is to be directly translated
into English. The
continual aspect of the present usually comes into
English in the form of
a participle. The time considerations of the
probable condition are
by definition future. Thus the best English
combination will be a
verb with its helping verbs to communicate both
ideas.
CHAPTER
V
THE POSSIBLE
CONDITION
Introduction
The final category of conditional sentences is noticable
for its
relative absence in
Koine Greek literature, especially the New Testament.
In fact, this condition
is technically outside the scope of this study,
for no complete
sentence of this type exists in the New Testament. This
condition is included
here, however, for the sake of completeness, though
it is better thought of
as a special use of the optative mood.
Technically this
condition "is expressed by ei]
with the optative in the
protasis and a@n with the optative in
the apodosis.”1
Moulton recognizes its absence when he writes that
"Neither in
LXX nor in NT is there
an ex. of ei]
c. opt. answered with opt. c. a@n,
nor
has one been quoted
from the papyri."2 Consequently
it is difficult to
establish firm
conclusions about its use in the New Testament. A general
survey of the few
partial examples will establish the general signifi-
cance of this
condition. First, though, a brief review of the optative
mood will be given.
1 H. E. Dana and Julius R.
Mantey, A Manual Grammar of the Greek
New Testament (New York: The
MacMillan Company, 1966), p. 290.
2 J. H. Moulton, A Grammar of New Testament Greek. Volume 1:
Prolegomena,
third edition (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1908), p. 196.
169
170
The Optative
Mood in General
General
Observations
All grammarians agree that the optative mood has been the
least
used of all the Greek
moods. Indeed, it has all but disappeared in
Modern Greek, save for
the stock phrase mh>
ge<noito.1 Robertson observes
that Greek was the only
language to preserve both the subjunctive and
optative moods, but
that the former was by far the dominant mood in
conversation and
writing.2 Moulton states
that the "optative mood
was doomed from the
very birth of the koinh<
. . . ."3 Obviously it
was well on its way to
its final demise during the time of the New
Testament.
The total number of optatives in the New Testament is not
very
great. Robertson claims
sixty-seven,4 and this is accepted by Heinz.5
Although this is a
statistically small quantity, the optative mood does
make a significant
contribution to the comprehension of the New Testament.
Since some of that
contribution is in the conditional sense, the details
of the optative mood
will be explored.
1 A. T. Robertson, A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the
Light of
Historical Research
(Nashville: Broadman Press, 1934), p. 325.
2 Ibid., pp. 325-326.
3 Moulton, Prolegomena, p. 240.
4 Robertson, Grammar, p. 939.
5 Vincent Heinz, "The
Optative Mood in the Greek New Testament,"
unpublished Th.M.
thesis, Dallas Theological Seminary, 1962, p. 23.
170
Specific Classifications
Robertson and others identify three basic uses of the
optative
mood: Futuristic (or
Potential), Volitive and Deliberative.1 These
will be examined below.
The Futuristic (or
Potential) Optative
Grammarians who address the subject of the optative mood in
detail agree on the
significance of the potential optative. Moulton
expresses it best:
"It was used to express a future in milder form, and
to express a request in
deferential style."2 Robertson3
and Heinz agree
with this statement.
This particular form of the optative may or may not
employ the particle a@n. New Testament
examples of this type of optative
may be found in Luke
9:46—to> ti<j a}n ei@h me<zwn
au]tw?n
("which of them
might be the
greatest") and Acts 17:18—ti<
a}n qe<loi o[ spermolo<goj
ou$toj
le<gein; ("What might this babbler wish to
say?").
Usually the potential optative occurs with the particle an. This
is its usual form
which, as Robertson notes, is limited to Luke's
writings and is
"an evident literary touch."5 The combination implies
a conditional concept,
making "one think of the unexpressed protasis of
1 A. T. Robertson and W.
Hersey Davis, A New Short Grammar of
The Greek
Testament
(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1933), p. 311.
2 Moulton, Prolegomena,
p. 197.
3
Robertson, Grammar, p. 937.
4 Heinz,
"Optative Mood," p. 31.
5 Robertson, Grammar,
p. 938.
171/172
the fourth-class
condition."1
The Optative with an
is used to express what would happen on the
fulfillment of some supposed condition. It
is thus an apodosis
correlative to a protasis expressed or
implied. It is usually
translated by the English Potential.2
He lists Acts 8:31—pw?j ga>r a}n dunai<mhn e]a>n
mh< tij o]dhgh<sei me ("How
can I unless someone
should guide me?") and Acts 17:18 (already quoted) as
examples. The specific
details of the optative and its conditional use
will be discussed
below, but this observation illustrates the close
link between the two.
The Volitive Optative
The most frequent use of the optative is that of an
expression
of volition or a wish,
hence the term "volitive" and the name "optative."3
Blass--Debrunner notes
that "The optative proper used to denote an
attainable wish is
still in use in the NT as it is in the the LXX and
Papyri (negative mh<)."4
This is the most frequent use of this mood.
1 Robertson, Grammar, p. 937.
2 Ernest DeWitt
ment Greek (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1897), pp. 79-80.
3 Alexander Buttmann, A Grammar of the New Testament Greek,
trans-
lated
and edited by J. H. Thayer (
1873),
p. 214.
4 Friedrich Blass and
Albert Debrunner, A Greek Grammar of the
New Testament
and Other Early Christian Literature, translated and revised
by Rovert W. Funk
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), p. 194.
173
Moulton corrects to
thirty-eight: ". . . which come down to 23 when we
drop mh> ge<noito.
Of these Paul claims 15 . . ., while Mk,
Lk, Ac, Heb,
I Pet and 2 Pet have
one apiece, and Jude two."2
Heinz identifies three types of volitive optatives: (a)
Optative
of Depreciation, (b)
Optative of Wishing and (c) Optative of Command. It
is also his opinion
that the volitive optative "is rare in the New
Testament in dependent
[including conditional] clauses."3 Robertson,
on the other hand,
claims that "The use of the opt. in the protasis of
[the possible]
condition is probably volitive . . .”4 This relatively
minor problem will be
discussed later.
The Deliberative
Optative
The optative mood is used in indirect discourse, and
Robertson
terms this usage the
"Deliberative Optative."5 Blass-Debrunner use the
term "oblique
optative."6 Dana and
Mantey describe this use as one in
which "indirect
rhetorical questions are expressed by the optative. In
this construction an
unusually doubtful attitude of mind is implied."7
1
2 Moulton, Prolegomena, pp. 194-195.
3 Heinz, "Optative
Mood," pp. 24-28, 42.
4 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1020.
5 Ibid., p. 940.
6 Blass-Debrunner, Grammar, p. 195.
7 Dana and Mantey, Grammar, p. 174.
174
There are few examples
of this use in the New Testament, not only because
of the scarcity of the
optative mood in general, but "simply because of
the very strong overall
preference for direct discourse" shown in the
New Testament.1
Heinz questions Robertson's identification of the
deliberative
optative as a separate
use. His thesis argues that the volitive and
potential optatives may
be used in either dependent or independent
clauses. In this he is
supported by Moulton, who also speaks of only two
uses of the optative.2 Further, Heinz identifies a separate
category
which is limited to
dependent clauses and "which cannot be satisfactorily
categorized as either
volitative or potential."3 This use is termed the
oblique optative, in
parallel with Blass-Debrunner's terminology.
The ultimate resolution
of the deliberative or oblique optative
question has no effect
on the subject of conditional sentences, but it
does illustrate the
difficulty of precise analysis of relatively few
examples.
The Optative Mood in
Conditional Sentences
Having given the optative mood a brief overview, its use in
conditional sentences
will be considered. The form of these sentences as
well as their
significance will be discussed.
1 Blass-Debrunner, Grammar., p. 195.
2 Moulton, Prolegomena, pp. 194-199.
3 Heinz, "Optative Mood," p. 54.
175
The
Construction
The Format Used
The protasis states a supposition which
refers to the future,
suggesting less probability of its
fulfillment than is suggested by
e]a<n with the
Subjunctive.
The protasis is expressed by ei]
with the Optative; the apodosis
by the Optative with a@n.1
He then speaks of the
absence of this condition in the New Testament:
There is no perfect example of this
form in the New Testament.
Protases occur in I Cor. and I Pet., but
never with a regular and
fully expressed apodosis. Apodoses occur
in Luke and Acts, but
never with a regular protasis.2
Moulton accepts this description and adds that the
combination
of ei] with the optative by
itself is exceedingly rare:
We only note here that H[atch] and
R[edpath] give no more than 13 exx.
from LXX of ei]
c. opt. (apart from 4 Mac and one passage omitted in
uncials): about 2 of these are wishes,
and 5 are cases of w!s(per)
ei]
tij while
2 seem to be direct or indirect questions.3
In spite of the absence
of any complete example, grammarians agree on
the form of this
condition.
The Optatives Used
Since there are three types of optatives in the New
Testament,
it would be useful to
inquire as to which one or ones are employed in
conditional sentences.
The question, of course, is limited to the
1
2 Ibid., p. 107.
3 Moulton, Prolegomena,
p. 196.
176
protasis, for the use
of a@n with the optative in
the apodosis marks it
as potential. The
optatives in the protasis are not so easily identified.
The Volitive Optative
Moulton identifies the optative in the protasis as a
volitive
optative, or an
optative of wish:
In hypotasis the optative of wish appears
in clauses with ei], as is
shown by the negative's being mh<,
as well as by the fact that we can
add ei], si, if, to a wish, or express a
hypothesis without a conjunc-
tion, by a clause of jussive or optative
character.1
Robertson agrees:
"The use of the opt. in the protasis of this condition
is probably volitive,
since the negative is mh<,"2
But does the occurrence of mh< automatically indicate a volitive
optative? Heinz
challenges Robertson and Moulton on this point, for
he questions whether
the presence of this particle should be so inter-
preted. His conclusion
is that it should not. He examines the eleven
examples of ei] with the optative and
concludes that "The optative in
the protasis of a
fourth class condition is normally potential rather
than volitional."3
He grants that five times the protasis
of these
conditions has "a
slightly volitive" character, but affirms that this
"is determined by
the element of purpose involved rather than by any
demands of grammatical
structure."4 It seems
that his reasoning could
1 Moulton, Prolegomena,
p. 196.
2
Robertson, Grammar, p. 1020.
3 Heinz,
"Optative Moods," pp. 41-42.
4 Ibid.,
p. 42.
177
be reversed and a case
made for the volitive over against the potential.
The final answer,
though, in no way affects the character of the protasis
in which it is found;
only the semantical "fine tuning" is involved.
The meaning stays the
same.
The Potential Optative
The potential optative, usually marked by a@n,1 is identified
by
Heinz as the
"usual apodosis to the fourth class condition."2 This
agrees with Robertson.3 The use of the potential optative in
the protasis,
though, is a subject of
disagreement. Moulton identifies the usual type
as the volitive
optative, since it appears with the particle ei] and
employs mh< as its
negative.4 Robertson accepts
this, and adds the
observation that the
potential optative (with a@n)
may appear in the
protasis of such
sentences.5 Again, the
specific identification of the
type of optative is not
essential to the meaning of the sentence. The
basic significance is
the same, regardless of how one identifies the
optative involved. The
basic constructional pattern will remain the same.
1 Robertson, Grammar, p. 937.
2 Heinz, "Optative
Mood," p. 45.
3 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1020.
4 Moulton, Prolegomena, p. 196.
5 Robertson, Grammar,
p. 1020.
178
The Significance
Exactly what is the significance of the possible condition?
Two
avenues will be
explored in answering this question. First, the opinions
of leading Koine
grammarians will be investigated. Then, the specific
examples of this
condition, or rather the fragments of it, will be
discussed.
The Grammarians
vivid" concept of
Classical Greek grammarians. He writes
The protasis states a supposition which
refers to the future,
suggesting less probability of its
fulfillment than is suggested
by ean with the
Subjunctive.
The protasis is expressed by ei]
with the Optative; the apodosis
by the Optative with a@n.1
Moulton agrees with
who also holds to it:
Meanwhile we may observe that Blass's
dictum that the ei] c. opt.
form is used "if I wish to represent
anything as generally possible,
without regard to the general or actual
situation at the moment,"
suits the NT exx. well; and it seems to
fit the general facts
better than Goodwin's doctrine of a
"less vivid future" condition.2
This concept might be
paraphrased by the English term "possibility" as
contrasted with the
term "probability," which this author reserves for
the subjunctive mood.
The latter implies a greater chance of fulfillment
than does the former.
1
2 Moulton, Prolegomena,
p. 196, note.
179
Blass-Debrunner
This grammar states: "Ei] with the optative presents something as
thought of, without
regard for reality or unreality, and emphasizes the
hypothetical character
of the assumption: 'a potential case.'"1 Funk,
the American editor,
repeats this terminology in his own grammar.2 Again,
as with
condition, not its
vividness.
Robertson
The fullest description of the significance of this
condition comes
from Robertson:
This fourth class condition is
undetermined with less likelihood of
determination than is true of the third
class with the subj. The
difference between the third and fourth
classes is well illustrated
in I Pet. 3:13f. So Jesus draws a
distinction in Lu. 22:67. The use
of the opt. in both apodosis and protasis
accents the remotness of the
hypothesis. And yet it is not in the
category of unreality as in the
second class. It floats in a mirage, but
does not slip quite away.
It is thus suitable not merely for real
doubt, but it also fits well
the polite temper of courteous address.3
In general, then, the grammarians offer agreement on the
significance of this
condition. They identify it as one which emphasizes
the possibility of the
supposition, rather than its probability; its
1 Blass-Debrunner, Grammar, p. 188.
2 Robert. W. Funk, A Beginning-Intermediate Grammar of
Hellenistic
Greek, 3 volumes (
1973),
II, p. 685.
3 Robertson, Grammar,
p. 1020.
180
distant potentiality,
rather than its closer anticipation. Robertson
uses the term
"remote" to describe this concept. It was an unfortunate
choice, since
"possibility" better fits the case. The next step in this
discussion is to take a
close look at a few New Testament examples of
this condition and see
what may be learned from each one.
The Specific Examples
Those with the Protasis
Implied
Roberts identifies six potential optatives as ones which
imply
a protasis of the
possible type.1 Each of these
will be considered in
order.
Luke 1:62.--The first suggested conditional use of
the potential
optative is Luke 1:62—ti< a}n qe<loi kalei?sqai
au]to< ("what he would like to
call him"). The
stated apodosis (a}n
qe<loi kalei?sqai) is thought to
imply the protasis
"if he could speak." Lenski follows this view:
The indirect question retains the optative
of the direct: "what
he would wish him to be called," i.e.
if he could speak, a condition
of potentiality (ei]
with the optative) in the protasis and the optative
with a@n
in the apodosis.1
Robertson also supplies
the words "if he could speak" and calls this
"a conclusion of
the fourth-class condition."2
The conditional element may not be as obvious as these
suggest,
though. The English
versions do not translate this phrase as a condition.
1 R. C. H. Lenski, The Interpretation of St. Luke's Gospel
(Minneapolis:
Augsburg Publishing House, 1961), p. 96.
2 A. T. Robertson, Word Pictures in the New Testament, 6
volumes
(Nashville: Broadman
Press, 1930), II, p. 17.
181
The New International Version, for example,
translates it as "what he would
like to name the
child." The use of such terms as "would," "might,"
etc.
can communicate the
concept of potential choice, and that is what is in
view here. The implied
protasis is not "if he could speak," but "if he
had a choice."
Culture, not silence, limited his selection of a name for
his son as verses 61
and 63 indicate. It does seem fair to list this
passage as an example
of an implied condition, but to recognize the
condition as referring
to a choice. Even in English questions are
asked which imply a
potential or possible choice, but in point of fact,
no choice is possible.
Luke 6:11.--The statement in Luke 6:11—ti< a}n poih<saien to<
]Ihsou?
("what they might do to Jesus")--is identified by some as implying
the protasis "if
they could do something." The remoteness of any oppor-
tunity at this point to
inflict injury on Him points to the possible
condition using the
optative. Plummer identifies this as an optative
used with an indirect
question, though, setting aside the conditional
concept.1 Lenski argues for the conditional idea and
expands the
statement: "If we
had him in our power, what could we do to him."2
Hendriksen follows
Plummer, noting that "the deliberative optative of the
direct question is
retained in the indirect question."3
1 Alfred Plummer, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the
Gosspel
According to S. Luke,
volume 28 of The International Critical
Commentary, edited by
Samuel Rolles Driver, Alfred Plummer and Charles
Augustus
Briggs (Edinburgh: T. g T. Clark, 1896), p. 170.
2 Lenski, Luke, p. 335.
3 William Hendriksen, Luke, p. 325.
182
So which is it? Does this optative represent an indirect
question without
conditional overtones, or does it represent a fragment
of a possible
condition? The answer lies in the context: they talked
to one another. This
question is one stated in indirect discourse.
Thus the optative poih<saien
is not to be understood as a conditional
statement, but one of a
simple question.
Luke 9:46.--This passage—to> ti<j a}n ei@h me<zwn au]tw?n
("which of
them would be the
greatest")--is very similar to the one above. Again
the statement could be
understood to be a condition, implying the
protasis "if they
could be." But it is also a statement of the words
of the apostles which
is presented in indirect discourse. Lenski tries
to have it both ways,
noting that the indirect question serves as "the
apodosis of a potential
condition and the optative with an
is left
unchanged in the
indirect question."1 The
conditional interpretation
seems rather forced,
since the theoretical direct question of the
apostles would not have
been put as a condition. It is simpler and
more direct to
interpret this optative as one of indirect discourse
rather than a
conditional one.
Luke 15:26.--Here there is less question about the
lack of a
condition than with the
other passages. The statement—ti<
a}n ei@h tau?ta
("what these
things might be")--implies no condition. It is just the
potential optative with
no conditional overtones at all. Roberts
1 Lenski, Luke,
p. 544.
183
identifies the optative
as a conditional and supplies the protasis
"If the fact should
be told."1 This is an
unnecessary concept.
Acts 5:24, --ti<
a}n ge<noito tou?to ("what might come of this") is
at first glance similar
to Luke 15:26 and appears to be a simple potential
optative. But, as
Alexander notes, there is a future dimension to the
question here:
"The question here was not what it was that they beheld
[as in Luke 15:26], but
what it would be, if they failed to use preven-
tive measures."2
Also, unlike Luke 9:46, the original
direct question
could have been stated,
in theory at least, as a condition. Here
Robertson's explanation
finds more support than the others:
Second aorist middle optative of ginomai with a@n,
the conclusion
of a condition of the fourth class
(undetermined with less likelihood
of determination), the unexpressed
condition being "if the thing
should be allowed to go on."3
Since the question has
a future concept to it and since the original
question may well have
been put as a condition, this will be accepted as
an example of the
conditional use of the optative mood.
Acts 10:17.--Here the optative phrase—ti< a}n ei@h to> o!rama
("what
the vision might
mean")--has no conditional overtones. This verse is
parallel to Luke 9:46,
for it asks a question of a present reality. In
spite of the fact that
both Robertson4 and Lenski5 identify this as an
1 Roberts,
"Conditional Sentences," p. 237.
2 Alexander, Acts, pp. 223-224.
3 Robertson, Word Pictures, III, p. 64.
4 Ibid., p. 138.
5 Lenski, Acts,
p. 405.
184
example of an indirect
question implying a condition.
Summary.--These six passages which Roberts
identifies as being
conditional uses of the
optative mood need to be reconsidered. One of
them (Luke 1:62) is
such a passage, one of them (Acts 5:24) might well
be one, and the rest
are not conditional statements. Examples of this
type of conditional
statement with the protasis implied are even more
elusive than is
popularly thought.
Those with the Protasis
Stated
In some verses the condition is stated and the conclusion
is
either implied or
stated in the form of another type of conditional
sentence. There are no
complete examples of conditional sentences using
optative moods in both
the apodosis and the protasis.
Acts 8:31.--This sentence takes the form of a mixed
condition
wherein the apodosis
used the optative mood and the protasis the
indicative—pw?j ga>r a}n dunai<mhn e]a>n
mh< tij o[dhgh<sei me; ("How can I
unless someone guides
me?”). The protasis is that of a simple condition,
though e]a<n is used with
the indicative o[dhgh<sei
instead of the usual ei].
The apodosis is that of
a possible condition, employing a@n
with the
optative dunai<mhn.
This phenomenon of mixed conditions is something
that Robertson calls a
"common enough phenomenon in the Koine."1
Alexander's comments
are in keeping with Moulton's observations on
the optative as an
expression of doubt and self-depreciation:
1 Robertson, Word
Picture, III, p. 110.
184
[This form] expresses in a high degree
the speaker's doubt, if not
as to the absolute intrinsic possibility,
at least as to the actual
and present practicability of the thing
in question . . . . Besides
the modest self-depreciation of this
answer, it implies a suspicion,
if no more, that the stranger who thus suddenly
accosted him was
just such a guide and helper as he
needed.1
The indicative mood in the protasis indicates the real need
the Eunuch felt for a
guide, and the optative in the apodosis shows how
improbably he regarded
his comprehension. Doubtless Alexander goes too
far when he reads into
the indicative the man's recognition of Peter and
his role.
Acts 20:16.—e@speuden
ga<r, ei] dunato>n ei@h au]t&?, th>n h[me<ran th?j penthkosth?j
gene<sqai ei]j ]Ieroso<luma
("For he was in a hurry to be in
writes that the phrase ei] dunato<n
implies "doubt or worry lest the sea
voyage should delay his
arrival by that time, thus the less probable
[possible]
condition."2 But if this is the protasis, what is the
apodosis? Both Lenski3
and Robertson4 identify this as a possible
condition, but neither
identifies the implied apodosis. The best
answer is that there is
none. The statement is simply one expressing
doubt in light of the
many problems confronting such a voyage.5
1 Alexander, Acts, p. 345.
2 Roberts,
"Conditional Sentences," p. 244.
3 Lenski, Acts, p. 835.
4 Robertson, Word Pictures, III, p. 347.
5 Lenski, Acts,
p. 835.
186
The optative mood fits
such a context as this, and such an author as Luke.
Acts 24:19.--This verse presents another mixed
condition which
uses an optative mood
in the protasis: ou!j
e@dei e]pi> sou? parei?nai kai>
kathgorei?n
ei@ ti e@xoien pro>j e]me< ("who ought to be
before you and accuse
me, if they should have
anything against me."). The doubt of the protasis,
emphasized by exoien, is reenforced
by the contrary to fact apodosis.
There was no charge
against Paul that was valid in a Roman court, nor
were the eye-witnesses
present to state such charges as could be
presented. Paul
employed the optative mood to underline the doubtful
nature of the whole
proceedings. Lenski objects to the identification
of the sentence as a
mixed condition, noting that e@dei
may be either "an
apodosis of present unreality"
or "the imperfect in an obligation that
has not been met."1
The only change this brings about is to identify
the apodosis as one
that is implied rather than stated. In either case,
the protasis implies
doubt as to the validity of the charge against Paul.
Acts 27:12.--The clause oi[ plei<onej e@qento boulh>n
a]naxqh?nai
e]kei?qen,
ei@ pwj du<nainto katanth<santej ei]j foi<nika paraxeima<sai
("the
majority decided to
sail from there, if somehow they might reach
and winter there")
is identified by Robertson as one containing the
protasis of a doubtful
condition involving the optative du<nainto.2
This
combination "is a
condition of the fourth class with the notion of purpose
1 Lenski, Acts,
p. 974.
2 Robertson, Word
Pictures, III, p. 462.
187
implied and indirect
discourse . . . ..”1 Lenski
challenges this identifica-
tion, quoting from
Robertson's Grammar to show that the
shift to optative
is accounted for by the
indirect discourse of the statement. He argues
that the optative
represents either indirect discourse or a conditional
statement, but not
both: "Ei@pwj
with the optative is not a condition of
potentiality . . .,
because it occurs in indirect discourse."2 Heinz does
not commit himself,
noting that this optative expresses "aim or purpose,"
but that it also
contains "an element of condition."3 Elsewhere he
speaks of this verb as
one that might be introducing indirect discourse,
but which leans
"more to the conditional use of the potential optative."4
It seems that Lenski's
observations about the optative being either
conditional or involved
in indirect discourse are valid, but it also
seems that this
particular example is hard to classify. In either case,
the general study is
not affected, for if this verb is considered
conditional, then its
use is typical: expressing mere probability about
the future outcome of a
situation.
Acts 27:39.--As Paul and his shipwrecked party
survey the
forbidding shoreline of
a small bay, a break in
the rocky coast, ei]j o!n
e]bouleu<onto ei] du<nainto
e]cw?sai
to> ploi?on ("into which, if it were possible, they
decided to run
1 Robertson, Word Pictures, III, p. 462.
2 Lenski, Acts, p. 1072.
3 Heinz, "Optative
Mood," p. 42.
4 Ibid.,
p. 68.
188
the ship"). Luke
uses the optative du<nainto
either to express an
indirect question on
the part of the sailors, "as if the sailors had
said amongst themselves
e]cw?somen ei] du<nameqa,"1
or a condition of
vague probability, i.e.
possibility. As mentioned above, Robertson
implies that both may
be true of a given optative verb, but others
question the dual
function in such cases. Which one is found here is
debatable. Moule notes
that "In Acts xxvii.39 it is not absolutely clear
in which sense ei] is used: does ei] bouleu<onto ei] du<nainto
e]cw?sai
mean
they
were planning whether they could. . ., or they were planning (if they
could),
to
. . . ?"2 He does
distinguish between the conditional and
indirect discourse
usages, but cannot classify this verse.
Were one to take the optative as that of a condition, then
the
verse represents the
sailors as viewing the possibility of their
reaching the safety of
the bay as theoretically possible at best. The
apodosis, in this case,
is not expressed. Certainly the situation was
not one to offer much
encouragement to the exhausted crew and weakened
passengers. Granting
the conditional nature of this optative, it fits
the general nature of
this condition: possibility as opposed to probability.
1 Corinthians 14:10 and 15:37.--Both passages employ
the phrase
ei]
tu<xoi which is identifies by Arndt and Gingrich as
"a formula if it
1 Nicoll, Greek Testament, II, p. 534.
2 C. F. D. Moule, An Idiom Book of New Testament Greek
(Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1953), p. 151.
189
should
turn out that way, perhaps."1 This formula is used throughout the
Church Fathers, as this
lexicon indicates. Robertson observes that these
two examples are the
only ones in Paul's writing: "Paul has only the
stereotyped phrase ei] tu<xoi
. . . which is a true example of this protasis,
'if it should
happen.'"2 The only
other optative formula found
frequently in Pauline
writings is the familiar mh>
ge<noito ("may it not
be"), but this one
lacks conditional force. Robertson and Plummer explain
the phrase in terms of
indefiniteness. In 14:10 ei]
tu<xoi "implies that
the number is large,
but that the exact number does not matter."3 In
15:37 it
"indicates an indefiniteness which is unimportant."4
I Peter 3:14.—a]ll
] ei] kai> pa<sxoite dia> dikaiosu<hn ("but even
if
you should
suffer") offers one of the fullest statements of this type of
condition in the New
Testament, and even this lacks a complete apodosis.
Here makarioi ("you are
blessed") is the closest one comes. The optative
mood of pa<sxoite
implies "the slight possibility that God wills such
suffering for
Christians," according to Roberts.5 The context, especially
1 William F. Arndt and F.
Wilbur Gingrich, A Greek-English Lexicon
of the New
Testament and Other Early Christian Literature, second edition
(Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 829.
2 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1021.
3 Robertson and Plummer, First Corinthians, p. 310.
4 Ibid., p. 370.
5 Roberts, "Conditional Sentences," p.
245.
190
verse 13 (kai> ti<j o[ kakw<swn u[ma?j
e]a>n tou? a]gaqou? zhlwtai> ge<nhste—
"and who is going
to harm you if you are zealous for the good?") provides a note
of victory, hence the
suffering of verse 14 is viewed as a possible
cloud on the horizon.
It may come about, but it is not guaranteed. This
is the emphasis of the
optative. Lenski expresses this idea well when he
writes:
Peter states it thus in the hope that the
readers may, after all,
despite the threatening clouds that are
arising in
special suffering. To say that he
indicates an improbability is not
exact. What he has in mind is not a
balancing of probability and
improbability. When he looks at the future
he expresses his own
desire that the readers may be spared;
yet, if this should not be
the case, it is really of no moment since
any suffering that might
come would be only blessedness. One always
speaks subjunctively
when using conditional clauses. In this
connection Peter wants his
readers to think of suffering only as
something that might come.1
Winer charts a singular course when he uses this verse to
prove
that ei] with the optative is
used to denote subjective possibility "when
a condition is regarded
as frequently recurring . . . as I Pet. iii.14 . . ."2
Most grammarians,
though, limit the sense of the optative to the basic
concept of possibility
rather than a repeated situation.
I Peter 3:17.--The other conditional statement which
comes the
closest to a complete
statement of the possible condition is also found in
I Peter—krei?tton ga>r a]gaqoroiou?ntaj, ei]
qe<loi to> qe<lhma tou? qeou?,
pa<sxein
h} kakopoiou?ntaj ("It is better, if the will of God
should be so, to
suffer for doing good
than for doing evil."). Here again the optative qe<loi
1 Lenski, I Peter, p. 148.
2 Winer, Grammar,
p. 293.
191
communicates the same
basic concept as in 3:14--a potentiality, a possibility
of suffering. These two
passages, I Peter 3:14 and 17, are considered to be
the fullest expressions
of this type of conditional sentence, yet both
are incomplete.
Translation of
the Possible Condition
The possible condition uses the optative mood to
communicate the
sense of possibility rather
than probability. The English language
approaches this by the
use of such adverbs as "should," "might,"
"maybe," etc.
The use of such terms in the common "if . . . then"
formula of conditions
can communicate the improbability, the possibility
of the condition.
Conclusion
The possible condition expresses a situation about which
the
speaker has significant
doubt. The degree of doubt is sufficient to place
the concept in the
realm of the less probable, but insufficient to classify
it as impossible. This
is accomplished by placing the thought in the
optative mood. Though
rare in the New Testament, this mood expresses
the verbal idea as one
which is stated as potential. Though the specific
type of optatives in the
New Testament are classified differently by
different grammarians,
the basic concept is the same.
The possible condition is as removed from the probable
condition
as the optative mood is
from the subjunctive. Although the optative
mood and its possible
condition were on their way out of Greek when the
New Testament was
written, they are still a part, albeit a small part, of
192
its pages. An
understanding of the significance of this mood and its
condition helps the
interpreted in those passages where the existing
fragments occur.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
The historical survey of Classical Greek grammarians shows
that
the majority of them
recognize nine types of conditional sentences. As
the language developed
into the Hellenistic phase and then the Koine
of the New Testament,
the number of conditional sentences decreased.
Today most Koine
grammarians recognize four types of conditions. Of
these, one type is represented
only by fragments, for no complete
example of it exists in
the New Testament. Thus there are only three
complete types of
conditional sentences to deal with in the Greek New
Testament.
Various systems of classification have been suggested for
analyzing
conditional sentences.
Among Classical grammarians four such systems have
been used. Goodwin
argues for time as the basic principle of classifica-
tion. Smyth arranges
them according to their fulfillment. Sonnenschein
argues that their form
should be the basis of classification. Gilder-
sleeve puts forth the
concept of determination as identified by the mood
of the protasis verb as
the guiding principle. Gildersleeve's system,
through Robertson, has
been accepted by most Koine grammarians.
As applied to the New Testament, Gildersleeve's system
identifies
four types of
conditional sentences. These are classified according to
the determination
implied by each sentence. This implication is based
193
194
upon the mood of the
verbs employed in the protasis. The four types of
determination are (1)
determined as real, (2) determined as unreal,
(3) determined as
probable, and (4) determined as possible.
Simple Conditions
Conditions determined as real are called Simple Conditions.
They
consist of a protasis
which contains the particle ei]
and any tense of the
indicative mood. The
apodosis may contain any form of the verb. By using
the indicative mood the
speaker is presenting the condition from the view-
point of assumed
reality. There is no guarantee, absolute or implied, as
to the objective
reality of the condition. It is merely stated as
though it were true.
Its conclusion naturally follows and is as valid
as the condition upon
which it is based.
One common fallacy of students is to read the concept of
objective
reality into this
condition. There is no warrant for such an interpre-
tive step, for any
proof of such objective reality must come from the
context of the
statement and not the statement itself. Although some
grammarians have made
statements which could be interpreted as supporting
this view, no one
accepts it.
This condition is called the Simple Condition because it
presents the
condition-conclusion relationship in its simplest form.
The condition is stated
as an assumed reality, and the conclusion
naturally follows. The
latter is as true, and only as true, as is the
former.
195
Unreal
Conditions
Conditional sentences which are determined as unreal or
unfulfilled are those
which state the condition with an implication of
unreality. Rather than
implying that the condition is true, these imply
that it is not true.
Such conditions use an augmented form of indicative
verbs in the protasus
and the apodosis. They usually employ the particles
ei]
in the protasis and a@n
in the apodosis. The indicative mood is the
correct mood, for the
assumption is that the statement is actually unreal.
There is no probability
or possibility about it.
As with the simple condition, this condition presents only
an
implication, an
assumption, not a direct statement about the condition and
its reality or lack of
it. The speaker presents his case as one that he
assumes to be unreal.
There is no guarantee in the statement of its
actual or objective
unreality. Such objectivity has to come from the
context, not from the
sentence. This condition is thus termed the
Unreal Condition, since
it presents the condition as one with an
assumption of
unreality.
Probable
Conditions
Conditional sentences which are determined as probable
consist of
a protasis containing
any form of the subjunctive mood, usually with e]a<n,
in the protasis and any
form of verb in the apodosis. The subjunctive
mood is one which
presents an action as potential, rather than actual,
and probable, rather
than possible. A subjunctive verb is one which could
well take place in the
future, but about which no guarantee or even
196
implication of reality
can be made. It cannot be stated as having
happened, or as one
that should not happen, but as one that could
happen. An alternative
title might be "conceivable," though it seems
that the term
"probable" is sufficient to describe the concept.
The subjunctive mood enables the speaker to present the
condi-
tion as one with a
significant degree of probability. This act could
well take place, but
there is a chance that it might not. The most
concise title for this
concept is Probable as contrasted with Possible.
Thus this condition is
termed the Probable Condition.
Possible
Conditions
The fourth type of conditional sentence exists only in
fragments.
Its complete form is a
protasis consisting of ei]
with an optative mood
and an apodosis with a@n and an optative mood.
The use of the optative
mood presents the
condition in the realm of potentiality, but a realm
that is less probable
than the subjunctive mood. The speaker does not
present the condition
as one that cannot happen, but as one that he does
not expect to happen.
The English term employed for this concept is
"possible,"
as contrasted with the "probable" of the subjunctive mood.
Hence this condition is
termed the Possible Condition.
Summary
In summary, then, the New Testament presents three complete
types of conditional
sentences and fragments of a fourth. This author
has termed these (1)
the Simple Condition, (2) the Unreal Condition,
(3) the Probable
Condition, and (4) the Possible Condition. In more
197
expanded form these
conditions are:
1. Stated as though assumed real--the Simple
Condition
2. Stated as though assumed unreal--the
Unreal Condition
3. Stated as though assumed probable--the
Probable Condition
4. Stated as though assumed possible--the
Possible Condition
If one wished to consider the Possible Condition as a
special use
of the optative mood
rather than a type of conditional sentence, then
Moulton's
classification becomes eminently usable: Simple Conditions,
Unreal Conditions and
Future Conditions with the optative being a special
case of the third
catagory. In either case, the optative condition
exists as fragments in
the New Testament, reflecting the changing
pattern of Koine as
opposed to Classical Greek.
Anyone who hopes to give an accurate presentation of the
content
of the New Testament
must take care to handle these conditional
sentences properly. He
must not read too much into them, nor fail to
recognize the fulness
of their content.
APPENDIX I
OCCURRENCES OF THE SIMPLE CONDITION
In the following lists, * indicates that the verb has been
supplied and #
indicates a textual problem. Unless otherwise noted,
the United Bible
Societies' text has been followed.
Protasis Using ei] with Present Indicative
(221
examples)
Apodosis Using Present
Indicative (91 examples)
Matthew 6:23*
6:30*
11:14
12:27
19:10
22:45
Mark 9:42
Luke 6:32
11:19
12:26
14:26
17:2
John 1:25
3:12
7:23
8:46
13:17
15:18
199
Acts 19:38
25:11
26:8*1
Romans 2:17-19*2
7:16
7:20
8:9
8:10*
8:13
8:17*
8:25
8:31*
11:6*
11:16*
11:18
12:18*
13:9
14:15
I Corinthians 6:2
9:2
9:12*
9:17
10:30
11:16
14:38#
15:2
15:29
15:44
2 Corinthians 2:2*
4:3
4:16
5:17*
8:12*
1 A. T. Robertson, Word Pictunes in the New Testament, 6
vols.
(Nashville,
Tennensee: Broadman Press, 1930), III, p. 445; W. Robertson
Nicoll,
editor, The Expositor’s Greek Testament,
5 vols. (
Wm.
B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1967), II, p. 503; and R. C. H. Lenski,
The
Interpretation of the Acts of the Apostles (
Publishing
House, 1961), p. 1030, all identify this as a simple condition.
2 Nicoll, Testament,
II, p. 599 indicates a textual problem.
200
2 Corinthians 11:4
11:6*
11:15*
11:20
12:15#
Galatians 2:14
3:18*
3:29*
4:7*
5:11
5:18
6:3
Philippians 1:221
2:17
3:4*
Colossians 2:5
I Timothy 1:10
3:1
5:8
2 Timothy 2:13
Hebrews 7:15
12:8
James 1:26*
2:8
2:9
3:2*
3:3#
4:11
I Peter 1:6*
2:19*
3:17*
4:4*
2 Peter 2:6
1 R. C. H. Lenski, The Interpretation of
Galatians,
Ephesians and Philippians
House,
1961), p. 744 identifies this as a simple condition. Robertson,
Grammar,
p. 1023 identifies it as anacoluthon and in his Word Pictures,
IV,
p. 440 as a condition.
201
I John 5:9
Revelation 11:5
13:10
14:11*
Apodosis
Using Present Subjunctive (1 example)
Galatians 5:25
Apodosis
Using Present Imperative (40 examples)
Matthew 16:24
19:171
19:21
Mark 4:23
7:16#
8:34#2
11:25
Luke 9:23
John 10:24#
10:37
10:38
Acts 4:9
13:15
19:38
25:5
I Corinthians 7:12
7:15
7:36
10:27
11:6*
11:34
14:35
14:37
16:22
1 Nicoll, Testament, I, p. 249 notes minor
evidence [B,D] for
the
present tense th<rei in the apodosis. Nestle's and
the United Bible
Societies'
texts give no discussion of the problem.
2 Ibid., I, p. 398 indicates that ei@ tij is found in x,B,C,D,
L
and D.
202
2 Corinthians 13:5
Galatians 1:19
5:15
Ephesians 4:29*
Philippians 4:8*
2 Thessalonians 3:10
3:14
I Timothy 5:4
5:16
Philemon 18
James 1:5
3:14
I Peter 4:11*
4:16
I John 3:13
2 John 10
Apodosis
Using Imperfect Indicative (2 examples)
Luke 17:61
John 8:39#
Apodosis
Using Aorist Indicative (6 examples)
Matthew 12:26
12:28
Luke 11:20
I Corinthians 8:2
1 Nicoll, Testament, I, p. 592 identifies this as
a first class
condition;
R. C. H. Lenski The Interpretation of St.
Luke's Gospel
types
of conditions; and Robertson, Word
Pictures, II, p. 226 calls it
a
mixed condition.
203
Galatians 2:21*
Colossians 1:21
Apodosis
Using Aorist Subjunctive (6 examples)
Mark 14:351
15:362
Luke 23:31
I Corinthians 8:13
15:32
2 Corinthians 2:9
Apodosis
Using Aorist Imperative (36 examples)
Matthew 4:3
4:6
5:29
5:30
8:31
14:28
16:24
18:8
18:9
18:28#3
19:17
19:21
26:39
26:42
27:40
27:43
1 R. C. H. Lenski, The Interpretation of St. Mark’s Gospel
(Minneapolis:
Augsburg Publishing House, 1961), p. 636 identifies this
as
a first class condition.
2 Nicoll, Testament, I, p. 450 identifies this as
a future
supposition.
3 Ibid., I, p. 243 shows some evidence for o! ti
as found in
T.R.
instead of ei# ti in the modern texts.
204
Mark 8:34
9:22
Luke 4:3
4:9
9:23
22:42
22:67
23:35
23:37
John 7:4
13:7
18:8
1 Corinthians 3:18
7:9
7:21
11:6
Philippians 2:1*
Philemon 17
I Peter 1:17
Revelation 13:9
Apodosis
Using Future Indicative (29 examples)
Matthew 17:4
17:11
19:21
Mark 9:35
Luke 11:13
11:36*
12: 28*
16:31
John 3:12
5:47
Acts 5:39
18:15
19:39
205
Romans 3:5
8:11
11:12*
11:15*
I Corinthians 3:12
3:14
3:17
2 Corinthians 11:30
Philippians 3:15
I Thessalonians 4:14
I Timothy 3:5
2 Timothy 2:12
Hebrews 9:14
I Peter 4:17*
4:18
Revelation 14:9
Apodosis
Using Perfect Indicative (10 examples)
Romans 4:14*
I Corinthians 8:3
9:17*
15:13
15:16
I Timothy 5:8
6:3
James 1:23
2:11
2 Peter 2:20
206
Protasis Using ei] with Aorist Indicative
(56
examples)
Apodosis
Using Present Indicative (17 examples)
Mark 3:26
Luke 19:9
John 10:35
13:14
18:23*
Romans 3:7
4:2
6:8
15:27
I Corinthians 4:7
9:11*
15:32*
2 Corinthians 3:9*
3:11
Galatians 2:17*
Colossians 2:20
I John 4:11
Apodosis
Using Present Imperative (3 examples)
Colossians 3:1
1 Timothy 5:10
Philemon 18
Apodosis
Using Imperfect Indicative (6 examples)
Matthew 26:24
Mark 14:21*
John 15:24
207
Acts 11:17
Galatians 3:21
Hebrews 4:8
Apodosis
Using Aorist Indicative (8 examples)
Matthew 11:21
11:23
Luke 10:13
Romans 5:15
11:17
I Corinthians 2:8
2 Corinthians 7:12
Revelation 20:15
Apodosis
Using Aorist Imperative (3 examples)
John 18:23
20:15
I Peter 2:3
Apodosis
Using Future Indicative (16 examples)
Matthew 10:25*
Luke 11:18
16:11
16:12
John 3:12
13:32#
15:20 (contains
two examples)
Romans 3:3
5:10
5:17
11:21
11:24
2 Corinthians 3:7*
208
Hebrews 2:2
12:25*
Apodosis Omitted (3 examples)
Luke 19:421
Acts 17:272
23:93
Protasis Using ei] with Future Indicative
(22
examples)
Apodosis
Using Present Indicative (5 examples)
I Corinthians 9:11*
2 Corinthians 5:3
I Peter 2:20* (contains two
examples)
Revelation 13:10
Apodosis
Using Imperfect Indicative (1 example)
Mark 3:2
Apodosis
Using Future Indicative (4 examples)
Matthew 26:33
I Corinthians 3:14
3:15
2 Timothy 2:12
1 Lenski, Luke, p. 967.
2 Robertson, Word Pictures, III, p. 288.
3 E. W. Bullinger, Figures of Speech Used in the Bible
(Grand
Rapids: Baker Book
House, 1968 reprint of 1898 edition), p. 154.
209
Apodosis
Using an Infinitive
(2 examples)
Matthew 24:24
Mark 13:22
Apodosis
in an Elliptical Condition (5 examples)
Mark 11:131
Acts 8:222
Romans 1:103
11:14
Philippians 3:11
Apodosis
Omitted Due to Hebraisms (5 examples)
Mark 8:124
Hebrews 3:11
4:3
4:5
6:14
Protasis Using ei]
with Perfect Indicative
(12
examples)
Apodosis
Using Present Indicative (5 examples)
Mark 9:42
Luke 17:2
1 Robertson, Word Pictures, p. 359.
2 Ibid., I, p. 359; also Nicoll, Testament, I, p. 218.
3 Robertson, Word Pictures, IV, p. 325.
4 Ibid.,
I, p. 331; also Nicoll, Testament, I,
p. 394.
210
Acts 25:11
I Corinthians 15:14
15:17
Apodosis
Using Present Imperative (2 examples)
Acts 16:15
2 Corinthians 10:7
Apodosis
Using Aorist Indicative (1 example)
2 Corinthians 10:7
Apodosis
Using Future Indicative (3 examples)
John 11:12
14:7#
Romans 6:5
Apodosis
Using Perfect Indicative (1 example)
2 Corinthians 2:5
APPENDIX II
OCCURRENCES OF THE
CONTRARY TO FACT CONDITION
In the following lists, * indicates that the verb has been
supplied, # indicates a
textual problem and + indicates that an
is
omitted in the
apodosis. Unless otherwise noted, the United Bible
Societies' text has
been followed.
Protasis with ei] and Imperfect Indicative
(21
examples)
Apodosis
using Imperfect
(15 examples)
Matthew 23:30
Luke 7:39
John 5:46
8:42
9:33+
9:41
15:19
18:36#
19:11+
Acts 18:14
I Corinthians 11:31
Galatians 1:10
Hebrews 8:4
8:7
11:15
211
212
Apodosis
using Aorist
(4 examples)
John 11:21
11:32
14:28
18:30
Apodosis
using Pluperfect
(2 examples)
Romans 7:7+
I John 2:19
Protasis with ei] and Aorist Indicative
(16 examples)
Apodosis
using Imperfect
(7 examples)
Matthew 6:5+
26:24+
Mark 14:21*+
John 15:22+
15:24+
Galatians 3:21
Hebrews 4:8
Apodosis
Using Aorist
(9 examples)
Matthew 11:21
11:23
24:22
Mark 13:20
Luke 10:13
Romans 9:29
I Corinthians 2:8
Galatians 4:15+
213
Revelation 20:15+1
Protasis with ei]
and Pluperfect Indicative
(6
examples)
Apodosis
Using Imperfect
(1 example)
Acts 26:32+
Apodosis
using Aorist
(4 examples)
Matthew 12:7
24:43
Luke 12:39
John 4:10
Apodosis
using Pluperfect
(1 example)
John 8:19
Other
Forms
Matthew 25:27 - protasis implied2
Luke 17:6 - mixed condition3
19:23 - protasis
implied4
19:42 –
aposiopesis5
John 14:2 - protasis implied6
1 A. T. Robertson, Word Pictures in the New Testament, 6
vols.
(Nashville:
Broadman Press, 1930), V, pp. 464-465 identifies this as a
first
class or simple condition.
2 Ibid., I, p. 200.
3 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1022.
4 Robertson, Word Pictures, II, p. 243.
5 Ibid., II, p. 246.
6 Ibid.,
VI, p. 248.
214
I Corinthians 12:19 - protasis = ei] + imperfect,
apodosis =
question
Hebrews 7:11 - protasis = ei] + imperfect,
apodosis =
question
APPENDIX III
OCCURRENCES OF THE
PROBABLE CONDITION
In this list of the occurrences of the probable condition,
all verbs were
classified in terms of their form, rather than function.
In periphrastic
constructions classification was made on the basis of
the main verb, and the
participle was regarded as a "supplimentary"
participle. * means the
verb has been supplied, and # indicates a
textual variant.
Protasis with e]a<n and Present
Subjunctive
(105
examples)
Apodosis
Using Present Indicative (53 examples)
Matthew 8:2
Mark 1:40
Luke 5:12
6:23
John 3:2
3:27
5:31
6:65
8:16
9:31
11:9
11:10
13:17
13:35
15:4
15:6
15:14
21: 22*
21:23*
21:25
215
216
Acts 26:5
Romans 2:25
14:8
(contains 4 examples)
I Corinthians 4:15
5:11
6:4
9:16
11:14
11:15
13:2
13:3
14:14
14:24
I Thessalonians 3:8
I Timothy 1:8*
3:25
2 Timothy 2:5
James 2:14*
2:15
2:17
I Peter 3:13*
I John 1:7
1:9
2:1
2:3
2:15
3:20
3:21
4:12
5:14
Apodosis
Using Present Imperative (8 examples)
Matthew 5:23
John 7:37
10:38
12:26
Romans 12:20
13:4
217
I Corinthians 7:36
14:28
Apodosis
Using Aorist Indicative (4 examples)
John 15:6
I Corinthians 7:28 (contains 2 examples)
I Thessalonians 2:7
Apodosis
Using Aorist Subjunctive (3 examples)
Matthew 26:35
Luke 20:28
Acts 13:41
Apodosis
Using Aorist Imperative (8 examples)
Matthew 5:23
10:13 (contains 2
examples)
Mark 9:45
9:47
John 10:38
15:7
Colossians 3:13
Apodosis
Using Future Indicative (26 examples)
Matthew 6:22
6:23
15:14
17:20
21:21
24:48 (contains 2
examples)
Luke 10:6
13:3
19:31
218
John 6:62*
7:17
12:26
13:35
14:15#
14:23
Acts 5:38
Romans 2:26
9:27
I Corinthians 14:16
14:23
14:24
16:4
Galatians 5:2
Hebrews 13:23
James 4:15
Apodosis
Using Perfect Indicative (2 examples)
Romans 2:25
I Corinthians 13:1
Apodosis
Using a Participle
(1 example)
Colossians 3:13
Protasis with e]a<n and Aorist Subjunctive
(177 examples)
Apodosis
Using Present Indicative (52 examples)
Matthew 5:46
5:47
12:29
18:12
18:13
21:26
219
Mark 3:24
3:27
7:3
7:4
7:11
10:12
Luke 6:34*
12:38
15:8
John 3:3
3:5
6:44
7:51
8:31
8:54
12:24
12:47
13:8
14:3
19:12
Acts 15:1
27:31
Romans 7:3
11:22
15:24
I Corinthians 7:8*
7:39
7:40
8:8 (contains 2
examples)
12:15
12:16
13:3
15:36
16:7
2 Corinthians 5:1
Hebrews 3:6
10:38
James 2:15*
I Peter 3:13*
220
I John 1:6
1:8
1:10
2:1
2:29
4:20
Apodosis
Using Present Subjunctive (3 examples)
Hebrews 3:7
3:15
4:7
Apodosis
Using Present Imperative (11 examples)
Matthew 5:23
18:15
18:17
Mark 13:21
I Corinthians 7:11
10:28
14:30
15:10
Galatians 1:8
6:1
James 5:19
Apodosis
Using Aorist Indicative (4 examples)
Matthew 18:15
I Corinthians 7:28 (contains 2 examples)
James 2:2
Apodosis
Using Aorist Subjunctive (20 examples)
Matthew 5:20
16:26
18:3
24:23
24:26
221
Mark 12::19
16::18#
Luke 20:28
22:67
22:68
John 4:48
8:51
8:52
9:22
11:57
16:7
20:25
Acts 9:2
Romans 10:15
2 Corinthians 9:4
Apodosis
Using Aorist Imperative (13 examples)
Matthew 5:23
18:15
18:16
18:17
26:42
Mark 9:43
11:3
Luke 17:3
(contains 2 examples)
22:68
John 15:7
I Corinthians 7:11
Colossians 4:10
Apodosis
Using Future Indicative (72 examples)
Matthew 4:9
5:13
6:14
6:15
9:21
12:11
222
Matthew 18:2
18:19
18:35
21:3
21:21 (contains 2
examples)
21:24
21:25
22:24
24:48
28:14
Mark 3:35
5:28
6:23
9:50
11:31
Luke 4:7
12:45
13:5
14:34
16:30
16:31
17:4
20:5
20:6
John 3:12
5:43
6:51
8:24
8:55
10:9
11:25
11:40
11:48
12:32
14:3
14:14
15:7
15:10
16:7
Romans 7:3
10:9
11:23
223
I Corinthians 4:19
8:10
14:6
14:7
14:8
14:9
14:23
14:24
2 Corinthians 10:8
12:6
13:2
I Timothy 2:15
2 Timothy 2:21
Hebrews 12:20
James 4:15
I John 2:24
3:2
5:16
3 John 10
Revelation 3:3
3:20
22:18
22:19
Apodosis
Using Perfect Indicative (2 examples)
Romans 7:2
14:23
Protasis with e]a<n and Perfect Subjunctive
(7 examples)
Apodosis
Using Present Indicative (3 examples)
I Corinthians 13:2
14:11
I John 2:29
224
Apodosis
Using Future Indicative (1 examples)
I Corinthians 14:11
Apodosis
to be Supplied
(2 examples)
2 Corinthians 11:16
2 Thessalonians 2:3
Apodosis
in Aposiopesis
(1 example)
Luke 13:91
Protasis with a@n
and Present Subjunctive
(4 examples)
Apodosis
Using Present Indicative (3 examples)
John 5:19
13:202
16:233
Apodosis
Using Perfect Indicative (1 example)
John 20:23b
Protasis with a@n
and Aorist Subjunctive
(1
example)
Apodosis
Using Perfect Indicative (1 example)
John 20:23a
1 A. T. Robertson, Word Pictures in the New Testament, 6
volumes
(Nashville:
Broadman Press, 1930), II, p. 187.
2 Ibid., V, p. 242.
3 Ibid., V, p. 271 discusses the condition and Frederick Louis
Godet,
Commentary on the Gospel of John, 2
volumes, (
Zondervan
Publishing House, n.d., reprint of 1893 edition), II, p. 317
discusses
a minor textual variant.
225
Protasis with ei]
and Aorist Subjunctive
(8 examples)
Luke 9:131
Romans 11:142
I Corinthians 9:11#3
14:5
Philippians 3:114
3:125
I Thessalonians 5:106
Revelation 11:5#7
1 Robertson, Word Pictures, II, p. 126.
2 Ibid., IV, p. 395.
3 W. Robertson Nicoll, ed., The Expositor’s Greek Testament, 5
volumes
(Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdman's Publishing Co., 1967), II, p.
849
and John Peter Lange, ed., Commentary on
the Holy Scriptures, 24
volumes
reprinted in 12 (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1960),
X,
p. 180.
4 Robertson, Word Pictures, IV, p. 455.
5 Ibid., IV, p. 455.
6 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1017.
7 Lange, Commentary, XII, p. 215.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aland,
Kurt, et. at., editors. The Greek New
Testament.
Bible Societies, 1966.
Alexander,
Joseph Addison. Commentary on the Acts of
the Apostles.
Reprint of 1875 edition.
House, 1956.
Allen,
According to S. Matthew. Volume 26 of The International Critical
Commentary. Edited by
Samuel Rolles Driver, Alfred Plummer and
Charles Augustus Briggs.
Allinson,
Francis G. "Gildersleeve, Basil Lanneay." Dictionary of
Amenican Biography. 10 volumes,
edited by Allen Johnson. New
Ball,
Francis Kingsley. The Elements of Greek.
Company, 1927.
Unpublished Th.D. dissertation, Grace
Theological Seminary, 1975.
Bayfield,
M. A. "On Conditional Sentences in Greek and Latin, and
Indefinite Sentences in Greek." The Classical Review, 4:2 (May,
1890), 200-203.
________.
"Conditional Sentences in Greek and Latin: Indefinite Sentences
in Greek." The Classical Review, 6:2 (May, 1892), 90-92.
Benner,
Allen Rogers and Smyth, Herbert Weir. Beginner’s
Greek Book. New
Blass,
Friedrich. Grammar of New Testament Greek.
Translated by Henry
Blass,
F[riedrich] and Debrunner, A[lbert]. A
Greek Grammar of the New
Testament and Other Early Christian
Literature.
Translated and
revised by Robert W. Funk.
1961.
Bonner,
Robert J. Greek Composition for Schools.
and Company, 1903.
226
227
Boyer,
James E. "Greek Exegetical Methods." Unpublished class notes,
Grace Theological Seminary, n.d.
________.
"Semantics in Biblical Interpretation." Grace Journal, 3:2
(Spring, 1962), 25-34.
Brennan,
Paul William. "The Structure of the Koine Greek Narrative."
Unpublished Th.D. dissertation, The
Hartford Seminary Foundation,
1968.
Broadus,
John A. Commentary on the Gospel of
Matthew. Volume I of An
American Commentary on the New
Tetament.
Edited by Alvah Hovey.
Bullinger,
E. W. Figures of Speech Used in the Bible.
Reprint of 1898
edition.
Burkitt,
F. C. "Mark VIII 12 and Ei in Hellenistic
Greek." The Journal
of Theological Studies, 27:1 (April,
1976), 274-276.
to the Galatians. Volume 35 of The International Critical Com-
mentary. Edited by
Samuel Rolles Driver, Alfred Plummer and
Charles Augustus Briggs.
_________.
Syntax of Moods and Tenses in New
Testament Greek.
Buttmann,
Alexander. A Grammar of the New Testament
Greek. Translated
and edited by J. H. Thayer.
1873.
Buttmann,
Philip. A Greek Grammar. Revised and
enlarged by Alexander
Buttmann. Translated from the 18th
German edition by Edward
Robinson.
Chamberlain,
William Douglas. An Exegetical Grammar of
the Greek New
Testament.
Chambers,
C. D. "The Classification of Conditional Sentences." The
Classical Review, 9:2 (May,
1895), 293-294.
Clapp,
Edward B. "Conditional Sentences in Aischylas." Transactions of
the American Philological Association, 18:1 (March,
1887), 43-58.
________.
"Conditional Sentences in the Greek Tragedians." Transactions of
the American Philological Association, 22:1 (March,
1891), 81-92.
________.
"Mr. Bayfield on Conditions 'Contrary to Fact.'" The Classical
Review, 5:5 (November,
1891), 397-399.
228
Coleman,
N. D. "Some Noteworthy Uses of Ei] in Hellenistic
Greek with a
Note on St. Mark viii 12." The Journal of Theological Studies,
27:1 (April, 1976), 159-167.
Dana,
H. E. and Mantey, Julius R. A Manual.
Grammar of the Greek New
Testament.
Darby,
J. N. The New Testament: A New
Translation from the Greek Original.
1961.
Davidson,
Chalmers G. "Goodwin, William Watson." Dictionary of American
Biography. 10 volumes,
edited by Allen Johnson.
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957.
Davis,
William Hersey. Beginner's Grammar of the
Greek New Testament.
5th edition.
Deissman,
Adolf. Light From the Ancient East.
Translated by Lionel R. M.
Strachen.
Donovan,
J. "Sonnenschein's Greek Grammar." The Classical Review, 9:1
(January, 1895), 60-67.
Ellicott,
Charles J. A Critical and Grammatical
Commentary on
First Epistle to the Corinthians.
Publisher, 1889.
_________.
Commentary on the Epistle to the Thessalonians.
Reprint of 1861
edition.
The Englishman's
Greek Concordance (14
the New Testament. 9th edition.
Funk,
Robert W. A Beginning-Intermediate
Grammar Hellenistic Greek.
3 volumes.
1973.
Gary,
Geo[rge] L. An Introduction to the Greek
of the New Testament.
Gildersleeve,
B. L. "Brief Mention." The
American Journal of Philology,
33:4 (December, 1912), 490.
_________.
"On Ei] with the Future Indicative and ]Ea<n with the
Subjunctive
in the Tragic Poets." Transactions of the American Philological
Association, 7:1 (January,
1876), 2-23.
229
Gildersleeve,
B. L. "Encroachment of Mh< on Ou]
in Later Greek." The
American Journal of Philology, 1:1 (January,
1880), 45-57.
________.
"Studies in Pindaric Syntax." The
American Journal of Philology,
3:4 (December, 1882), 434-445.
________. Syntax
of Classical Greek. 2 volumes.
Company, 1900.
_________.
"Transactions of the American Philological Association, 1887,
vol. XVIII,
9:4 (December, 1888), 491-492.
Godet,
Frederick Louis. Commentary on the First
Epistle of
the Corinthians. 2 volumes.
Translated by A. Cusin. Reprint
of 1886 edition.
_________.
Commentary on the Gospel Luke. 2 volumes. Translated by
E. W. Shalders. Reprint of 1887
edition.
Publishing House, 1957.
________.
Commentary on the Gospel of John. 2
volumes. Reprint of 1893
edition.
Goetchius,
Eugene Van Ness. The Language of the New
Testament. New
Gonda,
J. The Character of the Indo-European
Moods.
Harrassowitz, 1956.
Goodwin,
W[illiam] W[atson]. "A Revision of the Doctrine of Conditional
Sentences in Greek and Latin." Proceedings of the American
Academy of Arts and Sciences, 6:4 (December,
1864), 363-379.
_________.
An Elementary Greek Grammar.
_________.
An Elementary Greek Grammar. Revised
edition.
and Heath, 1880.
_________. Greek Grammar. Revised by Charles
Burton Gulick.
and Company, 1930.
__________.
"On the Classification of Conditional Sentences in Greek Syntax."
Transactions
of the American Philological Association, 6:1
(March, 1873), 60-79.
_________.
"'Shall' and 'Should' in Protasis
and their Greek Equivalents."
Transactions
of the American Philological Association, 7:2 (June,
1874), 87-107.
230
Goodwin,
W[illiam] W[atson]. Syntax of Moods and
Tenses of the Greek Verb.
Green,
Samuel G. Handbook to the Grammar of the
Greek Testament.
The Religious Tract Society, [1886].
Greenlee,
J. Harold. "'If' in the New Testament." The Bible Translator,
13:1 (January, 1962), 39-43.
Greenough,
James B. "On some Forms of Conditional Sentences in Latin,
Greek and Sanskrit." Transactions the American Philological
Association, 2:2 (June,
1871), 159-165.
________.
"Some Features of the Contrary to Fact Condition." Harvard
Studies in Classical Philology, 7:1 (January,
1896), 13-20.
Hackett,
Horatio Balch. A Commentary on the Acts of
the Apostles. Volume
IV of An American Commentary on the New Testament. Edited by
Alvah Hovey.
Society: 1882.
Hadley,
James. A Greek Grammar for Schools and Colleges.
Revised by
Frederic DeForest Allen.
Hale,
Clarence B. "First Year New Testament Greek." Mimeographed classroom
syllabus.
Hale,
William Garner. "The Origin of Subjunctive and Optative Conditions
in Greek and Latin." Harvard Studies in Classical Philology,
12:2 (April, 1901), 109-123.
Harrison,
Caskie. "Notes." The Classical
Review, 3:10 (October, 1889), 417.
________.
"Remarks on Mr. Bayfield's Paper." The Classical Review, 4:3 (June, 1890),
297-298.
Heinz,
Vincent. "The Optative Mood in the Greek New Testament."
Unpublished Th.M. thesis, Dallas
Theological Seminary, 1962.
Hendriksen,
William. The Gospel of Luke.
1978.
________.
The Gospel of Matthew.
________.
I
and II Thessalonians.
________.
I and II Timothy and Titus.
Hiebert, D. Edmund. Second Timothy.
231
The Holy Bible: Translated
from the Latin Vulgate.
Horton-Smith,
Richard. The Theory of Conditional
Sentences in Greek and
Latin.
Houben,
Jeffrey Lawrence. "The Conditional Sentence in Ancient Greek."
Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Huddilston,
John Homer. Essentials of New Testament Greek.
The Macmillan Company, 1933.
Jannaris,
A. N. An Historical Greek Grammar.
Limited, 1897.
Jay,
Eric G. New Testament Greek: An Introductory
Grammar.
The Macmillan Company, 1958.
Johnson,
Allen and Malone, Duman, editors. Dictionary
of American
Biography. 10 volumes.
Kaegi,
Adolf. A Short Grammar of Classical Greek.
Translated and edited
by James A. Kleist.
Katranides,
Aristotle. "Conditional Constructions in Modern Greek: A
Transformational Grammar."
Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Kautzsch,
E., editor. Gesenius' Hebrew Grammar.
Revised by J. E. Cowley.
Kent,
Homer A., Jr. The Pastoral Epistles.
Kinge,
John, Jr. "Greek Conditional Sentences." The Bible Translator,
13:4 (October, 1962), 223-224.
Kittel,
Rudolf, editor. Biblia Hebraica.
Bibelanstalt, 1951.
Kilhner,
Raphael. Grammar of the Greek Language.
Translated by B. B.
Edwards and S. H. Taylor.
Lange,
John Peter, editor. Commentary on the Holy Scriptures. 24 volumes
reprinted in 12.
La
Sor, William Sanford. Handbook of New Testament Greek. 2 volumes.
(March, 1899), 100-109.
232
Lejnieks,
Valdis. "Mood, Tense and Aspect in Homeric Greek." Unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation,
Lenski,
R. C. H. The Interpretation of St.
Matthew’s Gospel.
________.
The Interpretation of St. Mark's Gospel.
Publishing House, 1961.
________.
The Interpretation of St. Luke's Gospel.
Publishing House, 1961.
________.
The Interpretation of
Publishing House, 1961.
________.
The Interpretation of the Acts of the Apostles.
________.
The Interpretation of I and II Corinthians.
Publishing House, 1963.
_______.
The Interpretation of
Ephesians and Philippians.
House, 1961.
________.
The Interpretation of
the Thessalonians, to Timothy, to
Titus and to Philemon.
Minnea-
polis:
________. The
Interpretation of I and II Epistles of Peter, the Three
Epistles of John and the Epistle of
Jude.
Publishing House, 1981.
Liddell,
Henry George and Scott, Robert. A Greek-English
Lexicon. Edited
by Henry Stuart Jones and Roderick
McKenzie. 2 volumes.
At the Clarendon Press, 1951.
Lightfoot,
J. B. The Epistle of
edition.
________.
Notes on the Epistles of
Lindsell,
Harold, editor. The Harper Study Bible,
Revised Standard Version.
Machen,
J. Gresham. New Testament Greek for
Beginners.
MacMillan Company, 1951.
233
Mattil,
A. J. and Mattil, Mary Bedford. A Classified
Biography of Litera-
ture on the Acts of the Apostles. Volume 7 of New Testament Tools
and Studies. Edited by
Bruce Metzger.
McKnight,
Edgar V. "The New Testament and 'Biblical Greek.'" Journal of
Bible and Religion, 34:1 (January,
1966), 36-42.
Metzger,
Bruce M., editor. Index to Periodical
Literature on Christ and
the Gospels. Volume 6 of New Testament Tools and Studies. Edited
by Bruce M. Metzger.
Company, 1962.
________.
Index to Periodical Literature on the
Apostle Paul. Volume I
of New
Testament Toots and Studies. Edited by Bruce M. Metzger.
Moeller,
Henry R. and Kramer,
New Testament Greek." Novum Testamentum, 5:1 (January, 1962),
25-35.
Morris,
Charles D. "On Some Forms of Greek Conditional Sentences."
Transactions
of the American Philological Association, 6:1
(March, 1875), 44-53.
Moore,
Jerome. "
(June, 1979), 11.
Moule,
C. F. D. An Idiom Book of New Testament Greek.
Moulton,
J. H. An Introduction to the Study of New
Testament Greek.
Fourth edition.
________.
A Grammar of New Testament Greek. Volume
I: Prolegomena.
Third edition.
_________
and Howard, W. F. A Grammar of New
Testament Greek. Volume II:
Accidence and Word Formation.
________
and Milligan, George. The Vocabulary of
the Greek Testament.
Moulton,
W. F. and Geden, A. S., editors. A Concordance
to the Greek
Testament. Fourth edition.
Nestle,
Erwin and Kilpatrick, G. D. H KAINH DIAQHKH. Second
edition.
The New English
Bible.
234
Nicoll,
W. Robertson, editor. The Expositor's Greek
Testament. 5
volumes.
Norbie,
Donald. "If by any means . . . ."
The Evangelical Quarterly,
32:4 (December, 1960), 224-226.
Nutting,
H. C. "The Modes of Conditional Thought." The American Journal
of Philology, 24:3 (July,
1903), 278-303.
__________.
"The Order of Conditional Thought." The American Journal of
Philology, 24:1,2
(January, April, 1903), 25-39, 149-162.
Owen,
John. An Exposition of Hebrews. 4
volumes. Reprint of 1855 edition.
Perrin,
Porter and Smith, George H. Handbook of
Current English. Third
edition, edited by Jim W.. Corder.
Foresman and Company, 1968.
Phillips,
J. B. The New Testament in Modern English.
MacMillan Company, 1962.
Plummer,
Alfred. A Critical and Exegetical
Commentary on the Gospel
According to S. Luke. Volume 28 of The International Critical
Commentary, edited by.
Samuel Rolles Driver, Alfred Plummer and
Charles Augustus Briggs.
Pritchett,
W. K. "The Conditional Sentence in Attic Greek." The American
Journal of Philology, 76:1 (January,
1956), 1-17.
Roberts,
J. W. "Some Aspects of Conditional Sentences in the Greek New
Testament." The Bible Translator, 15:1 (January, 1964), 70-76.
__________.
"The Use of Conditional Sentences in the Greek New Testament as
Compared with Homeric, Classical and
Helenistic Uses." Unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, The University of
Texas, 1955.
Robertson,
Archibald and Plummer, Alfred. A Critical
and Exegetical Commen-
tary on the First Epistle of
of The
International Critical Commentary on the Holy Scriptures of
the Old and New Testaments. Edited by
Samuel Rolles Driver,
Alfred Plummer and Charles Augustus
Briggs.
Robertson,
A. T. A Grammar of the Greek New Testament
in the Light of
Historical Research.
235
Robertson,
A. T. A Short Grammar of the Greek New
Testament.
A. C. Armstrong & Son, 1908.
_________.
Word Pictures in the New Testament. 6
volumes.
Broadman Press, 1930.
_________
and Davis, W. Hersey. A New Short Grammar
of the Greek
Testament.
Seager,
John, translator. Hoogeveen's Greek
Particles.
and
Sedwick,
S. B. "Sonnenschein, Edward Adolf." Dictionary of National .
Biography, 1922-1930. Edited by J.
R. H. Weaver,
University Press, 1961.
The Septuagint
Version of the and Testament and Apocrapha.
Samuel Bagster and Sons, Limited, n.d.
Sewall,
J. B. "On the Distinction Between the Subjunctive and Optative
Modes in Greek Conditional
Sentences." Transaction's of the
American Philological Association, 5:1 (January,
1874), 77-82.
Simcox,
William Henry. The Language of the New
Testament.
and
Smyth,
Herbert Weir. Greek Grammar for Colleges.
ompany, 1920.
Sonnenschein,
E. A. "Horton-Smith's Conditional Sentence." The Classical
Review, 9:2 (April,
1895), 220-223.
_________.
"Notes on Conditional
Sentences." The Classical Review,
1:1,2
(January, May, 1886), 124-128,
238-239.
________
and Seaton, R. C. "Mr. Bayfield on Conditional Sentences." The
Classical Review, 6:2 (May,
1892), 199-203.
Tenny,
Merrill C., editor. The Zondervan Pictorial
Bible Dictionary.
Thayer,
Joseph Henry. Thayer’s Greek-English
Lexicon of the New Testament.
Reprint of Corrected Edition.
National Foundation for Christian
Education, n.d.
Thrall,
Margaret E. Greek Particles in the New
Testament. Volume 3 of
New
Testament Tool's and Studies. Edited by Bruce M. Metzger.
236
Thwing,
Charles. "
10 volumes. Edited by Allen Johnson
and Dumas Malone.
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958.
Tune,
Cecil. "The Use of Conditional Sentences in Hebrews." Unpublished
Th.M. thesis, Dallas Theological
Seminary, 1973.
Turner,
Nigel. A Grammar of New Testament Greek.
Volume III: Syntax.
Verkuyl,
Gerrit, editor. The Holy Bible: The
English.
Watson,
Dan Riley. "Conditional Sentences in Romans." Unpublished Th.M.
thesis, Dallas Theological Seminary,
1976.
Webster's
Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary.
G. and C. Merriam Company, 1967.
Wenham,
J. W. The Elements of New Testament Greek.
University Press, 1965.
Westcott,
Brooke Foss. The Epistle to the Hebrews.
and
_________
and Hort, Fenton John Anthony. The New
Testament in the 0riginal
Greek.
White,
John Williams. The Beginner’s Greek Book.
1893.
White,
W., Jr. "Greek Language." The
Zondervan Pictorial Encyclopedia of
the Bible. 5 volumes,
edited by Merrill C. Tenney.
Zondervan Publishing House, 1976.
Who was Who? 5 volumes.
Winer,
G[eorge] B[enedict]. A Treatise on the Grammar
of New Testament
Greek. Ninth English
edition, translated and edited by W. F.
Moulton.
________.
A Grammar of the Idiom of the New
Testament. Seventh edition,
revised by Gottlieb Lunemann,
translated by J. H. Thayer.
Warren F. Draper, Publisher, 1893.
Wuest,
Kenneth S. The Gospels: An Expanded Translation.
Volume I of
Wuest' Expanded Translation of the Greek
New Testament.
Grand
Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing
Company, 1956.
237
Wuest,
Kenneth S. Treasures From the Greek New Testament.
Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company,
1957.
Yenni,
Rev. D. A Grammar of the Greek Language.
D. & J. Sadlier & Co.,
1878.
Zerwick,
Maximilian. Biblical Greek.
Translated by Joseph Smith.
Scripta Pontificii Instituti Biblici,
1963.
Please report any
errors to Ted Hildebrand:
|| Pope Shenouda || Father Matta || Bishop Mattaous || Fr. Tadros Malaty || Bishop Moussa || Bishop Alexander || Habib Gerguis || Bishop Angealos || Metropolitan Bishoy ||
|| The Orthodox Faith (Dogma) || Family and Youth || Sermons || Bible Study || Devotional || Spirituals || Fasts & Feasts || Coptics || Religious Education || Monasticism || Seasons || Missiology || Ethics || Ecumenical Relations || Church Music || Pentecost || Miscellaneous || Saints || Church History || Pope Shenouda || Patrology || Canon Law || Lent || Pastoral Theology || Father Matta || Bibles || Iconography || Liturgics || Orthodox Biblical topics || Orthodox articles || St Chrysostom ||
|| Bible Study || Biblical topics || Bibles || Orthodox Bible Study || Coptic Bible Study || King James Version || New King James Version || Scripture Nuggets || Index of the Parables and Metaphors of Jesus || Index of the Miracles of Jesus || Index of Doctrines || Index of Charts || Index of Maps || Index of Topical Essays || Index of Word Studies || Colored Maps || Index of Biblical names Notes || Old Testament activities for Sunday School kids || New Testament activities for Sunday School kids || Bible Illustrations || Bible short notes|| Pope Shenouda || Father Matta || Bishop Mattaous || Fr. Tadros Malaty || Bishop Moussa || Bishop Alexander || Habib Gerguis || Bishop Angealos || Metropolitan Bishoy ||
|| Prayer of the First Hour || Third Hour || Sixth Hour || Ninth Hour || Vespers (Eleventh Hour) || Compline (Twelfth Hour) || The First Watch of the midnight prayers || The Second Watch of the midnight prayers || The Third Watch of the midnight prayers || The Prayer of the Veil || Various Prayers from the Agbia || Synaxarium