THE LEVIRATE AND GOEL
INSTITUTIONS IN THE
OLD TESTAMENT
With Special Attention
to
the Book of Ruth
DONALD
A. LEGGETT
TO LINDA
hvhy
rxry twx
Proverbs
31:30b
Acknowledgments
IT
is with deep gratitude that I take this opportunity to
publicly
acknowledge many who have played a key role
in
the completion of my work.
It was through training received at
Reformed Episcopal
Seminary,
delphia,
that I was first introduced to the Free University. A
scholarship
received from the University was an impetus to-
ward
taking the step of coming to
unfamiliar
language. I am grateful for the happy years which
I
was able to spend in
1960-1964,
while pursuing my studies. I would like to single
out
Rev. and Mrs. Jacob Vos, fellow-students at the Free
University
in those early years, who were tremendously help-
ful
to my wife and me and who remain to this day our closest
friends.
In
Leng
family who extended many kindnesses to us. Drs. Van-
noy
and his family graciously allowed me to share their home
in
the closing phases of my work.
Research for my thesis was carried on
in numerous librar-
ies.
Special mention should be made of the libraries of the
Free
University and
Theological
Seminary, and
and
I am grateful to Queen's University,
erous
use of their facilities. It was my pleasure to make two
extended
visits to the Tyndale House,
and
to be able to take advantage of their research facilities.
Lastly,
I would not wish to omit mention of the extensive
help
which I have received from the library personnel at the
v
vi Acknowledgments
This thesis would never have been
completed without the
generous
grant of a sabbatical year by
I
am also grateful for the stimulation received in my part-
time
involvement at the
year.
How can I ever thank those students of mine and their
wives
who gave me substantial support during that year and
who
have been a constant encouragement to me! To the
Postma,
Males, Pointner, Barber, Smith, Stoute, McPhee,
Henkelman,
and
larly,
to Dr. and Mrs. C. Wellum and Dr. and Mrs. E. Higbee,
and
the congregation of
To Professor Dr. N. H. Ridderbos, I
wish to express my
thanks
for his wise counsel and competent criticism of my
work.
For the considerable time which he has given in its
supervision
and for the high standard of biblical scholarship
which
he has exemplified, I remain in his debt.
Finally, I wish to thank my wife and
children for their
part
in my thesis. Through the loving encouragement of my
wife,
I was enabled to persevere in my work. She willingly
assumed
the added responsibilities of typing and proofread-
ing
to her already busy life. The children too have known
what
it is to sacrifice vacation time and other things in the
interest
of "the thesis." As a family we are thankful to God,
who
has enabled us to finish this work. To Him be glory
forever.
TABLE OF
CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS v
INTRODUCTION 1
Part One
THE
LEVIRATE AND GOEL INSTITUTIONS IN THE OLD
TESTAMENT (EXCLUSIVE OF THE BOOK OF
RUTH)
1.
THE LEVIRATE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST 9
Hittites 21
Nuzi 24
2.
THE LEVIRATE IN
The Levirate Incident, Gen. 38 29
The Levirate Law, Deut. 25:5-10 49
The Persons Involved, Deut. 25:5 42
The Purpose of the Levirate, Deut.
25:6 48
The Ceremony of Refusal, Deut. 25:7-10
55
3.
THE GOEL IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST 63
Parallels to the Goel-Redemption of
Property 63
Parallels to the Goel-Redemption of
Person 68
Parallels to the God-Redemption of
Blood 71
4.
THE GOEL IN
Goel-Redemption of Property, Lev.
25:23-28 83
Goel-Redemption of Person, Lev.
25:47-55 98
God-Redemption of Blood, Num. 35;
Deut. 19:
1-13; Josh. 20:1-9 107
Restitution to the Goel, Num. 5:8 138
vii
viii Contents
Part
Two
THE LEVIRATE AND GOEL INSTITUTIONS
IN
THE BOOK OF RUTH
5.
THE DATE AND PURPOSE OF THE BOOK OF
RUTH 143
The Date of the Book of Ruth 143
Arguments for a Pre-Exilic Date 143
Arguments for a Post-Exilic Date 146
Argument from Purpose 147
Argument from the Place of the Book in
the Canon 152
Argument from Language 154
Argument from the Social and Legal
Customs 157
The Purpose of the Book of Ruth 163
The Interesting-Story Purpose 164
The Exemplary Purpose 165
The Theological Purpose 166
The Davidic-Ancestry Purpose 168
The Legal Purpose 170
6.
NAOMI AND THE LEVIRATE 173
7.
NAOMI AND THE GOEL 181
The Discovery of a Goel, Ruth 2:20 181
The Approach to Boaz, Ruth 3:1-9 188
Preparations for the Visit, Ruth 3:1-4
188
The Appeal of Ruth, Ruth 3:7-9 192
The Response of Boaz, Ruth 3:10-15 201
EXCURSUS: THE INITIATIVE OF NAOMI
8.
BOAZ AND THE GOEL
The Administration of Law at the Gate,
Ruth
4:1, 2 209
The
The Double Responsibility, Ruth 4:5,
10 222
The Refusal of the Goel and the
Ceremony of
the Shoe, Ruth 4:6-8 249
Contents
ix
9.
OBED 255
Naomi's Goel, Ruth 4:14 255
Naomi's Son, Ruth 4:16, 17 260
Boaz' Son, Ruth 4:21 265
Part Three
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
10.
SUMMARIZING CONSIDERATIONS ON THE
LEVIRATE INSTITUTION IN
Representative Views 271
Recapitulation and
Conclusion 287
11.
SUMMARIZING CONSIDERATIONS ON THE
GOEL INSTITUTION IN
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BOOK OF RUTH 292
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL
ABBREVIATIONS 299
BIBLIOGRAPHY 303
Introduction
IN
recent years attention from different quarters has been
devoted
to the subject of the goel.1 in
important
publications can be named. In 1940 Stamm
published
his work Erlösen und Vergeben im
Alten Testa-
ment, which
established that the verb lxg was a term
taken
from
the sphere of family law, as over against hdp which
belonged
to the domain of commercial law.2 In 1947 the
stimulating
work of Daube, Studies in Biblical Law,
was pub-
lished,
in which considerable attention was devoted to the
study
of the goel concept and to the verb lxg. Daube made
additional
contributions to these topics in his later writings;
in
particular in his 1956 work, The New
Testament and Rab-
binic Judaism, and in the
work published in 1963, The Exo-
dus Pattern in
the Bible.
He presented very penetrating
studies
of the goel and opened serious discussion on the sub-
ject
of Yahweh as the Divine Goel. He suggested that the
specific
functions of the human goel in
some
instances to Yahweh, although he acknowledged that
there
were many general references to Yahweh as Goel where
specific
nuances could not be inferred. By studying the spe-
cific
functions of the goel, Daubecame to the conclusion
that
"lxg
primarily suggests the return of men or things into
their
own legitimate place. . . The word simply denotes the
1. Throughout the course of this
study the active participle of the verb lxg,
"redeem,"
will be transliterated simply with the word goel and the noun hlxg,
"redemption"
with the word geullah.
2. J. J. Stamm (p. 45) concludes:
"hdp
ist ein Terminus des Handelsrechtes,
welcher
einfach den Loskauf durch Stellung eines Gegenwertes ausdrückt. lxg ist
ein
familienrechtlicher Begriff, der stets eine vor dem einzelnen Rechtsgeschäft
zwischen
dem Loskaufenden und dem Losgekauften bestehende, durch die Zuge-
hörigkeit
zu einer Sippe gegebene, Beziehung voraussetzt." Stamm dealt with
Jahweh
as Goel in pp. 31-44 and made one passing remark on the goel in Ruth
(cf.
p. 28).
1
2 Introduction
rightful
getting back of a person or object that had once
belonged
to one or one's family but had been lost."3 Daube
proposed
therefore that lxg means "to recover."
Jepsen concurred in the main with
Daube in his article
written
in 1957. He wrote: "Go'el war
der, der Besitz,
Freiheit
und Leben der Sippe und ihrer Glieder wiederherste
len
sollte. . . . Ga'al bedeutet danach:
das, was eine Sippe an
Leben,
Freiheit und Besitz verloren hat, wiederherstellen.. . .
Die
Mittel der Wiederherstellung, der ge'ullah,
sind verschie-
den:
Blutrache, Heirat, Rückkauf . . . immer aber ist das eine
Ziel,
die verlorene Lebenskraft der Sippe wiederzugewinnen."4
An opinion in general agreement with
that of both Daube
and
Jepsen was Snaith's, who in 1961 argued that "primarily
the
root [lxg]
is used with reference to the enforcement, the
restoration
of a right or claim that has lapsed. . . . Generally,
whenever person or property is freed by
purchase, the verb is
G'L if it is reverting
to the original owner. . . . The idea of
reversion
is essential to the root.”5 The goel is the agent
involved
in securing this reversion to the original owner.
An article evoking wide interest on
this subject was that
of
Johnson, who in 1953 advanced the idea that the basic
idea
underlying the varying activities of the goel was that of
protection.
"When a kinsman is slain or dies childless, or
when
he is forced to sell himself into servitude or to part
with
his property, there is a breach of continuity, and the
normal
life of both individual and society is upset. Disorder
has
been introduced into the life of each, and in the case of
the
corporate unit as in that of the ordinary individual, any
weakness
or disorder, whether brought about by actual physi-
cal
death or not, involves a certain loss of vitality and it is the
function
of the lxeGo
to "protect" the life or vitality of both
the
individual and the kin-group and thus preserve their
3. D. Daube, Studies in Biblical Law, 1947, pp. 3940.
4. A. Jepsen, "Die Begriffe des
Erlösens im Alten Testament," Solange
es
"Heute"
heisst,
Festgabe fur R. Hermann, 1957, p. 159.
5 N. H. Snaith, "The Hebrew
Root G'L (1)," ALUOS, 3,
1961-62, pp. 60,
61.
Introduction 3
standing
in society by keeping intact their essential unity or
integrity."6
Johnson pointed out that lxg in several
places means
"defile,"
and argued that the verb lxg, "to defile" may not
be
divorced, as is commonly done, from lxg, "to
redeem, to
lay
claim to." In both cases the basic idea is that of "covering
up"
an object. He seeks support for his opinion from Job
3:5,
which he translates: "Let darkness, let utter blackness
cover it; Let a cloud
settle upon it; Let the o'er-shadowings
of
day bring terror to it." By a process of semantic polariza-
tion
the original thought of covering was employed both in
the
sense of protection from degradation as well as in the
sense
of causing degradation or defilement.7 Johnson's opin-
ion
on the root meaning of the verb did not receive wide-
spread
support8 although the article as a whole was a worth-
while
contribution to the growing material on the goel in
Within more recent years, Holmgren,9
Baltzer,10 Stamm
(for
the second time),11 Ringgren,12 Stuhlmueller,13
and
6., A. R. Johnson, "The Primary
Meaning of lxg," SVT, 1, 1953, pp. 71, 72.
7. A. R. Johnson, op. cit., pp. 72-74. RSV translates the
verb vhlxgy in Job
3:5
with "claim" as does the NV, "beslag op hem leggen"; KJV
translates with
"stain"
and the
8. Johnson's argument has been
accepted for example, by A. Guillaume,
"Unity
of the Book of Job," ALUOS, 4,
1962-63, pp. 26-46, and R. de Vaux,
Ancient Israel, 1961, p. 21,
who comments that the root "means 'to buy back, or
to
redeem,' ‘to lay claim to,’ but fundamentally its meaning is 'to protect.'
" It is
disputed,
in my opinion correctly, by J. Blau, "Uber Homonyme und angeblich
Homonyme
Wurzeln," VT, 6, 1956, p. 243.
Blau argues that the verb vhlxgy in
Job
3:5 is parallel with the verb vhwrdy in Job 3:4 in
an abc bca parallelism, in
which
case the thought is, God need not claim the day, for the darkness shall
claim
it for its own. wrd is used in a sense similar to lxg in Genesis
42:22 and
Psalm
9:13 (12) which supports Blau's argument. Cf. also K. Koch "Der Spruch,
‘Sein
Blut bleibe auf seinern Haupt,' und die israelitische Auffassung vom vergos-
senen
Blut," VT, 12, 1962, p. 410 n.l.
9. F. Holmgren, The Concept of Yahweh as Go'el in Second Isaiah, unpub-
lished
Ph.D. dissertation, Union Theological Seminary,
10. D. Baltzer, Ezechiel und Deuterojesaja (BZAW, 121), 1971, pp. 84-99.
11. J. J. Stamm, "lxg," THAT, 1,
pp. 383-397.
12. H. Ringgren, "lxg," TWAT, 1,
pp. 884-895.
13. C. Stuhlmueller, Creative Redemption in Deutero-Isaiah,
1970, pp. 97-
131.
4 Introduction
Sklba14
have published materials relevant to the topic of the
goel
in
root
meaning for the verb has receded somewhat into the
background
and more emphasis has been given to an exami-
nation
of the usage of the terms.
It was my intention initially to seek
to handle the topic
of
the goel in
of
Yahweh as Divine God. It soon became apparent that such
a
task was precluded by the sheer quantity of materials in-
volved.
It also turned out that in the
literature cited above rela-
tively
little was being said about the goel in the book of
Ruth.
Yet of the forty-four usages of the substantive goel,
nine
occur in Ruth; and of the fifty-one occurrences of the
verb
lxg
in the qal form, twelve are found in Ruth.15 In the
face
of these statistics and the paucity of material to be
found
in the general works cited above dealing with the goel
in
Ruth, it seemed that a study which specialized in the role
of
the goel in Ruth was needed. Further research into the
literature
brought to light a considerable number of articles
and
other small works which discuss the specialized questions
arising
from the book of Ruth. These individual questions all
have
a bearing on the basic problem of how the marriage of
Boaz
as goel to Ruth is to be related to the levirate16 law of
Deuteronomy
25:5-10, which requires only the marriage of
"brothers
dwelling together." It is necessary, therefore, as
well
as, we trust, useful to devote considerable space to pre-
senting
this literature and to sketching the views taken by
various
authors.17 In addition, a thorough study of the levirate
14. R. Sklba, "The Redeemer of
15. Cf. G. Lisowsky, Konkordanz zum Hebräischen Alten
Testament, pp.
299,
300 and J. J. Stamm, "lxg," THAT, 1, p. 383.
16. The term "levirate" is
derived from the Latinword levir
meaning "a
husband's
brother."
17. The commentary of W. Rudolph, Das Buch Ruth, Das Hohe Lied, Die
Klagelieder, KAT, 17, 1962,
provides considerable literature as does especially the
article
by H. H. Rowley, "The Marriage of Ruth," in The Servant of the Lord,
Introduction 5
institution
in
Ruth.
Some authors write that the book of Ruth has essential-
ly
nothing to do with levirate marriage,18 some find it neces-
sary
to coin the special term "ge'ullah marriage"19 to define
the
marriage of Boaz and Ruth, and others are convinced that
this
marriage is to be properly reckoned as a levirate mar-
riage.20
The strong majority of scholars seek to
fit the data of
the
book of Ruth concerning the levirate-type marriage into a
particular
phase of the levirate development within
seems,
therefore, that the book of Ruth is crucial to the
understanding
of the levirate and goel institutions in
Tentatively,
two conclusions affecting methodology were
reached.
In the first place, the commonly accepted methodol-
ogy
of tracing the historical development of the levirate by
dating
Ruth either before or after Deuteronomy was con-
cluded
to be faulty. In the second place, it was decided that
the
narrative sections of the Old Testament which tell of a
levitate
situation (Gen. 38; Ruth) should be given as serious
consideration
and weight in the study of the levirate
tion
as the levirate law of Deuteronomy 25.
In addition to studying the levirate
institution as the
background
for the goel activity in Ruth it was deemed
imperative
to examine the sections of the Old Testament law
where
the duties of the goel are prescribed, to see if any
correlation
might exist between these duties and the levirate
type-marriage
undertaken by the goel, which was not pre-
scribed
in the Old Testament laws.
In the examination of the goel and
levirate institutions in
ancient
Near East was felt to be of interest and importance.
19652,
but many significant articles appeared in more recent times. See chapter 1
nn.
2, 4.
18. Cf. for instance, K. Dronkert, Het Huwelijk in het Oude Testament,
1957,
pp. 68, 69.
19. L. Epstein, Marriage Laws in the Bible and the Talmud, 1942, pp. 86,
140.
20. Cf. the definition of the
levirate given by J. Mittelmann in chap. 2, n. 1.
6 Introduction
Finally,
because the book of Ruth occupies the central part
of
this study, it is necessary to give special attention to the
question
of the date (in spite of the first of
the above-named
conclusions
affecting methodology) and the purpose
of the
book
of Ruth.
Part One discusses the levirate and goel
institutions in the
Old
Testament (excluding Ruth) with their Near Eastern
counterparts.
Part Two, after dealing with the date and the
purpose
of the book of Ruth, focuses the reader's attention
upon
the light this book sheds on these important institu-
tions
within
the
levirate in Ruth 1:11-13. Chapter 7 is a study of the data
in
Ruth 3 which centers on Ruth's night-time encounter with
Boaz.
An excursus tackles the question, Why did Naomi take
the
initiative and send the widow, Ruth, to Boaz instructing
her
to request marriage from him on the basis of his being a
goel?
Chapter 8 directs attention to Ruth 4: 1-8, the account
of
the completion of Ruth's request by Boaz in his meeting
with
the nearer kinsman and the subsequent shoe transaction
ceremony.
Chapter 9 centers on Obed, who is called Naomi's
goel
in Ruth 4:14, Naomi's son in Ruth 4:16, 17 and Boaz'
son
in Ruth 4:21. Part Three is given over to our conclusions
on
the levirate and god institutions, which have been drawn
through
integrating the results of the general study in Part
One
with those of the specific study of the book of Ruth in
Part
Two.
PART ONE
THE LEVIRATE AND
GOEL INSTITUTIONS
IN THE OLD TESTAMENT
(EXCLUSIVE OF THE BOOK OF RUTH)
1
The Levirate In the
Ancient Near East
IN
1947, H. H. Rowley wrote, "The simple story of Ruth
abounds
in problems for which no final solution can ever
be
found, since the materials for this solution are denied
us."1
Anyone who seeks to penetrate beneath the surface of
the
book recognizes the validity of this remark. We may be
grateful,
however, that Rowley's essay has gone considerable
lengths
toward clarifying the issues, if not in providing a
"final
solution." Since the publication of his article a signifi-
cant
number of attempts have been made to solve the legal
complexities
of the book.2 Burrows has well summarized the
problem
in the book of Ruth by saying, "We have in Ruth a
combination
of three institutions which are not elsewhere
1.
H. H. Rowley, "The Marriage of Ruth," HTR, 40, 1947, p. 77 = The
Servant of the
Lord,
1965, p. 171. All references to Rowley's article will come
from
the latter.
2. Since the appearance in 1947 of
Rowley's comprehensive discussion of
the
marriage of Ruth, the following articles more directly connected with the
legal
problems in the book have appeared: S. Belkin, "Levirate and Agnate Mar-
riage,"
JQR, 6, 1969-70, pp. 284-287; J. R.
Porter, "Legal Aspects of Corporate
Personality,"
VT, 15, 1965, pp. 375-377; D. R.
Ap-Thomas, "Book of Ruth,"
ExpT, 79, 1968, pp.
369-373; D. R. G. Beattie, "Kethibh and Qere in Ruth 4:5,"
VT, 21, 1971, pp.
490-494; H. A. Brongers, "Enkele Opmerkingen over het
Verband
tussen Lossing en Leviraat," NedThT,
2, 1947, pp. 1-7; W. McKane,
"Ruth
and Boaz," GUOST, 19, 1961-62,
pp. 29-40; E. Robertson, "The Plot of
the
Book of Ruth," BJRL, 32, 1950,
pp. 207-228; Th. and D. Thompson, "Some
Legal
Problems in the Book of Ruth," VT, 18, 1968, pp. 79-99: Th.C. Vriezen,
"Two
Old Cruces," 0TS, V, 1948, pp.
80-91; D. Weiss, "The use of hnq in
connection
with Marriage," HTR, 57, 1964,
pp. 244-248; B. M. Wambacq, "Le
Mariage
de Ruth," Melanges Eugene Tisserant,
I, 1964, pp. 449-459. See also J.
Schoneveld,
De Betekenis van de Lossing in het Boek
Ruth, 1956.
9
10 The Levirate In the Ancient Near
East
found
together. Levirate marriage, redemption, and inheri-
tance
are all familiar to the reader of the OT, but only here
do
we encounter a transaction which involves all three of"
them."3
The background for our study of the activity of the
goel
in the book of Ruth must be the Old Testament institu-
tion
of levirate marriage.4 Since the law of the levirate was
not
an uncommon feature of ancient Semitic jurisprudence, a
summary
of levirate marriage in the ancient Near East will be
in
order.5
There is general agreement6
that the CH contains nothing
comparable
to levirate marriage, though Neufeld suggests that
3. M. Burrows, "The Marriage of
Boaz and Ruth," JBL, 59, 1940,
p. 445.
For
a detailed list of the legal difficulties encountered in the book, cf. W.
McKane,
op. cit., pp. 31-32.
4. Th. and D. Thompson, op. cit., p. 79, remark, "The
interpretation of
Ruth
depends on the understanding one has of the levirate." For an extremely
comprehensive
list of literature discussing levirate marriage in
Rudolph,
Das Buch Ruth, Das Hohe Lied, Die
Klagelieder, KAT, 17, 1962, pp.
60-61.
In addition to the works cited therein, cf. J. R. Porter, op. cit., pp.
375-377;
S. Belkin, op. cit., pp. 275-329; 1.
Mattuck, "Levirate Marriage in Jewish
Law,"
Studies in Jewish Literature in Honor of
Kaufmann Kohler, 1913, pp.
210-222;
0. Baab, "Marriage," IDB,
1962; D. Jacobson, The Social Background
of the Old
Testament,
1942, pp. 290-300; Morgenstern, "The Book of the
Covenant,
Part II," HUCA, 7, 1930, pp. 159-185;
the
Ancient Near East," BA, 11,
1948, pp. 30-31; G. R. Driver and J. C. Miles,
The Assyrian.
Laws,
1935, pp. 240-249; R. de Vaux, Ancient
Israel, 1961, pp.
37-38;
H. Schaeffer, Social Legislation of
Primitive Semites, 1915, pp. 57-65.
5. E. A. Speiser, "The Biblical
Idea of History in its Common Near East
Setting,"
Oriental and Biblical Studies, ed. J. J.
Finkelstein and M. Greenberg,
1967,
p. 188, correctly writes, "The Bible is first and foremost a unique distilla-
tion
of history. Now no process of this kind and magnitude can unfold in a
vacuum.
The people of the Bible, who were to make history in more ways than
one,
were neither politically nor culturally isolated from other soci-
eties....
Hence the ultimate achievement that is the Bible cannot be properly
understood,
still less appreciated, except in terms of the setting in which this
work
originated, and of the initial values which it went on to transfigure and
transcend."
Some indication of the pervasiveness of this custom may be gleaned
by
consulting, E. Westermarck, History of
Human Marriage, 3, 1925, p. 208 and
J.
Scheftclowitz, "Die Leviratsehe," ARW
18, 1915, 250 ff.
6. R. de Vaux, op. cit., p. 38; E. M. MacDonald, The Position of Woman as
reflected in
Semitic Codes,
1931, p. 23; M. Burrows, "Ancient Oriental Back-
ground
of Hebrew Levirate Marriage," BASOR,
77, 1940, p. 7 (hereafter cited as
"Background");
G. R. Driver and J. C. Miles, op. cit.,
p. 246. Generally this
The Levirate In the Ancient
Near East 11
the
institution may have been outgrown in Hammurabi's
days,
or even before his time. He affirms that such a wide-
spread
custom could not have been unknown to the Baby-
lonians
although he acknowledges the conjectural nature of
his
conclusion.7 MacDonald concludes that "the Babylonian
woman
gained by its abandonment, both in personal freedom
and
economic relief, for her support was definitely arranged
for
in giving her the usufruct of her husband's property dur-
ing
her lifetime, and she was not forced to be dependent
upon
the precarious existence of her husband's male relatives,
or,
failing them, upon the charity of her own kin or the
absence
of reference to levirate marriage is attributed to the practice of adoption
in
girls.
Cf. M. Burrows, "Background," p. 5; D. Mace, Hebrew Marriage, 1953, pp.
116,
117; S. Belkin, op. cit., p. 276. E.
Speiser, "People and Nation of
JBL, 79, 1960, p.
161, writes, "There is not a single attested case of adoption in
the
whole of the Hebrew Bible, in marked contrast to
hand,
the levirate, much though its hold may have been loosed through progres-
sive
urbanization, is never completely eliminated." This difference, he
attributes
to
a differing role of the family in relation to the state. In
family
played a part, inevitably, but its autonomy was severely restricted by
political
and economic considerations. Though blood was thicker than water,
bread
and taxes rated still higher. That is why adoption, which tends to loosen
blood
ties, became such a prominent factor in Mesopotamian society; contrari-
wise,
the institution of the levirate, which stands guard over blood relationship,
never
took hold in
position
in Yahweh and the Gods of Canaan,
1968, p. 58 n. 31. For a contrary
view
on adoption within
JBL, 30, 1931, pp.
186-200. A. Phillips, "Some Aspects of Family Law in Pre-
Exilic
spread
practice of adoption throughout the ancient Near East, that it was also
undertaken
in
and
was a unilateral act of the adopter. It would also explain why no mention of
adoption
occurs in the legal sections of the Old Testament, for as a part of family
law
it did not concern the community at large, and therefore no resort was made
to
the courts." R. de Vaux, op. cit.,
p. 52, writes, "We may conclude that the
notion
of adoption, in the juridical sense, was known in Old Testament times, but
had
little influence on daily life; it was unknown in later Jewish law."
7. E. Neufeld, Ancient Hebrew Marriage Laws, 1944, p. 49 (hereafter cited
as
AHML). Cf. also H. D. Bracker, Das Gesetz Israels, 1962, p. 36.
12 The Levirate In the Ancient Near East
community
at large."8 Despite occasional9 attempts at identi-
fying
comparable laws, the consensus of scholarly opinion is
that
no such institution as the levirate existed in
would
seem to be the case that the misfortune of having no
son
was solved through adoption customs.10
A far better case can be made for the
presence of the
levirate
custom in
dispute.
The generally accepted date for the MAL, which are
closely
related to the CH, is from 1500 to 1100 B.C.11 MAL
§30,
33, and 43 from Tablet A have the most direct bearing
on
the question of the levirate. Meek cites MAL §30 as a law
which
the Assyrian code held in common with the levirate
law
in Israe1.12 It reads: "If a father has conveyed (or)
brought
the betrothal-gift to the house of his son's (prospec-
tive)
father-in-law, with the woman not yet married to his
son
and another son of his, whose wife is living in her father's
house,
died, he shall give his dead son's wife in marriage to
his
other son to whose father-in-law's house he brought (the
8. E. M. Macdonald, op. cit., p. 12. C. Lattey, The Book of Ruth, 1935, pp.
XXII,
XXIII, writes, "In the ancient Babylonian code of Hammurabi a widow is
allowed
under certain conditions to keep or inherit property from her husband
(nos.
150, 171); this fact and the absence of any mention of the Goel appear to
indicate
a more developed social system than that of the Pentateuch or of the
Book
of Ruth."
9. Friedrich Delitzsch,
Eheformen bei
den Indogermanen,
1937, p. 101, made reference to an unpub-
lished
Sumerian inscription, which he believes may contain a reference to the
levirate.
E. Neufeld, AHML, p. 50, remarks,
"If so thorough an expert on Baby-
lonian
law as Koschaker knows of no further proof for the existence of levirate
marriage
than this doubtful inference no more reliable evidence is available at the
moment."
10. M. Burrows, "Background,"
p. 5; G. R. Driver and J. C. Miles, op.
cit.,
p.
249.
11. T. Meek, "The Middle
Assyrian Laws," ANET, 19693, p.
180, dates the
tablets
at the time of Tiglathpileser I in the 12th century though he states that the
laws
themselves may well go back to the 15th century. G. R. Driver, and J. C.
Miles,
op. cit., p. 12, place the laws
between 1450-1250. Cf. also E. F. Weidner,
"Das
Alter der mittel-assyrischen Gesetzestexte," Archiv für Orientforschung, 12,
1937,
p. 50.
12. T. Meek, Hebrew Origins, 19602, p. 63.
The Levirate In the Ancient
Near East 13
gift).
. ."13 On this law he comments, "The Levirate was to
be
enforced even though other marriage plans had been made
for
the deceased man's brother."14 Driver and Miles however,
do
not regard this as a case comparable to the Hebrew levi-
rate,
since the girl is not a widow in the strict sense. The
marriage
transaction has been legally completed but the bride
has
not yet been given to her husband. She is the "assatu" of
her
dead bridegroom, living with her father. "This, however,
does
not seem to be a case of the levirate, as there is nothing
showing
a legal duty on the second son to marry her apart
from
the duty to fulfill his father's wish.”15
Burrows and Neufeld dispute the
conclusion of Driver
and
Miles and contend that the law does constitute a genuine
case
of levirate marriage. The point under dispute between
them
is the fact that the widow is living in her father's house,
while
under the authority of her father-in-law. Two possibili-
ties
present themselves. One would be to explain the presence
of
the woman in her father's house as an "errebu" marriage,
whereby
the husband enters his wife's father's family, receiv-
ing
only partial powers of a husband over her.16 While this
13. T. Meek, ANET, p. 182.
14. T. Meek, Hebrew Origins, p. 64. E. Neufeld, AHML, p. 51, agrees re-
marking,
"It seems to follow from §30 of M.A.L. that a father-in-law can give his
son's
widowed bride—she is a bride although the text speaks of an Assatu—to
another
of his sons for whom he had already acquired a bride before the death of
his
previous son. In these circumstances the bride of the second son might become
a
second wife to her original bridegroom who has in the meantime married his
widowed
sister-in-law, or perhaps she could be given to another son by her pro-
spective
father-in-law." Cf. also, M. Burrows, "Background," p. 12.
15. G. R. Driver and J. C. Miles, op. cit., p. 247. They further add (p.
173):
"Here
there is nothing to show whether the marriage of this girl who is described
as
the assatu of the dead son was a completed marriage, but it is almost incon-
ceivable
that it was so. For as she is still in her father's house, she is presumably of
tender
age, and moreover it would be expected that, if the marriage had been
completed,
she would have had issue, as no one would marry or at any rate keep a
barren
wife; but no issue is mentioned in the text."
16. M. Burrows,
"Background," pp. 3, 5, 11-12. Cf. also M. Burrows, "The
Complaint
of Laban's Daughter," JAOS, 57,
1937, pp. 259-2761M. David, Vorm
en Wezen van de
Huwelijkssluiting naar de Oud Oostersche Rechtsopvatting,
1934,
pp. 4 f., 19 (hereafter cited as Vorm en Wezen); T. Meek, Hebrew Origins,
p.
65;
tites,"
ArOr, 18, 1950, pp. 124-130.
14 The Levirate In the Ancient Near East
would
explain her presence in her own family, it does not
seem
likely under such circumstances that her father-in-law
would
have any control over her or responsibility toward
her.17
It is more likely that the law is concerned with widows
who
have returned to their father's homes before or after the
death
of their husbands and the design of such a law is to
establish
the right of the father-in-law even where the widow
is
seeking to get out from under his control.18 There is, in
any
event, no mention of sons or of lack of sons in the law.
Because
of this Neufeld, who sees levirate marriage in this
law,
acknowledges that some sections of the MAL refer to
the
levirate custom in a rather confused manner.19
MAL § 33 has a bearing as well on a
possible levirate
custom
in
still
living in her father's house, her husband died and she has
sons,
(she shall live where she chooses in)20 a house of theirs.
(If)
she has no (son, her father-in-law shall marry her to the
son)21
of his choice ... or if he wishes, he may give her in
marriage
to her father-in-law. If her husband and her father-
in-law
are both dead and she has no son, she becomes a
widow;
she may go where she wishes."22
Four cases seem to be in view.23
The first is that of a
widow
with at least one son. In such a situation she is to live
with
her son(s). The second is where there are no sons, but
17. M. Burrows,
"Background," p. 12.
18. Ibid. Cf. E. Neufeld, AHML, pp. 51, 52.
19. E. Neufeld, AHML, p. 51.
20. G. R. Driver and J. C. Miles, op. cit., p. 228, restore the missing
words in
the
same fashion as Meek, "It seems then that 11.58-9 contained words to the
effect
that the woman may live with her sons and, of course, be supported by
them."
21. G. R. Driver and J. C. Miles, op. cit., p. 228, restore the text again
in the
same
fashion as Meek, reasoning that the case here in view is where the woman
"has
no sons or only infant eons. For the statement in the last paragraph setting
out
what happens if she has neither sons nor father-in-law, coupled with that in
11.65-66
to the effect that under certain circumstances she is given in marriage to
her
father-in-law, makes it practically certain that the mutilated lines dealt
some-
where
with the case in which she had no sons but had only a father-in-law."
22. T. Meek, ANET, p. 182.
23. M. Burrows,
"Background," p. 13.
The Levirate In the Ancient
Near East 15
the
dead husband is survived by brothers as well as his father.
Here
the law states that the father-in-law of the widow may
give
the widow to his son, as we saw in MAL §30. The third
case
is where there are no sons or brothers, but where the
father-in-law
is living. Because of the brokenness of the text
there
is some question of interpretation. Driver and Miles
comment,
"The lines preceding the statement that she may
be
given to her father-in-law are missing, so that it is impossi-
ble
to be certain that they did not deal with the case in which
she
had no sons or with that in which she was inchoately
married."24
How then are we to understand the statement "if
he
wishes, he may give her in marriage to her father-in-law"?
In
other words, Who gives the woman to her father-in-law?
We
have seen that MAL § 33 is one of the laws regulating the
situation
where the woman is living in her father's house.
Driver
and Miles infer from MAL §43, "that if there are no
brothers
of a deceased husband of an age to marry his wife,
she
reverts into the power of her own father.”25 Burrows
agrees
that the subject of the clause "if he wishes, he may
give"
is the woman's father. He is of the opinion, however,
that
"there must be some significance in the fact that the
clause
allowing the woman's father to give her to her father-
in-law
is preceded by the condition, 'or if he pleases.' This
suggests
that the missing portion of the text just preceding it
allowed
the father the option of retaining his daughter in his
own
household if he so desired. In other words, the wife's.
father
even in an errebu-marriage had no
responsibility for
her
support when her husband died, leaving no sons, but
might
either keep her at home or give her to her father-in-
24. G. R. Driver and J. C. Miles, op. cit., p. 247. They use the phrase
"inchoately
married" to describe the situation in which the marriage transaction
has
been completed, but the bride has not actually gone over to the husband.
"In
the
Assyrian laws there appear to be three classes of widows; the first is the
completely
married wife who has sons, the second is the almattu, who has neither
grown-up
sons nor father-in-law, and the third is the inchoately married bride who
has
lost her husband and of course has no sons"; op. cit., p. 246.
25. G. R Driver and J. C. Miles, op. cit., p. 229.
16 The Levirate In the Ancient Near East
law.
In that case, the permission granted to the father-in-law
to
give the widow to one of his other sons in the second set
of
circumstances, may have been similarly conditioned upon
her
father's consent."26
The fourth situation mentioned in,.
MAL §33 regulates
the
case where there are neither sons nor father-in-law. In this
case
"she may go where she wishes." She is free to dispose of
herself
as she sees fit, particularly now in her right to remarry
whom
she will.27
From MAL §33 Neufeld affirms that
"one may deduce
with
caution that in
tive
of the existence of children of the widow, who can be
married
by her own father-in-law where, for example, her
husband
has left no brothers. Whether the father-in-law mar-
ried
his daughter-in-law if there was issue remains an open
question."28
Another law possibly touching on the
levirate in
is
MAL §43. It reads: "If the seignior either poured oil on
(her)
head or brought betrothal-presents (and) the son to
whom
he assigned the wife either died or fled, he may give
(her)
to whichever he wishes of his remaining sons from the
oldest
son to the youngest son who is at least ten years old. If
the
father died and the son to whom he assigned the wife also
died,
but the dead son has a son who is at least ten years old,
he
shall marry (her), but if the grandsons are younger than
ten
years, the girl's father, if he wishes, may give his daughter
(to
one of them), or if he wishes, he may make an equitable
return
(of the gifts)."29 Here we see the case where a daugh-
ter
has been conveyed from her father's house and has come
26. M. Burrows,
"Background," p. 13.
27. G. R. Driver and J. C. Miles, op. cit., pp. 224, 225: "This
phrase obvi-
ously
permits her to remarry but probably connotes something more than
this....
She is free from both paternal and marital control, and this freedom
includes
the right to marry whom she will."
28. E. Neufeld, AHML, p. 52. T. Meek, Hebrew
Origins, p. 64, comments on
MAL
§33, "In the light of this law we can see the justification for Tamar's
trickery
whereby she was enabled to marry her father-in-law, Judah."
29. T. Meek, ANET, p. 184.
The Levirate In the
Ancient Near East 17
under
the authority of a man who is to give her to one of his
sons.
The son to whom she has been given disappears or dies
before
the consummation of the marriage. The father may
then
give her to another of his sons. If the bridegroom's
father
is dead, a son of the bridegroom not younger than ten
years
of age shall take the bride. If there are no such sons the
girl's
father may either give her to any sons of the bride-
groom
younger than ten, for whom she shall have to wait, or
return
the gifts he received.
Does this law, in any sense, reflect
the Hebrew levirate?
Once
again there is a divergence of opinion among scholars.
The
negative position is taken by Driver and Miles, who main-
tain
that there is no right or duty placed upon the brother of
the
deceased comparable to the Hebrew duty of the levirate.
Furthermore,
they note that this law clearly reflects a case of
an
inchoately married bride, which would set it apart from
the
Hebrew levirate, which governs the widow without chil-
dren.30
Neufeld, on the other hand, rather confidently af-
firms
from this law that the Assyrian levirate was extended
under
certain circumstances beyond the brothers and father
of
the deceased, and contends that though it deals with a
bride,
it must also apply to a wife.31
The difficulty of evaluating the
evidence for the levirate
custom
in
scholars.
The positions taken hinge upon how much impor-
tance
is attached to the differences.32 Driver and Miles feel
that
"these laws then contain no certain instance in which
the
girl who is given to her brother-in-law had actually been
the
full wife of the dead man. The evidence then in favour of
the
existence of the Hebrew type of levirate is very slight, for
30. G. R. Driver and J. C. Miles, op. cit., p. 247. See n. 24,
31. E. Neufeild. AHML. p. 52 n. 1. “This law also deals a
bride; how
much
more must it apply to a wife?" M. David. Vorm en Wezen. p. 25 n. 14, also
argues
that this law is a true reflection of the levirate marriage institution.
32. For an enumeration of the
differences, see E. Ring,
zm Lichte der
neuentdeckten assyrischen und hethitischen Gesetzesurkunden,
1926,
pp. 43-49.
18 The Levirate In the Ancient Near
East
the
case where any inchoately married man or woman has
died
and another brother or sister takes their respective
places
is certainly not what is generally understood as the
Hebrew
levirate."33 The laws which would seem to point to
the
existence of the levirate are explainable in terms of the
Assyrian
practice of buying a girl ana kallatuti,
"for bride-
ship."34
Burrows, Neufeld, David, and Meek all speak of vari-
ous
Assyrian laws as exemplifying real cases of levirate mar-
riage.35
To a certain extent—as we have seen, only to a cer-
tain
extent—the differences between scholars are semantic,
since
one may talk about "a real case of levirate marriage" as
Burrows
and Neufeld do, and yet go on to carefully distin-
guish
between the purpose of the levirate law in
compared
with the purpose in Israel.36 One of the laws cited
33. G. R. Driver and J. C. Miles, op. cit., pp. 247, 248. Their argument
is
also
based on several laws (§25, 33, 36, 45, 46), which "inferentially are
opposed
to
the existence of the levirate"; op.
cit., p. 248. H. Bracker, op. cit.,
p. 36, states,
"Also
von einer Leviratsehe der Witwen war in Assyrien keine Rede."
34. G. R. Driver and J. C. Miles, op. cit., pp. 163, 174, 248. Commenting
on
MAL
§ 30 they write, "The transaction then must resemble that in which a
father
acquires
another man's daughter 'for the purpose of a daughter-in-law (Bab. ana
kalluttim or kallatuti) in order to marry her to a
specified son or, if that son dies,
to
another of his sons"; op. cit.,
p. 175. H. Bracker, op. cit., p. 35,
writes, "Die
Braut
war eben nicht nur für ein spezielles Glied der Familie, sondern für die
ganze
Familie zum Heiraten gekauft oder `adoptiert.' " For a similar custom at
Nuzi
and
ZA, 43, 1936, pp.
152, 153 (hereafter cited as "Status") and A. F. Rainey,
"Family
Relationships in
35. M. Burrows,
"Background," p. 12; E. Neufeld, AHML.
p. 52, writes:
"The
Assyrian levirate law can thus be summarized as follows: (a) It applied
whether
the widow had sons or not; (b) it was in force even if there were no
marriage
but only an engagement; (c) all brothers of the deceased husband arc
subject
to the obligation; (d) failing brothers, the deceased's father marries the
widow;
(e) failing brothers and father of the deceased, the levirate duty extended
to
the grandchildren horn by another wife, and most probably also to children
thus
begotten." For reference to Meek and David, see nn. 28 and 31.
36. M. Burrows,
"Background," p. 12, as against G. R. Driver and J. C.
Miles,
refers to MAI, §30 as a real case of the levirate practice. Yet when he
summarizes,
in terms of how this institution functioned in Assyria and
writes,
"Except among the Hebrews and perhaps the Canaanites, levirate marriage
was
not in the ancient Near East a means of securing a son for the dead. It was
rather
a part of the whole system of family relationships, authority, and inheri-
tance";
op. cit., p. 15. This can also be
observed as well in E. Neufeld, op. cit.,
p.
54,
who writes, "1,o:irate marriage was a common feature in
The Levirate In the Ancient
Near East 19
by
Driver and Miles as inferentially opposed to the levirate in
section
of MAL §33 concerns the widow living in her father's
house
who has no son and whose father-in-law is dead. The
widow
is free to go where she wishes; that is, to marry whom
she
will. For Driver and Miles, this law is the opposite of the
Hebrew
levirate, which would not allow the widow a similar
freedom
of choice if any male kinsman of her husband were
living.37
This objection presupposes that the marriage of
Ruth
to the goel was a levirate marriage. At this point this
question
can be set aside. Suffice it to say, that others might
not
see MAL §33 as inferentially opposed to a levirate cus-
tom,
since they would not speak of the marriage of a Hebrew
widow
to a more distant relative as a levirate marriage.
More important than the inquiry into
whether one should
or
should not speak of a levirate custom in
consideration
of the purpose of the levirate in
quite
evident that the laws functioned dissimilarly in the two
places.
In the Hebrew levirate, the emphasis is
on the child-
less
widow and the need for male progeny for the deceased.
A
connection between the much desired male issue and the
succession
to the family estate must be noted. So also the
levirate
in
inheritance.39
Yet as Ring has noted, "Der Unterschied aber
ist,
dass in CA die Rücksicht auf den Toten and die berech-
tigte
Forderung darauf, dass sein Name nicht aussterben
ancient
Hebrew has stamped the custom in
ter.
There are many points of difference between the Hebrew levirate and the
Assyrian-Hittite
levirate which are much more striking than their points of resem-
blance."
37. G. R. Driver and J. C. Miles, op. cit., p. 248, maintain that "a
childless
widow
could not do this by Hebrew law if she had either a brother-in-law or a
male
kinsman of her husband."
38. G. Morgenstern, op. cit., p. 161, talks of the levirate
in
"an
altogether new motif ... entirely without parallel in Semitic practice."
Cf. n.
36.
39. M. Burrows,
"Background," p. 15.
20 The Levirate In the Ancient Near East
möge,
gar keinen Platz findet. Es handelt sich blos um das
Recht
der ihn Überlebenden ihn zu beerben. Das assyriche
Levirat
hat daher sicherlich bezweckt das Eigentum innerhalb
eines
Geschlechtes zusammen zu halten, aber die Bestimmun-
gen
über dasselbe haben nicht, wie es in Israel der Fall war, es
gleichzeitig
und vor allem darauf abgesehen, dass der von
Anfang
an mit dem Eigentume verbundene Name auch fer-
nerhin
an dasselbe gebunden bleiben und auf diese Weise fort-
leben
möge. In CA sind es nur die Interessen der Hinter-
bliebenen
und deren erbrechtliche Forderungen gewesen,
denen
bei der Leviratsehe Beachtung geschenkt worden
ist."40
One can conclude, then, that while there are formal
points
of contact between the two practices, such as the role
of
the father-in-law and the brothers of the deceased, there
are
some rather basic differences. At least many of the cases
adduced
from the Assyrian laws have reference to the incho-
ate
bride and not to the widow. It is unclear in others wheth-
er
children are present or not. Ring is correct in calling atten-
tion
to the fact that in
toward
the dead, to continue his name, whereas in
the
exclusive focal point is the rights obtained by the family,
in
the marriage contract, which brings the bride into her
husband's
family. It is therefore understandable when Brack-
er
concludes, "Kommt man vom ausserisraelitischen Levirat
40. E. Ring, op. cit., p. 49. H. Bracker,
op. cit., p. 36, writes, "In
die
Leviratsehe etwas sehr viel anderes. In
Versorgung
oder Festhaltung der Witwe als eines gekauften Eigentums der Fam-
ilie,
sondern darum, dass dem ohne Sohn verstorbenen Ehemann für dessen Land-
besitz,
der in seinem Geschlecht forterben sollte, ein Erbe verschafft wurde....
Die
Witwe ging in diesem Falle nicht wie eine Ware aus einer Hand in die andere,
sondern
sie handelte selbstandig zu Ehren ihres verstorbenen Mannes und seines
Geschlechtes."
I. Price "The so-called Levirate marriage in Hittite and Assyrian
Laws,"
Oriental Studies Dedicated to Paul Haupt,
ed. C. Adler and A. Embler,
1926,
p. 271: states, "The Assyrian laws uphold the sanctity of a betrothal on
the
part
of the parents of both parties with all the detail that a complicated society
would
seem to require. If these features may be classed as a kind of levirate-
marriage,
they omit those phases of the question, viz:
posterity, property and
inheritance,
that stand out so prominently in Hebrew legislation."
The Levirate In the Ancient
Near East 21
zum
israelitischen, ist es, als ob man in eine ganz andere Welt
tritt."41
Hittites
The Hittite law code42
contains one law, HC § 193, which
resembles
the levirate law in
wife,
and the man dies, his brother shall take his wife, then
his
father shall take her. If also his father dies, his brother
shall
take his wife (and also) the son of his brother shall (take
her).
(There shall be) no punishment."43
There are variations in translation
arising from an imper-
fect
text,44 which affect the order of responsibility in the
levirate
marriage situation. There is agreement among schol-
ars
that the first and second responsibility falls upon the
brother
of the deceased and the father of the deceased. Opin-
ion
is divided over the question of who assumes the responsi-
bility
for marrying the widow if the father of the deceased
dies
as well. Stated in another way, How are we to under-
41. H. Bracker, op. cit., p. 37. This conclusion is also arrived at by P.
Cruveilhier,
"Le lévirat chez les Hébreux et chez les Assyriens," RB, 34, 1925, p.
542,
"Si nous comparons entre eux le droit de Lévirat des Hébreux et celui des
Assyriens,
nous constatons que leur ressemblance est plus apparente que
réelle....
En spécifiant que c'est uniquement, quand it n'y a pas de fils, que le
droit
de lévirat doit s'exercer, le Deutéronome marque clairement que le but de
cette
institution est d'assurer la perpétuité du nom et de l'héritage du défunt. En
négligeant
au contraire la question de l'existence d' enfants, le Recueil de lois
assyriennes
nous manifeste qu'un tel but n'a nullement préoccupé l'auteur de son
droit
de lévirate." E. M. MacDonald, op.
cit., p. 72, writes, "In Israel there was a
religious
motive behind Levirate marriage, in
42.
In connection with the dating of these laws A. Goetze, "State and
Society
of the Hittites," in Neuere
Hethiterforschung, ed. G. Walser, 1964, p. 27,
comments,
"It is quite clear that they go back to the
refinement
of palaeography allows the statement that some of the law tablets that
have
come down to us in Fact were inscribed during this early period (1800
B.C.)."
43. E. Neufeld, The Hittite Laws, 1951, p. 55.
44.
father
die, then his first brother, although married, may take her; there is no
penalty."
J. Friedrich, Die Hethitischen Gesetze,
1959, p. 85, translates, "Wenn
ein
Mann eine Frau hat und der Man stirbt, nimmt seine Gattin sein Bruder; dann
nimmt
sie sein Vater. Wenn zweitens auch sein Vater stirbt und die Frau die er
hatte
sein Bruder nimmt, ist kein Anstoss."
22 The Levirate In the Ancient Near
East
stand
the reference to "his brother" who takes the woman
after
the decease of the father? Does the phrase, "his broth-
er,"
refer to the brother of the originally deceased man or to
the
father who has died?45 Price46 Ledersen,47 and
Ring48
assert
that a married brother of the deceased is the third in
order
of responsibility. The distinction between married and
unmarried
is inferred from the conclusion where it is express-
ly
stated that in the instance of the latter assuming the obli-
gation
of the levirate "There shall be no punishment."49
On the other hand, Koschaker50
Nöetscher,51 Burrows,52
and
Neufeld53 understand the sequence as involving the
brother
of the deceased, the father of the deceased, and the
45. The translation of A. Walther in
J. M. P. Smith, The Origin and History
of Hebrew Law, 1931, p. 272,
circumvents this problem by translating the dis-
puted
lines, "If again also his father die and one brother of his take the
woman."
This
translation presupposes that the "his brother" has reference to the
father's
brother.
46.
47. J. Pedersen,
§
193, "If a man marries a woman and then dies, then his brother may (or
must)
marry
her; secondarily, his father. When the father dies, a brother may (or must)
marry
her, whatever his marital relations." He remarks (p. 548) on the
concluding
section
of the law, "The latter remark might point in the direction that the
first-mentioned
brother is at any rate not under obligation to take over the
widow,
if already married."
48. E. Ring, op. cit., pp. 137, 138, writes, "Eine besondere Eigentümlich-
keit
ist die ausdrtickliche Vorschrift, dass ein verheirateter Bruder, wenn so
erfor-
derlich,
die Leviratspflicht erfüllen kann. Er kommt dadurch in die Lage in Biga-
mie
zu leben, and vermutlich hat man bigamische Verbindungen innerhalb des
hethitschen
Rechtsgebietes als nicht erlaubt angesehen, da besonders angegeben
wird,
dass er nicht hestraft werden soil. Seine neue Verbindung wird nämlich als
eine
durch besondere Verhaltnisse veranlasste ausserordentliche Massnahme
betrachtet,
eine reine Ausnahme, welche das Gesetz, deshalb dulden kann."
49.
should
be carried out even if it involved polygamy of a brother of the deceased.
This
proceeding was an emergency case and was not punishable under a law which
impliedly
was in vogue at that time."
50. P. Koschaker, "Zum Levirat
nach hethitischen Recht," RHA,
10, 1933,
p.
77.
51. F. Nötscher, Biblische Altertumskunde, 1940, p. 88 n.
2, comments,
"Der
hethitische Levirat ist fakultativ, greift aber viel weiter als der
israelitische.
Levir
ist der Reihe nach der Bruder, der Schwiegervater and sogar der Bruder des
Schwiegervaters
des Verstorbenen."
52. M. Burrows,
"Background," p. 14.
53. E. Neufeld, The Hittite Laws, 1951, pp. 191, 192.
The Levirate In the Ancient
Near East 23
paternal
uncle of the deceased. Meeks54 and Gurney55 believe
the
third party to he the nephew of the deceased.
It is not expressly stated whether
this law is in operation
only
if the widow is childless. Koschaker believes it is highly
probable
that such was the case.56 On the other hand, Price is
of
the opinion that the law "aims to provide a home for the
bereaved
widow among the kinsman of her late husband or
husbands,
and thus promotes humanitarianism in a wide
sense."57
Neufeld,58 Pedersen,59 Ring,60 Brongers,61
and
54. T. Meek, Hebrew Origins, 1960, p. 63 n. 32. Cf. A. Goetze, ANET, p.
196,
"If in turn also his father dies, one of his brother's sons shall take the
wife
whom
he had. There shall be no punishment."
55. 0. R. Gurney, The Hittites, 1954', p. 101.
56. P. Koschaker, "Zum Levirat
nach hethitischen Recht," p. 80, remarks,
"Sie
ist noch-einleuchtender, wenn der Levir auch die Aufgabe hat, für die Fort-
setzung
der Familie und des Namens seines verstorbenen Bruders zu sorgen. § 193
gedenkt
indessen dieser Voraussetzung nicht. Dass aber auch in diesem Punkte das
hethitische
Recht der allgemeinen Regel folgte, lässt sich meines Erachtens in
hohem
Grade wahrscheinlich machen." J. Morgenstern, op. cit., p. 163, draws the
parallel
between Genesis 38 and this law and implies a similar purpose. 0. R.
Gurney,
op. cit., pp. 101, 102, maintains
that the law is "remarkably similar to
the
Hebrew law of levirate rnarriage"; he argues that § 193 is not a full
statement
of
the levirate. 57.
58. E. Neufeld, The Hittite Laws, p. 192, writes, "The Law makes no refer-
ence
to the question of issue of the original marriage of the deceased. It seems
certain,
however, that this question does not affect the obligation of the persons
involved
in the levirate duty. As long as the widow's age permitted her to give
birth
to children, all the above persons were under an obligation to marry her."
59. J. Pedersen, op. cit., p. 548, comments, "From
the Hittite and Assyrian
Laws
it appears that the Levirate marriage was a common feature in
but
the Israelites stamped this custom with quite a different character."
60. E. Ring, op. cit., pp. 138, 139, discusses the similarities and distinctions
between
Hittite levirate law and the levirate in Deut. 25. Mention is made of three
similarities
which take in the following points: both involve a moralistic responsi-
ilit
make reference to the performance of the levirate by a brother of the
deceased;
both, in contrast with the Assyrian legal system, know nothing of the
counterpart
of the levirate in cases where the woman has died. The differences are
noticeable,
including the absence of any mention of the dead person dying with-
out
male issue and the prescribed sequence. The purpose of the institution is
dissimilar:
"Darum ist es vermutlich nicht, so wie im israelitischen Recht, in erster
Linie
die Sorge für das Fortleben des Namens des Toten gewesen.... Wahrschein-
lich
ist die in Frage kommende Einrichtung bei den Hethitern mit dem ganz
allgemeinen
Zwecke begründet gewesen, dass durch sie, ebenso wie im assyrischen
Rechte,
gewisse Garantieen dafur gegeben werden sollten, dass das Eigentum
fortdauernd
in der Familie als deren Besitz erhalten bliebe and nicht nötig hätte
in
fremde Hände überzugehen."
61. H. Brongers, Oud-Oosters en Bijbels Recht, 1960, p.
129, remarks on
24 The Levirate In the Ancient Near
East
Meek62
draw a clear distinction between the practice of the
levirate
among the Hittites and in
Nuzi
One brief mention is made in the Nuzi
texts of something
similar
to the levirate. A brother giving his sister in marriage
for
a purchase price agrees that if Hanaya, the husband, dies,
Ithipsharru,
the husband's father, who purchased her, shall
give
her to his other son.63 Gordon refers to this as "levirate
marriage
in the crudest form."64 The purchase of a bride with
the
attendant right of transfer to another son in case of de-
cease
is similar to what we saw in MAI. §43. There is also the
case
where, in a husband's will, provision was made to pre-
vent
the wife from remarrying. The children were to strip her
and
she was to go out naked. This has, ill any case, nothing in
common
with the Israelite levirate, since the marriage in view
had
already resulted in children.65
HL
§ 193, "We ontmoeten hier het instituut van het leviraat, dat ons ook uit
het
bijbels
recht bekend is (Deut. 25:5 vv.). Er is echter enige nuancering. Zo wordt
bier
de kwestie of het huwelijk kinderloos was gebleven, niet aan de orde gesteld,
terwijl
dit voor de bijbelse wet op het leviraat een conditie sine qua non is.
Bovendien
schijnt de nadrukkelijke constatering dat een leviraatshuwelijk niet
strafbaar
is, crop to wijzen dat het niet wcttelijk verplicht was."
62. T. Meek, Hebrew Origins, p. 63 n. 32, denies, as Brongers, cf. our
preceding
note, that the levirate was required among the Hittites. He bases this
conclusion
on the final word in the law, "There shall be no punishment," and
remarks,
"It is clear from this that the Levirate with the Hittites had become
quite
obsolete; so obsolete and out of favor that a law had to be formulated to
make
it legal if someone did follow it." For a different interpretation of the
statement
"There shall be no punishment," cf. nn. 48, 49.
63. Text 441 in E. Chiera, Mixed Texts, Publications of the
School,
V, 1934. Cf. C. Gordon, "Status," p. 163.
64. C. Gordon, "Fratriarchy in
the Old Testament," JBL, 54,
1935, p.
230.
He feels that "in the Old Testament, a secondary, sentimental and purely
fictitious
phase of levirate marriage, to wit, that of supplying the deceased with an
heir,
has evolved into its 'raison d'etre.'
The whole institution, which was original-
ly
the right of the levir, has developed into the widow's privilege."
65. E. Neufeld, AHML, p. 54; C. Gordon, "Status," p. 163.
The Levirate In the
Ancient Near East 25
The evidence from
scholars
are of the opinion that the levirate was known.66
One
text possibly bearing on the levirate is an Akkadian doc-
ument
uncovered at the excavation of the royal palace of
“To be effective immediately! Thus
says Arihalbu, King of Ugarit:
“Whoever, after my death, takes (in
marriage) my wife, Kubaba,
daughter of Takan (?) from my brother—
May Baal crush him,
May he not make great (his) throne,
May he not dwell in a (royal) house,
May Baal of Mt. Casius crush him!'”67
Due to its conciseness, there has been
some difference of
interpretation,68
but a number of scholars arc convinced that
we
have in this political testament of the Ugaritic King Ari-
halbu
a reference to the levirate. According to M. Tsevat,
Arihalbu
"drew up the document when he felt his end near
and
he was not blessed with a son, for no man would provide
for
the levirate of his widow as long as he might hope for a
male
heir."69
This text then is a political
testament with the unusual
added
weight of the curse. Apparently, Arihalbu is anticipat-
ing
a possible violation of the intended marriage of his broth-
er
to his wife by some would-be aspirant to the throne. The
imprecations
in the text are designed to thwart any attempt
66. R. de Vaux, op. cit., p. 38; L. M. Muntingh, "The Social and Legal
Status
of a Free Ugaritic Female," JNES,
26, 1967, pp. 108, 111; M. Tsevat,
"Marriage
and Monarchical Legitimacy in
237-243;
A. van Selms, Marriage and Family Life in
Ugaritic Literature, 1954, p.
36.
67. M. Tsevat, op. cit., p. 237. His translation is from R. S. 16.144. J.
Nougayrol, Le palais royal d' Ugarit, III, 1955,
p. 76, offers a similar translation
except
in line eleven. Nougayrol renders: "(Sa) maison ne florira pas!"
Tsevat:
"May
he not dwell in a (royal) house."
68. Cf. M. Tsevat, op. cit., p. 239, for the particular
views.
69. M. Tsevat, op. cit., p. 240. Also, L. M. Muntingh, op. cit., p. 108 and G.
Boyer,
"La place des textes d'Ugarit dans l'histoire de l'ancien droit
oriental," in
Le palais royal
d'Ugarit,
III, 1955, p. 300.
26 The Levirate In the Ancient
Near East
to
overthrow his purpose to secure the continuance of his
line
in the kingship of Ugarit.70
Van Selms calls attention to two
instances in the Ugaritic
texts
where the daughter-in-law is mentioned as present in
the
household of the master of the house (329:2, 3; 11, 12).
He
feels that these are best explained by the supposition that
the
daughter-in-law remained with the dead husband's family,
in
which case it is probable that "we have here something we
could
compare with the idea underlying the Levirate mar-
riage:
once married into her husbancf's family, the wife is
regarded
as belonging to that family, and on her husband's
death
she remains in the care of her father-in-law. Perhaps he
detained
her till the moment a younger son could marry
her.”71
It would appear then that the levirate
did operate in some
form
in ancient
more
on inference than on direct statement.72 Summing up
Ugaritic
matrimonial law, Muntingh, who concurs with the
opinion
that R. S. text 16.144 is a political testament of King
Arihalhu
presupposing a levirate custom that there is
tdo
little material to come to definite conclusions.73
70. M. Tsevat, op. cit., p. 241, points out that the concern of the king was
"a
dynastic one: to retain kingship in his family, ideally to secure the uninter-
rupted
hereditary line.... The brothers, far from entertaining suspicion of each
other,
acted in the fullest accord. The document is written to guard the interests
of
either brother as well as those of the dynasty." Ile then draws an
interesting
parallel
with David (II Sam. 12:8), Ahithophel (II Sam. 16:21), and Adonijah
(I
Kings 2:13-25); in these texts the appropriation of the king's wives is
connected
with
taking over his office.
71. A. van Selms, op. cit., pp. 35, 36.
72. A. van Selms, op. cit., p. 36.
73. L. M. Muntingh, op. cit., p. 111. G. Boyer, op. cit., pp. 300, 301,
concludes,
"mail sur la foi de ce seul texte nous ne pouvons affirmer que le lévirat
était
de regle pour l'ensemble de la population. La famille royale a pu etre
soumise
en matiere matrimoniale a des usages differents de ceux appliques au
reste
de la population. Si on peut raisonner par analogic avec les institutions
hébraiques,
le manage de la veuve de l'ancien souverain a pu jouer un role dans la
dévolution
de la couronne." R. de Vaux, op. cit.,
p. 38, tersely states that there is
evidence
for the levirate in
institution
of the levirate is attested in the ancient Near East for
Hittites,
Assur, and Nuzi. In Biblical law, the condition for the levirate is that the
The Levirate In the Ancient Near
East 27
We have now finished our survey of the
levirate in the
ancient
Near East. With the exception of the one text which
contained
the political testament of the Ugaritic King Ari-
halbu,
the evidence suggests that the levirate was basically a
matter
of inheritance, a means whereby a piece of property,
acquired
through an act of purchase, is kept within the fam-
ily
because of the value for the family This fact, in itself,
must
set it apart from the levirate in
possible
to regard the operation of the levirate in
similar
terms.74 Moreover, as has been pointed out, the em-
phasis
in the surrounding nations is on the rights of the living
whereas
in
the
dead may not be blotted out" (Deut. 25:6). Other pur-
poses
may have been incorporated in the course of the his-
tory
of this institution in
throughout
on the need for a male descendant, and it is this
emphasis
which we cannot find in the surrounding cultures.
In
commenting on Hebrew law and its relation to other an-
cient
Semitic law codes, Meek concludes, " . . .What they did
borrow,
they made their own. It was no slavish imitation of an
uncreative
people, but an imitation that improved what it took,
and
in the end what it did take became definitely Hebrew and
did
not remain Babylonian or Hurrian or Canaanite."75
husband
has died without leaving a son; according to Koschaker it is likely that
this
applies to Hittite law as well. We may assume identical conditions for
sandwiched
as it was between
testament
of king Arihalbu: "On this evidence alone it is not possible to argue for
the
regular practice of levirate marriage as in Hebrew society. The fact that
marriage
of a widow with any but her brother-in-law is here expressly forbidden
by
special deed suggests that even if levirate marriage was regular in Ugaritic
society
it was certainly not compulsory. Indeed, since this is a royal disposition
where
the marriage of the king's widow might have possible political conse-
quences,
to say nothing of the infringement of the 'divinity that doth hedge a
king,'
it may well be that levirate marriage in
74. See chap. 8, nn. 59, 104.
75. T. Meek, Hebrew Origins, p. 81. D. Mace, Hebrew
Marriage, 1953, p.
113,
remarks: "Though it has parallels with the customs as it obtains in other
lands,
the Hebrew levirate is essentially an inherent product of the culture to
which
it belongs, and its antiquity marks it as having grown out of that soil."
See
also
nn. 36, 40, 59-61.
2
The Levirate In
MATERIALS
for the study of the levirate custom1
in
the Old Testament are somewhat meagre, con-
sisting
of three main passages: the story of
and
Tamar in Genesis law given in Deuteronomy
25:5-10,
and the book of Ruth. In this chapter consideration
is
given to the first two passages.
The Levirate Incident, Genesis 38
In Genesis 382 we are told
of
and
the birth of three sons, Er, Onan and Shelah.3 The ac-
1. For our purposes we shall operate
with the definition of levirate given by
J.
Mittelmann, Der altisraelitsche Levirat,
1934, p. 1, who says, "Die moderne
Rechtswissenschaft
verwendet jedoch den Ausdruck Levirat für alle Falle, in
denen
die Witwe einem Verwandten des Mannes zufällt, mag dies nun der Bruder
oder
irgendein anderer Verwandter des Verstorbenen sein." We recognize that
some
will strongly object to calling the marriage of Boaz and Ruth a levirate
marriage.
Cf. S. R. Driver, Deuteronomy, ICC,
19023, p. 285. K. Dronkert, Het
Huwelijk in het
Oude Testament,
1957, pp. 67, 68, writes, "Strikt genomen
komen
wij het leviraatshuwelijk in de practijk alleen tegen in Gen. 38 en als
wettelijke
bepaling in Dent. 25:5-10. In het boek Ruth hebben wij niet te doen
met
een leviraatshuwelijk.... Het geval Ruth heeft met het leviraatshuwelijk in
wezen
niet veel te maken." L. Epstein, Marriage
Laws in the Bible and the Tal-
mud, 1942, pp. 86,
140, prefers to use the term "geullah marriage" when refer-
ring
to the marriage of Boaz and Ruth. While there may be some merit in using
different
terms for the purpose of more precisely defining the distinctions within
the
levirate development, most scholars would nevertheless employ the termi-
nology
"levirate marriage" when referring to the marriage of Boaz and Ruth.
2. D.
20),
1970, p. 18, states, "As for the insertion of 38 at exactly this point in
the
story
... , one can only protest (a) between chapters 37 and 39 there is a natural
pause
in the action, and (b) certain coincidental features of chapter 38 bind it to
chapters
37 and 39. Among the latter one may note the similarity between
in
38 and Jacob in 37: both are patriarchs; both are deceived, both are obliged to
give
legal recognition to a piece of evidence."
3. S.R. Driver, Genesis, 192612, p. 326, finds two purposes in this
narrative.
29
30 The Levirate In
count
goes on to mention the marriage of Er, the firstborn,
to
Tamar and the subsequent death of Er.4
Onan
to go in to Tamar, his brother's wife, and perform the
duty
of a brother-in-law to her and to raise up offspring for
his
brother: jyHxl frz Mqhl htx Mbyv (v. 8). Knowing that
the
offspring of such a union would not be his, when he went
in
to Tamar, he spilled the semen on the ground.5 For the
First,
to explain the origin of
the
duty of marriage with a deceased brother's wife. M. Burrows, "Levirate
Mar-
riage
in
should
not be used in discussions on the levirate since it is not typical. "As an
illustration
of possible variations it may he relevant, but for information as to
normal
procedure it has little value." So also R. K. Harrison, I0T, 1970, p. 650,
and
H. Brongers, "Enkele Opmerkingen over het Verband tussen Lossing en
Leviraat
in Ruth IV," NedThT, 2, 1947-48,
p. 4. S. Belkin, "Levirate and Agnate
Marriage,"
JQR, 60, 1969-70, p. 278, writes,
"This story of Tamar reveals the
ancient
practice of levirate, before the Sinaitic Revelation." W. McKane,
"Ruth
and
Boaz," GUOST, 19, 1961-62, p. 3,
and E. Neufeld, Ancient Hebrew Marriage
Laws, 1944, p. 35
(hereafter cited as AHML) oppose
Burrows. Neufeld argues
that
the case of Judah and Tamar represents not merely a local law as distinct
from
a general law, since "on comparison with the C. Hitt. and the M.A.L.,
it will
be
seen that the duty of levirate marriage might devolve upon a
father-in-law." D.
Mace,
Hebrew Marriage, 1953, p. 96,
maintains that Gen. 38 "provides us with an
interesting
example of the levirate custom in action." L. Epstein, op. cit., p. 80,
calls
Gen. 38 "the first case of levirate." D. Daube, "Consortium in
Roman and
Hebrew
Law," JurR, 62, 1950, p. 72
(hereafter cited as "Consortium") remarks,
"The
narrative of Judah and Tamar confirms that the original and chief function
of
levirate marriage was among brothers still under the rule of their paterfami-
lias..
. . This state of affairs must unquestionably be considered typical of levirate
marri
age."
4. In contrast to the case of Onan,
no particular crime is mentioned; never-
theless,
Er incurred the displeasure of the Lord and the Lord slew him. C. F.
DeVine,
"The Sin of Onan," CBQ, 4,
1942, p. 334, maintains, "that both Iler and
Onan
committed the same sin and so were killed by God." This conclusion he
bases
on the similarity of expression (hvhy ynyfb fr) in Gen. 38:7
and Gen.
38:10
and the similar fates of the two brothers. Cf. n. 5. We cannot see that
similar
wording used to describe Yahweh's verdict on an action constitutes proof
that
the actions themselves were similar. G. Coates, "Widows Rights: A Crux in
the
structure of Genesis 38," CBQ,
34, 1972, p. 462, is probably correct when he
writes,
"Neither is 'Er's character a part of the narration. The exact nature of
his
violation,
the act that angered Yahweh, is not set out. It is irrelevant for the
developing
plot. The only purpose of this stage is to explain that Tamar became a
widow."
5. S. R. Driver, Genesis, p. 328, believes that Onan was
"hoping perhaps
selfishly
to secure the rights of primogeniture in his father's family for him-
self...."
D. Kidner, Genesis, TOTC, 1967, p.
188, writes, "The enormity of
Onan's
sin is in its studied outrage against the family, against the brother's widow
The Levirate In
second
time the story relates the reason behind his practice
which
was "lest he should give offspring to his brother" (v.
9).
What he did was displeasing to the Lord and the Lord
slew
him. At this point,
father's
house until Shelah, the younger son, grows up.6
to
her, house father's house.7
and
against his own body." The standard English translations fail to make
clear
that
this was his persistent practice. The repetitiveness of Onan’s, sin is a factor
in
understanding
the severe punishment which was meted out to him. Mx (v. 9)
should
be translated "whenever." Cf. Num. 21:9; Judg. 6:3. CF. GKC §112,gg.
The
NV brings out accurately the true meaning when it translates, "zo vaak hij
tot
de
vrouw van zijn broeder kwam." C. F. DeVine, op. cit., pp. 337-339, argues that
the
principle cause of Onan's punishment was his violation of the natural law.
Secondarily,
his evasion of the levirate duty was a factor. This conclusion he seeks
to
support with several arguments. Emphasizing the hWf rwx in 38:10 he
writes,
"What
Onan did was to waste his seed on the ground; this constituted an offence
against
the natural law, and for this was Onan killed." He goes on to suggest that
"it
Onan were killed by God simply because he failed in the levirate duty, we
would
be forced to admit that God punished Onan with severity beyond measure,
and
in fact, beyond the measure of the law which He later gave to Moses." He
further
argues that "if the penalty of death were inflicted on Onan simply and
solely
because of his levirate failure then we fail to see why Juda did not suffer
the
same penalty." Finally, he introduces reasons based on his belief that Er
and
Onan
committed the same crime (cf. n. 4). If both committed the same crime and
were
visited by " the same fate and no levirate failure could be attributed to
Er
"this
leads to the conclusion that Onan was not killed, principally because of the
levirate
failure but because he, like Her, did something wicked in the eyes of God.
This
something is recounted in detail of Onan and suggested as regards Her."
Several
things must be said in reply to De Vine. The meaning of hWf
rwx
cannot
be
restricted to the spilling of the seed but must include the remaining clause
"lest
he
should give offspring to his brother" (Gen. 38:9b).
It is. speculative to presume that
the brothers, Er and Onan, committed
similar
crimes simply because in both cases it is stated they were evil in the eyes
of
the Lord. Nor can an argument be based on the unusual punishment of Onan in
relation
to his father, Judah, since the latter's levirate responsibility is open to
question.
Cf. nn. 14-19: For these reasons we must reject DeVine's position.
6. Cf. MAL §43. J. Morgenstern,
"The Book of the Covenant, Part II,"
HUCA, 7, 1930, p.
164, writes, "A certain parallelism with the Assyrian practice
exists
in that the youngest brother had to reach a certain age, no doubt the age of
puberty,
before his union with his brother's widow could be effected."
7. According to G. von Rad, Genesis, OTL, 1961, p. S53,
honesty
"lay in considering this solution as really final for himself but in
present-
ing
it to Tamar as an interim solution." Cf. also A. van Selins, Marriage and
Family Life in
Ugaritic Literature,
1954, p. 36: "In sending her hack to her father
he
made it clear to her—though he did not actually say so—that he no longer
wanted
her as a daughter-in-law. That looks
like a legal figure for which we have
39 The Levirate in
The second and main part of the story
concerns
and
Tamar.
this
time, become aware of his intent to be permanently rid
of
her. When she sees that sufficient time had elapsed for
Shelah's
maturation and yet
(38:
14b), she resorts to a form of trickery, waylaying him in
the
disguise of a harlot.8
When it becomes evident that Tamar is
pregnant and
immediately
decides that she should be burnt.9 However,
not
a proper name; a 'divorce' by the father-in-law! Nevertheless, when
hears
that she is pregnant, he feels that his rights, or rather those of his son,
have
been
infringed (rather illogically we should think), but as he never formally in
words
'divorced' Tamar, he is still able to exert full authority over her."
8. According to Gen. 38a15,
But
when his friend goes to recover his pledge (38:21) he-asks for the cultic
prostitute
(hwdqh).
The mention of the veil in 38:14 seems to point in the
direction
of the latter. Cf. M. Astour, "Tamar the Hierodule," JBL, 85, 1966, pp.
1921-1121
Porter, "Legal Aspects of Corporate Personality," VT, 15, 1965,
pp.
370, 371, comments, "Heb. ZANAH, frequently, and perhaps more often
than
not, in the Old Testament, has the technical sense of becoming a sacred
prostitute
in the service of some female deity, whose worship would he con-
sidered
apostasy to Yahweh. This is clearly the case with the use of the word in
the
story of Judah and Tamar, Gen. XXXVIII 24, since twice the word there used
for prostitute is qedeshah, one devoted to a
religious cult, and it is noteworthy
that
the punishment for Tamar's prostitution is to be burning." See also C.
Vos,
Women in Old
Testament Worship,
1968, p. 97, who views the two words in
Genesis
38 as "virtua1synonyms." E. Speiser, Genesis, AB, 1964, pp. 299, 300,
suggests
that
affair
on a higher social level." E. Good, Irony
in the Old Testament, 1965, p.
108,
states, "
irony,
as does her, insistence on a pledge of payment, which prepares us for the
conclusion;
we must also perceive the irony of the fact two words for 'prostitute'
are
used in the story.... Certainly the alternation of terms is not accidental.
is
not about to inform strangers that he runs around after ordinary prostitutes
while
anyone would assume perfect respectability in the search for a cultic prosti-
tute."
9. G. von Rad, op. cit., p. 355, writes, "
he
thus reckons Tarnar as part of his family, though Tamar's act proceeded from
the
assumption that.
Cf.
H. J. Boecker, Redejormen des
Rechtslebens im Allen Testament, 1964, p.
147,
comments, "In dem Ehebruchprozess gegen Thamar wird von Juda, dem
zustandigen
Richter. caber die angeklagte Frau die Tatfolgebestimmung verhangt:
Jrwtv. S. Belkin, op. cit., pp. 279, 319, 320, feels that the story is significant in
ascertaining
the legal status of the widow before the levirate is performed. From
the,mention
of burning as punishment he concludes that her status was still that
The Levirate In
Tamar
has obtained from
ly
identifying him as the father of her child. Accordingly, she
is
vindicated by
in
the right11 than he, because he has not given his son,
of
a married woman. "Her marriage ties were not considered dissolved by the
death
of her husband." S. R. Driver, Genesis,
p. 330, holds that Tamar is treated
as
the bethrothed of Shelah and consequently as ad adulteress. We should note that
burning
is mentioned as the punishment of the priest's daughter who has com-
mitted
fornication (Lev. 21:8, 9), death by stoning being the usual mode of
execution
for adultery. R. de Vaux, Ancient Israel,
1961, p. 36, believes that in
very
ancient times it may have been that burning was also employed as a more
common
means of execution. M. Astour, op. cit.,
pp. 190-195, in an attempted
reconstruction
of the whole chapter, views Tamar in the role of a sacred prosti-
tute
of the kind allowed to marry but not to have children. The explanation of
Tamar's
burning then is that "she became pregnant while being a hierodule."
His
drastic
reconstruction of the data, however, is not convincing. Nor can we accept
the
view of A. Phillips, Ancient Israel's
Criminal Law, 1970, p. 129, who believes
that
"
reflecting
this Babylonian type of punishment, which had been incorporated into
the
Holiness Code."
10. According to D. Daube, Studies in Biblical Law, 1947, p. 6, the
verb
rkn (cf. vv. 25, 26) sometimes has the
technical meaning of the "formal finding
out
of, and making a statement to the other party about, a fact of legal relevance;
be
it one on which a claim might be based, or one on account of which a claim
must
be abandoned, or one on account of which the other party's claim must be
admitted."
In the story of Judah and Tamar there is "the submission of formal
evidence
with a request to acknowledge it, and the acknowledgment." Cf. H. J.
Boecker,
op. cit., pp. 126-128.
11. A. Jepsen, "qdc und hqdc im Alten
Testament," in Gottes Wort und
Gottes Land, Festschrift H.
W. Hertzberg, 1965, pp. 81, 82, calls attention to the
use
of this term in the historical books (Gen. 30:33; 38:26; I Sam, 24:18; II Sam.
4:11;
15:4; 19:29; I Kings 2:32 and II Kings 10:9): "Bezeichnend ist das Vor-
kommen
der Wurzel in den Geschichtsbuchern, wo es uberwiegend auf das Ver-
halten
der Menschen zueinander angewandt wird. Aber es sind doch nur wenige
Stellen,
die von der Gottesbeziehung absehen, wo nur der Unterschied der
Menschen
in bezug auf ihre hqdc festgestellt wird oder vom ‘ordentlichen’
Gericht
gesprochen wird. Zu allermeist wird deutlich, das qdc etwas mit Gott
zu
tun
hat." E. Gerstenberger, Wesen und
Herkunft des apodiktischen Rechts, 1965,
pp.
115, 116, writes: "In der Familie, Grossfamilie oder Sippe ist der Vater
die
Autoritatäperson,
die im Zentrum des sozialen Geftiges steht.... Das Familien-
oberhaupt
ist darum als der Urheber und Garant der das Sippenleben regulierenden
Prohibitive
und Gebote anzusehen. Die Einschränkung seiner Rechte ist jedoch
dadurch
gegeben, dass auch er sich innerhalb der ihm übergeordneen, durch Gott
geschutzten
Rechte bewegt, die sich eben in der Familienordnung ausdrücken. So
Weiss
sich Juda Gen. 38, 26 durch die 'höhere Gerechtigkeit' überführt...."
It is
possible
that the phrase ynmm hqdc expresses a contrast rather than
a comparison
in
which case we should translate, "she is in the right as compared with
me." Cf.
GKC
§ 133 n. 2. H. J. Boecker, op. cit., p.
127 remarks, "So muss er öffentlich
34 The Levirate In
Shelah,
to her. The incident ends with the affirmation that he
did
not have intercourse with her again (38:26b).
In the levirate incident in Genesis
38, primarily three
things
will he investigated: (1) the purpose of the levirate,
(2)
the parties involved in its execution, and (3) the pressures
placed
upon the involved participants to execute their re-
sponsibility
toward the deceased. It is evident from
command
to Onan to go in to his brother's wife that the levitate
duty
consisted of raising up offspring for the brother (Gen.
38:84).
This is reiterated in the statement that Onan knew
the
offspring would not be his own (Gen 38:9a) and in the
comment
that "whenever he went in to his brother's wife he
spilled
the semen on the ground, lest he should give offspring
to
his brother” (Gen. 38:9b). This threefold reiteration
makes
it abundantly clear that the child of such a union was
reckoned
as the legal offspring of the deceased, and that such
was
the purpose of the levirate as recorded in this story.
Property
succession is not expressly mentioned as being in-
volved,
though it may be possible to infer from the continued
adament
refusal of Onan that such interests may also have
been
at stake in this incident.12
feststellen,
class Thamar im Recht hqdc er selbst aber im Unrecht (ynmm) ist." K.
Koch,
Sdq im AT, Diss. Heidelberg 1953, p.
71, cited by H. J. Boccker, op. cit.,
p.
127,
translates "Sic ist sdq-ich bin es nicht."
12. The relation between begetting a
son for the deceased, and the property
succession
is one of the thorny questions of the levirate. This question. becomes
most
acute in the marriage of Boaz to Ruth, where the property transaction is
suddenly
introduced in Ruth 4. J. Scheftelowitz, "Die Leviratsehe," ARW, 18,
1915,
p. 255, maintains that Onan, "der das Erhe des verstorbenen Bruders
dauernd
im Besitze haben wollte, darauf bedacht, dass diese kinderlos bliebe."
Similarly,
J. Mittelmann, op. cit., p. 13.
child
which Onan would have raised, were he to perform the levirate, would not
have
been reckoned as his. The inheritance of his deceased brother, too,—if there
had
been any—would have belonged, it seems, to the new-born child. Surely, these
factors
were deterrants to a willing moral performance of the levirate." Th. and
D.
Thompson,
"Some Legal Problems in the Book of Ruth," VT; 18, 1968 pp.93,
94,
reason: "If Onan had openly refused the levirate obligation, then Tamar
would
have been able to lake her own independence, as well as, we must suspect,
her
dead husband's share of inheritance.... But when Onan ostensibly does ac-
cept
his levirate obligation, Tamar is left without any way of proving her case.
Onan
(and this is of what his sin consisted) was trying to steal his dead brother's
The
Levirate In
The levirate duty first devolved on
Onan, the brother of
Er,
whereupon it then was passed to Shelah. It would appear
that
the widow was to wait until the young brother was able
to
perform the levirate duty. The suggestion has been made,
based
on Ruth 1:11-14, that in ancient
born
brother would have been obliged, as well, to marry the
widow.13
It is more disputable how we are to understand
sons
with HL, § 193, many scholars believe that an obligation
to
marry the widow of his deceased son rested as well with
the
father-in-law.14 Such an inference, however, is debatable
and
there have not been lacking those who would resist draw-
ing
this conclusion.15 In discussing a possible father-in-law
inheritance,
which, upon
and
keep in lieu of a possible future son of Tamar's." Because the right of
inheritance
was intertwined with the duty of the levirate, D. Mace, op. cit., pp.
106,
108, feels there were two kinds of abuses. "First, the heir might try to
take
the
property without marrying the widow.. The second possible abuse of the
law
was that the brother, having taken over both the property and the widow,
might
try to avoid his responsibility as levir by preventing the woman from
becoming
pregnant, so that he might keep the property for himself. It is possible
that
attempts of this kind were quite frequent; and the story of the tragic fate of
Onan
may well have been a cautionary tale to warn others who were tempted to
employ
a similar device."
13. E. Neufeld, AHML, p. 35. M. David, Het
Huwelijk van Ruth, 1941, p. 4,
writes,
"Dit sluit evenwel niet uit, dat ook voor eventueel later geboren zonen
van
Juda
de verplichting zou kunnen hebben bestaan, na den dood van de oudste
broeders
Tamar te trouwen.''
14. J. Wijngaards, Deuteronomium, BOT, 1971, p. 285,
remarks, "Het is
zeer
waarschijnlijk, dat de plicht om een mannelijke afstammeling te verwekken
oorspronkelijk
niet alleen op de broers, maar zelfs op de schoonvader en andere
familieleden
rustte." Similarly, E. Neufeld, op.
cit., p. 36; D. Mace, op. cit.,
p.
103;
C. Lattey, The Book of Ruth, 1935, p.
XXVI; J. Morgerstern, op. cit., p.
163;
J. Mittelmann, op. cit., p. 15; H. H.
Rowley, "The Marriage of Ruth," in The
Servant of the
Lord,
19652, p. 80; L. Epstein, op. cit.,
p. 100; G. A. Smith,
Deuteronomy, 1918, p. 287;
Th. and D. Thompson, op. cit., p. 94;
S. Belkin, op.
cit., p. 278. G.
von Rad, op. cit., p. 354, believes
that Tamar "can well have
reckoned
with
15. J. Skinner, op. cit., p. 455, warns against concluding that it was the
father-in-law's
duty to marry his son's widow under all circumstances. This would
ignore
the exceptional nature of the circumstances which the writer wished to
portray.
Cf. W. Caspari, "Erbtochter and Ersatzehe in Ruth 4," NKZ, 19, 1908,
p.
128, and D. Jacobson, The Social
Background of the Old Testament, 1942, p.
296.
F. Horst, "Leviratsehe," RGG,
4, 19603, p. 338, writes, "
36 The Levirate In
obligation
two points in particular should be noticed: First,
the
right than he, is explained16 in the words of the final
clause
"inasmuch as I did not give her to my son, Shelah."
This
acknowledged delinquence seemingly has to do with his
failure
to give Shelah to her upon his maturation. It is not an
acknowledgment
of his own failure to act personally on her
behalf,17
but perhaps
than
I, inasmuch as I did not give her to my son, Shelah" go
beyond
an admission of fault for not giving Shelah to Tamar.
He
may as well be saying that since he had not given her
Shelah,
"she had the right to obtain fulfillment of the duty
of
the levirate by him, if his sons failed."18
"she
is more righteous," are an acknowledgment of his delin-
quence
in his responsibility toward Tamar in not giving her
his
grown son, but it could be that in the light of this omis-
sion
the levirate was then his duty, which of course he also
had
not assumed. Through her cunning artifice she had man-
aged
to take what should have been hers but what was with-
held
from her. Secondly, the son born to the union is reck-
oned
(Gen. 46:12)19 to be
von
Brüdern wie im Hethitischen der Schwiegervater leviratsehepflichtig wurde,
ist
aus Gen. 38 nicht sicher zu entnehmen."
16. E. Jacob, TOT, 1958, p. 95, is far removed from the text when he
explains
teous
than himself he is saying that in the particular circumstances which are
being
narrated she has acted according to the rules and customs of prostitution
while
he himself has not respected them."
17. W. Rudolph, Das Ruch Ruth, Das Hohe Lied, Die Klagelieder, KAT, 17,
1962,
p. 63.
18. G. R. Diiver and J. C. Miles, The Assyrian Laws, 1935, p. 242. They
refer
to MAL, A, §33, in their interpretation of the responsibility of the father-
in-law.
Cf. also T. Meek, Hebrew Origins, p.
64.
19. J. Morgenstern, op. cit., pp. 182, 183, cites Gen. 46:12
as well as Ruth
4:1
1 b, 12 and 4:17b, 22 as passages which reflect a late post-exilic attitude
where
the
child is reckoned as belonging to the actual father and the institution is
merely
regarded in terms of the inheritance of property. D. Mace, op. cit., p. 109,
argues
that in both Ruth and Gen. 38, "the fundamental point of the custom
appears
to have been overlooked in the telling of the story, because the children
born
are described as belonging to their actual fathers and not to the deceased
husbands
of their mothers." G. Coates, op.
cit., p. 462, writes, "Implicit in
The Levirate In
to
Er as would be expected if the father-in-law were regarded
in
the story as having validly performed the levirate.
We have reason to conclude from this
incident that there
was
an order followed in the performance of the levirate.
Such
an order went from the oldest to the youngest of the
brothers.
Whether the father of the deceased was also legally
involved,
in the event of the nonfulfillment of the levirate by
the
brothers, is certainly debatable, though there are no in-
surmountable
arguments that can be introduced against it.
From Genesis 38 it appears that the
obligation to per-
form the levirate duty rested strongly upon
the brother of
the
deceased.20 The fact that Onan resorted to a secret act of
defiance
suggests that no other recourse was available by
which
he might have avoided his responsibility. God, himself,
the
custom is protection for the widow's inheritance rights within the father-in-
law's
family. The concern is not simply, for 'Er's future line; in, fact, the
children
finally
conceived within they frame of the story trace their paternity to their real
father,
not to 'Er (cf. Numb. 26:19-20). The concern is for Tamar's future." This
is
clearly contrary to the emphasis of Gen. 38:5, 8, 9 on giving offspring to the
deceased
brother. It is not valid to give precedence to later geneological references
over
the clear statements of the narrative. Because of the extreme difficulty in
interpreting
the genealogies of the Bible, the inclusion of Perez and Zerah as sons
of
Judah in Gen. 46:12 and Num. 26:19-20 should, not, in the absence of addi-
tional
evidence, be regarded as a final evolutionary stage of the levirate. As a
possible
example within a genealogy the use of both the real father as well as
the
father by means of the levirate, note should be taken of Zerubbabel who is
called
the son of Pedaiah (I Chron. 3:19) and the son of Shealtiel (Ezra 3:2, 8;
5:2;
Neh. 12:1; Hag. 1:12, 14). W. Rudolph, Chronikbücker,
HAT, 21, 1955, p.
29,
writes: "Beide Angaben werden so auszugleichen sein, dass Fedaja, als
Scheal-
tiel
ohne Sohn starb, mit dessen Witwe eine Leviratsehe (Dt. 25:5ff) schloss, so
dass
sein Erstgeborener Serubbabel physisch sein Sohn, rechtlich aber der seines
Bruders
war." This is also considered to be distinctly possible by J. Myers,
I Chronicles, AB, 1965, p.
21. For an explication of some of the obscurities in
biblicalgenealogies,
see A,Malamat, "King Lists of the Old Babylonian Period and
Biblical
Genealogies," in Essays in Memory of
E. A. Speiser, ed. W. Hallo, 1968,
pp.
163-172. See also, M. Johnson, The
Purpose of the Biblical Genealogies, 1969,
pp.
77-82.
20.
p.
30, maintains that this incident suggests a revolt on the part of Canaanite
society
against an institution "economically and socially out of tune with the
times."
In an attempt to justify compliance with the law the new interpretation
of
"raising up seed" for the dead brother was advanced, but Onan refused
such an
innovation,
even though his evasion was punishable by death.
38 The Levirate In
severely
punished21 this sin of "Lieblosigkeit gegen den ver-
storbenen
Bruder."22
in
withholding Shelah similarly points to the seriousness with
which
such duties were regarded. While it might appear to be
possible
to argue that his failure to give his son to Tamar
betrays
the opposite, such reasoning would not sufficiently
take
into account the exceptional nature of the recorded
incident.
Furthermore, we must not overlook Tamar,23 who
21. The lack of opportunity to opt
out of this responsibility as well as the
severe
punishment meted out by Jahweh may be evidence for the most ancient
phase
of the levirate, at which time the levirate was an unavoidable obligation. We
cannot
speak with "complete certainty on this point. It is instructive to note
the
remarks
of W. Rudolph, op. cit., p. 62, who
writes, "Dass in der sehr alten
Erzahlung
Gn 38 die Leviratspflicht ganz streng ist, ergiht sich daraus, dass Onan,
obwohl
er möchte, sich dieser Pflicht nicht entziehen kann und dafür, dass er
geheime
Sabotage treibt, von Jahwe mit dem Tode bestraft wird." Comparing the
obligation
pictured here with that in the book of Ruth, he makes the following
significant
statement: "Nun hängt dieser Unterschied in der Verbindlichkcit
offenbar
mit dem Unterschied des Verwandtschaftsgrades zusammen: Der Bruder
musste,
der entferntere Verwandte konnte; dass zwischen Gn 38 und Ru kein
Widerspruch
besteht, folgt auch aus Ru I, 1 I ff., wo Noomi doch wohl als
selbstverständlich
voraussetzt, dass, wenn sic Söhne hätte diese ihre Schwieger-
töchter
pflichtgemäss ehelichen würden. Andererseits schliesst Gn 38 die
Anschauung
vom freiwilligen ‘Levirat’ entfemterer Verwandter nicht aus, nur dass
dort
kein Anlass war, davon zu reden."
Moreover, it may be that this severe
punishment of Onan should be attri-
buted
to the exceptional nature of the means employed to circumvent the obliga-
tion
and the deception involved in such a procedure. The repetitive nature of
Onan's
sin may also have been a factor. See n. 5.
22. H. Gunkel, Genesis, HK, 1, 19173, p. 413. He writes further,
"Man
beachte
die Gottesanschauung, die hier zu Grunde liegt: Jahves Augen sehen auch
das
Geheimste, was kein Menschenauge schaut; und er beschutzt den, der sich
selhst
nicht helfen kann: den Verstorbenen, desscn Recht man verletzt."
23 C. F. Keil, The Pentateuch, 1, 1864, p. 343, explains Tamar's conduct as
resulting
not from lust but from "the innate desire for children." G. von Rad, op
cit., p. 357, on
the contrary feels that "the question of whether she was moti-
vated
more by the desire for a child than by her widow's duty is not raised in the
story."
While one must agree that there is no express statement on Tamar's
motivation,
there is also no reason to believe it to be anything other than that
with
which the entire narrative is preoccupied, which is the duty of the deceased's
family
to raise up seed to the dead brother. H. H. Rowley, op. cit., p. 181, is of
the
opinion that of all the duties of the next-cif-kin that of performing the
levirate
was
the least pressing. In support of this opinion, he cites Judah's behavior in
disregarding
the levirate as well as Tamar's in resorting to trickery rather than
appealing
to public opinion. It is questionable, however, whether public opinion
would
have been a feasible means of counteracting the kind of subterfuge em-
ployed
against Tamar. J.
The Levirate In
keenly
felt her obligation to her dead husband and whose
persistence
led her surreptitiously to seek for a son for her
deceased
husband.
One remaining point must be mentioned
regarding the
levirate
in Genesis 38. This duty, as we say, consisted of
raising
up offspring to the dead brother. Such a purpose,
however,
did not necessarily require a levirate marriage.
take
Tamar as a wife. Furthermore, when Tamar had become
pregnant,
and subsequently was exonerated by
told
that "he did not lie with her again" (Gen. 38:26b). For
this
reason Belkin remarks, "In retrospect, one realizes that
this
story reveals only the duty of levirate, but not necessar-
ily
levirate marriage."24 If this is the case, one can see a
writes,
"Israelitic women have looked up to her as an example, a woman who
knew
how to show endurance and cunning and set aside all other considerations
in
order to attain the great victory, namely to give the husband progeny." G.
von
Rad, op. cit., p. 357, remarks, "Only
Tamar is unmistakably praised by the
narrator."
For rabbinic comment on Tamar, cf. M. Johnson, op. cit., pp. 159-162.
We
cannot accept the verdict on Tamar expressed by E. Robertson, "The Plot of
the
Book of Ruth," BJRL, 32, 1950,
p. 226: "That Tamar had my legal justifica-
tion
for her conduct I do not for a moment believe, yet Old Testament scholars
have
displayed extraordinary ingenuity in attempting to provide her with one."
We
prefer the verdict of D. Redford, op. cit.,
p. 18, who describes Tamar as "an
honorable
woman faithful to the interests of her husband." This is also the verdict
of
A. van Selms, "The Canaanites in
Genesis," OTS, 12, 1958, p. 205,
who
comments,
"For later generations in
of
complete devotion to first task, the
procuring of offspring."
24. S. Belkin, op. cit., p. 279; also G. R. Driver and J. C Miles, op. cit., p.
243.
G. Coates, op. cit., p. 463, comments, "Not tantamount to marriage, the
duty
of a brother-in-law (yabam) is only for production of a male heir. The
widow
remains the wife of the dead brother (cf. vs. 8a: Go in to your brother's
wife)."
Coates maintains that the goal toward which Tamar's scheme moves is the
conception
of a child, not marriage. His conclusion (p. 465) is that "the widow
can
look for marriage from the brother-in-law or whoever fulfills the levirate
custom.
But she has the right only for conception." His reasoning concerning the
purpose
of Tamar's deception may well be correct but his attempt to link Tamar
and
Ruth together in similar strategies must remain unconvincing. Cf. 7 n. 31.
Cf.
H. H. Rowley, op. cit., p. 186,
"The woman was still considered as the wife of
the
dead man, and the brother was merely a substitute for him for a single
purpose.
Again, levirate marriage had reference only to a single birth. The broth-
er-in-law
had completed his duty when he had provided the dead with a single
heir."
He feels (p. 187 n. 2) that the case of Judah, who was married and with
children,
is significant, confirming that "an institution whose only raison d'etre in
40 The Levirate In
parallel
to the custom of niyoga mentioned in the laws of
Manu
which reads: "But when the purpose of the appoint-
ment
to cohabit with the widow has been attained in accor-
dance
with the law, these two shall behave towards each
other
like a father and daughter-in-law."25 Yet we must also
take
notice of Genesis 38:14, "For she saw that Shelah was
grown
up and she had not been given to him as wife"26 (xl
hwxl vl hntn). Such
terminology, however, may have been
employed
to emphasize that the "obligation of the levir_does
of
its purpose." Later, however, (p. 192) he remarks, "it neither
required nor
excluded
full marriage."
25. E. Bühler, The Laws of Manu, Sacred Books of the East, 25, 1886, p.
339.
Such a parallel is viewed by M. Burrows, "The Ancient Oriental Background
of
Hebrew Marriage," BASOR, 77, p.
6 (hereafter cited as "Background") as
being
too remote to be of any significance in interpreting the Hebrew levirate.
Similarly,
J. Mittelmann, op. cit., pp. 10, 11.
Th. and D. Thompson, op. cit., p.
95,
mention the parallel in the laws of Manu as being far afield but valuable! They
maintain
that "because of its closeness to incest, it was felt necessary to limit
the
levirate
relationship to what was necessary to fulfill its purpose. It was certainly
not
considered equivalent to marriage.” Chamberlayne, Man in Society,
1966,
p. 65, refers the laws of Manu on the basis of which he regards it as
probable
that the levirate duty was finished when a single son was born.
26. The same phraseology is to be
seen in Deut. 25:5. G. R. Driver and J. C.
Miles,
op. cit., p. 243, argue that marriage
is not required in the Deuteronomic
law
of the levirate or in the Tamar incident. J. Mittelmann, op. cit., p. 11, writes,
"Weiter
finden wir im A. T. an keiner den Levirat betreffenden Stelle ein Verbot
der
Fortsetzung des Geschlechtsverkehrs nach der Zeugung des Leviratssohnes."
His
reasons are interesting, in that they provide an example of the circular
reason-
ing
which is at times involved in this issue. Considering the data from Ruth as
implying
levirate marriage, he is able to argue that the levirate duty involved
marriage
for at least two reasons. One would be the clear statement of Ruth 4:13.
"So
Boaz took Ruth and she became his wife." The second is the goel' s
reluctance
to
redeem the property (for fear of impairing his own inheritance). This reluc-
tance
may be reasonably explained, according to Mittelmann, on the grounds that
a
number of sons will come from the union which, when combined with his own
sons,
will lead to the dismemberment of his estate, ibid, p. 13. There can be little
doubt
that in the book of Ruth we have a full marriage taking place between Boaz
and
Ruth. For this reason, our discussion of whether the levirate duty involved
marriage
or merely cohabitation for the purpose of procreation is of some rele-
vance
in the analysis of the goel marriage in Ruth. If the levirate duty were merely
to
produce a son, and were not a levirate marriage, this would be an addition-
al
argument in favor of differentiating between the levirate duty and the goel
marriage
in Ruth. Noting this, H. H. Rowley, op.
cit., p. 192, remarks, "Indeed, if
in
the case of a brother-in-law such marriage [full marriage] would have been
excluded,
it is hard to see how Ruth's marriage could have been brought within
the
framework of the levirate custom at all."
The Levirate In
not
stop short at furnishing a son to perpetuate the name of
the
dead, but extends to the future security and status of the
woman.
We must accept Rowley's plea for a
greater flexibility in
our
approach to the details of the levirate. He writes: "The
scanty
evidence we have thus suggests that we ought to recog-
nize
a much greater degree of looseness than some writers
allow
Levirate marriage was not in early times limited to a
brother-in-law
it neither required nor excluded full marriage;
it
neither required nor excluded the unmarried condition of
the
levirate partner."28
We have been discussing Genesis 38 as
background mate-
rial
for the goel marriage in Ruth. A comparison between the
two
is drawn by the elders and people who say to Boaz,
"May
your house be like the house of Perez, whom Tamar
bore
to
you
by this young woman" (Ruth 4:12). We shall now pro-
ceed
to Deuteronomy 25 which is generally regarded as the
key
passage in discussions of the Hebrew levirate.
27. W. McKane, "Ruth and
Boaz," p. 30.
28. H. H. Rowley, op. cit., p. 192.
42 The Levirate In
The Levirate Law, Deuteronomy
25:5-10
The Persons
Involved In the Levirate, Deuteronomy 25:5, 6.
The law reads: "If brothers29
dwell together,30 (vbwy yk
vdHy MyHx) and one of them dies and has no
son,31 the wife of
29. Many kinship terms in the Bible
have both a specific and a more general
usage.
See F. I. Anderson, "Israelite Kinship Terminology and
Social-Structure," BT,
20;
1969, pp. 29-39. Hx accordingly, has the meaning of a blood
brother of the
same
parents, as well as the more general meaning of a blood brother of the
same
clan, cf. Gen. 13:8; 19:7; 29:4; Lev. 25:25; Judg. 19:23. The later usage is
at
the basis of the levirate as practiced by the Samaritans and the Jewish Karaite
sect.
These groups held that the duty devolved not upon the blood brother but
the
intimate friend, believing that the performance by the blood brothers of the
levirate
violated the Levitical prohibition in Lev. 18:16 and Lev. 20:21. Cf. L.
Epstein,
op. cit., pp. 89, 92. A. van Praag, Droit matrimonial assyro-babylonien,
1945,
p. 109, remarks, "Si dans Deut. XXV 5-10, ‘la loi fondamentale du
levirat',
le
term frère avait un sens classificatoire, la clause que les frères doivent
habiter
ensemble
serait plus clairement un résidu de l'epoque patriarcale où les différ-
ents
fils mariés d'un patriarche continuaient d'habiter, avec leurs femmes, chez
leur
père; ainsi, les fils de ces fils, en grandissant ensemble, étaient regardés
comme
des frères." He goes on to appeal to Lev. 25:25 and Ruth 4 to support his
opinion
that Hx
should be interpreted as brother in the wider sense.
30. Cf. J. C. De Moor, "Lexical
Remarks concerning Yahad and Yahdaw,"
VT, 7, 1957, pp.
350-355. Cf. Gen. 13:6; Gen. 36:7; and Ps. 133:1 for vbwy
vdHy. J. Pederson, op. cit., p. 508, interprets the living together as meaning
"in
the
same town" since the matter is an affair of the city. E. Neufeld, AHML, p. 40,
writes,
"The word 'together' no doubt means here living on the same family estate
at
the same time." The rabbinic tradition took vdHy temporally;
thus: when they
lived
contemporaneously. Any later born son would be thereby excluded. A.
Ehrlich,
Randglossen zur Hebraischen Bibel, 2,
1909, p. 323, writes, "bwy kann
an
dieser Stelle nur heissen: da sein, lehen, und der Ausdruck den Fall
ausschlics-
sen,
wo der verstorbene Bruder nicht Zeitgenosse des lebenden war." He gives
the
following
explanation for interpreting vdHy temporally:
"Der Grund dieser
Beschränkung
unserer Vorschrift liegt auf der Hand. Denn im Falle der verstor-
bene
Bruder starb, noch ehe der lebende zur Welt kam, ist die Witwe des erstern
im
gewöhnlichen Verlauf der Dinge zur Zeit, wo letzterer die geschlechtliche
Reife
erlangt hat, zu alt, um Kinder zu gebaren und so den Zweck der Leviratsehe
zu
erfüllen. Dabei kann aber auch der Umstand mitwirken, dass das Verwand-
schaftsgefuhl
gegen einen Bruder, den man nie gesehen und nie sehen konnte, fur
ein
so grosses Opfer zu gering ist. Denn die Leviratsehe war seitens des Mannes ein
sehr
grosses Opfer."
31. Nb; LXX: spe<rma. Josephus, Antiquities,
IV, 8, 23, uses the term a
childless
(a@teknoj) wife; so also Luke 20:28; Matt. 22:24; and Mark
12:19. The
word
used by
is
in some way connected with levirate, Neufeld's observation that "in
interpret-
ing
the word Nb
in its relation to the levirate the state of the law of inheritance at
different
stages in the history of
valid
(AHML, p. 45).
The Levirate
In
the
dead shall not be married outside the family (hcvHh)32
to
a
stranger; her husband's brother (hmby)33
shall go in to her,
and
take her as his wife, and perform the duty of a husband's
brother
to her (hmbyv).
And the first son whom she bears
shall
succeed to the name (Mw lf Mvqy) of his brother
who
is dead, that his name may not be blotted out of
The key phrase in our understanding of
who is affected
by
the law is the phrase "brothers dwelling together."34 It
is
generally
assumed that this law presupposes the existence of
the
patriarchal family with the father as authority over his
wife
and children, even over the married sons living with him
32. See Judg. 12:9 for a comparable
use of this word. J. Mittelmann, op.
cit., p. 30,
concludes from this word "dass hier die Rede ist von einem in
örtlicher
Gemeinschaft
lebenden Verwandten - Verbande, dem sämtliche Bruder mit ihren
Familien
angehoren und aus dem die Witwe nicht ausscheiden soil." R. Meren-
dino,
Das Deuteronomische Gesetz, (Bonner Biblische Beiträge, 31),
1969, p.
319,
comments on hcvH: "Das Wort setzt eine scharfe
Grenze zwischen der
Familie
und den nicht dazu Gehörigen."
33. Mby, is used in
Deut. 25:5, 7 to refer to the dead husband's brother:
hmby, is used in Deut. 25:7, 9 to refer to
the brother's widow and further alone in
Ruth
1:15 where it refers to the widow of the brother of a wife's husband. J.
Vesco,
"La Date du Livre de Ruth," RB,
1967, p. 243, cites this as a possible
linguistic
argument for a late date for Ruth: "Si le livre de Ruth emploie ce nom
sans
lui donner son séns précis mais en lui accordant une signification plus large,
n'est-ce
pas l'indice que le livre de Ruth a
été écrit, à une, époque où la législation
léviratique
n'était plus d'un usage fréquent et où le vocabulaire de la parenté
devenait
plus large?" See also, M. David, "The Date of the Book of Ruth,"
OTS,
1941-42,
p. 62; C. Rodd, "The Family in the Old Testament," BT, 18, 1967, p. 20.
One
need not assume imprecise usage in Ruth 1:15. For a similar usage which
parallels
the twofold use of hmby, one can point to hdvd in Exod. 6:20,
meaning
father's
sister and in Lev. 18:14, meaning wife of father's brother. Hebrew has a
special
verb for the performing of the levirate (Mby) which may be
evidence of the
importance
of the levirate duty; cf. S. R. Driver, Deuteronomy,
pp. 282, 283. For
a
discussion of the root cf.
ground,"
pp. 6, 7, following a suggestion of Albright's, calls attention to the
epithet
"ybmt limm" for the goddess Anat in the Ras Shamra texts. W.
Albright,
"Recent
Progress in North Canaanite Research," BA,
70, 1938, p. 19 n. 6, sug-
gested
that "ybmt limm" means "progenitress of the peoples." The
word devel-
oped
the meaning brother-in-law and sister-in-law because of their involvement in
the
yibbum, the levirate marriage. C.
"progenitress
of heroes" may be a correct rendering of "ybmt limm." Th. and D.
Thompson,
op. cit., p. 85, write, "We
ought not to translate yibbum as levirate'
but
as 'progenitor marriage' or the like. It is the progeny rather than any
previous
relationship
between the couple that is significant in this custom." Cf. J. Gray,
The Legacy of
34. Cf. n. 30.
44 The Levirate In
and
their wives.35 Furthermore, it is commonly asserted that
this
law is operative only where brothers
are dwelling to-
gether.36
Mittelmann is representative when he writes, "Da
das
Gesetz die Erfüllung der Leviratspflicht nur von zusam-
menwohnenden
Brüdern fordert, ist der Gegenschluss ge-
rechtfertigt,
dass nach dem Willen des Gcsetzgebers der nach-
geborene
Bruder nicht der Leviratspflicht unterliegen soll, da
er
mit dem Verstorbenen nicht zusammengewohnt haben
kann,
dass ferner Brüder, die in verschiedenen Orten, Län-
dern
oder Erdteilen wohnen, nicht leviratspflichtig rein
sollen."37
Our understanding of this phrase
"dwell together" takes
on
significance when the question is posed, "Is the levirate
connected
with the laws of inheritance?" As we shall present-
ly
see, the phrase "succeed to the name of the dead brother"
has some connection with the rights of inheritance.38
Should
35. R. de Vaux, Ancient Israel, 1961, p. 20. He believes the proper word to
describe
the Israelite family is bx tyb, "the house of one's
father." T. Mitchell,
"Family,"
NBD, 1962, p. 415, regards Josh.
7:16-18 as instructive in understand-
ing
the relation between the tribe, clan and house. "Conceptually the members
of
a
tribe can be pictured as a cone with the founding ancestor at the apex and the
living
generation at the base." See also F. I. Anderson, op. cit., pp. 29, 30.
36. G. von Rad, Deuteronomy, 1966, pp. 154, 155; D. Mace, op. cit., p.
110;
G. R. Driver and J. C. Miles, The
Assyrian Laws, 1935, p. 243;
"Levirate
Marriage in Jewish Law," Studies in
Jewish Literature in Honor of
Kaufman Kohler, 1913, p. 211;
H. Schaeffer, Social Legislation of the
Primitive
Semites, 1915, p. 59;
S. R. Driver, Deuteronomy, p. 282.
According to L.
Epstein,
op. cit., p. 88, "Dwelling
together, which alone permits the levirate
situation,
presupposes a patriarchal family structure, and where there is no patri-
archal
family there is no levirate." This is in accord with the very strong
distinc-
tion
which he draws between levirate marriage and geullah marriage. Both existed
at
the same time. "Brothers dwelling together performed levirate, when not
dwell-
ing
together, they performed the ge'ullah courtesy." Levirate marriage was
rare
and
came to an end with the breakdown of the patriarchal family.
37. J. Mittelmann, op. cit., p. 31.
38. In later Jewish writing the
meaning of "to succeed to the name" is "to
inherit
the property." According to Tannaitic tradition the child of the levirate
union
was the levir’s and the levir was the inheritor of the property, cf.
op.
cit., p. 289. Such an understanding is contrary to the literal intent of the
text
"and
the first son whom she bears shall succeed to the name of his brother who
is
dead." I. Mattuck, op. cit., p.
217, refers to the "forced interpretation" of rvkb
which
"is made to mean that the duty of the marriage devolves first upon the
oldest
of the surviving brothers." He adds: "The reason for transferring the
inheri-
The Levirate In
we
then see in the phrase "brothers dwelling together" an
additional
indication that inheritance is an important factor
in
the levirate? Epstein answers in the negative since he be-
lieves
that "the levirate situation arises while the patriarch is
still
alive and heads his corporate family. It is one of the sons
who
has died childless and left a widow. There is no question
of
disposing of an estate, because the patriarch is still alive. It
is
a matter of conserving property right in the childless
widow
and perpetuating the name of the deceased.”39 This is
the
complete opposite of the opinion held by Driver and
Miles,
who call attention to the absence in this law of any
inclusion
of a duty on the part of the father (similar to the
duty
of
case
the brothers are sharing the inheritance.40 They see the
situation
pictured in the phrase "dwelling together" paral-
leled
in the MAL by the phrase "brothers who have not
divided
the inheritance"41 which would indicate their living
on
a joint estate.
Such a family pattern described in the
phrase "brothers
tance
from the son to the brother-in-law is the recognition of his right to inherit
his
brother's property at the same time that he inherits the widow." S.
Belkin, op.
cit., pp. 290, 291,
explains the change remarking: "Our sages could not and
would
not visualize that the son born from the levies seed should legally be
recognized
as, the seed of the deceased.... If the levir's son exclusively inherited
the
property of the deceased, the levirate union would ofttimes not be consum-
mated,
due to the financial complexities inherent.... On this account the Rabbis
explained
the biblical law, establishing therewith the legality of the natural father
(the
levir) to be also the legal heir of the deceased's estate. Under these condi-
tions,
the usual ground for objecting to the fulfilment of the levirate duty was
removed."
39. L. Epstein, op. cit., p. 86.
40. G. R. Driver and J. C. Miles, op. cit., p. 243. Cf. n. 18.
41. G. R. Driver and J. C. Miles, op. cit., p. 243. See Meek's translation
of
MAL,
B, §2, 3 (ANET, p. 185): "If one
among brothers who have not divided
(the
inheritance) took a life, they shall give him up to the next-of-kin; if he
chooses,
the next-of-kin may put him to death, or if he chooses, he may spare
(him)
(and) take his share. If one among brothers who have not divided (the
inheritance)
uttered treason or ran away, the king (shall deal) with his share as he
thinks
fit." A. F. Puukko, "Die altassyrischen und hethitischen Gesetze und
das
Alte
Testament," StOr, 1, 1925, p.
132, comments, "Die Wendung [the brothers
of
an undivided estate] ist dieselbe wie Dt 25:5 wenn Brüder beisammen (d. h. in
der
ungeteilten Hinterlassenschaft) wohnen."
46 The Levirate In
dwelling
together" is indisputably ancient.42 Neufeld re-
marks,
"Although the Deuteronomic levirate law had in view
a
restriction of the levirate obligation, the way in which the
law
is framed leaves little doubt that it bears the traces of an
ancient
custom of Hebrew family law which was no doubt
out
of date in Deuteronomic times.”43 Driver and Miles re-
flect
on the consortium of brothers and ask why such a word-
ing
is included in the Deuteronomic law. They see the phrase
"dwelling
together" as reflecting the ancient situation where
inheritances
were impartible. They maintain that "when the
law
which now stands in Deuteronomy was originally laid
down,
brothers generally did dwell together, and the Deuter-
onomic
compiler has left the phrase where it is either per
incuriam or because he
wished to restrict the custom as far as
possible."44
The latter explanation seems somewhat artificial,
since
it is doubtful whether the lawgiver would deliberately
legislate
a situation he knew to be virtually nonexistent in
order
to restrict the practice of the levirate.45
Daube argues convincingly that in
Deuteronomy 25, "the
legislation
about levirate marriage, as conceived by its author,
dealt
with consortium, brothers who on their father's death
remained
together on the paternal estate.... In this case, if
one
died without leaving children and the survivor refused to
raise
seed for him in order that his place in the consortium
should
be filled again, the widow could summon the traitor
before
the elders.”46 As over against the situation reflected in
42. Cf. Z. Falk's review of R. de
Vaux's Les Institutions de l'Ancien
Testa-
ment, in JJS, 9, 1958, p. 202, where he comments
on the levirate law, "Our
passage,
however, seems to be based on an earlier law. It was formulated when
‘brethren
dwelt together,’ i.e. during the patriarchal stage."
43. E. Neufeld, AHML, pp. 41, 42.
44. G. R. Driver and J. C. Miles, op. cit., p. 243.
45. Cf. A. Noordtzij, Het Boek Levitikus, KV, 1940, p. 16, who
comments:
"Die
onderstelde wetgevers waren toch zeker geen archeologen! Ze schreven toch
voor
hun eigen tijd, wilden hun wetten toch door hun tijdgenooten gehoorzaamd
zien.
En dan toch voorschriften geven, die in hun tijd ten eenenmale onuitvoer-
baar
waren?!"
46. D. Daube,
"Consortium," pp. 89, 90, J. Mittelmann, op. cit., pp. 30, 31,
is
of a similar opinion when he remarks that "der Gesetzgeber bei der Form-
The Levirate In
Genesis
38, in which the father was alive, Daube maintains
that
the Deuteronomic lawgiver refers to a situation in which
the
estate had not been partitioned after a father's death but
the
inheritance held in common. As evidence to support his
view
that the phrase "brothers dwelling together" refers to
consortium,
Daube cites Psalm 133:1. He finds references to
the
consortium institution in early Hebrew law in the stories
of
Abraham and
36:6,
7) where the phrase "to dwell together" is found.
Daube
gives several reasons for believing that the law operates
in
the situation where the father is dead. "If the lawgiver had
in
mind the ordinary case where the paterfamilias
is still alive,
(1) the expression 'if brethren dwell
together and one of
them
die' would be strange, and one would expect something
like
'If a man take a wife for his son and this son die. . . .’
(2) Similarly, the expression 'her
husband's brother shall
go
in unto her and take her to him to wife' would be strange,
and
one would expect something like 'the paterfamilias
shall
send
her husband's brother in unto her and give her unto
him..
.’
(3) If the paterfamilias were still alive, one would expect
him
to be strong enough to force the remaining brother to
marry
the widow even if he did not wish to do so. . . .
(4) At least, one would expect the paterfamilias to play
some
part in the proceedings laid down in the case of disobe-
dience
on the part of the survivor."47
Daube appears to be arguing for the
original Sitz im Leben
of
the levirate law and his argument is cogently presented.
The
application of the levirate law to additional cases (where
the
father is alive or where the father is dead and the brothers
separate,
taking their own inheritance portion) is a later
ulierung
des Gesetzes in erster Linie an Brüder gedacht haben, die als Bauern in
fortgesetzter
Erbengemeinschaft auf dem vdterlichen Grund and Boden gemein-
sam
Leben." Similarly, H. Brongers, Oud-Oosters
en Bijbels Recht, 1960, p. 199.
47. D. Daube, "Consortium,"
pp. 72, 73. Cf. also Daube's review of L.
Epstein,
Marriage Laws in the Bible and the Talmud
in BiOr, 3-4, 1947, pp. 32-35.
48 The Levirate In
development
"when the primitive consortium had become
obsolete
and forgotten."48
At the beginning of our discussion of
the phrase "broth-
ers
dwelling together," we noted that most scholars assume
that
the levirate law operates only where
brothers are dwell-
ing
together; that the law provides the exclusive conditions
under
which the levirate duty was to be in effect, but it is
questionable
whether the levirate law is to be understood in
such
a fashion; that is, as prescribing exhaustively the situa-
tion
in which the levirate operated. Rather, as Th. and D.
Thompson
state, "When Deuteronomy speaks of brothers
dwelling
together, it is not specifying the limits under which
the
law is binding. It is describing the typical situation under
which
the law would normally be used."49 The law is then
legislating how the responsibility toward the
deceased and
the
deceased's widow customarily operated. Normally, the
brother50
of the deceased, being the nearest of kin and best
suited
to act for the deceased, will be called upon to raise up
seed
for the deceased. However, it should not be understood
as
if the levirate was performed only under the conditions
and
through the specific parties mentioned in the Deutero-
nomic
law.
The Purpose of
the Levirate, Deuteronomy 25:6.
We must now enter into the very heart
of the levirate
marriage
institution and to the crucial question of its purpose
as
construed by the Deuteronomic legislation. In particular,
we
must inquire into the meaning of Deuteronomy 25:6.
There
it is stated that the first-born of the levirate union
48. D. Daube,
"Consortium,". p. 90. H. H. Rowley, op. cit., p. 175 n. 3,
objects
to Daube's position and remarks, "This would seem to distinguish the
marriage
of Ruth too sharply from levirate marriage, and would make the refer-
ences
to Deut. 25:5-10 and Gen. 38 in the book of Ruth hard to explain."
Rowley's
objection does not sufficiently take into consideration, however, that
Daube
is arguing for the primitive life setting contained in the phrase
"brothers
dwelling
together."
49. Th. and D. Thompson, op. cit., p. 90.
50. J. Pedersen, op. cit., p. 78: "When the brother
is mentioned as the one
to
take this obligation upon himself, it is because he is the nearest of kin to
the
The Levirate In
"shall
succeed to the name of his brother who is dead, that
his
name may not be blotted out of
meaning
of the phrase Mw lf Mvqy? What is meant by the
statement
of purpose "that his name may not be blotted out
of
widow's
accusation against the levir is that "he refuses to
perpetuate
his brother's name in
lxrWyb Mw vyHxl). In the
halisah ceremony the brother-in-
law
who rejects his duty is referred to as the one who is not
willing
to build up his brother's house (v. 9). We must en-
quire
into these statements relating to the distinctive purpose
of
the levirate in
cording
to Deuteronomy, the purpose of the levirate was to
provide
the dead man with a son," which in Israelite think-
deceased
and best suited to act in his name, just as he is the man from whom it is
most
fair to exact the fulfillment of this duty."
51. It is difficult to believe that
in v. 5 "son" is not the intended meaning
despite-any
apparent conflict with Num. 27. However, M. Kline, Treaty of the
Great King, 1963, p. 117,
writes, "In view of the provision of Numbers 27:4 ff.,
there
would be no need for the levirate marriage if the deceased had daughters.
Hence
the AV seems preferable to RSV in rendering in verse 5 no child, rather
than
no son." Cf. also R. K. Harrison, IOT,
1970, p. 650, "The levirate law did
not
apply if daughters had been born, and regulations for the inheritance of such
individuals
constituted an early concern of codified Hebrew law (Num. 27:1 ff.)."
Cf.
S. Belkin, op. cit., p. 280, for a similar interpretation. G. A. Smith, Deuter-
onomy, 1918, p. 287,
on the contrary, remarks: "P, by allowing daughters to
inherit
(Num. xxvii 1-12), abolished part of the need for Levirate marriages; but
obviously,
D knows nothing of P's law: for his own is limited to sons: This is
generally
the position taken by those more inclined to see development within the
laws
of the Pentateuch. L. Epstein, op. cit.,
p. 81, states: "Leviticus and Numbers
at
times ignore the levirate institution and at times legislate it out of exis-
tence....
If a man dies childless, according to the ruling of the Book of Numbers,
his
estate goes over to the brothers or uncles, as if a levitate institution did
not
exist
at Critical scholars see historical development in the institution and
successive
biblical legislation in respect to it." A. Geiger, "Die
Leviratsehe,"
Jüdische
Zeitschnft für Wissenschaft and Leben, 1, 1862, pp. 19-39, believes that
the
two biblical statements are explainable on the basis of the divergent geo-
graphical
locations of the lawgivers; levirate being, according to Geiger, known
only
in the south. The author of the Numbers 27 tradition, which revolves around
the
daughters of Zelophehad who was of Manasseh, would have been from the
north
and either did not know of or was free to ignore the southern tradition of
the
levirate. This argument is rejected by J. Mittelmann, op. cit., p. 37, whose
interpretation
of the two passages in Num. and Deut. follows the common critical
source
approach. In the Exile, the Israelites came under Babylonian influence.
"Die
Folge des exilischen Rechtsangleichungsprozesses war eine Vereinheitlichung
50 The Lervirate in
ing
was extremely important. The son. born of the union
between
the levir and the widow is reckoned- as belonging to
the
deceased.52 The phrase Mw lf Mvqy, obviously does
not
and
Reformierung des judaisch—israclitischen Rechtes, die manche Spuren in der
Queue
P. des Hexatcuches hinterlassen . . . Die Tatsache, dass gerade P., also
eine
Quelle aus dem ausgehenden 6. Jh., mit grosser Emphase das Tochtererbrecht
predigt,
lasst darauf schliessen, dass es sich hierbei fair die judäischen
Exulanten
um
etwas Neues handeln muss, das mit grossem Nachdruck befohlen und gut
begrUndet
werden muss, um Wurzel schlagen zu konnen." Several things should be
said
about this matter. First of all, it is evident that some of the Pentateuchal
laws
show
traces of a process of development. A clear example is the further amplifica-
tion
of the law of Num. 27 in Num. 36. J. Weingreen, "The Case of the Daughters
of
Zelophchad," VT, 16, 1966, pp.
519, 520, maintains that in this incident we
have
a significant pointer toward legislative procedure in
law
may emerge out of the ruling of a judicial authority in a case of unprece-
dented
circumstances, for which the law had made no provision." He argues that
"such
phenomena, surely, would not be unusual in any ancient organized society
and
may be seen as manifestations, through evolving law, of social growth and
widening
experience." We acknowledge that the laws of the Bible are divinely
revealed,
yet given in concrete historical circumstances, and therefore accept the
principle
of development where the Bible points in that direction. Cf. W. H.
Gispen's
interesting discussion of development within the Pentateuchal laws, "De
Soepelheid
der Mozaische Wet," GTT, 57,
1957, pp. 106-111. In the case under
discussion,
however, the Old Testament legal traditions are being interpreted in
the
light of the Wellhausen source analysis with a post-exile date for the P docu-
ment.
This dating has recently come under some suspicion, cf. e.g. Y. Kaufman,
Religion of
in Oriental and Biblical Studies, ed. J.
Finkelstein and M. Greenberg, 1967, pp.
123-142
= Yehezkel Kaufmann Jubilee Volume,
ed. M. Haran, 1960, pp. 29-45.
Apart
from these considerations, we note that not all are agreed that the incident
in
Num. 27 demonstrates that the so-called P document did not know or dis-
approved
of the levirate. N. Snaith, "The Daughters of Zelophehad," VT, 16,
1966,
p. 126, holds that "the story of the daughters of Zelophehad has actually
nothing
to do with the general rules and laws as to the inheritance of property,
but
that primarily it is a story told to account for the fact that the tribe of
Manasseh
held land to the west of the
know
all of the specifics for which this law was enacted it could be covering a
situation
where a wife without a son had predeceased her husband, where the wife
remained
without a son after levirate marriage or a case where the deceased's
brother
had refused to marry the widow. See J. S. Wright, "Marriage," NBD,
1962,
p. 789.
52. Since the biblical statement is
that "the firstborn is to succeed to the
name
of the deceased" in any levirate union, such a unique arrangement would
apply
only to the firstborn son. It is difficult to understand the ground on which
I.
Benzinger, "Marriage," EB,
1903, p. 2950, sees a "not unimportant altera-
tion"
between Gen. 38 and Deut. 25. He remarks, "In Gen. 38:9 all the children
(not
only the first son) are to he reckoned to the dead man." Surely, frzh in
Gen.
38:9 does not refer to a plurality of offspring. On the relation of frz in
Gen.
38 to 7: in Deut. 25:5, L. Epstein. op.
cit., p. 97 n. 55, remarks that seed
The Levirate In
mean
that the child shall assume, in the literal sense, the name
of
the deceased since this was not so in either of the two
incidents
of the levirate narrated in the Old Testament (Gen.
38,
Ruth 4). Pedersen explains the phrase
when he writes, "If
a
man, after having contracted a marriage, dies without sons,
then
he dies entirely. It is this blotting out of life which is to
be
avoided. His nearest of kin, the brother, must perform this
office
of love in order to protect him from extermination.
The
wife, whose object in life it is to bear him a son in whom
his
life is resurrected, must be enabled to do her duty to-
wards
him."53
The desire for children and in
particular for male children
was
very strong in Old Testament times. Barrenness was a
dire
misfortune (I Sam. I ) and it was considered to be the
highest
blessing from God to have sons (Ps. 127:3-5). "Give
me
children or I die," was the distressed plea of the wife
Gen.
30:1). In many places the Old Testament makes a con-
nection
between having descendants, particularly sons, and
"is
only a general expression for offspring and may be used even when one has in
mind
only sons," pointing to the employment of the term seed in connection
with
circumcision in Gen. 17. Since the phrase hwxl vl hHqlv, Deut. 25:5,
points
in
the direction of a more permanent marital, union, it would be likely that
either
children
would be produced. The most natural explanation of the term firstborn
would
also suggest other children and permanent marriage, though Rowley argues
that
"when the law of Deuteronomy speaks of the firstborn child it is not
implied
that
the union would normally continue and that there would be other children
who
would take the name of the dead man, but rather that levirate marriage was
only,
concerned with a first birth"; op.
cit., p. 187.
53. J. Pedersen, op. cit., p. 78. See also
A. R. Johnson, The One and the
Many in the
Israelite Conception of God, 19612, p. 3: "Thus, to the Israelite,
when
the time comes for that dissolution of the personality which is known as
death,
it is in this particular 'extension' that he may continue to live most power-
fully.
Hence the extermination of the name is regarded as the greatest disaster
which
can befall a man, and various measures are adopted to preserve his memory.
The
need of male offspring for this particular purpose finds typical expression in
the
legislation providing for the so-called levirate marriage...." W. Rudolph,
op.
cit., p. 62,
commenting on the meaning of the phrases under discussion, writes,
"Dieses
Wertlegen auf die Erhaltung des Namens ist bei dem Fehlen einer Aufer-
stehungshoffnung
durchaus begreiflich, so dass wir es nicht notig haben, nach
einem
anderen als dem im AT angegebenen Motiv fur den Levirat zu suchen...."
J.
R. Porter, op. cit., p. 377, states,
"The principal aim of the Levirate marriage,
as
the Biblical texts plainly show, was that a son might be born who would take
the
dead husband's name and so keep him alive."
52 The Levirate In
the
continuation of the name (I Sam. 24:22; II Sam. 14:7;
18:18;
Isa. 56:5; 66:22; Jer. 11:19; Ps. 45:17 f.; 109:13). It is
not
proper to conclude from this that in
was
connected with ancestor worship,54 but it seems evident
that
the descendants, and especially sons in
viewed
as the ones who keep in remembrance the name55 of
the
father.56
In addition to the idea of the
continuance of the name of
the
father through his son, more must be said about the
concept
of "succeeding to the name." From additional pas-
sages
now to be mentioned it seems likely that "succeeding
to
the name" must be linked as well with inheriting the prop-
erty.57
Genesis 48:5, 6 makes mention of Jacob's adoption of
Ephraim
and Manasseh, the two sons of Joseph born in
before
Jacob's arrival. This privilege is restricted to the two
54. M. Burrows, "Levirate
Marriage in
that
it is "entirely likely that the levirate had some connection with
ancestor-
worship
among the Hebrews." I. Benzinger, "Family," EB, 1903, p. 1502, calls it
"the
essential consideration in levirate marriages." For a critique of this
idea, see
55. On the distinctive Israelite
understanding of the name, see G. von Rad,
Studies in
Deuteronomy,
1953, pp. 37-44; J. A. Motyer, "Name," NBD, 1962,
pp.
861-864; J. Pedersen, op. cit., pp.
245-259; Th. and D. Thompson, op. cit.,
pp.
84-88.
56. H. W. Robinson, "The Hebrew
Conception of Corporate Personality,"
BZAW, 66, 1936, pp.
49, 52, has sought to explain the levirate in terms of his
well-known
concept of corporate personality. The levitate is the result of
unique
"unitary group conception." This is defined as follows: "The
whole group,
including
its past, present and future members might function as a single individ-
ual
through any one of the members conceived as representative of it." The
extension
into the future of the living group is "best illustrated by the dominant
aspiration
of the Hebrew to have male children to perpetuate his name, the name
that
was so much a part of himself that something of him died when his name
ceased."
The application of the corporate personality concept to the levirate law
is
questioned by Porter, op. cit., p.
377, who writes, "Here indeed, as also with
the
obligation of blood-revenge, there is a very strong awareness of the solidarity
of
the family, but this is based on ties of kinship and the bond of property and
does
not require the postulate of 'corporate personality'...."
57. W. Rudolph, op. cit., pp. 62, "Nur spielt neben der Erhaltung des
Namens
auch noch der Gedanke an die Erhaltung des Grundbesitzes mit." J. R..
Porter,
op. cit., p. 377, affirms that the
principal aim of the levirate was to
continue
the deceased's name and life in a son but goes on to say, "Closely linked
with
this, as is implied in Deut. xxv 5, and the story of Ruth, was the object of
preserving
the family property intact." For a contrary view, cf. H. H. Rowley, op.
The Levirate In
sons:
"and the offspring born to you after them shall be
yours;
they shall be called by the name of their brothers in
their
inheritance" (v. 6). In other words, later born sons will
not
form tribes of their own, with a special inheritance, but
will
be incorporated into Ephraim and Manasseh. Here it
appears
that "being called by the name" includes being made
a
partaker of the inheritance.
Numbers 27 points to a direct
connection between Mw
and
the family property. The daughters of Zelophehad asked
Moses,
"Why should the name of our father be taken away
from
his family, because he had no son? Give to us a posses-
sion
among our father's brethren" (v. 4). When a decision is
rendered
to meet this situation58 we see that the daughters
are
to be given possession of an inheritance among their
father's
brethren (v. 7).
This same idea is also found in Ruth
4:10. Boaz remarks,
"Also
Ruth the Moabitess, the widow of Mahlon, I have
acquired
to be my wife, to perpetuate the name of the dead
in
his inheritance (vtlHn lf tmh Mw Myqhl), that the name
of
the dead may not be cut off among his brethren."
It thus appears that through the
levirate, the name and
the
estate of the deceased were continued in the son of this
union,
who was considered to be the son of the deceased. As
such,
he was the one who ultimately came into possession of
his
father's property. Undoubtedly this would be a duty of
love
on the part of the deceased's brother, who would stand
cit., p. 185,
"There is no reference ta property in the law of levirate marriage in
Deuteronomy."
58. R. de Vaux, op. cit., p. 166, writes, "If a man dies without male heirs,
the
land is bequeathed to his daughters (Nb 27:7-8), but they must marry within
their
tribe, so that their portion may not be transferred to another tribe (Nb
36:6-9).
If the owner dies childless, the inheritance reverts to his brothers, his
uncles
or his nearest kinsman (Nb 27:9-11)." According to
321-324,
this episode in Numbers 27 and 36 "is the reflection of agnate marriage,
meaning
marriage within the family, tribe or
clan." This is to be sharply distin-
guished
from the levirate and was not obligatory. These laws provided that
daughters
inherited the property, where there were no sons, when they married
within
the family tribe. They are reflected with some significant variations in the
marriage
of Tobias to Sarah, mentioned in the book of Tobit.
54 The Levirate In
to
gain personally in case his dead brother remained without
children.59
It is important to recognize that the levirate duty
entailed
a sacrifice of love. From the examples of Onan and
the
god in Ruth, as well as from the ceremony whereby the
refusing
brother is shamed, we have confirmation that some
in
responsibilities
were rejected where love had grown cold.
However,
because of the close bond of kinship which united
the
Israelite clan, the levirate law was one of the concrete
ways
in which the law of love within the Israelite family
often
came to expression. The levirate had in view, then, the
raising
up of descendants for the deceased, but, in addition,
was
designed to prevent the alienation of the family
property.60
59. According to J. Pedersen, op. cit., p. 91, to maintain the name implies
the
continuation of the deceased's life, but includes as well the taking over of
his
property.
"It always expresses an office of love on the part of the brother. If he
is
actually
the natural heir, it is clear that it is a great sacrifice on his part; for
then
he
might let the deceased be blotted out and take over the inheritance for himself
and
his progeny.... The presupposition is that it is really a great sacrifice he is
making."
Cf. D. Mace, op. cit., pp. 106, 108.
We must assume that the property
of
the deceased was under the control of the levir until such time as a male child
was
born and able to assume control. If the levir was married and had children by
a
first wife and had additional children from the second, difficulties in his estate
may
well have resulted. See J. Morgenstern, op.
cit., pp. 174-175.
60. D. Mace, op. cit., p. 105, remarks, "We may therefore suppose that even
where
its primary purpose was limited to the propagation of a son to the de-
ceased,
as among the Hebrews, it may at the same time have subserved the ends of
inheritance."
This dual purpose is also affirmed by G. R. Driver and J. C. Miles,
op. cit., p. 243; 0.
Baab, "Marriage," IDB,
1962, p. 283; C. Steuernagel,
Deuteronomium
and Joshua,
HK, 1900, p. 92. Sometimes an effort is made to
distinguish
between primary and secondary purposes. Cf. R. de Vaux, op. cit., p.
38:
"The essential purpose is to perpetuate male descent, the 'name,' the
'house,'
and
therefore the child (probably only the first child) of a levirate marriage was
considered
the child of the deceased man.... A secondary, but similar, purpose
was
to prevent the alienation of family-property." A few scholars believe that
the
levirate
serves an additional purpoSe;i:e., to provide for the care and protection of
of
the widow in society. If such were the case, then the levirate duty must be
understood
as involving full marriage, not merely cohabitation for the purpose of
impregnation.
D. Mace, op. cit., p. 108, calls this
nothing more than an "inciden-
tal
element." L. Epstein, op. cit.,
pp. 79, 80, describes it as a later development.
E.
Neufeld and I. Mattuck see it as the primary and fundamental object of the
levirate.
Cf. E. Neufeld, op. cit., pp. 29-33,
46, 47. I. Mattuck emphatically
repudiates
the idea that the maintenance of the dead man's estate could have been
the
central purpose in the legislator's mind. The central purpose can be discerned,
The Levirate In
The Ceremony of
Refusal, Deuteronomy 25: 7-10.
We must now examine the ceremony in
Deuteronomy
which
followed the refusal of the levir to fulfill his duty to
the
widow. We have seen from Genesis 38 that there were
occasions
when the duty of the levirate was evaded by the
brother-in-law.
The Deuteronomic law recognized that there
would
be those who refuse to perform the duty, although the
reasons
for such refusal are not directly mentioned.61 The
prescribed
ceremony may be an indication that it was felt to
be
in the interests of both parties to exert some pressure so
that
evasions of this pious duty would be kept at a minimum.
It
is true that in this, as in all the laws of God, obedience is
the
response of love, and love cannot be coerced. Neverthe-
less,
some pressure can be beneficial. This law recognizes the
very
real possibility of that to which Genesis 38 points as
well:
the levir's rejection of his responsibility. It would be
wrong
to see in the halisah ceremony merely a legalization of
this
rejection. We should not imagine that the law is designed
to
provide the brother-in-law with the occasion for escaping
his
duty.62 Rather, the intention of the ceremony is primarily
he
asserts, by asking the question "Whom did the law benefit?" The widow
alone
benefited
by it, as can be seen also from the story of Tamar and Ruth. Taken in
combination
with the humanitarian concern in Deuteronomy for widows and
orphans,
the combination of these arguments can lead to no other conclusion
than
that the purpose of the law is to benefit the widow. This purpose is also the
explanation
for the lawgivers' preoccupation with an heir. Where there was a son
surviving
the husband, the widow's maintenance was secure. Thus Mattuck, op.
cit., p. 214,
concludes that "by the law of levirate marriage, Deuteronomy sought
to
ensure the welfare of the childless widow by obtaining for her through a son a
claim
on her deceased husband's property." Mattuck's opinion has been echoed in
recent
times by W. Williams, Archeology in Biblical
Research, 1966, p. 159. Cf.
also
the position of H. Brongers in chap. 5, n. 95.
61. The phrases used in v. 7 to
describe the brother-in-law's response to the
widow
do not touch on the specifics in back of the refusal as is the case in Gen.
38:9.
62. Cf. J. Morgenstern, op. cit., p. 166: "The performance
or non-
performance
of this duty was naturally a matter of strictest secrecy, known only
to
the two of them. And of course, if the brother-in-law had no desire to perform
this
duty, there was obviously no need nor occasion for him to make the matter
public."
56 The Levirate In
to
protect the widow, not the unwilling brother.63 It will be
well,
at this point, to investigate the procedure which the law
stipulates
in the circumstance of refusal of duty. The first
step
taken by the widow is to go up to the gate to inform the
elers64
of the levir's uncooperative stand, and thereby make
formal
declaration of the brother-in-law's refusal. When due
attention
is paid to the woman's initiative, it does not appear
likely
that the law was intended to furnish the deceased's
brother
with an escape mechanism, for "if the purpose of this
mispat was the
protection of the brother-in-law from the
necessity
of performing a formal duty disagreeable to him,
the
first condition thereof would hardly have been to compel
the
sister-in-law to comply with a provision which must have
been
extremely distasteful and humiliating to her; namely to
voluntarily
take the initiative and go before the legal authori-
ties
of the town and make formal charge of neglect of duty
against
her brother-in-law in regard to a matter of extreme
privacy
and delicacy."65
63. Ibid.
64. There are references to judicial
procedures taking place at the gate
throughout
the Old Testament. In Deut. the phrase "elders of his occurs in
19:12;
21:3; 4, 6, 19, 20; 22:15, 18; 25:8. We shall encounter one of the most
important
examples of the every day operation of justice at the gate in Ruth 4.
Other
important incidents furnishing examples of judicial process in
incidents
mentioned in Judg. Jer. 26 I Kings 21; cf. F. I. Anderson "The
Socio-Juridical
Background of the Naboth Incident,” JBL,
85, 1966, pp. 46-57.
One
of the pioneering works on judicial procedure appeared in L. Köhler's
work,
Der
Hebräische Mensch, 1953, pp. 143-171. For additional literature on
the sub-
ject
of elders in the Old Testament, cf. J. L. McKenzie, "The Elders in the Old
Testament,"
Biblica, 40, 1959, pp. 522-540; J. van
der Ploeg, "Les Anciens dans
l'Ancien
Testament," Lex Tua Veritas,
Festschrift für Hubert Junker, ed. H.
Gross
and F. Mussner, 1961, pp. 175-191; C. Umhau Wolf, "Traces of Primitive
Democracy
in Ancient
and
Going at the City Gate," BASOR,
144, 1956, pp. 20-23; G. Evans, "Coming
and
Going at the City Gate, a discussion of Professor Speiser's Paper," BASOR,
150,1958,
pp. 28-33; D. A. McKenzie, "judicial Procedure at the Town. Gate,"
VT,
14,
1964, pp. 100-104. For a recent full scale treatment, cf. J. Salmon, Judicial
Authority in
Early Israel,
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
1968.
65. J. Morgenstern, op. cit., p. 166, E. Neufeld, op. cit., p. 42, makes the
statement,
"To enable the levir to escape from his levirate obligations, the law
recognized
the ceremony of Halizah," but
this does not adequately take into
account
the woman's initiative within the proceedings.
The Levirate In
The woman's initiatives make it likely
that her interests
were
being protected by this procedure. The plight of the
widow
is a prominent theme in the Old Testament66 and we
have
already seen that some scholars suggest that it was the
principal
motive behind the levirate.67 If the widow waited a
reasonable
period without any sign that the brother-in-law
was
disposed to perform his duty toward her, she might, as a
final
measure, seek to be free from .his authority and to either
return
to her own father or make her own way.68 This cere-
mony
would then constitute a kind of release similar to the
bill
of divorcement.69
66. F. C. Fensham, "Widow,
Orphan and the Poor in Ancient Near Eastern
Legal
and Wisdom Literature," JNES,
21, 1962, pp. 129-139:
67. See
68. Based upon analogies with some
Near Eastern and Bedouin circles,
where
a widow and her children have the right to return to the house of her
father.,
F. C. Fensham, op. cit., p. 136,
asks, "What about the levirate marriages?
Was
this marriage only contracted when the widow had no remaining family
ties?"
He does not believe that the levirate was in effect only where the woman
had
no family ties and gives two reasons: "The married wife was bought by her
husband
from the house of her father.... After her husband's death his family
had
the right to keep her in the family or else they would suffer damage. This is
the
basis of levirate marriage...." A second reason is found in the
Tamar-Judah
incident
which demonstrates that there is "one case in the Old Testament where
the
levirate took place in spite of family ties." In my opinion there is some
truth
in
Fensham's first reason, but his formulation is not quite right, cf. the
discussion
of
the verb hnq,
used in connection with marriage in chap. 8, "The Double
Responsibility,"
as well as chap. 8, n. 104. The levirate incident in Gen. 38 is
sufficient
evidence, however, to support the position that the levirate was opera-
tive
regardless of whether members of the woman's house were alive.
69. We have seen from the Tamar
incident (cf. n. 9) that the widow was
considered
to be married to Shelah even though she was not given to him. I.
Mattuck,
op. cit., p. 216, remarks, "The
widow becomes the wife of the brother-
in-law
at the death of her husband. There are no preliminaries neces-
sary....
When, however, he refused to retain her as his wife a ceremony of release
was
prescribed. This could be nothing else than a form of divorce." Cf. also,
E.
Neufeld,
AHML, p. 48, who believes it, to be
highly likely that "the widow
became
the legal wife of the brother-in-law immediately on, and by virtue of, the
husband's
death, and her new husband received, together with this automatic
acquisition
of a wife, the right to disclaim her and dissolve the union which had
been
thrust upon him." R. Yaron, "Ad Secundas Nuptias Convolare," in Sym-
bolae Ivredicae
et Historicoe Martino David Dedicatae, 1968, p. 265 n. 2, com-
ments
in a somewhat different vein, "Biblical law (Deut. 25:5-10) provides that
she
is to become the wife of a brother of the deceased, unless a ceremony of
‘unshoeing’
has taken place, which dissolves the tie between the widow and the
brothers
of the deceased."
58 The Levirate in
The elders, upon being presented with
the widow's state-
ment,
attempt to persuade the brother-in-law to fulfill his
responsibility.
They speak to him, but beyond that they can-
not
go. If, in the face of their entreaties, he remains adamant
and
refuses to enter into the levirate union with her, no more
can
be done, for it appears that the elders had no power of
compulsion,
only that of persuasion.
The culmination of the widow's
initiative took place in
the
events of the ceremony itself, in which she went up to
the
levir in the presence of the elders, pulled off his sandal
(vlgr
lfm vlfn hclHv)
and spit in his face (v. 9). During this
time
the woman recited the formula, "So shall it be done to
the
man who does not build up his brother's house" (v. 9).70
His
house is subsequently referred to as the house of the one
who
had been unsandalled (v. 10).
From the appellation "the house
of him that had his
sandal
pulled off" (v. 10) can be seen the seriousness with
which
this lack of affection for the dead brother was con-
ceived.
The label attached to the house of the recalcitrant
brother
perpetuated the remembrance of this unkindly act
toward
the brother, and must have been deeply felt by the
offender
and his house. Nor should one lose sight of the fact
that
this is the only law in the Pentateuch with a punishment
consisting
of public degradation.71
70. D. Daube,
"Consortium," pp. 77, 78, writes, "The guilty party is public-
ly
disgraced, with the words 'So shall it be done unto that man that will not
build
up
his brother's house.' It is interesting that much later, in the case of
Mordecai,
who
is to be publicly honored, the formula employed is ‘So shall it be done unto
that
Man that the king delighteth to honor.' Clearly, ‘So shall it be done unto that
man'
was the customary opening of public exaltation or degradation...." R.
Yaron,
"Forms in the Laws of Eshnunna," RIDA,
9, 1962, p. 152, refers to Deut.
25:9
and Esther 6:9-11 as examples of proclamation forms in the Old Testament
"in
which the proclamation is not in anticipation of an occurrence, but in conse-
quence.
. . . In both cases an element of public policy is discernible: in the former
a
person is held up for contempt, so as to discourage others from behaving in
such
a
reprehensible manner; in the latter the person rewarded is made an example to
be
emulated."
71. D. Daube, "Repudium in
Deuteronomy," in Neotestamentica et
Semitica,
Studies in honor of M. Black, 1969, p. 236. D. Daube,
"Consortium,"
pp.
78, 80, 81 affirms, "No doubt a man branded as 'he that bath his shoe
loosed'
The Levirate In
Some have seen the ceremony of the
shoe as a form of
divorce,
noting the Bedouin divorce formula, in which the
husband
says, "She was my slipper and I have cast her off."72
Mattuck
suggests that there is a reversal of normal procedure,
whereby
the woman "takes off his shoe instead of allowing
him
to throw it at her. This would no doubt be an act of
contempt
toward the man because it signified that she freed
herself
from him rather than that he as the superior discarded
her.
"73
Hoffner cites a Hittite parallel to
the case of "the man
whose
sandal has been removed" which "demonstrates that
the
connotation attributed to this action by Deuteronomy is
by
no means either isolated or late but completely at home in
was
avoided by the better citizens, excluded from higher offices and not much
trusted
in any business transactions.... A breach of trust by one brother vis a vis
the
other, even if it does not amount to a proper crime, is a grave moral offence.
It
deserves public censure ... ; hence the public degradation of the faithless
consors
in Deuteronomy." This law is cited by Daube, as part of the evidence for
his
contention that "Deuteronomy contains a notable shame—cultural ingredi-
ent,"
"The Culture of Deuteronomy," Orita,
3, 1969, pp. 27-28, 35-36. J. Peder-
sen,
op. cit., p. 91, speaks of the
levir's refusal as "a serious ignominy."
72. W. Robertson Smith, Marriage and Kinship in Early
105.
S. Nystrom, Beduinentum and Jahwismus,
1946, p. 57, remarks on this
custom,
"Vermutlich dürfte irgendein Zusammenhang zwischen diesen Sitten bei
Beduinen
und Israeliten bestehen." He reconstructs the ceremonies, with the first
stage
based on the Bedouin custom leading to a final stage presented in Deuter-
onomy.
"Ursprunglich zog der Betreffende den Schuh ziemlich verachtungsvoll
vom
Fusse und warf ihn von sich mit den Worten: Sic ist mein Schuh, ich habe sie
fortgeworfen....
'Schliesslich vcrgass man den Sinn der Sitte fast ganzlich, und
nun
war es auf einmal die Frau, die dem Manne den Schuh vom Fusse zog, und die
ganze
Zeremonie wurde zu einem Hohn ihrerseits," ibid. p. 58. Cf. J. Nacht,
"The
Symbolism of the Shoe with Special Reference to Jewish Sources," JQR, 6,
1915-1916,
p. 6: "In disputes the term shoe designates an insult in the highest
degree.
Thus the Arab women in their mutual quarrels and altercations call to one
another:
"My shoe upon thy head." T. Gaster, Myth, Legend and Custom in the
Old Testament, 1969, p. 450,
cites what he calls "a curious interpretation ad-
vanced
by some Jewish authorities to the effect that the drawing off of the shoe
was
a mourning custom. When the potential heir refused to 'raise up seed' for his
deceased
brother the latter was indeed dead, and the widow signified this by
drawing
off the levir's shoe." He rejects this explanation maintaining that the
true
explanation
lies in the fact that "the shoe was a symbol of authority; the cere-
monial
removal of it therefore indicated that such authority had been surren-
dered."
73.
60 The Levirate In
the
legal literature of the late second millennium B.C."74 It
comes
from the Hittite protocol for the royal guard. "If a
guard
deserts (his post) and carries off a lance from the
postern,
and the gateman catches him in the sin, he (the
gateman)
shall remove his (the guard's) shoe" (I BoT I 36:
53-54).75
He concludes: "From the text
before us we can see that
all
four of the above factors in Deuteronomy 25 arepresent
in
the Hittite passage. (1) The guard has been remiss in the
performance
of his duty; (2) one of his shoes is removed by
the
man who apprehended him in the flight from duty;
(3)
the gateman thus acts as a witness against him; (4) the
action
constitutes a public stigmatization."'
We
conclude then that the ceremony of the shoe symbol-
izes
that the woman is free, no longer bound by her dead
husband's
family.77 Having been rejected, she is now in full
control
of her affairs. In addition, it may be that in taking off
the
shoe in the presence of the elders,78 she was barring the
74. H. Hoffner, "Some
Contributions of Hittitology to Old Testament
Study,"
TB, 20, 1969, p. 43.
75. Ibid. p. 44.
76. Ibid.
77. R. de Vaux, op. cit., p. 169, "He is dispossessed of the right he had over
his
brother's widow."
78. The judicial proceedings in Ruth
4 and Deut. 25 are commented on by
H.
J. BOecker, op. cit.,–"Die
Funktion des im Tor versammelten he-
braischen
Gerichtsforums besteht nicht nur in der Schlichtung und Beendigung
von
Streitfallen der verschiedensten Art. Bei erb-, familien- und sachenrechtlichen
Vorgängen
ist oft eine offizielle Bestätigung für die sachgemässe Ahwicklung
eines
Rechtsgeschäftes
erforderlich. Als die offizielle Vertretung der Bewohnerschaft
des
Ortes hat das Gerichtsforum auch eine notarielle Funktion wahrzunehme:n."
He
draws a comparison between the phrase "I am not able to redeem it"
(Ruth
4:6)
and the levir's words "I do not wish to take her" (Deut. 25:8). He
remarks
(pp.
160, 161), "Zu dieser Verzichterklärung [Ruth 4:61 ist Dt. 25:8 zu
ver-
gleichen,
wo in der deuteronomischen Bestimmung uber die Leviratsehe eine
ahnliche
Formulierung mitgeteilt ist, mit der rich der zur Leviratsehe Ver-
pflichtete
vor der Ortsgerichtsbarkeit von seiner Verpflichtung losen konnte." The
widow's
words are understood as an "Anklagerede." "Denn die Witwe
versteht das
Verhalten
des Schwagers als eine gegen ihren verstorbenen Mann gerichtete
unkorrekte
Handlungsweise, die vor dem Gericht geklart werden soll," ibid., p.
163.
No defense against the charges is supplied in the context of the Deutero-
nomic
law though in the living legal process itself, such would have been normal
procedure
as Ruth 4:6 makes evident. After their seeking to reason with the
The Levirate In
brother
from any further right to her dead husband's estate.79
If
this is so, it is apparent that the juridicial procedures
outlined
were not ineffectual symbolic acts intended simply
to
insult the brother. The element of insult is not lacking,80
as
the related act of spitting81 also makes clear. Too often,
unwilling
brother-in-law without result, "haben die Ältesten die ihnen bei
fami-
lien-bzw.
sachenrechtlichen Verfahren zukommende Funktion zu erfüllen, Zeugen
und
Bürgen eines zwischen zwei Partnern rechtskräftig abgeschlossenen
Vertrages
zu
sein," ibid., p. 164. D. Daube, "Consortium," p. 81, remarks:
"In the proce-
dure
laid down in Deuteronomy, though the State, the elders, plays an important
role,
yet the actual disgracing measures—the halisa
and the pronouncement 'So
shall
it be done,' and so on—are taken by the aggrieved widow.... The State
regulates,
makes possible and takes note of the infliction of infamy on the faith-
less
partner, but the decisive action is still left to the victim."
79. H. J. Boecker, op. cit., p. 164, writes, "Indem
diese Zeremonie ‘vor den
Altesten’
vollzogen wird, verliert der Schwager rechtskraftig alle Erbrechte am
Grund
und Boden seines Bruders." J. Scheftelowitz, "Die Leviratsehe," ARW, 18,
1915,
p. 255: "Der Schuh wird ihm ausgezogen zum Zeichen, dass dem Bich
Weigernden
das Recht auf das Eigentum des Bruders genommen ist.... Der
Schuh
gilt nämlich als Symbol des Rechts, des Besitzes." Similarly, G. R.
Driver
and
J. C. Miles, op. cit., p. 244, L.
Epstein, op. cit., p. 114. D. Mace, op. cit., p.
104,
writes, "There is reason to believe that he lost the property by refusing
to
marry
the widow on the one hand, and he also lost it by begetting a child by her
on
the other." M. Burrows, "Levirate Marriage in
opposed
to this, maintaining that "in Deuteronomy 25, as a matter of fact, there
is
no indication that the brother-in-law was the heir, or that he would be the
heir
if
there were no levirate marriage. If this is to be assumed, in view of the fact
that
there
was no son to inherit the estate, it is at least noteworthy that the penalty
imposed
for refusal to take the widow does not include forfeiture of the inheri-
tance."
As we have been saying, many see the forfeiture of the inheritance im-
plied
in the ceremony of the shoe. Th. and D. Thompson, op. cit., p. 93, consider
it
possible, not only that the brother was debarred, but that the widow assumed,
through
these proceedings, her dead husband's estate. "The primary right taken
by
the widow, in taking the shoe, is the right to her dead husband's estate."
This,
they
believe, is more probable in the light of Gen. 38. "If Onan had openly
refused
the levirate obligation, then Tamar would have been able to take her own
independence,
as well as, we must suspect, her dead husband's share of the inheri-
tance."
80. D. Jacobson, The Social Background of the Old Testament, 1942,
p.
298,
goes too far when he says that the symbolic act of untying the shoes "was
not
in the nature of a disgrace to the man, but simply a sign of the conclusion of
a
commercial
transaction by which property passed from one to another." Cf. n.
71.
81. References in the Old Testament
to the act of spitting in one's face are
few.
The only other use of the verb employed in our passage is Num. 12:14 where
in
response to Moses' prayer to the Lord for Miriam's healing the reply comes
"If
her
father had but spit in her face should she not be shamed seven days?"
Other
Old
Testament references confirm the highly shameful effect of the act of expec-
62 The Levirate In
however,
the meaning of the ceremony of the removal of the
shoe
has been seen merely as an act by which the brother-in-
law
is disgraced for being derelict in his duty.
toration.
Cf. Isa. 50:6 and Job 30:10. According to later Jewish interpretation,
the
woman spits before the elders. The halisah document given to the woman,
certifying
the legality of her release, included the phrase "the spittle on the floor
as
seen by the Court." By this later period the ceremony of halisah was no
longer
considered
to be a disgrace but contrariwise in some instances superior to the
performance
of the levirate. The highly disgraceful act of spitting in the face was
removed;
cf. S. Belkin,i., pp. 327, 328, who points to Yebamoth 39b. J.
Pedersen,
Der Eid bei den Semiten, 1914, p. 96
f., believes that spitting in the
face
was intended as a curse upon the uncooperative brother.
3
The Goel In the
Ancient Near East
BEFORE
beginning an examination of the Old Testa-
ment
laws in which the duties of the goel are pre-
scribed
it will be helpful to bring the light of extra-
biblical
materials to bear upon our subject. In doing so,
however,
it must be noted that the Hebrew root lxg has.not
been
found thus far outside the Old Testament.1 Thus as we
look
for parallels to this concept in the ancient Near East we
still
be seeking evidence which suggests parallel functions to
those
of the goel in
Parallels to the Goel-Redemption of
Property
For something resembling the Old
Testament property
redemption
, law in Leviticus 25:23-28 attention
should be
directed to §39 of the Laws of Eshnunna which
reads: "If a
man became impoverlshed2 and sold
his house--the day the
buyer
will sell, the owner of the house may redeem."3 This
law
has been discussed by several scholars. David remarks,
"Weliswaar
kent de Bijbelse wet, en wel Leviticus XXV vs. 25
v.v.
een recht van ‘lossing’ voor onroerend goed, derhalve
ook
voor huizen. Maar dit recht bestaat volstrekt en onvoor-
1. J. J. Stamm, “lxg," THAT, I, p. 383. Outside of the Old
Testament the
root
appears only in an Amorite personal name, Ga'ilàlum,
cf. H. Huffmon,
Amorite Personal
Names in the Mari Texts, 1965, p. 179.
2. A. Goetze, "The Laws of
Eshnunna," AASOR, 31, 1956, p.
108, notes
the
correspondence between the verb eneium with the verb jvm in Lev. 25
which
he
calls "the exact equivalent in Hebrew law." Cf. chap. 4, n. 4.
3. R. Yaron, The Laws of Eshnunna, 1969, p. 41. The translation of A.
Goetze,
ANET, p. 163, is similar to that of
Yaron.
63
64 The Goel In the Ancient Near
East
waardelijk,
is dus niet, zoals in §39 van de nieuw-gevonden
wet,
afhankelijk van het feit, dat de koper van plan is het
gekochte
veld of huis van de hand te doen.”4 There is, how-
ever,
still more Old Babylonian material. Greenberg writes:
"Old
Babylonian legal writings contain a law (Eshnunna 39;
Pritchard
Texts 163) and a number of contracts showing the
right
of an owner of real property to redeem it after he had
been
forced by financial need to sell it. One of the contracts
suggests
that the right may have existed even when the prop-
erty
was not up for sale (as in Lev. 25:25-32)."5
Concerning the price paid for
redeeming the property
nothing
can be stated with certainty. Whether it was the
original
price paid by the buyer or whether the law allowed
for
the improvement of the property or possible changes in
land
value, and thus for more than the original sale price, is
left
unmentioned.6
Yaron asks whether redemption as
envisaged in the Laws
of
Eshnunna was a continuous liability, in other words,
whether
the first owner lost right to subsequent recovery
of
the property when it passed into the hands of a third party
of
redemption. He answers in the negative since if so "the
through
his failure, due to lack of funds, to exercise his right
provisions
concerning redemption would have been all too
4. M. David, Een nieuw—ontdekte Babylonische wet uit de tijd vóór Ham-
murabi, 1940, p. 15.
H. Brongers, Oud-Oosters en Bijbels Recht,
1960, p. 31,
comments
on § 39, "Hier hebben we een geval dat in de verte aan het bijbelse
begrip
lossing herinnert en toch niet hetzelfde is. In de eerste plaats behoeven hier
nog
geen familie-belangen in het spel te zijn. De bepaling ligt geheel en al in het
sociale
vlak.... Een belangrijk verschil met Lev. 25:25 vv. is echter dat bier het
recht
volstrekt en onvoorwaardelijk bestaat en dus niet, zoals in dit artikel,
afhankelijk
is van het feit dat de koper van plan is het gekochte huis van de hand
te
doen."
5. A. Greenberg, "Sabbatical
Year and jubilee," EJ, 14, 1971,
pp. 577, 578.
Cf.
R. Yaron, op. cit., p. 153, who
comments on §39: "No time limit for redemp-
tion
is mentioned, but the occasion to exercise the power depends on the buyer's
intention
to alienate the property. As long as the buyer holds on to it, he is secure
in
his possession. It is probable, however, that the parties were free to make
different
arrangements."
6. R. Yaron, op. cit., pp. 153, 154.
The Goel In the Ancient Near
East 65
easy
to circumvent, by the simple device of a fictitious trans-
fer,
following immediately upon the true original sale."7
The right of redemption regardless of
the original buyer's
intention
to sell is implied in Khafajah text, 82, which men-
tions
a field belonging to Kalarum: "Whenever he (Kalarum)
will
acquire money of his own, he may redeem, the field. He
cannot
redeem the field with money belonging to another
person."8
There is an important restriction herein mentioned,
in
other words, Kalarum may redeem his field but he must
not
borrow the money for that purpose, but rather it must be
his
own.9 The examples, thus far cited, seem to be generally
similar
to that section of Old Testament property redemption
law
which allows the impoverished Israelite, if able, to re-
deem
his property (Lev. 25:26b).
A possible example of the family right
of redemption in
ancient
"Wegen
28 GAN Feldes vom Gefilde der Stadt Amurri, des
Besitztums
des Ibni-Ramman, des Kaufmanns, klagte
Siri,
der Sohn des Etiru, vor den Richteren also: Das Feld,
welches
ich von meinem väterlichen Hause erworden babe,
haben
Ibku-Sala und sein Bruder, die Söhne des Samar-nasir,
dem
Kaufmann Ibni-Ramman für Geld verkauft Addatu
und
Basisu, die SOhne des Kaufmanns Ibni-Ramman, brachte
man
vor die Richter.... Am Eingang (?) von Sippar werden
sie und gemass der Besitztafel des Samar-nasir
und des Ibku-
Annunitu
wird Arad-Sin sein Haus empfangen und zu seinem
7. Ibid., p. 154.
8. R. Harris, "The Archive of
the
pp.
96, 97. According to Harris (p. 36), "the archive of Tutub (modern
Khafajah)
is
the first known example of an Old Babylonian official archive."
9. According to Harris (pp. 96, 97),
the purpose of the final clause was to
exclude
outsiders from acquiring the fields cheaply. "The field has obviously been
undersold
and the buyer wishes to protect himself against the possibility of a
third
party robbing him of his profit." R. Yaron, op. cit., p. 153, explains the
restriction
in the final clause as resting on a legal notion "widespread in ancient
systems
of law: the ownership in property acquired with a third person's money
rests
in that third person, not in the actual buyer. Consequently, repurchase of
the
field with money belonging to an outsider would not result in true redemp-
tion,
merely in the substitution of a new alienee for the earlier one."
66 The Goel In the Ancient Near
East
Felde
hinzu nehmen."10 This
text deals with a case brought by
Arad-Sin
against Ibni-Ramman. A field which had belonged
to
Arad-Sin's father, through unknown circumstances had
come
into the possession of Samas-nasir, who had sold the
field
to Ibni-Ramman. This text suggests that the court recog-
nized,
in this instance at least,11 the right of a descendant to
regain
the possession of the family property which happened
to
have fallen into a stranger's hands.
Babylonian sale documents often12
contain a statement
which
excludes the, seller from making a,claim upon theprop-
erty.
Schaeffer cites a text wherein a piece of property was
sold
by Nannar-idinna and Sin-bani his brother, to Ilushu-bani.
After
a description of the property the text reads, "He has
paid
the money. . . . They are content. They shall not say,
‘We
have not received the money'—they have received it be-
fore
the elders. At no future time shall Nannar-idinna
and
Sin-bani
make claim upon the field. If their brothers or sisters
should
make claim, then Nannar-idinna and Sin-bani shall pay
an
indemnity. By Shamash, Marduk and Zabium (the king)
they
swore!”13 The right of redemption is not directly men-
tioned
in this text, but rather the text basically contains
solemn
assurances that the sale price has been paid. However,
from
the clause excluding the sellers and their brothers and
sisters
from making claim upon the field it is perhaps possible
to
conclude, as Schaeffer has done, that "the right of buying
10. B. Meissner, Beitrage zum altbabylonischen Privatrecht, 1893, p. 42.
11. B. Meissner, op. cit., p. 126, remarks, "Nun
behauptet Arad-Sin dass
dieses
Feld in Wirklichkeit ihm gehöre, and in der Gerichtsverhandlung wird es
ihm
auch wirklich zugesprochen; jedoch ist, wie gewöhnlich bei solchen
Prozess-
verhandlungen,
gar kein Grund für die Handlungsweise der Richter angegeben."
12. R. Yaron, op. cit., p. 153 n. 33, writes, "Such a clause [by the owner
waiving
his right of redemption] is very frequent in documents from
iptiru ul
manzazanu S'imu gamru—'not
(subject to) redemption, not (given as a)
pledge,
complete sale.' " Cf. also E. Ginzberg, "Studies in Biblical
Economics,"
JQR, 22, 1931-32,
p. 376.
13. The text was originally
published by Daiches, "Alt babylonische
Rechtsurkunden
aus der Zeit der Hammurabi Dynastie," in Leipziger Semi-
tistische
Studien,
I, 1907, p. 38 n. 5, and cited in H. Schaeffer, The Social
Legislation of
the Primitive Semites,
1915, pp. 72, 80.
The Goel In the Ancient
Near East 67
back
such property must have existed on the seller’s side.
otherwise
neither he nor his closest relations would have been
called
upon to obligate themselves not to interfere with the
transaction.”14
On the basis of the evidence from Old Baby-
lonian
sale documents as well as from §39 of the Laws of
Eshnunna,
Stamm makes the statement: "Die ge’ulla
als
Recht
oder Pflicht, verlorenen Familienbesitz and versklavtc
Personen
zurückzukattlen, war nicht
Das
babylonischc Recht kennt sic sowohl hinsichtlich ver-
kauften
Landes als Ruch hinsichtlich verkaufter Personen,
wobci
im Bab. das Verbum pataru 'lösen, auslösen' die Stelle
des
hebr. g’l einnimmt.”15
Schaeffer even goes as far as
suggesting that it is possible
to
infer the goel’s right of preemption16 but this of course is
only
an inference. The available evidence suggests a general
correspondence
between Israelite and Babylonian law. This is
what
we may expect in the light of the historical
nature of
Old
Testament revelation, but as in so many other points of
comparison
between
nificant
differences in the laws as well. Again, this is to be
expected
if we do not ignore the fact that the Old Testament
is
a historical revelation.
First, the laws of property redemption
in Leviticus open-
ate
where proporty is lost to the family on account of pover-
ty.
In Leviticus 25 it is not simply a case of a regular sale of
property,
but one necessitated by dire economic condi-
tions.17
Sometimes this was also the case in
Eshnunna
§ 39, also the quotation of Greenberg, n. 5), but
we
have the impression that it was not so in every case.
14. H. Schaeffer, op. cit., p. 80.
final
clause which excludes the seller or his descendants from attempting to
repurchase
the land as follows: "Likely attempts at redemption of family estates
were
common occurrences previous to this date and more or less sanctioned by
custom;
and the law is now trying to get away from this procedure."
15. J. J. Stamm, "lxg," THAT, I, p. 385.
16. H. Schaeffer, op. cit., p. 79.
17. Cf. chap. 4, "Goel-Redemption
of Property."
68 The Goel In the Ancient Near East
Secondly, the property redemption laws
in Leviticus 25
are
based on Yahweh's ownership of the land," and it is this
fact
which provides the motivation for the specific outwork-
ings
of the laws.
Parallels to the Goel-Redemption
of Person
In the ancient Near East persons may
be said to be in
need
of redemption either as a result of a legal transaction or
through
captivity in war.19 Legal
transactions may be of two
basic
kinds; either of sale or of seizure due to defaulting on a
debt.
When we think of redemption necessitated by a legal
sale
transaction several possibilities must be considered,
that
is, either self-sale or the sale of children by parents,
or
of a slave by his master.20 In Leviticus 25:47 ff. we have a
situation
involving voluntary self-sale and subsequent re-
demption
either by the seller himself or his goel. We shall
therefore
confine ourselves to Near Eastern evidence bearing
on
this rather than on texts relating to the other redemption
situations.21
In
regained
her freedom by paying ten shekels to her owner. We
would
call attention to Schorr number 28, which reads:
"Dusubtum,
die ‘Gottesschwester’ des Gottes Suzianna, die
Tochter
des Dugga, hat der Istar-rabiat, ihrer Sklavin, Freilas-
sung
gewährt. Ihre Stirn hat sie gereinigt. Die Auflösung (?)
ihrer
Sklavenschaft hat sie erklärt. Eine Urkunde über ihre
18. Cf. chap. 4, "Goel-Redemption
of Property," and nn. 12-17. J. J.
Stamm,
"lxg,"
THAT, I, p. 386, writes, "Die
Eigenart der isr. ge'ulla gegenüber
der
babylonischen liegt ihrer Beziehung zu Jahwe."
19. R. Yaron, Redemption of Persons
in the Ancient Near East," RIDA,
6,
1959,
P. 155 (hereafter cited as "Redemption of Persons"). For documentary
evidence
on redemption from captivity, cf. R. Yaron, "Redemption of Persons,"
pp.
159, 171.
20. Ibid.
21. CH § 119 and §281 are cited by
R. Yaron, "Redemption of Persons,"
pp.
157-159, and J. J. Stamm, "lxg," THAT, I, p. 385, as examples of extra-
biblical
material bearing on the redemption of slaves by their masters.
The Goel In the Ancient Near
East 69
Reinigung
hat sic ihr ausgefertigt. Istar-rabiat hat der Dusub-
tum,
ihrer Herrin, 10 Sekel Silber eingebracht."22
Several Babylonian documents mention
loans transacted
for
the purpose of redemption. One is Schorr number 52
which
reads: "1/3 Minc 4 Sekel [Silber], Zehnt (abgabe), hat
vom
(Gotte) [
er
es zu seiner Auslosung gegehen. Zur Zeit der Ernte wind er
Getreide
dem (Gotte) Samas geben."23
Schorr interprets this to mean that Kisusu
has borrowed
money
in order to redeem Anum-abi. The money is given to
the
person in bondage that, he may be able to redeem him-
self.24
Since there is another old Babylonian document which
we
shall be examining which clearly mentions a case of bor-
rowing
for the purpose of redemption, this interpretation
may
be correct. However, Yaron believes that "this is unnec-
essarily
complicated: payment to the person having another
in
his power would be expected." "Zu seiner Auslösung (ana
ipterisu)" refers,
according to Yaron, to the redemption of
Kisusu
From Anum-abi.25
A clear case of redemption by a
relative can be seen in
Khafajah
text 88 which reads: "17 shekels of silver for the
redemption of Hagaliga his father, Zagagan has
received (as a
(loan).
(But.) he had no silver (with which to repay the loan),
(so)
he sold himself to the enum
priest....,”26
Here can be clearly seen the case of a
son acting in fulfill-
ment
of his responsibility toward his father. The son borrows
22. M. Schorr, Urkunden des altbabylonischen Zivil and Prozessrechts,
1913,
pp. 52, 53.
23. M. Schorr, op. cit., p. 84.
24. Ibid. A similar interpretation
is given by R. Harris, op. cit., p.
99, "In a
the
Samas temple ... he gave (the money) to Anum-abi for his (the latter's)
redemption."
25. R. Yaron, "Redemption of
Persons," p. 170.
26. R. Harris, op. cit., p. 99. Harris believes (p. 43) that "self-sale was
not a
socially
accepted institution, for the contract states the circumstances which led
to
the sale."
70 The Goel In the Ancient Near East
the
needed funds, but being unable to repay the loan, he sells
himself
into bondage.27
Mention should be made of legal
documents from Mari,
published
by G. Boyer, particularly text 77: "Hatni-iluma,
citoyen
de . . . , relevant de Sin-mustal, que Napsi-Dagan, son
frère,
a li [bé] ré; Gahsu, citoyen de Sasran, que Talli, son
père,
a libéré. L'argent de leur li[bé] ration Bunuma-Addu a
recu.
. . .9/28
This text is complicated by the
combination of what
appears
to be the unrelated redemption of two people. Yaron
ventures
the opinion "that the document is merely a receipt
evidencing
the payment of the redemption money to Bunu-
ma-Addu.
The two men ransomed were strangers to Mari, and
on
their release may perhaps have been furnished with proper
documents
stating that fact. Since the present document was
found
in Mari that suggests that it may have been executed
for
some third person, a resident of that city, who had as-
sumed
responsibility for the payment of the ransom money.
Since
the relatives have indeed paid up, as expected, the pres-
ent
document will establish the fact that the creditor has no
claim
against the surety who is not named."29
Finally, we would call attention to
MAL, A, §48, which
reads:
"If a seignior, whose debtor's daughter is living in his
house
as (pledge for) a debt, asks her father, he may give her
to
a husband, (but) if her father is not willing, he may not
give
(her). If her father is dead, he shall ask one of her broth-
ers
and the latter shall speak to her (other) brothers; if a
brother
says, 'I will redeem my sister within one full month,'
if
he does not redeem her within one full month, the credi-
tor,
if he wishes, may declare her quit (of all claim and) give
her
to a husband. . . ."30
27. R. Yaron, "Redemption of
Persons," p. 170. R. Harris, op. cit.,
p. 42,
writes,
"We find that the enum—priest
purchased people only under special cir-
cumstances,
namely, when a debt to the enum—priest
could not be paid."
28. G. Boyer, ARM, VIII, 1958, p. 113.
29. R. Yaron, "Redemption of
Persons," p. 172.
30. T. Meek, ANET, p. 184.
The Goel In the Ancient Near East 71
This law concerns the proper giving in
marriage of a
debtor's
daughter held in pledge by the creditor of the girl's
father.
The creditor must obtain the permission of the girl's
father
before she can be given in marriage. Driver and Miles
comment,
"Nor presumably can her father give her in mar-
riage
unless he redeems her or makes some arrangement with
his
creditor whereby her husband takes over his debt."31
With
the death of the father, the brothers do not retain their
father's
right to prohibit the marriage. They do have, how-
ever,
a limited right of redemption for one month, and if
they
do not redeem their sister within that period the credi-
tor
may free her and marry her to whom he will.32
Parallels to the Goel-Redemption of
Blood
Though there is considerable evidence
in the ancient Near
East
for the exercise of blood-vengeance,33 there are only a
limited
number of specific references to the performance of
the
duty of blood-vengeance by a relative.
There is a difference of opinion as to
whether blood-
vengeance
was practiced in
Hammurabi.34
Whatever the answer to this question, it is true
31. G. R. Driver and J. C. Miles,
The Assyrian Laws, 1935, p. 278.
32. Ibid.
33
Cf. J. Jolluck, Blood Vengeance
among the Israelites in the light of its
Near Eastern
Background,
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
1966,
p. 140-188; vanOeveren, De Vrijsteden in
het Oude Testament, 1968,
pp.
21-57.
34. These differences are to be seen
in the varying opinions of M. David and
G.
R. Driver and J. C. Miles. M. David, "The Codex Hammurabi and its Relation
to
the Provisions of the Law in Exodus," OTS,
7, 1950, p. 169, writes, "With the
Babylonians
the whole penal law is regulated by the state; law courts of the state
acted
autonomously and saw to it that the laws were observed. No traces whatso-
ever
are to be found of blood-vengeance." See esp. David, n. 71. G. R. Driver
and J.
C.
Miles, The Assyrian Laws, 1935, p.
33, on the contrary write, "As neither the
Babylonian
code nor the Assyrian laws deal generally with the offence of murder,
it
must be supposed that it still came under the rules of the ancient blood-feud
as
among
other Semites; and it is remarkable that this custom is not regulated by
legislation
as is the case with the Hebrews. The desire indeed and right of the
family
to seek vengeance dies hard and the state, even though it may disapprove,
dares
not interfere, at any rate until the central authority is very strong." It
is
their
opinion that "if the blood-feud was recognized in the time of Hammu-rabi
it
72 The Goel In the Ancient Near East
to
say that there are no specific references to any relative35
who
performs a duty comparable to that of the avenger of
blood
in
In
who
is involved in the duty of blood-vengeance. We would
call
attention first of all to MAL, A, §10, which reads: "[If]
either
a seignior or a lady entered a(nother) seignior's
[house]
and killed [either a man or a woman, they shall
give]
the murderers [to the next-of kin] , and if he chooses
he may put them to death, or [if he chooses]
he may spare
(them
but) take [their property] . [However, if] the murder-
ers
have nothing at home [to give] , either a son or [a daugh-
ter]
. . . in the house . . . belonging to . . ."36
In the place where Meek translates:
"the next-of-kin,"
the text is corrupt. Meek restores: “the master
of life," and
translates:
the "next-of-kin."37 Driver and Miles write: "The
person
who has this choice can hardly be anyone else than
the
'owner of the life' (Ass. bel napsate),
of whom mention
has
just been made, or 'the owner of the dead persons' (Ass.
bel mitute) as the avenger
of blood is called in one Assyrian
document."38
The Assyrian document where the term bel
was
probably limited to cases of intentional killing...." The Babylonian Laws, 1,
1952,
p. 314. Cf. further B. van Oeveren, op. cit., pp. 24-31.
35. G. R. Driver and J. C. Miles, The Assyrian Laws, p. 33, refer to § 153
of
Hammurabi
as the "sole case" of murder mentioned in the Babylonian code. It
reads:
"If a seignior's wife has brought about the death of her husband because of
another
man, they shall impale that woman on stakes." T. Meek, ANET, p. 173.
Driver
and Miles, op. cit., p. 33 n. 3,
explain the law as follows: "The wife does
not
herself commit the murder at all but 'causes him to be murdered' (Bab.
usdik), namely procures
another, presumably the lover on whose account the
crime
is committed, to kill her husband; the law deals with her offence alone, i.e.,
procuring
his death, while it leaves the punishment of the actual murderer to the
blood-feud."
36. T. Meek, ANET, p. 181.
37. Ibid. Cf. also H. Brongers, Oud-Oosters en Bijbels Recht, 1960, p.
138,
who
restores with "naaste bloedverwant." He feels that it is clear
"dat hies de
bestraffing
van een moord nog niet tot de competentie van de rechter behoort,
maar
aan de naaste bloedverwant wordt overgelaten...."
38. G. R. Driver and J. C. Miles, The Assyrian Laws, p. 34. They add,
"Another
possibility is to supply 'the owner of the house' (Ass. bel bitu), who of
course
would usually be identical with the bel napisate
or bel mitute, and this is
The Goel In the Ancient
Near East 73
mitute
is found is text 660 in Kohler and Ungnad. It reads:
"Siri
ist der Eigentiimer der Toten, (bel mitute) die Silim—ili
getötet
hat. Vor ihnen (d.h. ‘vor den obengenannten Leuten')
wird
entweder sein Weib oder sein Bruder oder scin Sohn-
wer
es auch sei, der sich erhebt, —die Toten ersetzen."39
Driver
and Miles comment on text 660: "The murderer has
to
deliver up his wife, brother, or son to the 'owner of the
dead
persons' (Ass. bel mitute), and
whoever of them is sur-
rendered
'makes good, i.e. compensates for, the dead persons'
(Ass.
mittite us'allum), and presumably the
murderer is put to
death
if he fails to deliver a substitute."40
MAL, B, §2 refers very clearly to the
next-of-kin's re-
sponsibility
in the area of blood-vengeance. It reads: "If one
among
brothers who have not divided (the inheritance) took
a
life, they shall give him up to the next-of-kin; if he chooses,
the
next-of-kin may be willing to settle [and] take his
share.”41
From both these texts it is apparent
that in
was
one who could be called the avenger of blood, who was
authorized
to take the life of the murderer. However, the
Assyrian
law knows of the alternative of compensation in
exchange
for the life of the murderer. An arrangement could
be
made for taking some form of goods belonging to the
guilty
party or, failing that, it is likely that the murderer had
to
surrender a son or daughter.42 This, it will be seen, is
strikingly
different from the Old Testament law (Num. 35:
31),
which allows only the life of the murderer to be taken
rather
than any kind of substitute.43
There is no mention of the avenger of
blood in the Hittite
given
in the transcription since it is a shorter phrase and seems therefore to suit
the
gap shown in the autographed text...."
39. J. Kohler and A. Ungnad, Assyrische Rechtsurkunden, 1913, pp.
388,
389.
40. G. R. Driver and J. C. Miles, The Assyrian Laws, pp. 35, 36.
41. T. Meek, ANET, p. 185.
42. G. R. Driver and J. C. Miles, The Assyrian Laws, p. 35, cite MAL, A,
§
§ 2, 50, 55 as evidence of vicarious punishment in
43. See chap. 4, n. 159.
74 The Goel In the Ancient Near East
laws,
but this does not mean that blood-vengeance was non-
existent
among the Hittites.44 Of importance is the Edict of
Telipinus,
which mentions "the lord of blood." It reads:
"The
rule of blood is as follows. Whoever commits a deed of
blood,
whatever the 'lord of blood' says—if he says 'Let him
die,'
he shall die; but if he says 'Let him make restitution,' he
shall
make restitution: the king shall have no say in it."45 It is
likely
that the "lord of the blood" is comparable to the goel
of
blood. He is the head of the family of the murdered victim
or
one of the heirs of the murdered victim."
Of importance, as well, is a letter
written by Hattusilis III
to
the Babylonian king Kadasman-Enlil II, in which the Hit-
tite
king complained of the murder of his merchants in
and
in
when
a case of murder occurred among the Hittites the mur-
derer
was given over to the relatives of the victim. The text
reads:
"Betreffend das, was mir mein Bruder geschrieben hat:
44. Cf. B. van Oeveren, op. cit., pp. 31-38. The homicide laws
in the Hittite
code
( § § 1, 2, 3, 4) make a clear distinction between killing in anger and killing
accidentally.
Cf. R. Haase, "Zum Tatbestand der vorsätzlichen Tötung eines
Menschen
in der hethitischen Rechtssammlung," BiOr,
18, 1961, pp. 14-16.
There
is also a possible correspondence between the statement found in the
homicide
laws, "but if his hand (alone) is at fault," and Ex. 21:13, cf.
The Hittite Laws, 1951, p. 1 n.
4, and B. van Oeveren, op. cit., p.
34 n. 14. There
is
also a formal correspondence between HL §6 and Deut. 21:1-9 which specifies
procedures
to be followed to discharge the guilt of innocent blood when a mur-
dered
man is found in the fields and his murderer is not known. Cf. B. van
Oeveren,
op. cit., pp. 35, 36 and 0. R.
Gurney, The Hittites, 19542,
pp. 97, 98.
45. 0. R. Gurney, op. cit., p. 98. Gurney (p. 216) dates Telipinus from
1525-1500.
46. Ibid; B. van Oeveren, op. cit., pp. 37, 242; E. Neufeld, The Hittite Laws,
p.
130 n. 6. Cf. also, M. San Nicolò, Reallexikon
der Assyriologie, 2, 1938, s. v.
"Blutrache"
who remarks, "Die Vergeltung der Bluttat liegt in den Hamden des
‘Blutsherrn'
(des Oberhauptes der Familie oder des Erben des Getotenen). Dieser
bestimmt,
ob der Mörder sterben soil oder ob er mit der Zahlung des Wergeldes
die
Tat sühnen darf. Die staatliche Intervention wird dabei ausdrücklich abge-
lehnt."
This is disputed by E. P. Matter, Die
Bedeutung der Hethiter für das Alte
Testament, 1936, pp. 26,
27, who writes: "Nach dem Edikt des Telepinui gab es
einen
obersten Gerichtshof, an dessen Spitze als Präsident der ‘Blutsherr’
stand.
Der
Entscheidung dieses Gerichtshofes musste sich der Konig beugen, and nie-
mand
durfte urn Intervention bei ihm einkommen." V. Korosec, "Die
Kollektiv-
haftung
im hethitischen Recht," ArOr,
18, 1950, p. 190, interprets the "Bluts-
herrn"
as a judge.
The Goel In the Ancient Near
East 75
‘Meine
Kauficute pflegt man im Lande Amurru, im Lande
Seele.
Wenn der König hurt, class irgend jemand eine Seele
getötet
hat, so nimmt man den Mörder dieser Seele gefangcn
und
liefert ihn den Brtidern des Getöteten aus..."47
It would appear then that among the
Hittites the blood-
feud
existed, and the relative of the murdered party played a
role
in avenging the death of the victim. However, as was the
case
in
means
of a money payment or possibly by the substitution48
Of
the life of someone other than that of the murderer.
Again,
it must be emphasized that such a possibility is ex-
pessly forbidden in the biblical regulations (Num.
35:31).
We shall conclude our study of
parallels, to the goel-
redemption
of blood with a survey of the customs of the
pre-Islamic
nomadic Arabs.49
In
when
a kinsman kills another kinsman. In such an event, the
slayer
is either formally excluded from the kin-group or is the
47. Text K Bo, I, 10, 14-25 as found
in R. Haase, Der privatrechtliche
Schutz der
Person und der einzelnen Vermögensrechte in der hethitischen Rechts-
sanzmlung, 1961, p. 28.
Haase dates the Hittite king Hattu.S"ig III from 1298-
1266.
Cf. also E. Neufeld, op. cit., p. 130
n. 66.
48. Vicarious punishment was
practiced in Assyria, cf. n. 42. Commenting
on
the phrase "Let him make restitution" 0. R. Gurney, op. cit., p. 98, writes,
"The
practice of giving 'persons' as part of the composition for manslaughter is
remarkable.
The expression is that generally used for slaves. Perhaps such slaves
were
slain at the tomb of the deceased, as in some other ancient societies."
49. B. van Oeveren, op. cit., p. 50, correctly observes that
it is sometimes
difficult
to precisely date some of the Arabic customs on blood-vengeance. Cf.
also
M. J. L. Hardy, Blood Feuds and the
Payment of Blood in the Middle East, 1963,
pp.
13, 14. For additional literature on blood vengeance in Arabia, cf. D. S.
Attema,
Arabia en de Bijbel, Exegetica, 3:4, 1961, pp. 54-56; S. Nystrom,
Beduinentum und
Jahwismus,
1945, pp. 31-40; J. A. Montgomery, Arabia
and the
Bible, 1934; II.
Schaeffer, op. cit., pp. 80-84; W.
Patton, "Blood-Revenge in
Arabia
and Israel," AJT, 5, 1901, pp.
703-731; W. Robertson Smith, Kinship and
Marriage in
Early Arabia,
19032; 0. Procksch, Über
die Blutrache bei den
vorislamischen
Arabern,
1899. S. Nystrom, op. cit., p. 34,
stresses the importance
of
the Bedouin custom of blood-vengeance for understanding the practice in
Israel.
"Eine voile Erklarung für die Stärke der Pflicht fur Blutrache, Licht
über
dunkle
Punkte in der Ausübung dieser Pflicht schenkt tins der Vergleich mit den
Gesetzen
der Blutrache bei den Beduinen."
76 The Goel In the Ancient Near
East
subject
of a judicial execution by the community.50 The obli-
gation
of blood-revenge arises in cases of homicide in which
the
common blood of a kin has been shed by one of a differ-
ent
kin. In this instance, the slaying of a man of another tribe
is
not viewed as a moral issue,51 for sacred blood is that of a
kinsman
alone. The principle that the shedding of the blood
of
an individual within the group is the shedding of the blood
of
the community is stated by Smith: "All the members of
the
group regarded themselves as of one blood. . . . A kindred
group
is a group within, there is no blood-feud. If a
man
kills one of his own kin, he finds no one to take his part.
Either
he is put to death by his own people or he becomes an
outlaw
and must take refuge in an alien group. On the other
hand,
if the slayer and slain are of different kindred groups, a
blood-feud
at once arises, and the slain man may be avenged
by
a member of his own group on any member of the group
of
the slayer."52
In addition to motives of kinship,
blood-vengeance in
tribal
god have been violated, and he joins the dead man's kin
in
seeking vengeance. His displeasure will cause him to break
off
communion with them, should they not avenge the shed
blood.
Moreover, the spirit of the dead must be propitiated."53
It is true that in many cases the
religious motive was lost
50. W. Patton, op. cit., pp. 703, 704, 730.
51. Ibid., p. 704; M. J. L. Hardy, op. cit., pp. 20, 21.
52. W. Robertson Smith, op. cit., p. 25. According to Smith
blood-revenge
is
the primary test of kinship. He writes (p. 26), "The ultimate kindred
group is
that
which always acts together in every case of blood-revenge."
53. W. Patton, op. cit., p. 704. On pp. 712, 713 he writes, "The spirit of an
unrevenged
man ... finds no peace in the grave until the
bird,'
which hovers at the head crying, 'Give me to drink,' has been
satisfied...."
M.
J. L. Hardy, op. cit., p. 18, speaks
of the tribal structure as well as the religion
of
the period as sources of equal potency in the encouragement of the blood-feud.
He
remarks, "The soul of the murdered man was imagined to flutter around the
tomb
in the form of an owl, crying with thirst and unable to find rest until
vengeance,
was taken. If that vengeance was not pursued, some form of blood guilt
was
thought to fall upon the remaining kin."
The Goel In the Ancient Near East 77
sight
of and was replaced by the more natural motives of
private
passion and tribal hostility.54
As to the question of responsibility
for blood-revenge, it
appears
that the obligation to avenge a death rested basically
with
the raht which included descendants
to the fifth genera-
tion.55
Among the males within the raht the heaviest respon-
sibility
rested upon the brother and son of the deceased.56
There
are instances of the father of the victim assuming the
responsibility,57
though this was perhaps not common.58 If,
for
any reason, a brother or the eldest son did not assume his
role
as avenger, the duty passed to the younger sons, and
eventually
to the sons of a brother.59
Procksch concludes, "So dürfen
wir sagen, class die Blu-
trache
der Regel nach Angelegenheit des raht, also Familien-
rache
war and zwar so, dass der n'ächste Verwandte auch der
nachste
Blutracher ist.... Die Bluträcher waren also schon
damals
die Familienglieder. Erst wenn diese die Rache nicht
Ubernchmen
wollen, wird diese zur Pflicht des Stammes. Des
Stammes
(hajj) eigcntliche Sache ist der Krieg, der Familie
(rapt)
Sachc die Blutrache."60
54. W. Patton, op. cit., p. 704, quotes a saying of the Bedouins, “I will
have
my revenge if I should be cast into hell for it.' "
55. W. Patton, op. cit., p. 705; M. L. Hardy, op.
cit., p. 16.
56. W. Patton, op. cit., p. 705, believes that though the brother and eldest
son
of the deceased were nearly equal in their responsibility, "the greater
respon-
sibility
rested upon the brother rather than the son. These two were the first heirs
of
a man, as well. In fact there seems to be some kind of relationship between
these
two things, inheritance and blood-revenge. This is suggested by the sharing
of
brother and son, not only in the inheritance, ... but in the bloodwit, where
that
was accepted instead of revenge." 0. Procksch, op. cit., p. 26, comments,
"Daraus
entsprang denn auch fur den Bruder in erster Linie die Pflicht der Blut-
rache."
According to M. J. L. Hardy, op. cit.,
p. 17, however, "the apparent
order
was sons, brothers, cousins and uncles...."
57. 0. Procksch, op. cit., pp. 27, 28.
58. W. Patton, op. cit., p. 705.
59. Ibid., p. 706.
60. 0. Procksch, op. cit., pp. 28, 29. So also, W.
Patton, op. cit., p. 707; J.
M.
L. Hardy, op. cit., p. 17; S.
Nystrom, op. cit., p. 35. H.
Schaeffer, op. cit., p.
81,
writes, "The duty of retaliation was an immediate concern of the 'family'
and
not
of the community at large. It was only when the 'family' was in no position
to
carry out the obligation that the duty fell to the lot of the tribal group to
which
'the family' belonged." The opinion of W. Robertson Smith, op. cit., pp.
78 The Goel In the Ancient Near East
The avenger of blood is referred to as
the wali or as the
waliy-ad-damm. Wali is the term applied as well to
marriage
and
inheritance.61 Schaeffer asserts that "the functions of the
Hebrew
goel . . . are assumed to a very
large extent by the
wali of Arabic
literature."62
So pressing63 was this duty
that it was considered legiti-
mate
to use any ruse or strategy to deceive the one who was
to
be put to death, though apparently it was not permitted to
strike
a man in his sleep.64 According to Hardy, "at the
moment
of striking the mortal blow the avenger had to cry
aloud
that he was taking vengeance for his murdered kins-
man,
so as to inform any witnesses that this was a judicial
killing
and not itself an unjustified attack."65
Vengeance threatens not only the
killer himself but any
member
of his tribe as well.66 Certain restrictions were ob-
served
in an attempt to curtail the disastrous results of the
exercise
of unbridled revenge. Slayers were safe from the
26,
27 varies somewhat from the above position. He writes, "In Arabia this
group
[kindred
group] was not the family or household, not the relatives of the slayer
and
the slain within certain degrees of kinship as we reckon kinship, but a
definite
unity
marked off from all other groups by the possession of a common group-
name.
Such a group the Arabs commonly call a hayy..
. . The call to vengeance is
no
doubt felt more strongly by the father, the son or the brother of the
slain....
But this has nothing to do with the principle of the blood-feud. No man
who
is within the group can escape responsibility merely because he is not a close
relation
of the slayer or the slain.... Kinship then among the Arabs means a
share
in the common blood which is taken to flow in the veins of every member
of
a tribe...." Cf. also B. van Oeveren, op.
cit., pp. 51, 52, 242, and R. de Vaux,
Ancient Israel, 1961, p. 11.
Note should be taken of the remarks of W. Patton,
op. cit., p. 709, who
acknowledges that it is impossible from the available evi-
dence
to trace the stages of the institution of blood-vengeance in Arabia.
61. W. Patton, op. cit., p. 706; H. Schaeffer,
op. cit., pp. 82, 83; See n. 56.
62. H. Schaeffer, op. cit., p. 80.
63. D. S. Attema, op. cit., p. 55, remarks, "Men
ervoer dit als een wet,
waaraan
onvoorwaardelijk gehoorzaamd moest worden, en als een plicht die tot
geen
prijs mocht worden nagelaten."
64. M. J. L. Hardy, op. cit., p. 19.
65. Ibid., S. Nystrom, op. cit., p. 36, remarks, "Doch ist
es sowohl bei
Arabern
wie bei Israeliten meistens dass der Bluträcher, ehe er seinem
Opfer
den Todesstoss versetzt, kundtut, für wen er die Blutrache fordert." He
cites
Judg. 8:18-21 as an illustration of his point.
66. D. S. Attema, op. cit., p. 55, writes, "Zij
moesten er zorg voor dragen
dat
de moordenaar of een van zijn naaste verwanten met de dood gestraft werd."
The Goel In the Ancient
Near East 79
avenger
during holy months. There were also places of asy-
lum.67
An unusual custom was the protection provided by a
woman
who placed her cloak-over a threatened man.68 The
most
widely employed practice was that of seeking the pro-
tection
of a powerful tribe.69 Such measures, however, did
not
effectively prevent the recurring vendetta.70 The blood-
feud
could have been arrested by handing the murderer over
but
"since there was no moral judgment of the deed, there
was
no decisive motive for surrendering the murderer. As a
practical
means to solve this problem, resort was had to the
payment
of compensation."71
We have seen that the practice of
compensation in the
ancient
Near East, excluding Israe1,72 was common. In
a
weak tribe would likely settle the blood-feud by payment
of
blood-money. Yet there are cases of weak tribes waiting
for
protracted periods of time in order to execute ven-
geance.73
The choice of exacting vengeance or receiving com-
pensation
belonged to the offended kinsman.74 On occasion
men
resorted to the oracle for an answer to the vengeance or
compensation
choice.75
67. Cf. B. van Oeveren, op. cit., pp. 55-57.
68. M. J. L. Hardy, op. cit., p. 20. Cf. also W. Patton, op. cit., pp. 713-715.
69. M. J. L. Hardy, op. cit., p. 20.
70. W. Patton, op cit., p. 768, writes, "When the tribe took part in blood-
feud,
the common result was a war which ever increased-the fend between parties,
because
every man killed began–a-new quest for revenge." D. S. Attema, op. cit..
p.
56, writes, "Men bemerkt hier duidelijk waartoe de bloedwraak leidde.
Daaruit
ontstonden
vaak hele bloedveten tussen de stammen, hele clans werden sums
uitgemoord."
71. M. J. L. Hardy, op. cit., pp. 21, 22.
72. See chap. 4, n. 159 and below
nn. 79 and 80.
73. W. Patton, op. cit., p. 710; D. S. Attema, op.
cit., p. 55.
74. M. J. L. Hardy, op. cit., p. 22. Cf. however, W. Patton,
op. cit., pp. 715,
716.
He affirms that in some instances an arbitrator was used. "He might be of
one
of the two tribes involved. He decided whether the bloodwit offered or the
revenge
insisted on by the other party should prevail; and in cases of dispute as to
the
amount of the bloodwit he occasionally settled the sum."
75. W. Patton, op. cit., p. 714. He cites the case (p. 714) "of one man who
sought
the oracle, and who, not getting the answer he desired when he wished to
know
whether he should avenge the blood of his father or accept an alternative,
threw
the arrows at the image and cried out: 'You wretch!' If your father had
been
killed, you would never have forbidden me to avenge him."
80 The Goel In the Ancient Near
East
Patton suggests that compensation as a
method of settle-
ment
was "theoretically just as complete a satisfaction and as
honorable
an adjustment as the execution of vengeance. Prac-
tically,
however, the question of tribal honor enters in at this
point.
. . . One condition of the acceptance of blood-money
was
that a full acknowledgment of the ability of the accept-
ing
party to accomplish revenge should be made. The slayer
was
delivered up to the avenger. He entered the avenger's tent
saying:
"Here I am; kill me or accept ransom." By saying this
he
renounced his claim to the protection of the tent and
might
have been slain. Actually, however, it was not often
the
case that one who did this was slain. The purpose of the
renunciation
is merely to satisfy the avenger's pride, and this
purpose
of the act is always respected by the latter."76
Certain differences between
blood-vengeance in
and
in
ment
on a killing outside of the kin group.77 The same can-
not
be said to be true in
avenger
of blood enacts vengeance not only upon the perpe-
trator
of the evil deed (this may or may not be the case) but
upon
any of the kin members of the murderer. This is forbid-
den
in the Old Testament.78 A final difference is that of
compensation,
which was excluded by the Israelite law,79
compare
Numbers 35:31.
76. W. Patton, op. cit., p. 715.
77. Cf. W. Patton, op. cit., p. 730, who calls the absence
of any moral
feeling
toward the killing of a man of another tribe "the most striking difference
between
the blood-revenge of the Old Testament and that of the Arabs."
78. B. van Oeveren, op. cit., p. 242, writes, "Was de
moordenaar onbereik-
baar,
dan moest een lid van zijn familie worden gedood. Dit laatste wordt in de
Mozaische
wetgeving uitdrukkelijk verboden, Deut. 24:16."
79. S. Paul, Studies in the Book of the Covenant in the Light of Cuneiform
and Biblical Law, (SVT, 18)
1970, p. 82, correctly states: "Composition is appli-
cable
only in a system which is motivated entirely by economic presuppositions:
the
family has suffered a loss, thus payment in kind must be made and is accept-
able.
In the Bible, however, homicide is an unpardonable offense, since it is
considered
to be, in addition to everything else, a flouting of the divine will;
hence,
no matter nor manner of composition is acceptable."
The God In the Ancient
Near East 81
It is clear from our discussion that
blood-vengeance was
practiced
by many peoples in the ancient Near East in addi-
tion
to the Israelites. As has already been pointed out, such
similarities
should occasion no particular surprise in the light
of
the historical nature of biblical
revelation. In the final
analysis,
the basic difference in outlook and in operation
between
only
from
of
God;80 see further our discussion of the Old Testament
data
in chapter 4 under "Goel-Redemption of Blood." No
compensation
for the life of the murderer was possible, for
he
had shed the blood of one made in the image of God.
However,
it was only the murderer's life which
was to be
taken.
A clear distinction between premeditated and acci-
dental
slaying was laid down in Old Testament law. More-
over,
the goel of blood in
motives
of personal vengeance, was intended to be the instru-
ment
of divine justice with a mandate from Yahweh, the
Ultimate
Seeker of the blood of the murdered victim. An
attack
upon man made in .the image of God was an attack
upon
the Lord, himself.
80. On the differences between
Israelite and Near Eastern laws of homicide
cf.
M. Greenberg, "Some Postulates of Biblical Criminal Law," Yehezkel Kauf-
mann Jubilee
Volume,
1960, pp. 5-28. The main differences between biblical and
cuneiform
law, according to Greenberg, are that compensation of any kind is
ruled
out and vicarious punishment is excluded in the biblical law. There is also a
striking
distinction between biblical and cuneiform law in the treatment of of-
fenses
against property. Greenberg (p. 18) writes: "This unparalleled leniency of
biblical
law in dealing with property offences must be combined with its severity
in
the case of homicide, just as the leniency of nonbiblical law in dealing with
homicide
must be taken in conjunction with its severity in dealing with property
offences.
The significance of the laws then emerges with full clarity: in biblical
law
life and property are incommensurable; taking of life cannot be made up for
by
any amount of property, nor can any property offense be considered as
amounting
to the value of a life. Elsewhere the two are commensurable: a given
amount
of property can make up for life, and a grave enough offense against
property
can necessitate forfeiting life.... A basic difference in the evaluation of
life
and property separates the one from the others. In the biblical law a religious
evaluation;
in nonbiblical, an economic and political evaluation, predominates."
Cf.
chap. 4, n. 159.
4
The Goel In
Goel-Redemption of Property, Leviticus
25:23-28
THE
law of property redemption in Leviticus 251
forms
an important part of the Old Testament
teaching
on the role of the goel in
law
which most directly relates to the interpretive problems
of
the book of Ruth.2 Despite the difference between the
property
transaction in Ruth and the law of property re-
demption
in Leviticus 25, it is generally accepted that in the
book
of Ruth we have an application of the property re-
demption
law which is formulated in Leviticus 25. The law in
Leviticus
25:25-28 states, "If your brother3 becomes poor,4
1. Lev. 25 forms part of the
so-called Holiness Code, which is taken by some
scholars
as being very late. On the question of the separate existence of such a
code,
cf. W. H. Gispen, Het Boek Leviticus,
COT, 1950, pp. 17-27. For more
recent
discussions on this subject, cf. H. G. Reventlow, Das Heiligkeitsgesetz.
Formgeschichtlich
Untersucht,
1961, and W. Thiel, "Erwägungen zum Alter des
Heiligkeitsgesetzes,"
ZAW, 81, 1969, pp. 40-73. J. van der
Ploeg, "Studies in
Hebrew
Law," CBQ, 13, 1951, p. 39,
comments, "There can be no doubt indeed,
that
most of the contents of the Law of Holiness must be very old, and must have
been
practiced in ancient times." Cf. also, H. Brongers, Oud-Oosters en Bijbels
Recht, 1960, p. 191.
As far as the content of Lev. 25 itself is concerned there is
good
reason to see a reflection of very ancient practices. The antiquity of the laws
regulating
indebtedness in Lev. 25:35-54 has been demonstrated by
"Leviticus
and the Critics," Oriental and
Biblical Studies, ed. J. Finkelstein and
M.
Greenberg, 1967, p. 135, (hereafter sited as “Leviticus and the Critics")
who
has
cited parallels from Alalah and Nuzi and remarks, "The cuneiform analogues
demonstrate,
among other things, that the long passage in Leviticus had its roots
in
life rather than in cultic speculation. These roots, moreover, reach far back
into
the
past."
2. See chap. 8, "The
3. jyHx should be taken
in its wider meaning of fellow clan-member.
4. A similar verb can be found in
the Ugaritic texts which C. Gordon, UT,
1965,
p. 433, translates "to be vanquished." The verb jvm is unique to
Lev. 25
83
84 The Goel In
and
sells part of his property,5 then his next of kin shall
come6
and redeem what his brother has sold. If a man has no
one
to redeem it, and then himself becomes prosperous7 and
finds
sufficient means8 to redeem it, let him reckon the years
since
he sold it and pay back the overpayment9 to the man to
whom
he sold it; and he shall return to his property. But if he
has
not sufficient means to get it back for himself, then what
he
sold shall remain in the hand of him who bought it until
the
year of jubilee;10 in the jubilee it shall be released,11
and
he
shall return to his property."
Basic to the laws of land tenure in
the Old Testament is
the
conviction that Yahweh is the true owner of the land.12
apart
from its use in Lev. 27:8. In Lev. 25, the laws concerned all begin similarly:
jyHx jvmy yk. H. G.
Reventlow, op. cit., p. 141, regards
them as part of an indepen-
dent
complex of laws, "der nur sachliche Beziehungen zur Einrichtung des
Halljahrs
besitzt.... Hier finden wir Bestimmungen sozialer Art, die sich einer-
seits
mit der hlxg,
von Land (v. 25 ff.) und Mensch (v. 47 ff.), andererseits mit
bundesgemässem
sozialem Verhalten gegenuber armen Mitbürgern (v. 35 ff.) und
Schuldsklaven
(v. 39 ff.) befassen."
5. vtzHxm--the most
general term for property in the Old Testament as over
against
hlHn
and hwry
which refer to inheritance. Cf. the unusual usage in Lev.
25:45,
46, where the word refers to persons rather than to property.
6. xbv—here used as a
technical term meaning to appear on behalf of, to be
responsible
for. Cf. K. Elliger, Leviticus, HAT,
4, 1966, p. 355.
7. vdy hgywhv—to reach, to be
able to afford. Cf. Lev. 25:47, 49.
8. vtlxg ydk—KB,
"sufficient to his redemption." Cf. Lev. 25:28:
vl bywh yd —KB,
"enough for repurchase."
9. Jdfh—that which
remains over. The word is used in connection with food
(Ex.
16:23) and people (Num. 3:46) as well as money (Lev. 25:27).
10. lbvy —the word means
ram (Josh. 6:5) or ram's horn (Ex. 19:13). The
year
of the lbvy
was inaugurated with the blowing of the ram's horn.
11. xcy—a technical
term for release. Cf. Lev. 25:28, 30, 31, 33, 41, 54.
12. In addition to the fundamental
notion of Yahweh's ownership of the
land,
Lev. 25:38 stresses Yahweh's redemptive intervention at the Exodus as a
basis
for the economic laws in
Land,"
in The Problem of the Hexateuch and Other
Essays, 1966, p. 85, believes
that
"the fundamental notion expressed in Lev. xxv 23 is very ancient, and had
cultic
significance in ancient
conception
that the great sacral sabbatic year was appointed." Against this cultic
notion,
von Rad contrasts the historical outlook involved in the promise of the
land
made to the patriarchs. The two are "of a totally different order.... The
theological
statements in the Hexateuch concerning the land derive from two
basically
quite distinct viewpoints," ibid., pp. 88, 89. Von Rad denies that the
cultic
notion was originally derived from Canaanite sources and was a later devel-
opment
than the more ancient historical conception of the Yahwist. He remarks,
The Goel In
"The
land shall not be sold in perpetuity, for the land is
mine,
for you are strangers and sojourners with me" (Lev.
25:23).13
Because the land was conceived of as belonging to
Yahweh,
religious and moral considerations were involved in
questions
of land ownership and transfer.14 One of the out-
workings
of this idea of God's ownership of the land was that
no
Israelite could lose his property permanently.15 These
"The
notion that Yahweh is the true owner of the land can be traced back to the
very
oldest commandments of Yahweh, and was evidently current at a time when
syncretism
with the features of Canaanite religion had not even begun to appear,"
ibid.,
p. 88. Cf. also G. von Rad, OTT, 1,
1962, p. 300. On the concept of
Yahweh's
ownership of the land, cf. R. North, Sociology
of the Biblical Jubilee,
1954,
pp. 158-175. Cf. also A. Alt, "The Origins of Israelite Law," in Essays on
Old Testament
History and Religion,
1966, p. 128 n. 118. See also below, nn. 13,
14.
13. For references to the divine
ownership of the land in the Old Testament,
cf.
Josh. 22:19; Jer. 16:18; Ezek. 36:5; Hos. 9:3; Ps. 85:2(1). This concept was
not
unique to Isreal. For data from the
ancient Near East and particularly
where
there seems to be a strong emphasis on the land belonging to the Deity, cf.
A.
M. Brown, The Concept of Inheritance in
the Old Testament, unpublished
Ph.d.dissertation,
all
the Biblical passages which refer to Yahweh's inheritance of the land either in
terms
of the whole area of Canaan or in terms of the concept of
the
ownership,
a view held by other Near Eastern cultures and particularly evident in
Ugaritic
literature, with the more specifically Hebraic concept of Yahweh's in-
volvement
in history. This involvement was the existential vehicle for expressing
Yahweh's
relationship with
around
which that history was enacted."
14. K. H. Hervey, "Land Tenure
in the Old Testament," PEQ,
1954, p. 5,
points
out that there were actually two competing schools of thought in
concerning
land ownership and related problems. "The one saw the land as be-
longing
to Yahweh, and demanded—in His name—the application of religious and
moral
considerations to land ownership and transfer. To the other, dealing in land
was
partly business, partly governed by certain customs (and no doubt laws)
which
were influenced by those prevailing amongst the surrounding peoples. The
two
principles were impossible to reconcile...." F. Horst, "Das Eigentum
nach
dem
Alten Testament," in Gottes Recht,
1961, p. 205, writes, "So gewichtig and
beachtlich
dieses religiose Eigentumsverstandnis ist, so ist es doch nicht das im
Alten
Testament alleinbestehende and vorherrschende gewesen. Ein anderes, rein
profanrechtliches
Eigentumsverstandnis steht daneben."
15. On. the term ttmcl, in Lev. 25:23
cf. J. E. Hogg, "The Meaning of
ttmcl in Lev. 25:23-50;" AJSL, 42, 1925-26, pp. 208-210. In place
of forever"
or
"in perpetuity" he suggests "without right of redemption"
or "in derogation of
the
seller's right of redemption," ibid., p. 210. F. Horst, op. cit., p. 220, under-
stands
the word as meaning "mit unwiderruflicher Gultigkeit." J. J.
Rabinowitz,
"A
Biblical Parallel to a Legal Formula from
"In
a large number of conveyances of property it is stated that the transfer is
86 The Goel In
laws
were intended to ensure the freedom of the small land-
owner
in
these
regulations lies in the fact that by blocking, speculation
in
landed property they make it easier for that peasant class
which
springs from the soil to preserve its independence.”16
In
addition, as Brown remarks, "the fact that the Israelites
were
legally prohibited from making any permanent sale of
their
property would be a constant and sometimes frustrating
reminder
to them of their link with the divine provenance of
their
possession and the divine sovereignty of the real owner
of
the land."17
Three separate situations are
contemplated in Leviticus
25:25-28.
All involve the selling of a portion of property due
to
extreme poverty. In verse 25 the law envisages the recov-
ery
of the land through the intervention of the goel. In verse
26
the law allows for the possibility of the land being recov-
ered
by the seller who finds himself, at a later date, financial-
ly
able to repurchase his property.18 Such a situation may
made
in perpetuity, the formula being samid
adi dariti . . . . This formula is strik-
ingly
similar to vytrdl. . . ttymclof Lev. xxv 30."
Rabinowitz sees this as speak-
ing
"volumes against those who would assign a late date to the sections of
Leviti-
cus
relating to the year of the jubilee."
16. W. Eichrodt, TOT, 1, 1961, pp. 96, 97, who goes on to
remark, "The
basic
idea of this law constitutes a consistent and energetic attempt to guarantee
the
independence and liberty of each individual Israelite."
17. A. M. Brown, op. cit., p. 214. According to Brown,
this law "involved
more
than the integrity of the social structure of an ancient society. In the
biblical
material, the, law is linked toYahweh's gift of the land and to the sove-
nant
relationship between, Yaliweh and
18. D. Daube, The Exodus Pattern in the Bible, 1963, p. 85, (hereafter cited
as
Exodus Pattern) regards this section
which allows the impoverished person to
free
his land as a later development and writes, "That these clauses
contemplating
a
decisive financial improvement in the affairs of the impoverished man are a
relatively
late amendment is evident from the way they are stuck on to the
principal
legislation; they are an afterthought." In Studies in Biblical Law, 1947,
p.
44, (hereafter cited as Studies)
Daube calls the provision allowing redemption
by
the impoverished person himself "a Biblical innovation" which had not
existed
in
prebiblical legislation. His position is controverted by E. Neufeld,
"Socio-
Economic
Background of Yobel and Semitta," RSO,
33, 1958, p. 77 (hereafter
cited
as "Socio-Economic Background"). He writes: "We have evidence that,
e.g.,
in
by
paying the amount of ten shekels to her mistress. Such cases were obviously
not
frequent, but the practice of allowing the impoverished man himself to buy
The Goel In
take
place where the impoverished person has no goel. The
absence
of a goel19 does not imply the absence of the relative
as
such but of one with the necessary means20 and willingness
to
act for the impoverished debtor. A third situation can be
seen
from verse 28. Here the property is sold and there is no
goel
to recover the property, and the impoverished man is
not
able to repurchase the land. In this case, it remains with
the
buyer until the year of jubilee,21 when it returns to the
one
who had been forced to sell his possession.
back
his freedom or property, and the rules governing such a practice existed long
before
the Biblical legislation." Cf. also, J. de Moor, "De vrijkoop van
slaven in
het
Oude Nabije Oosten," Vox T., 34,
1963-64, pp. 74, 75. See chap. 3, "Parallels
to
the Goel-Redemption of Person."
19. Cf. A. B. Ehrlich, Randglossen zur hebraischen Bibel, 2,
1909, p. 92.
The
goel's duty was not absolute, cf. Ruth 3:13. It is this fact which lies behind
the
phrase
lxg vl hyhy xl yk, v. 26a. K. Elliger, op. cit., p. 355, commenting on
writes,
"schwerlich= überhaupt vorhanden ist, eher= in der Lage ist." E.
Neufeld,
"Socio-Economic
Background," p. 77, remarks: "In reality, therefore, the debtor
could
be saved by the ius redemptionis when his go’el
was a wealthy person and
was
willing to fulfill his social obligation."
20. W. H. Gispen, Het Boek Leviticus, COT, 1950, p. 360,
comments, "Met
lxg is hier bedoeld een verwant, die rijk
genoeg is, om to lossen."
21. For a thorough study of the,
year of jubilee in the Old Testament, cf, R.
North,
Sociology of the Biblical Jubilee,
1954, and the extensive article by E.
Neufeld
cited in n. 18. R. North, op. cit.,
pp. 176, 189, maintains that "the
ultimate
significance of the jubilee was as a bankruptcy law. . . . The Hebrew con-
viction
'Land must remain in the family' involves as its corollary 'The bankrupt
must
be rehabilitated.'" North (pp. 207, 210) argues that "the legislator
intended
the
50-year respite for once: a single
fresh start for the bankrupt Israelite. He does
not
exclude the desirability of its repetition at fifty-year intervals forever
after.
Indeed,
it may be said that he virtually prescribes this insofar as the economic
situation
would show continuing need of such measures.... Thus the fifty-year
release
prescribed once for all by the lawgiver is now carried along on the books as
a
legislated ideal." North (p. 212) suggests a 12th century origin for the
jubilee
law
and remarks: "The jubilee law presumes an agrarian economy of primitive
simplicity.
. . . The jubilee law was not the original composition of an author, but
a
rearrangement of existing Semitic economic and calendar usages by an authority
of
the Occupation era." R. de Vaux, Ancient
Israel, 1961, p. 177, believes that
"the
Law of jubilee was a late and ineffective attempt to make the sabbatical law
more
stringent by extending it to landed property, and at the same time to make
it
easier to observe, by spacing out the years of remission. It was inspired by
ancient
ideas, and made use of the framework of an archaic calendar. . . . But it
was
a Utopian law and it remained a dead letter." So also
Biblical
Economics," JQR, 22, 1931-32, p.
368. E. Neufeld, "Socio-Economic
Background,"
p. 122, reacts strongly against the view that the Jubilee laws are
principally
the imaginary work of the exilic period. "Its main elements, such as
the
inalienability of land, the ius redemptionis, the release of slaves, the penta-
88 The Goel In
In summary, we see that either the
land reverted to its
original
owner through the activity of the goel, or the recov-
ery
was effected through the original seller when he acquired
sufficient
means, or the land was released at the jubilee year.
We must now examine in more detail the
situation en-
visaged
by the law of Leviticus 25:25. It seems clear from the
Old
Testament that no Israelite would have parted with his
inheritance
except under the direst circumstances. It was
when
he became hopelessly in debt22 and was forced to relin-
quish
his property that the need arose for the goel to act.
Several
questions present themselves under closer scrutiny of
this
law. First, it may be asked whether the property has
already
been sold and is therefore to be obtained by the goel
from
the buyer. In the light of the two other cases in Leviti-
contial
system, are part and parcel of the real life factors of ancient
framework
and, therefore, it cannot even remotely be regarded as a utopian idea."
Neufeld
(p. 118) argues for the antiquity of the ideas involved in the jubilee and
believes
that the "recurrent application of these institutions was an endeavour to
safeguard
the preservation of old socio-economic forms by regularly repeating a
new
economic programme and thus arresting and suppressing the development of
city
life and its economy." A. Jirku, "Das Israelitische Jobeljahr,"
Reinhold
Seeberg
Festschrift, 2, 1929, p. 178, maintains "dass der Gedanke des Jobeljahres
in
discussing
the real and practical character of the laws in the Pentateuch J. van der
Ploeg,
"Studies in Hebrew Law," CBQ,
13, 1951, p. 171, comments, "The law of
the
Jubilee must be an ancient law meant to be kept in a society of still simple
social
and economic structure." S. Stein, "Laws on Interest in the Old
Testa-
ment,"
JTS, N. S. 4, 1953, p. 164, believes
that the jubilee regulations along with
the
ordinance of the sabbatical year "can best be understood as belonging to a
group
of half sedentary people who were on the point of settling permanently but
who,
for the time being, were assured of their livelihood by their pastoral mode of
life."
J. Lewy, "The Biblical Institution of Deror in the Light of Akkadian Docu-
ments,"
Eretz Israel, 5, 1958, p. 29,
remarks, "The Biblical legislation relating to
the
'proclaiming' of releases reflects and perpetuates the influence which the
Amorite
states of the
Akkadian
in setting fixed intervals for release. Lewy maintains that this "is like-
wise
indicative of the ancientness of the principles transmitted to us in Lev.
25:10
ff. For such a regulation which offered the advantage of making the procla-
mations
of releases independent of an absolute ruler's arbitrariness ... was obvi-
ously
imperative in states not headed by a monarch." Cf. also M. Noth, Leviticus,
OTL, 1965, p. 185.
For a more recent treatment of this subject cf. R. Westbrook,
"Jubilee
Laws," ILR, 6, 1971, pp.
209-226.
22. M. Noth, op. cit., p. 187, writes, "The separation from the 'property'
was
caused by a sale of the stake in the soil—made necessary as a rule by
debt."
The Goel In
cus
25:26-28 this would appear to be the case. It is obvious
in
these that the property had passed out of the control of
the
original owner. In the one instance, the property was
recovered
by the seller, himself, when he came into sufficient
means,
and in the other it reverted to the original owner in
the
jubilee year. These latter cases have been cited by the
majority
of scholars to support the idea that in Leviticus
25:25
the goel, intervenes to recover the property which has
already
been lost to the family. On the other hand, we shall
see
that in the two applications23 of the property redemption
law
(Ruth 4, Jer. 32) we do not find the repurchase of an
already
sold, property, but a prior right to purchase a prop-
erty
which is being offered for sale.24 For this and other
reasons,
some have argued that it is the right of preemption
which
is legislated in Leviticus 25:25. Thus Buhl comments
on
this verse: "Freilich liegt hier die gewöhnliche Auffassung,
wonach
es rich urn den Rückkauf eines schon verkauften
Grundstiickes
handeln insofern etwas näher, als man
23. While there are only two
passages in which we find a direct and obvious
application
of the laws of property redemption, it should be noted that a more
obscure
reference to such may be found in Ezek. 11:14-20. In Ezek. 11:15
following
the MT (jtlxg),
rather than the LXX (jtvlg), as the RSV transla-
tion
"your fellow exiles" does, we find the term "the men of your
redemption."
This
is best explained by the previous double mention of the word "your breth-
ren"
(jytx).
NV therefore renders Ezek. 11:15: "Mensenkind, het zijn uw
broeders,
uw broeders, uw verwanten en het ganse huis
wie
de inwoners van Jeruzalem zeggen: blijft verre van den Here, aan ons is dit
land
in
bezit gegeven." W. Brownlee, "The Aftermath of the Fall of Judah
according to
Ezekiel,"
JBL, 89, 1970, p. 393, portrays the
following situation: "What is re-
ferred
to is the obligation of the OW to redeem or to hold in custody the
property
of the near kinsman. Some of Ezekiel's kinsmen have been sent into
exile,
and Ezekiel, if anyone, should have the right to occupy their vacated
property.
However, persons without any natural right are crowding in and with
great
glee are taking possession. What they say by their attitude, though not
perhaps
in explicit words, to the unfortunate exiles is, 'Get you afar from
Yahweh,
this is ours!' Instead of replying in the same selfish vein, 'No, this is
mine,
since it belonged to a brother of mine,' Ezekiel directed himself rather to
the
underlying spiritual assumption that exile meant expulsion from the presence
of
Yahweh (v. 16)."
24. There can be little doubt that
such is the case in Jer. 32. Ruth 4 is
subject
to dispute, but,the majority of scholars maintain that Naomi is offering
the
property for sale in Ruth 4:3. Cf. chap. 8, "The
90 The Goel In
auf
die Analogie von v. 47f., wo ein schon verkaufter Sklave
zurückgekauft
wird, verweisen könnte. Aber trotzdem ist
diese
Auffassung auch hier unrichtig, wie der Wortlaut deut-
lich
lehrt. Es heisst nämlich, dass der Goel zu dem verarm ten
Israeliten
kommen soil um seine Geulla—Pflicht zu erfüllen,
wahrend
es widrigenfalles natOrlich heissen müsste: er soll zu
dem
gehen, der das Feld gekauft hat. Erst v. 26 handelt von
dem,
was geschehen soil, wenn der arme Israelit thatsächlich
seinen
Besitz verkauft hat."25 Buhl translates verse 25, "wenn
dein
Bruder verarmt und etwas von seinem Grundbesitze ver-
kaufen
muss, so soil sein nächster Verwandter zu ihm kom-
men
und das lösen, was er verkaufen will."' His argument
largely
revolves around the phrase vylx brqh vlxg xbv. Else-
where
he comments, "The consecutive perfect rkmv can just
as
easily signify if he must sell, and
that this is in fact the
thought
in this place is clear from the statement: 'his re-
deemer
shall come to him,' while at the
redemption he must
go
to him who had previously bought the property."27 It is
only
the law in Leviticus 25:26 which presupposes that the
property
has already been sold.28
25. F. Buhl, Die Socialen Verhaltnisse der Israeliten, 1899, p. 61 (hereafter
cited
as Verhältnisse).
26. F. Buhl, Verhältnisse, p. 62.
27. F. Buhl, "Some Observations
on the Social Institutions of the
ites,"
AJT, 1, 1897, p. 738 (hereafter cited
as "Social Institutions"). A similar
argument
is introduced by R. de Vaux, op. cit.,
p. 167, who writes, "If an
Israelite
falls into distress and has to sell his land, his nearest go'el comes 'to his
house'
(generally omitted by translators) and buys what he has to sell." J.
Kohler,
"Gemeinderschaft
[sic] und Familiengut im israelitischen Recht," Zeitschrift für
Vergleichende
Rechtswissenschaft,
17, 1905, p. 218, distinguishes between
"Erbenretrakt"
and "Wiederkaufsrechts." He complains that Lev. 25:25 is often
inaccurately
translated. The proper meaning is, "wenn dein Bruder verarmt und
etwas
von seinem Landgut verkauft (verkaufen will), so soil sein Löser, der Ver-
wandte,
zu ihm kommen und den Verkauf (die zu verkaufende Sache) seines
Bruders
losen. Das will heissen: er soil rechtzeitig eintreten und durch den Kauf
der
Sache, welche in Gefahr steht, aus der Familie zu fallen, der Familie das
Erbgut
erhalten." J.
comments
that the law mentioned in Lev. 25:25 relates to "the redemption of a
field
which is on the point of passing out of the family." However, cf. his
transla-
tion
of the law, ibid., p. 83.
28. F. Buhl, Verhältnisse, p. 61. Similarly, J. Kohler, op. cit., p. 221.
The Goel In
This interpretation has the advantage
of harmonizing
with
the two situations in the Old Testament which apply the
property
redemption in law, and it is certainly desirable to give
adequate
emphasis29 to the specific applications of biblical
law.
"There is some question, however, whether Buhl's inter-
pretation
of the crucial phrase is correct. It may be that vylx
should
be taken with brqh rather than with the verb as is the
case
in passages such as Leviticus 21:2, 3 and Numbers 27:
11.30
If so, then xbv stands alone
and is probably a technical
term31
signifying he entrance of the goel as the one who
defends
and guarai tees the well being of his kinsman, wheth-
er
in person or in property. As such, the principal support for
Buhl's
argument di appears.
According to Rudolph, "Aus dem
Wortlaaf von Lev. 25,
25
geht nicht eind'utig hervor, ob der Besitz schon verkauft
ist
oder erst zum Verkauf steht (rkmm ‘zu
Verkaufendes’
oder
‘Verkauftes’? , d. h. ob es sich urn Vorkauf oder um
Rückkauf
handelt.” He goes on to add, "Ich
glattbe, dass die
Ausdrucksweise
a sichtlich unbestimmt ist, urn beide Mö-
glichkeiten
einzuschliessen.... Das Normale war wohl der
Vorkauf;
aber für den Fall, dass keiner der Löser augenblick-
lich
bci Gelde war, sollte der Rückkauf nicht ausgeschlossen
sein."32
It seems more likely that Leviticus
25;25 is,dealing origi-
nally
with the recovery by the goel of a piece of property
inch
had already been sold by an impoverished Israelite.
This
will allow us to understand the verb lxg in verse 25 in
the same way as in verse 26. However, it is clear from Jere-
miah
32 that the goel function included the preemption as
29. Citing the two instances of
property redemption in Ruth 4 and Jer. 32,
R.
de Vaux, op. cit., p. 1 .7, remarks,
"These are the only concrete cases recorded
in
the Bible and it is in t eir light that the law of Lv. 25:25 must be
interpreted."
30. Cf. Z. Falk's review of R. de Vaux'
Les Institutions de l'Ancien Testa-
ment in HS, 9, 1958,
p. 03.
31. Cf. n. 6.
32. W. Rudolph, Das Buch Ruth, Das Hohe Lied, Die Klagelieder, KAT, 17,
1962,
pp. 63, 64.
92 The Goel In
well
as the redemption of property. The latter is probably the
original
function from which the prior right of purchase (pre-
emption)
duty originated.33
A second question which must be
considered in connec-
tion
with Leviticus 25:25 is the purpose behind such a law.
Does
the goel act in order to return the property to the one
who
has lost it or is the property retained by the goel himself?
Pedersen
expresses himself very strongly on this problem
when
he remarks, "The law contains no sentimental34 regula-
tions
that the kinsman should assist the needy by keeping the
property
for his person. If he has not the strength to keep it
for
himself, he must lose it. The centre of gravity passes from
him
to a relative; he loses in importance what the relative
gains,
but the family, as family, lose nothing."35 Pedersen
sees
a fundamental difference between the workings of the
property
redemption law and the jubilee year law. The first
“provides
for the property, so that, if it comes to one who is
inefficient
and cannot hold it, it is directed into other chan-
nels
of the stream of kindred. . . . The object of the law of
the
yobhel year is, by might and main, to
preserve the prop-
erty
for the person into whose hands it has come, whether he
is
worthy or not."36
33. Z. Falk in JJS, 9, 1958, p. 203, writes, "The go'el always demands
something
back from a foreigner, be it the blood of his clansman, his body, where
he
has sold himself into slavery, or his real property. The original meaning
(geullah)
is, therefore, redemption rather than
pre-emption, though the latter
right
may have arisen quite early."
34. Cf. the strictures made by R.
North, op. cit., p. 166, against
Pedersen's
use
of the term "sentimental."
35. J. Pedersen, op. cit., p. 84. So also, F. Buhl,
"Social Institutions," p.
738.
W. McKane, "Ruth and Boaz," GUOST,
19, 1961-62, p. 35, supports the
view
of Pedersen that the goel acquires the land for himself in order to keep it in
the
family. His agreement is based on the phrase jl hnq in Jer. 32:8.
36. J. Pedersen, op. cit., p. 88. This same divergence of
purpose is seen by
Buhl,
"Social Institutions," p. 738, as being present within Lev. 25:25-28.
Cf. also
R.
de Vaux, op. cit., p. 167. J.
Pedersen, op. cit., p. 88, asks, "If the property, in
any
case, must return to the original owner, why then should a relative in the
meantime
go and buy it?" This establishes to his satisfaction that the law of
redemption
"was made entirely unnecessary by the law of the yobhel year." Such
reasoning
ignores two things: first, that the land only reverted back to the one
who
lost it after fifty years. This is a sufficiently long period to supply a
reason
The Goel In
One of the mot stimulating discussions
on geullah law in
the
Old Testamen comes from Daube.37 He maintains that
the
account of the Exodus was patterned after familiar legal
concepts.
It was “construed as an application of the social
laws,
as a 'recover' by God of an enslaved son, relation or
friend
or of property fallen into the hands of strangers. Un-
der
the social regime of Old Testament times, an enslaved
son,
relative or friend who was redeemed, 'recovered,' by the
person
nearest to him came into the power of the redeemer;
and
similarly, family land redeemed by a member of the
family
became the redeemer's property. . . . Just so, in the
view
of the Old Testament writers, the Hebrews, as a result of
their
redemption from thraldom by God, became his sub-
jects—as
sons or slaves—or his property. . . . Liberation by
God,
in analogy to 'recovery' prescribed by the social laws,
means,
not liberation pure and simple, but a change of mas-
ter.
It means a passage from a distressing, foreign and arbi-
trary
yoke to contentment and security under the rightful
authority."38
Daube affirms that the property redeemed by
why
a relative should "in the meantime go and buy it"; second, that these
laws
were
not simply economically motivated but also religiously oriented. It is the
religious
and moral factor of the union of person and property which we see in
the
story of Naboth and which is at the basis of the prophetic condemnations of
Isaiah
(5:8) and Micah (2:1, 2). The moral principle of the union of the person
with
his property, and th duty of family solidarity, makes it understandable why
a
relative should "in the meantime go and buy the land." M. Noth, op. cit., p.
189,
commenting on the relation between geullah redemption and the release at
the
jubilee remarks: "This redemption, not in general tied down to any
particular
time,
was something quite different from the jubilee-year provision for the rever-
sion
of land every forty-ninth year, which automatically involved a redemption.
On
the other hand the 1aw of redemption, especially when it was a question of
land,
had material contacts with the year of jubilee; and so it was natural for Lev.
25
to deal also with the law of redemption."
37. D. Daube, Studies, pp. 39-61, 122-125, Idem, The New Testament and
Rabbinic Judaism, 1956, 'p.
268-284; Idem, Exodus Pattern, pp.
27-29, 42-46.
38. D. Daube, The New Testament and Rabbinic Judaism, 1956, pp. 272,
273.
Idem, The Exodus Pattern, p. 16, sees
three stages of interaction between
the
laws and the Exodus. "There is the ancient social practice, there is the
exodus
depicting
God as acting in conformity with that practice, and there is social
practice
advancing under he stimulus of the story." D. Daube, Studies, p. 61, sees
at
least two implications from the fact that this key term for redemption should
have
originated from the sphere of social legislation: "In the first place, the
94 The Goel In
the
goel became the possession of the goel. The other view,
that
the property reverted to the former owner, is in conflict
with
the texts and even if correct "it would still remain true
that
the actual redeemer of a slave or of family property
must
be the one to gain effective control, no matter where
control
might reside in theory: as he proved able to recover
what
had got [sic.] lost, it is he who would continue being
looked
up to as the real protector."39
Sikkema is strongly opposed to the
idea that the goel
retained
the property for himself. He comments, "Dit is
uiteindelijk
het doel, dat de man, die arm werd en moest
verkopen,
het zijne terugkrijgt. Het jubeljaar bewerkstelligt
dat, en zo mogelijk al eerder de lossing. Het lijkt mij
daarom,
dat
de losser het land los koopt ten behoeve van zijn ver-
armde
verwant; de losser brengt hem terug op het land, dat
hij moest verkopen. . . . Het lijkt niet aannemelijk, dat
de tos-
ser
he land vrij koopt en het behoudt tot het jubeljaar. Dit
zou niet ‘lossen’ zijn, het zou voor de verkoper niet
veel
verschil
maken, of de koper het genot van het land had dan
wel
de losser."40
There is a certain consistency then,
according to Sik-
kema,
in the three situations described in Leviticus 25:25-28.
In
each case, the land returns to its -original owner either
through
the, goel, through self purchase,mr through the jubi-
lee.41
The verb lxg in verse 25 may
then be understood in
prominent
part played in the visions of final deliverance by this legal-social ele-
ment,
redemption, by the idea of God reclaiming His own as relative or master,
may
well be one of the causes, and effects, of a great feeling of confidence that
we
come across time and again. Salvation is not a vague myth: there is absolute
certainty,
as within a good family and one the head of which is very powerful,
that
God will and can and must act. In the second place, the prominent part
played
by this legal-social element, redemption, no doubt is one of the causes, and
effects,
of that constant stressing, in the leading religious literature of Judaism
and
Christianity, of the tremendous importance attaching to our practical work,
here
and now, by being merciful to the weak, for the final deliverance of the
world."
39. D. Daube, The New Testament and Rabbinic Judaism, p. 273.
40. R. Sikkema, De Lening in het Oude Testament, 1957, pp. 96, 97.
41. R. Sikkema, op. cit., p. 101. Cf. also M. Noth, op. cit., p. 189, who
remarks
that the goel entered into the distressful situation "to preserve the
soli-
The Goel In
Israel 95
the
same sense as in verse 26. Sikkema seeks to buttress his
case
by an appeal to the laws concerning redemption of
slaves.
He writes: "Is het mogelijk, dat de losser zijn verwant
uit de slavernij los koopt ten cigen behoeve, zodat dus
de
slaaf verlost zou warden van zijn schuldeiser, maar dan
de
slaaf van zijn verwant zou zijn? Dit zou geen lossen
zijn, het
zou in strijd zijn met vcrs 54: Indien hij op deze wijze
niet
gelost
words,' d.w.z. indicn hij Met gelost wordt door zijn
verwant
en niet- door zichzelf 'dan komt hij vrij in het jubel-
jaar.'
Wat gecn losser doet en wat de slaaf niet zelf doet, dat
doet
het jubeljaar; het bevrijdt de slaaf. Dit vers stelt het
gevolg
van lossing door verwant en cigen lossing gelijk aan het
gevolg
van het jubeljaar, het is de bevrijding. Dan moot bij
lossing
van land en huis ook de lossing door de verwant het-
zelde
gevolg hebben als de eigcn kissing en het jubeljaar, nl.
de
terugkeer van de verkoper op zijn goed."42
This is admittedly a difficult
question and one on which
the
Old Testament is not as explicit as we might wish.43 If, as
some
believe,44 we have two sets of laws in Leviticus 25,
that
is, an originally independent body of, geullah regu-
lations
as well as jubilee Jaws, then Sikkema's argument is
invalid,
for in such a case there would be no original connec-
tion
between the three situations described in Leviticus 25:
25-28,
but on the other hand, we must seek to understand
the
texts as we have them, and in that case the preference
should
go to the view that the god intervened on behalf of
his
relative and obtained the property which reverted to the
kinsman.
darity
of the family group or kindred by paying the purchase-price to the buyer
on
his own account and thus getting back the piece of land that had been sold.
This
was not in order to retain it himself, but only to return it to the original
owner."
42. R. Sikkema, op. cit., p. 101.
43. E. Neufeld, "Socio-Economic
Background," p. 76, remarks, "Nor do we
know
whether when property was redeemed, the go’el
returned it to the impover-
ished
debtor or kept it for himself.
44. M. Noth, op. cit., p. 189, see above n. 36; cf. also H. G. Reventlow, op.
cit., p. 135.
From the circumstances described in
Jeremiah 32 we see
that
the goel also had a right of preemption, of buying the
property
before it was placed upon the open market. It seems
clear
from this incident that the property was retained by the
goel
who purchased it.45 This prompts the question: How are
the
two passages related? There are clear differences between
the
incident in Jeremiah 32 and the law in Leviticus 25.
Sikkema
differentiates sharply between the two. The sale of
the
land in Leviticus 25 is to be understood as a "verkoop
wegens
schuld" whereas that in Jeremiah 32 is an example of
a
"vrijwillige verkoop."46 In Jeremiah 32 Hanamel is not sell-
ing
the land out of need.47 He receives the selling price
whereas
"in Leviticus XXV betaalt de losser de prijs aan de
koper,
aan wie het land wegens schuld verkocht was."48 The
deed
of purchase is lacking in Leviticus as is to be expected in
a
debt sale. "Bij vrijwillige verkoop gaat het land over in
andere
handen; dit wordt vastgelegd in koopbrieven, er zijn
getuigen
bij, die de koopbrieven tekenen; de brieven worden
zorgvuldig
bewaard. De koper moet in het volgend jubeljaar
kunnen aantonen, dat de akker hem toebehoort en niet
dient
terug
te komen aan de verkoper."49 Land, which is not sold
out
of necessity, as in Jeremiah 32, is not restored in the jubilee.
The
buyer is able to prove, by means of the deed of purchase,
that
his land need not revert to the original owner.50
45. W. McKane, "Ruth and
Boaz," p. 35, writes, "It is plain (jl hnq) that
Jeremiah
is not redeeming the field in order to rehabilitate Hanamel, but is taking
possession
(hwry)
of the land by buying it from him. Being no longer able finan-
cially
to effectively possess his land Hanamel offers it to his cousin as his nearest
effective
kinsman." Cf. also R. Sikkema, op.
cit., p. 105.
46. R. Sikkema, op. cit., pp. 105-107. He makes this same sharp differentia-
tion
between Lev. 25 and Ruth 4.
47. R. Sikkema, op. cit., p. 105, comments, "Uit nets blijkt, dat Hanameël
arm
geworden is en uit noc,d verkoopt; de slotwoorden tonen aan, dat Hanameël
niet
gedwongen is zijn goec om schuld te verkopen, integendeel, hij ontvangt de
koopsom,
Jeremia weegt die af."
48. R. Sikkema, op. cit., p. 106.
49. R. Sikkema, op. cit., p. 107.
50. R. Sikkema, op. cit., p. 107, remarks, "Deze overwegingen maken het
aannemelijk, dat het jubeljaar de vrijwillige verkoop
niet ongedaan maakt."
The Goel In Israel 97
By differentiating sharply between
"verkoop wegens
schuld"
and "vrijwillige verkoop" Sikkema is able to draw a
clear
distinction between redemption as a duty and redemp-
tion
as a right. "Zij is een plicht van de naaste verwant ingeval
van
verkoop van huis of land wegens schuld of ingeval van
schuldslavernij.
Bij vrijwillige verkoop heeft dezelfde verwant
het
voorrecht de akker voor zich te kopen."51 The question
may
be raised: How is it possible, in the case of a "vrijwillige
verkoop,"
to speak of the buyer as a redeemer? Sikkema
comments, "Bij vrijwillige verkoop bevrijdt de
losser het goed
inzoverre,
dat hij het behoedt voor overgang in vreemde
hand;
hij neemt het bezit over van een erfgenaam van de
oorspronkelijke
bezitter en behoudt het als afstammeling van
diezelfde
oorspron kelijke bezitter, wiens naam hij doet voort-
leven."52
The sharp distintion drawn by Sikkema
between Leviti-
cus
25 and Jeremiah 32 is questionable. The mention of a
deed
of purchase53 is the kind of detail one expects from an
account
of an application of a law in an historical section of
the
Old Testament As such, it cannot be regarded as evi-
dence
for the distinction between a forced sale and a freely
chosen
commercial transaction. The same applies to the
phrase
"and weighed out the money to him"
(Jer. 32:9). In
view,
of the impending Babylonian invasion it would be plau-
51. R. Sikkema, op.cit., p. 106.
52. R. Sikkema, op. cit., pp. 110, 111.
53. R. de Vaux, op. cit., p. 168, cites as parallels to these procedures con-
tracts
of sale drawn up in
parallels,
however, he believes, come from
the
same sheet of papyrus two copies of the contract were written, separated by a
blank
space. The first copy was rolled up and sealed, the other rolled up but not
sealed:
this is the 'open' copy of which Jeremias speaks. It could be consulted at
will
but was liable to be falsified; if a dispute arose the sealed copy was
opened."
Cf.
L. Fisher, "Die Urkun en in Jer. 32: 11-14 nach den Ausgrabungen and dem
Talmud,"
ZAW, 28, 1910, pp. 136-142. E.
Hammershaimb, ''Some Observations
on
the Aramaic Elephantine Papyri," VT,
7, 1957, p. 25, writes, "The procedure
corresponds
in principle to the Babylonian case-tablets, where the outer one
serves
to give information about the content and the inner one is only taken out if
a
dispute about the content arises.... In accordance with older Babylonian prac-
tice
the contract is drawn up by the purchaser, in Jer. XXXII, not by the
vendor."
98 The Goel In
sible
to assume that the property was being offered for sale
because
of the economic hardships which accompanied-such
a
situation.54 If such were the case, Jeremiah's purchase of
the
land would serve all the more convincingly as a sign of his
own
trust in the God of Israel, the Lord of history, whose
message
through this transaction was, "Houses and fields and
vineyards
shall again be bought in this land" (Jer. 32:15).
God-Redemption of Person, Leviticus
25:47-55
In the Old Testament as well as in the
rest of the ancient
sources
existed for the supply of slaves, the taking of captives
in
war being the earliest.56 Not only were foreigners captured
in
war enslaved, but the native population itself was also
reduced
at times to slavery. Mendelsohn comments, "Al-
though
captives of war and imported foreign slaves made up a
substantial
part of the slave population of the ancient Near
East,
the bulk of the Babylonian, Assyrian, Canaanite, and
Hebrew
slaves originally came from the ranks of the freeborn
54. A. Weiser, Das Buch des Propheten Jeremia, ATD, 21, 19604, pp. 294,
295,
writes, "Der Grund, weshalb der Vetter Jeremias ihm seinen Acker zum
Vorkauf
anbietet, wird nicht genannt; doch liegt die Vermutung Nahe, dass die
langere
Anwesenheit des babylonischen Belagerungsheeres mancherlei Not für die
Bewohner
der Umgebung von
von
Besitz zwang." So also W. Rudolph, Jeremia,
HAT, 12, 19683, p. 209, writes,
"Was
den Vetter zum Verkauf trieb, hält Jer zu sagen nicht für nötig; es
ist klar,
dass
die Nahe des chaldäischen Belagerungsheers den Dörfern urn
zumal
im Norden, viel Not brachte."
55. For literature relating to the
topic of debt and enslavement, cf. E. Neu-
feld,
"Ius Redemptions in Ancient Hebrew Law," RIDA, 1961, pp. 29-40 (here-
after
cited as "Ius Redernptionis"); idem, "Socio-Economic Background,"
pp.
72-80;
R. K. Sikkema, op. cit., pp. 72-112; B. Maarsingh, Onderzoek naar de
Ethiek van de
Wetten in Deuteronomium, 1961, pp. 99-112. For Near Eastern
materials,
cf. I. Mendelsohn, "Slavery in the Ancient Near East," BA, 9, 1946, pp.
74-88
=Biblical Archeologist Reader 3, ed.
E. F. Campbell and D. N. Freedman,
1970,
pp. 127-143 (hereafter cited as "Slavery");
Critics,"
pp. 131-135, J. C. de Moor, op. cit.,
pp. 73-79; R. Yaron, "Redemption
of
Persons in the Ancient Near East," RIDA,
6, 1959, pp. 155-176 (hereafter
cited
as "Redemption of Persons").
56. Cf. R. de Vaux, op. cit., p.
80; I. Mendelsohn, "Slavery," p. 127. For
Old
Testament data bearing on the enslavement of war enemies, cf. Deut. 20:
10
ff.; Judg. 5:30; I Sam. 4:9; 30:3; II Chron. 28:8.
The Goel In
Israel
99
native
population. The native-born slaves were recruited from
three
sources: sale of minors by their parents, voluntary self-
sale
by adults and enslavement of defaulting debtors."57
Old Testament evidence for the sale of
minors by their
parents
can be found in the law regulating the sale of daugh-
ters
in Exodus 21:7-11. In addition, we learn from II Kings
4:1
that creditors seized the children of deceased debtors. It
seems
clear that in the postexilic period (Neh. 5:5) farmers
who
were experiencing economically disastrous times were
forced
to relinquish their sons and daughters as slaves. Inter-
esting
in this connection is the statement in Isaiah 50:1:
"Where
is your mother's bill of divorce, with which I put her
away?
Or which of my creditors is it to whom I have sold
you?
Behold, for your iniquities you were sold, and for your
transgressions
you: mother was put away." Here the "you" is
likely
the Lord's children with the allusion being to the sale
of
children into bondage.
Economic adversity sometimes
necessitated the individual
voluntarily
selling himself into slavery. In the Old Testament
such
a situation is reflected in the law codes (Ex. 21:2-6;
Deut.
15:16-17) which mention the refusal of a slave to go
out
after his six-year term of service. He may opt for slavery
with
economic security rather than for freedom with eco-
nomic
insecurity. Voluntary self-sale is also seen in Leviticus
25:39
ff. which wit be presently examined.
Voluntary servitude has been
documented in
arid
Nuzi, though some differentiation in the status of the
enslaved
person is apparent between the two. Mendelsohn
comments,
"Legally most of the Habiru self-sale cases in Nuzi
differ
fundamentally from the self-sale documents of Baby-
lonia.
In
purchase
price and as a result became a slave, the property of
another
man. But in Nuzi no purchase price is paid to those
who
'sell themselves.' The Habiru enter voluntarily into the
57.
Persons,"
p.155, who distinguishes between legal transactions involving self-sale
and
cases where "there may be seizure subsequent to the nonpayment of a
debt."
100 The Goel In
state
of servitude in exchange for food, clothing, and shel-
ter."58
As we saw earlier, there is some evidence that in addi-
tion
to self-sale in
redeem
the enslaved person.59
The most basic source for slaves in
the ancient Near East
was
the defaulting debtor.60 Insolvency was caused by vari-
ous
factors such as drought and other adverse climatic condi-
tions,
and by war; but the primary factor was high interest
rates.61
Seizure of the insolvent debtor and sale into slavery is
reflected
in certain passages within the prophets. In Isaiah
52:3,
we read, "You were sold for nothing (Mtrkmn) and you
shall
be redeemed (vlxgt) without money.62
With less cer-
tainty,
we might so interpret Amos' complaint against the
58.
Jewish
and Roman Law," Louis Ginzberg Jubilee
Volume, 1945, p. 114, makes
the
following distinction between bondage and slavery: "A bondman is a legal
person
capable of rights and obligations but bound by law to render service to
another,
whereas a slave is the absolute property of the master, possessed as
chattel,
or owned as a thing. . . . The chief difference between slavery, pure and
proper,
and bondage, consists in the status, treatment, and duration of service."
59. See the remark of Stamm in chap.
3, n. 15.
60. Cf. n. 55. In addition to the
literature therein cited cf. E. Neufeld, "The
Emergence
of a Royal Urban Society in Ancient
45-47;
idem, "The Prohibition against Loans at Interest in Ancient Hebrew
Laws,"
HUCA, 26, 1955, pp. 355-412
(hereafter cited as "Prohibition"); idem,
"Inalienability
of Mobile and Immobile Pledges in the Laws of the Bible," RIDA,
9,
1962, pp. 33-44; R. North, op. cit.,
pp. 135-157; H. Gamoran, "The Biblical
Law
against Loans on Interest," JNES,
30, 1971, pp. 127-134.
61.
interest
in ancient
had
no fixed or average rate. In Late Assyria the usurer had a free hand in
determining
the rate of interest. Interest on money varied from 20% to as high as
80%
per annum. In addition to this general type there were two other kinds of
loans
current in Babylonia and
by
the temples and the landlords to their tenant-fanner, and loans on which
interest
was charged only after the date of maturity. In the latter case the interest
was
enormous. In
charged;
in Neo-Babylonia we find 40% and also 100%; and in Late Assyria 100%
and
even 141% v as charged.... There is no information in the Old Testament as
to
the rate of interest charged in
of
interest from a fellow Hebrew we may infer that a higher interest rate was
charged
and that
62. E. Neufeld, "Ius
redemptionis," p. 31, suggests translating the niphal
verb
reflexively, "you have sold yourselves," and so he finds this to be
"a distinct
allusion
to the redemption of self-sold debtors."
The Goel In
rich
that "they sell the righteous for silver and the needy for
a
pair of shoes" (2:6).
We must now undertake to examine the
law of slave
redemption
found in Leviticus 25:47-55. This law reflects the
situation
where the Israelite, due to dire economic factors,
has
sold himself in to the hands of a resident alien in
reads:
"If a stranger63 or
sojourner64 with you becomes rich,65
and
your brother beside him becomes poor66 and sells him-
self
to the stranger or sojourner67 with you, or to a member
of
the stranger's family, then after he is sold he may be
redeemed;
one of his brothers68 may redeem him, or his
uncle,
or his cousin may redeem him, or a near kinsman
belonging
to his family69 may redeem him; or if he grows rich
he
may redeem imself. He shall reckon with him who
bought
him from he year when he sold himself to him until
the
year of jubilee, and the price of his release shall be ac-
63. rg is best
expressed by the term resident alien, cf, R. de Vaux, op. cit.,
pp.
74-76 and R. North, op. cit., p. 141,
who comment:, "Perhaps the most
accurate
translation would be 'non-Israelite resident' or (as a collective noun)
‘racial
minority'; but this is clumsy, a ‘alien’ provides a tolerable substitute."
E.
Neufeld,
"Prohibition," pp. 392, 393, comments, "The gerim constituted a social
class
in an intermediate position between the free Hebrew and the Hebrew
slaves
. . . . They were a half-way house on the road to full legal equality and
complete
absorption in o the Hebrew community." As H. Gamoran, op. cit., p.
130,
writes, a distincti n is to be made between the "nokri, the foreigner who
came
to the land for a limited period of time, and the ger, the alien who perma-
nently
settled among th Israelites."
64. bwvt found in
combination with rg in Gen. 23:4; Lev. 25:23, 35;
I
Chron. 29:15 and 39:13, and in combination with rykw (hired servant)
in
Lev.
25:40. It would seem that the status of the toshab was similar to the ger
though
not identical. R. de Vaux, op cit.,
76, remarks, "He seems less assimi-
lated,
socially and religiously (Ex. 12:45; cf. Lev. 22:10), less firmly rooted in the
land
and also less independent: he has no house of his own, but is some man's
toshab
(Lev. 22:10; 25:6)." Cf. R. North, op.
cit. pp. 141, 142.
65. dy gywt Cf. n. 7.
66. See n. 4.
67. Either the v of possibly lv has been
omitted in MT between rgl and
68. In contrast with v. 47 where Hx has a general
meaning, it should be
understood
here in the literal sense. This is made clear by v. 49.
69. vrwb rxwm found only here
and in Lev. 18:6 means literally "from
his
bodily flesh." The phrase is best translated as blood relation or near-of-kin.
102 The Goel In
cording
to the number of years; the time he was with his
owner
shall be rated as the time of a hired servant.70 If there
are
still many years, according to them he shall refund out of
the
price paid for him the price for his redemption.71 If there
remain
but a few years until the year of jubilee, he shall make
a
reckoning with him; according to the years of service due
from
him he shall refund the money for his redemption. As a
hired
servant year by year shall he be with him; he shall not
rule72
with harshness73 over him in your sight. And if he is
not
redeemed by these means, then he shall be released in the
year
of jubilee, he and his children with him. For to me the
people
of
brought
forth out of the
God."74
The question of the relation of the
various laws in the
Old
Testament dealing with slavery is very complex,75 and
70. rykw, cf. v. 40. One
of the free wage earners who hired himself out for a
period
of time. Cf. Deut. 24:14.
71. vtlxg—here and in v.
52 employed in a special sense referring to the
price
of redemption. Cf. K. Elliger, Leviticus,
HAT, 1966, p. 337.
72. vndry Cf. also Lev. 25:43,
46.
73. jrpb. Found only in
Ex. 1:13, 14; Ezek. 34:4; and in Lev. 25:43, 46.
Because
of its use in Ex. 1:13, 14, M. Noth, Leviticus,
p. 192, suggests that "it
can
well be rendered 'forced labour' , and apparently means something like
oppression."
The phrase"to rule with harshness" probably has reference to nor-
mal
slavery. Cf. M. Noth, Leviticus, p.
191.
74. E. Speiser, "Leviticus and
the Critics," p. 132, sees in Lev. 25:35-54
three
stages reflecting the status of an Israelite debtor: "(a) the creditor is
a
fellow-Israelite
who is enjoined from exacting interest from his brother (35-38);
(b)
the debtor has been driven to self-enslavement (nimkar), yet the master shall
not
treat him as slave (39-46); (c) the debtor has fallen into the hands of a
resident
alien and must be redeemed." In case (a) above, Speiser (p. 141) has
produced
interesting comparisons from Alalakh to show that "the arrangement to
which
Lev. 25:35 ff. alludes is one of antichretic pledge; that is to say, the
debtor's
person (and this Tray include various members of his family) secures the
loan,
while his labor covers the interest. Accordingly, no other interest may be
charged,
whether discounted in advance or compounded eventually."
75. Cf. R. North, op. cit., pp. 135-157; M. David,
"The Manumission of
Slaves
under Zedekiah," OTS, 5, 1948,
pp. 63-79; H. L. Ellison, "The Hebrew
Slave:
A Study in Early Israelite Society," EQ, 45, 1973, pp. 30-35. I. Mendel-
sohn,
Slavery Ancient Near East, 1949, p.
18, commenting on the laws in
Leviticus
remarks, "The law of Leviticus 25:39 ff. is of an entirely different
character.
This law has nothing in common with those of Exodus and Deuter-
The Goel In
the
differences are well-known. One of the differences which
distinguishes
the Levitical law from the others is the fact that
in
Leviticus the individual is spoken of as voluntarily selling
himself.76
The law in Leviticus 25:39-46 concerns the
ite
who voluntarily sells himself to a fellow-Israelite. He is
not
to be treated as a slave but rather as a hired servant and
as
a sojourner (Lev. 25:40). He is to remain until the year of
the
jubilee when he goes out along with his children and
returns
to his family and to his land (Lev. 25:41). The law-
giver
supplies the rationale for this in terms of the great
exodus
deliverance.
The law in Leviticus 25:47-55 concerns
the impoverished
Israelite
who sells himself to a resident alien who has become
onomy.
There the subject is the defaulting debtor enslaved by his creditor; here it
is
the free Hebrew who voluntarily enters into the state of slavery because of
adverse
economic circumstances." S. R. Driver, Deuteronomy,
ICC, 19023, p.
185,
makes the following comment on the differences between the slavery laws:
"The
discrepancy between the laws of Ex., Dt., and the law of Lev. can be
satisfactorily
explained only by the supposition that the latter is a provision for
the
mitigation of the servitude of Israelites, designed without reference to the
former,
and originating at time when experience had shown (cf. Jer. 34:11,
14b-16)
that the limit of service fixed by Ex. and Dt. could nor be enforced. The
law
of Lev. lengthens the legal period of service, but offers, in some measure,
compensation
for this by insisting (in phrases borrowed from H that the Israelite
slave
is to be treated, whilst in servitude, as humanely as if he were a free
man."
76. rKam;niv;, Lev. 25:39,
47. It is true that Deut. 15:12 uses –rkemA.yi, but this has
reference
to a forced sale. Other differences are the term of servitude and the fact
that
the law in Leviticus makes no mention of giving gifts to the departing slave.
H.
Ellison, op. cit., pp. 33, 34, argues
that the laws of slavery in Exodus and
Deuteronomy
which use the term "Hebrew slave" contain the relics of a pre-
ethnic
use of the term Hebrew. "So the 'Hebrew' was the landless man without
hope
of acquiring land.... The landless man was always in danger of falling into
debt
and of being in a position where he could not repay. He would then be sold
as
a Hebrew slave, or would have to allow sons or daughters to be so sold. It is
this
submerged
stratum of Israelite society which the law takes under its special pro-
tection,
demanding that its members be given the opportunity of a new start,
when
they were freed (Deut. 15:13 f.) . . . . The position in Lev. 25:39 ff. is
tially
another one. Here the man owns land, but has alienated it in one way or
another.
In the year of Jubilee, however, it will return to him. To pay his debts,
or
for some equally cogent reason, he sells himself to a neighbour, but it is
clear
that
he is only a semi-slave, for he retains control over his family, something
denied
to
the slave. When he leaves, he does not need largesse from his master, for he
returns
to his land."
104 The Goel In
affluent.77
In this instance he is to be redeemed.78 The re-
sponsibility
devolves first upon one of his brothers, then
his
uncle, cousin, and finally another fellow kinsman. This
duty
to act on behalf of the fellow kinsman and to redeem
him
from slavery is based, like each of the other duties of the
goel,
on the solidarity of the tribe and family.79 In connec-
tion
with the redemption of property, we have seen that the
law
stated that the nearest kinsman80 was to act in behalf of
his
impoverished kinsman. We can see from Boaz' initial reply
to
Ruth (3:12) "And now, it is true that I am a near kins-
77. Cf. Deut. 28:43, which also
recognizes the heights to which the resident
alien
was able to rise.
78. R. Sikkema, op. cit., p. 99, disputes the apparent sense of the two laws
whereby,
on the one hand, when the Israelite becomes debtor to an Israelite he
has
no right of redemption, but on the other when he becomes debtor to the alien
he
does. He comments, "De letter van de tekst geeft alle aanleiding tot deze
opvatting,
de zin van lossing verzet zich er tegen. Zal de vreemdeling aan de
Israeliët
het recht van lossing toestaan en zou de volksgenoot het hem onthou-
den?
Dit
given
in Lev. 25:48:52 relate not only to the case where the Israelite has sold
himself
to the resident alien but to the preceding case (25:39) is-well. His argu-
ments
however, are weak. It is not accurate to state that v. 47 is connected to v.
39
"met de woorden 'en wanneer' " for the Hebrew yk introduces many
of the
laws
in Lev. 25. Furthermore, it is unconvincing to state, "de vele
bijzonderheden
over
de lossing, die nu volgen in de verzen 49-52, maken ook eerder de indruk, dat
zij
betrekking hebben op beide gevallen dan alleen op het laatste." We prefer
the
explanation
of J. C. de Moor, op. cit., p. 78,
who remarks, "De israëlitische heer
mocht
zijn volksgenoot volstrekt niet als slaaf behandelen (Lev. 25:39-40, 43,
46).
Van een in Palestina woonachtige vreemdeling kon men zulks niet ver-
wachten
en daarom gold voor een hebreeuwse slaaf in dienst van een vreernde de
lossingsplicht."
R. Yaron, "Redemption of Persons," p. 156, remarks, "There are
no
redemption-provisions attached to self-sale to an Israelite (Lev. 25:39-43). A
nationalistic
approach to the matter, regarding bondage to an alien as particularly
undesirable,
may have been involved."
79. E. Neufeld, "Ius
Redemptions," pp. 32-34, suggests that the goel's
obligation
was social and not legal. "The ius redemptionis rested on the solidarity
of
the tribe and family. The obligation of the kinsman was a liability of kinship.
A
debt
or other obligation or responsibility of any member of the clan was a
liability
of the group." Cf. also A. R. Johnson, "The Primary Meaning of lxg,"
SVT,
1, 1953, p. 71, "The responsibility of the lxeGo is primarily a
responsibility
towards
the kin-group as an extension in time as well as space." J. Pedersen, op.
cit.,
pp. 353, 354, comments, "The most fundamental law is that of kin-
ship.... He who
infringes upon the right of a man, strikes his family, and if the
person
stricken cannot himself repair the breach, then the kinsman must come to
his
assistance and restore the family; this is the most elementary claim of
justice."
80. vylx brqh
vlxg,
Lev. 25:25.
The Goel In
man,
yet there is a kinsman nearer than I," that there is an
order of responsibility
to be followed in the performance of
the
duties of the goel. This is clearly indicated in verses 48
and
49. The goel must be both willing and able to act on
behalf
of his weakened relative. It is therefore not surprising
that,
in verses 48 and 49, an order of responsibility exists for
the
performance of this duty. If for any reason the responsi-
bilities
of the goel were not assumed, the impoverished
ite
had the opportunity, should his circumstances change, of
redeeming
himself. Such an opportunity was also prescribed
in
the property redemption law (Lev. 25: 26).81 Gispen remarks,
"Dat
deze mogelijkheid, dat de Israeliëtische slaaf zichzelf kon
lossen,
hier wordt gesteld, bewijst wel, dat hij een tamelijk
zelfstandige positie bleef innemen en loon moest
verdienen
(zie
vs. 50). Daarnaast bestaat natuurlijk de mogelijkheid, dat
hij
geld of bezit in handen kreeg doordat iemand hem die
naliet
of gaf."82 The redemption of the enslaved Israelite in
Leviticus
25 was by purchase.83 The redemption money paid
was
to be in proportion to the number of years remaining
until
the year of jubilee. The original sale had been based on
the
number of years available to serve until the jubilee. The
man
selling himself was selling his labor over a number of
years
just as the man selling his property was actually selling
a
number of harvests.84 If the enslaved Israelite were not re-
leased85
by his kinsman, or through his own activity, then he
81. Cf. n. 18.
82. W. H. Gispen, Het Boek Leviticus, COT, 1950, p. 368.
83. According to
85, there were "five ways by
which a Hebrew slave could obtain his freedom.
These
were: (1) a defaulting debtor was to be freed in the seventh year (Ex. 21,
Dt.
15); (2) he who sold himself into slavery was to be released in the year of the
jubilee
(according to Lev. 25); (3) a freeborn girl who had been sold by her father
on
condition that her master marry her or give her into marriage to one of his
sons
must be freed if the master should refuse to live up to the conditions of the
sale
(Ex. 21:7-11); (4) by purchase (Lev. 25:47 ff.); and (5) by injury (Ex. 21:
26-7)."
84. R. Sikkema, op. cit., p. 100, "Bij koop van land koopt de schuldeiser
een
aantal oogsten, bij koop van een slaaf koopt hij de arbeid van een aantal
jaren."
85. Earlier, when considering the
redemption of property, we discussed
106 The Gael In
went
out in the year of jubilee, he and his children with him
(Lev.
25:54). No Israelite was to be held permanently in
bondage
since he is a slave of Yahweh. He belongs to Yah-
weh,
having been brought out of the
25:55).
It is this important principle which is the basis for
the
prescriptions concerning redemption of slaves, even as the
laws
regulating the redemption of property are governed by
the
principle that the land is owned by Yahweh (Lev. 25:23).
There
is an integral connection between the person and his
property.
The responsibility of the goel extends to the rela-
tive's
person and property. Mendelsohn's comments are note-
worthy:
"It would have been highly inconsistent with its own
high
ideal if the law had demanded the return of the land
while
leaving its rightful owners in servitude. Hence, both the
land
and its former possessors were to be freed at the same
time.”86
We shall see later in our study of the
book of Ruth
that
the principle of the integrality of the person and his
property
explains one of the perplexing questions of the
book
of Ruth.87
whether
the property became the goel's or was recovered for the one who had lost
it.
Cf. Chap. 4, "Goel-Redemption of Property." The same question may be
posed
in
connection with redemption of slaves, Did the redeemed slave become respon-
sible
to the god or was his freedom absolute?
34,
comments, "If the go'el redeemed
his kinsman debtor, the latter probably
became
responsible to the go'el but nothing
is known of the implications of this
responsibility."
R. Yaron, "A Document of Redemption from
1960,
p. 89, calls attention to the Ugaritic text 16.191 which he translates:
"From
today Iwr-kl has ransomed Agdn, son of ... , and Ynhm, his brother, and
B’ln, his brother,
and Httn, his son, and Btsy, his daughter, and Istrmy, daughter
of
‘bdmlk, and Snt, daughter of
100
(shekels of) silver from the hand of the Beyrouthians. An estate they do not
have,
until they repay the silver of Iwr-kl.
And (then) they will return to their
estate."
R. Yaron, "Redemption of Persons," p. 167, makes the following com-
ment
on this text: "What is particularly of interest is that redemption does
not
itself
imply recovery of all rights previously enjoyed. Only after having reim-
bursed
their redemptor will the redeemed return to their unt" [estate] . Two things
should
be noted in this connection. In the first place, when the enslaved Israelite,
himself,
is the acting agent in the redemption there can be no doubt that his freedom
was
absolute. Secondly, hlxb (v. 54) points in the direction of
complete freedom,
for
redemption which comes through the relative or the enslaved Israelite him-
self
is equated with the total freedom which comes through the jubilee release.
86.
87. See chap. 8, n. 106.
The Goel In
Goel-Redemption of Blood,
Numbers 35;
Deuteronomy 19:1-3; Joshua
20:1-9
The duty of blood-vengeance may well
be the oldest88
and
most pressing89 'responsibility of the goel in
find
this duty mentioned in Numbers 35:12, where the single
term
lxg
is found, land in Numbers 35:19, 2:1, 24, 25, 27;
Deuteronomy
19:6 12; Joshua 20:3, 5, 9, where the term
Mdh lxg is found. In the historical
books we find reference
to
the latter term in II Samuel 14:11. In order to understand
this
particular duty which rested upon the next-of-kin it will.
be
necessary to investigate briefly the concept of vengeance
in
the Old Testament.90
Various motives have been suggested as underlying the
practice
of blood-revenge in the ancient world. According
to
Buttenwieser, "Blood revenge among Semites was gov-
88. B. van Oeveren, De Vriisteden in het Oude Testament,
1968, p. 160.
Extensive
reference to this important work will be made throughout the course of
our
discussion. H. Schaeffer, The Social
Legislation of the Primitive Semites,
1915,
p. 77, maintains that the duty to avenge the blood of a relative was the
oldest
and that "the transition from 'the avenger of blood,' charged with the
duty
of
avenging the wrongs of a fellow clansman, to a vindicator of family rights (in
property)
would seem to be a natural one."
89. H. H. Rowley, "The Marriage
of Ruth," in The Servant of the Lord,
19652,
p. 179, believes it probable that in ancient times "this obligation always
rested
with especial weight on the next-of-kin." He comments (p. 181), "It
is
probable
that in the absence of a brother the duty of blood revenge would be
more
pressing on a more distant relation than the duty, of redeeming property,
and
there was no need to legislate for the case when the next-of-kin, whoever he
was,
should refuse." R. de Vaux, op. cit.,
p. 11, writes, "The most solemn respon-
sibility
of the Israelite go'el was to enforce blood-vengeance...."
90. For literature on this topic of
blood-vengeance reference should be
made
to B. van Oeveren, op. cit., pp.
227-245. Three other newer studies of the
subject
are J. Tullock, Blood Vengeance among the
Israelites in the light of its
Near Eastern
Background,
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
1966;
J. Salmon, Judicial Authority in Early
Israel, unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tion
Law, 1970, pp.
99-109. also E. Merz, Die Blutrache bei
den Israeliten, BWAT,
20,
1916; D. Daube, Studies, pp. 59-58, 123-125; W. Patton, "Blood Revenge in
Arabia
and
Covenant,
Part II," HUCA, , 1930, pp.
56-84; idem, "The Book of the Covenant,
Part
III," HUCA, 8-9, 1931-32, pp.
79-121; J. Pedersen, op. cit., pp.
376-410.
108 The Goel In
erned
by the same primitive belief as in ancient
belief
that the souls of those who have met a violent
death
. . . cannot find rest in the nether world but are con-
demned
to haunt the earth as wretched spirits until their
deaths
have been duly avenged on their slayers."91 Böhl adds
two
additional motives. "Een stam, een geslacht heeft geen
kostbaarder
bezit dan zijn mannen: het verlies, door een
manslag
geleden, moet in het evenwicht gebracht worden
door
het geslacht van den moordenaar hetzelfde verlies te
doen
lijden. Het 3de motief is het verlangen naar
wraak-
neming,
waarop ons woord ‘bloedwraak’ te eenzijdig den
nadruk
legt."92
Pedersen explains blood-vengeance in
terms of restoration
and
retaliation. "The greatest infringement that can be made
upon
men is that they are robbed of life. If a man is killed,
then
life is taken away, not only from him, but also from the
family
with which he has life in common. This breach must
be
healed by life being taken from him who robbed him, and
this
is done by means of blood-vengeance. . . Vengeance is
the
real restoration of the violated. His name has been less-
ened,
his righteousness has been infringed upon, but the
name
revives when vengeance is done."93 The function of
the
goel
as avenger of blood is similar to the other functions
91. M. Buttenwieser, "Blood
Revenge and Burial Rites in Ancient
JAOS, 38-39, 1918,
p. 306. He further remarks, "Though we have no express
statement
to that effect, there can be no doubt that the same belief prevailed in
92. F. M. Th. Böhl,
"Bloedwreker," in BKW, 1,
Het Oude Testament, 1919.
Cf.
also
Old Testament, 1942, pp.
275-285, speaks of a number of deeply rooted impulses
which
were involved in blood revenge. These include "simple passion," which
he
calls
the "psychological motive," exemplified in passages such as Judg.
16:28; Isa.
1:24;
Ps. 58:11; Num. 35:26; Deut. 19:6; the motive of compensation for the
material
loss of a clan member; the numinous motive, which is "the chief compul-
sion
for blood revenge" and which leads to blood revenge as a form of human
sacrifice.
On blood-vengeance as a form of human sacrifice, cf. R. H. Pfeiffer,
Religion in the
Old Testament,
ed. Charles Forman, 1961, p. 37, "Blood revenge
is
therefore an expiation a human sacrifice intended to atone for an offence
against
the deity and to placate its anger."
93. J. Pedersen, op. cit., pp. 378, 389, 390.
The Goel In
prescribed
in the law. "He is the upholder of the family, its
restorer.
His task as an avenger is of exactly the same kind:
he
restores the name of the offended, and thus maintains the
family
of which he himself is a member."94 However, there
is
an
additional principle operating in
older
law of restoration and is assimilated by it. It is the law
of
retaliation. "The law of retaliation does not place the
point
of gravity in the offended and his claim to have a
breach
healed. The point of gravity lies outside or, rather,
above
both parties, in a power maintaining justice for its own
sake.
Every action which deviates from the right must be
balanced;
it is just as necessary for the sake of justice that he
who
commits injustice should suffer a loss, as that he who
suffers
an unjust loss should receive satisfaction."95
Daube explains the laws of
blood-vengeance in terms of
the
principles of restoration and compensation. "The mur-
derer
gets hold of the murdered mm's strength. But by tak-
ing
vengeance and killing the murderer, the victim's family in
turn
seizes the strength of the offender. Where this belief
prevails,
retaliation does ,imply compensation.96 Daube ex-
plains
the expressions Md wrd or Mymd
wrd
"to require the
blood"
and the term Mdh lxg in terms of the principle of
compensation.
Concerning the first term he writes: "It is
used
of God's requiring the murdered man's blood from his
94. J. Pedersen, op. cit., p. 390.
95. J. Pedersen, op. cit., pp. 392, 393. According to
Pedersen (p. 395) the
restoration
law was original to ancient Israel, the law of retaliation was of foreign
ongin.
The history of the blood-vengeance concept is that of the interplay be-
tween
the two principles. "Thus the inner development of the Israelites tends
toward
the assimilation of the extraneous principle of retaliation.... Retaliation
becomes
a claim on the part of the violated, a definitely apportioned restoration.
The
old principle of restoration also has a negative side, viz. to strike him down
in
whom
the wrong originates, to free oneself of him in whom one's misfortune is
seated....
In the law of retaliation this is regulated in the direction of the of-
fender
losing what he has taken. It is a kind of negative restoration for the
injured.
The offender has lessened the other, and now himself is to be made just
as
small. Instead of the positive object of the old law, i.e., that the righteous
is to
be
made whole, stress is laid on the opposite, i.e., that the unrighteous is to be
broken."
96. D. Daube, Studies, p. 123.
110 The Goel In
murderer.
This phrase, however loosely we may employ it
nowadays,
and however loosely it may be employed even in
some
passages of the Bible, could come into existence only
on
the basis of the belief that the murderer is in control of
the
murdered man's blood; only on the basis of this belief
would
people see in vengeance a demanding back, a 'requir-
ing'
of the blood that was shed. We have also to consider that
the
way in which God 'requires' the murdered man's blood is
invariably
by killing Dr having killed the murderer."97
With regard to the second term Daube
remarks: "As
Mdh lxg, as 'taker back of the blood,'
the 'redeemer,' I sub-
mit,
wins back the blood of his murdered kinsman from the
murderer.
. . . The murderer has obtained control over the
murdered
man's soul. So the Mdh lxg has to redeem the dead
man
from the power of the murderer. By killing the mur-
derer,
he takes back the victim's soul. Vengeance is compen-
sation."98
In understanding the operation of the
goel of blood we
must
give attention to the biblical terminology on the shed-
ding
of blood and blood-vengeance.99 In doing so, we
will be
able
to see the religious motive100 behind the
practice of
vengeance
in the Old Testament. We shall conduct our study
without
going into questions related to the dating of the
texts,
which would be beyond the scope of our inquiry.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid., p. 124. Cf. also, J.
Porter, "Legal Aspects of Corporate Personal-
ity,"
VT, 15, 1965, p. 375.
99, For a classification of the
usages of the term "blood" in the Bible, cf. L.
Moms,
"The Biblical Use of the Term Blood,"
For
discussions of various terms having a connection with blood-vengeance, cf. K.
Koch,
"Der Spruch ‘Sein Blut bleibe auf seinem Haupt' and die israelitische
Auffassung
vom vergossenen Blut," VT, 12,
1962, pp. 1-42; H. Kosmala, "His
Blood
on us and on our Children," Annual
of the Swedish Theological Institute,
7,
1968-69, pp. 104-108; H. G. Reventlow, "Sein Blut komme über sein
Haupt,"
VT, 10, 1960, pp.
311-327.
100. J. Salmon, op. cit., pp. 143, 144, writes, "The obligation of the family
unit
to avenge an injury or death caused to one of its members is not merely a
matter
of family pride, nor even of a family solidarity necessitated by the exigen-
cies
of nomadic existence; it was elevated to the level of a religious demand, a
demand
of the God of the household, clan, or tribe...."
The Goel In
From
our standpoint it is not strictly necessary to deal with
these
questions; in our opinion there is less development in
the
Old Testament ideas concerning the shedding of blood
and
blood-vengeance than many authors presuppose.
Genesis 4:10 speaks of Abel's blood
crying to God from
the
ground. In Genesis 9:5, 6, we read "For your lifeblood I
will
surely require a reckoning (wrdx); of every
beast, I will
require
it and of man; of every man's brother I will require
the
life of man. Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man
shall
his blood be shed; for God made man in his own
image."
Job 16:18 gives us a similar thought, "0 earth, cover
not
my blood and let my cry find no resting place." Job's
appeal
in this context is to his witness in heaven to whom he
appeals
for justice, cf. Ezekiel 24:6-8. In Genesis 42:22, we
find
Reuben saying, "Did I not tell you not to sin against the
lad?
But you would not listen. So now there comes a reckon-
ing
for his blood" (wrdn hnh vmd Mg).
The Psalmist (9:13 [12]) speaks of the
Lord himself as
the
Divine Avenger of Blood101 (Mymd
wrd)
who does not for-
get
the cry of the afflicted. The Lord is portrayed as Divine
Avenger
in II Kings 9:7 26, "And you shall strike down—the
house
of Ahab your master, that I may avenge (ytmqnv)102 on
101. NEB translates the term Mymd
wrd/with
"Avenger of Blood."
102. D. Daube, Studies, p. 47, suggests that the concept of God as redeemer
of
the blood of Israel is particularly common in the Old Testament. He cites Isa.
47:3
ff.) 59:17-20; 63:4. Regarding the use of the verb Mqn Daube comments,
"Maybe
a considerable number of texts representing God as avenging Israel—Mqn,
etc.—such as Deuteronomy XXXII. 43 are intended
to suggest the idea of redemp-
tion
of blood even though they do not use the term 'to redeem.'" Ibid., p. 55.
Regarding
the employment of vengeance terminology in the prophecies of final
salvation
in the Old Testament, Daube (p. 47) remarks: "It must now be added
that
of those texts which emphasize the spiritual side of salvation the majority
seem
primarily to allude to redemption of a murdered man's blood. The reason
for
this may be that in the case of spiritual salvation, salvation from sin, the
destruction
of the opposing party, of sin, is even more requisite than in the case
of
salvation from human enemies." Daube (p. 58) cites Hosea 13:14 as
illustrating
his
argument and writes, "As death and grave are to be utterly destroyed, the
parallel
with the redemption of a murdered man's blood, carried out by killing the
murderer,
is particularly appropriate." He gives a second reason: "When God
redeems
man from sin, He redeems not so much his body or property as his wpn,
his
soul.... Just so it is the soul which, in the case of murder, has to be
redeemed
112 The Goel In
Jezebel
the blood of my servants the prophets, and the blood
of
all the servants of the Lord. .. . As surely as I saw yester-
day
the blood of Naboth and the blood of his sons—says the
Lord—I
will requite (ytmlwv)103 you on this
plot of ground."
According to Numbers 35:33 ff. blood
pollutes the land:
"You
shall not thus pollute the land in which you live; for
blood
pollutes the land, and no expiation can be made for
the
land, for the blood which is shed in it, except by the
blood
of him who shed it. You shall not defile the land in
which
you live, in the midst of which I dwell." Compare
Psalm
106:38.
Before we leave this subject of the
shedding of blood, we
must
make mention of several additional terms which have
by
the Mdh lxg, the redeemer of blood. It may be recalled that the
old law of
retaliation
begins, wpn tHt wpn, soul for soul." Ibid., p. 58. For an extensive
discussion
on God as Avenger, cf. John Tolluck, op.
cit., pp. 263-294. Tolluck
discusses
the use of the verb Mqn in the Old Testament and finds (p. 105)
that
"the
idea of God as the avenger is not just an exilic or postexilic creation, but
that
it
has a basis in much earlier times." He believes (p. 70) that "some of
the clearest
cases
of blood-vengeance never mention Md or the avenger
of blood. They are
present
by inference rather than specific
designation." Tolluck makes the sugges-
tion
that the Suffering Servant in the second half of Isaiah is the reversal of the
figure
of the goel. "Deutero-Isaiah uses g'l
not only in the broader sense of
redemption,
but specifically in relation to Jahweh as Goel who carries out Mqn
for
his
people. It may be that Deutero-Isaiah has reversed the figure of the goel taken
from
blood vengeance terminology and used it to set forth his conception of the
Suffering
Servant," p. 294. "Jahweh as avenger was believed to carry out ven-
geance
through agents such as men, nations, or natural forces. In a word, they
were
his servants. What is being proposed here is that Jahweh, the Goel of Israel,
has
done an astonishing thing through his agent, the Suffering Servant. Through
the
Servant, he has brought expiation and salvation to his sinful people, the
transgressors
of the covenant. But the transgressor does not die. Instead, through
a
reversal of roles, the Servant, who normally would carry out Yahweh's ven-
geance,
submits himself to the avenging action...." pp. 290, 291. According to J.
Morgenstern,
"The Book of the Covenant, Part II," p. 59, Mqn is
"clearly the
technical
term for 'to exact blood revenge.'" For a list of the references to
Yahweh
as the Divine God, with the specific nuances of Yahweh as Redeemer of
Blood,
as well as the Redeemer from slavery and the Divine Goel who comes to
the
aid of the widow
103. The piel of the verb Mlw
is
also found with the Lord as subject in Deut.
32:41
and II Sam. 3:39. In the former passage the verb Mlw is parallel
with Mqn.
Very
interesting is Deut. 32:43, "He takes vengeance on his adversaries, and
makes
expiation for the land of his people." In these passages the claims of
justice
are
being executed by Yahweh, who functions as the goel. Cf. W. Èisenbeis,
Die Wurzel Mlw im Alten Testament (BZAW, 113), 1969, pp. 310-315.
The Goel In
some
connection with blood-vengeance. In the Deuteronomic
passage
dealing with the avenger of blood, mention is made
of
the shedding of innocent blood (19:10). Sufficient cities
of
refuge are to be established "lest innocent blood (yqn
Md)
be
shed in your land which the Lord your God gives you for
an
inheritance, and so the guilt of bloodshed be upon you."
This
term is also found in Deuteronomy 21:1-9 where cere-
monies
are prescribed for the case in which one is found lying
slain
in the open country whose killer is not known. "And all
the
elders of that city nearest to the slain man shall wash
their
hands over the heifer whose neck was broken in the
valley;
and they shall testify 'Our hands did not shed this
blood,
neither did our eyes see it shed.104 Forgive, 0
Lord,
thy
people
guilt
of innocent blood in the midst of thy people
let
the guilt of blood be forgiven them.’ So you shall purge
the
guilt of innocent blood from your midst" (Deut. 21:6-
9).105 From these passages we learn that guilt
resulting from a
murder
contaminates the murderer and cries out for ven-
geance.
Moreover, the blood contaminates the land, city (Jer.
26:5)
and the people;106 and measures
must be taken to
104. D. Daube, "Direct and
Indirect Causation in Biblical Law," VT,
11,
1961,
p. 250, (hereafter cited as "Causation") writes, "The second
half embraces
any
manner of participating or condoning."
105. Additional passages where the
term "innocent blood" is found are
I
Sam. 19:5; II Kings 21:16; 24:4; Isa. 59:7; Jer. 2:34; 7:6; 19:4; 22:3, 17;
26:15;
Joel 4:19; Jonah 1:14; Ps. 94:21; 106:38; Prov. 1:11; 6:17. G. R. Driver
and
J. C. Miles, The Babylonian Laws, 1,
1952, p. 317, see the elders in Deut. 21
acting
as the goel of blood, requiting the blood of the slain by means of the blood
of
the heifer. G. von Rad, Deuteronomy,
OTL, 1966, pp. 136, finds in this
passage
a combination of very ancient as well as late materials. It contains points
which
make it difficult to compare the ceremony with a sacrifice. These include
the
killing of the animal, not at a place of worship but at a waste plot of ground;
the
method of killing: by breaking the neck. "It was on the contrary, a
magical
procedure
for getting rid of sin, possibly to be compared with the sending away of
the
scapegoat into a desert place.... But the whole procedure has been given a
new
interpretation by the prayer to Yahweh in v. 8. Now it is no longer a magical
procedure,
efficacious in itself, which diverts the calamity towards an unculti-
vated
area, but it is God who in his mercy purges the guilt."
106. K. Koch, op. cit., p. 405, writes, "Wo Blut vergossen wird, bildet es
eine
‘Blutsphäre,' die den Urheber der
Tat einhüllt, vor allem an seinen Händen
114 The Goel In
counteract
the contamination. The term "innocent blood"
then
applies to those slain without cause or justification, and
not
in accordance with the duty of blood-vengeance.107
The discharging of the duty of
blood-vengeance is some-
times
expressed by the phrase dYm Mdh tx wqb. When
Rechab
and Baanah slew Ishbosheth and came to David to
report
what they had done, he asks them, "Shall I not now
require
his blood at your hand ... ?" (II Sam. 4:11). Similar
phrases
may be seen in I Samuel 20:16 and Ezekiel 3:18,
20.108
A final reference to blood-vengeance
is found in the
phrase
vb vymd and jwxr lf jmd.109 Passages
containing
this
phrase are numerous (Lev. 20:9, 11, 12, 13, 16, 27; Josh.
2:19,
II Sam. 1:16; I Kings -2:37; Ezek. 18:13; 33:4, 5).
und
seinem Haupt haftet, aber auch die Menschen ergreift, mit denen er
zusammenlebt."
107. J. Morgenstern, "The Book
of the Covenant, Part II," pp. 59, 60. In
II
Sam. 3:28, David makes the following statement regarding Joab's killing of
Abner:
''I and my kingdom are for ever guiltless (yqn) before the
Lord for the
blood
of Abner the son of Ner." There the words ymdm. . . yqn may mean
"not
subject
to the penalty of blood revenge."
108. In Ezek. 3:18, 20, the prophet
is spoken of as the watchman who must
warn
the wicked concerning their sin; otherwise "that wicked man shall die in
his
iniquity;
but his blood I will require (wqbx)." In
Ezek. 33:6 there is a similar
reference
to the watchman, ''but his blood I will require at the watchman's hand"
(wrdx
hpch dym vmdv).
K. Koch, op. cit., p. 410, states,
"So steht hinter
diesem
Brauch [Blutrache] eine zwiefältige Vorstellung vom vergossenen Blut.
Einerseits wirkt diese Blutsphäre
an dem Menschen Unheil, den sie nun
umgibt;
andrerseits aber ist dieses
Blut—vom Erschlagenen her gesehen—unter
fremder
Botmässigkeit und ‘schreit’
nach Ruckkehr zur angestammten Gemeinschaft."
The
phrase wpn wqb occurs often in the Old Testament (Ps. 35:4, 38:13
[12] ;
40:15
[14]; 63:10 [9]; 70:3 [2]; 86:14; Prov. 29:10; II Sam. 16:11; I Kings
19:10,
14; Jer. 11:21) and signifies death by violent means.
109. On the distinction between the
prepositions, Koch, op. cit., p. 413
n.
2,
writes: "Zu beachten ist, dass die Preposition n in der Regel mit dem
Singular
Md, die Präposition lf dagegen mit dem
Plural Mymd verbunden
wird. Anscheinend
denkt
man im ersten Fall an einen noch geschlossenen Blutkreislauf, er soll nach
der
Tötung nicht den Körper des Getöteten verlassen und
auseinanderspritzen,
sonder in ihm erstarren. Beit, lf
Mymd
dagegen hat der Sprecher das in Blutspritzer
und-sphären
verteilte Blut vor Augen und wunscht, dass es auf den eigentlichen
Besitzer
zurückgeht (oder auf den schuldigen Morder übergeht)." It should be
noted
that in Jer. 51:35 there is similar blood terminology but with the preposi-
tion
lx:
"'The violence done to me and to my kinsmen be upon
inhabitant
of
let
The Goel In
Koch
comments, "Sie will bei gewaltsamer Tötung die Über-
tragung der
Blutsphäre ausschliessen. Vermutlich hat jeder
Blutracher
diesen Satz ausgerufen, ehe oder nachdem er
seinen
Gegner niederstreckte. Durch einen solchen fluchähn-
lichen
Spruch verhinderte der Tötende oder (in den kul-
tischen
Gebotsreihen z.B.) sein Auftraggeber, Bass das Blut
des
zu Tötenden nicht nur sichtbar, sondern auch unsichtbar
auf
den Tater übersprang und Bich als Blutsphäre auf ihm
verteilte."119
There can be no doubt that Koch is
correct in relating the
phrase
in question to the sphere of blood-vengeance. There is
a
question, however, as to whether these words were spoken
by
the goel of blood or by the judicial authorities. According
to
Boecker the original function of these phrases seems to
have
been that of a verdict formula111 used in the
judicial112
process.
The formula was a pronouncement by the judge that
the
accused was guilty of murder. Additional light is thrown
upon
this expression where we note its use in Leviticus 20,
where
the phrase Mb Mhymd. . . vtmvy
vtm
occurs (vv. 9, 11,
12,
13, 16). Reventlow suggests that the expression should be
understood
in connection with two other punishment pro-
nouncements:
xwy vnvf "he shall bear his iniquity" (Lev.
20:17,
19, 20) and the trk pronouncements, "they shall be
cut
off" (Lev. 17:4, 9, 10, 14)."3 He remarks: "Auch die
Formel vb vymd ist eine kultrechtliche Disqualifikations-
110. K. Koch, op. cit., p. 413.
111. Other examples of verdict
formulae are xvh Hcr in Num. 35:16, 17,
18,
21, and jpw
112. H. J. Boecker, Redeformen des Rechtslebens inn Alten
Testament,
1964,
p. 138, states that the phrase vb vymd is a
"Urteilsformel, und zwar als
Schuldigerklärung
anzusehen ist: ‘er hat Blutschuld.’" J. Salmon, op. cit., p. 178,
comments
on this phrase, "It has obvious reference to the practice of blood-
vengeance.
By this formula the public judicial authorities declared themselves not
responsible
for the death of the criminal and thereby precluded any future act of
blood-vengeance
for him, at the same time absolving the family of any responsi-
bility
to take such action."
113. H. G. Reventlow, op. cit., p. 318.
116 The Goel In
formel
mit selbstwirkender Folge, von einem bevollmächtig-
ten
Kultbeamten nber einen Kultteilnehmer ausgesprochen.”114
Leviticus 17:4 shows very clearly the
connection between
the
shedding of blood and the bloodguilt—wyxl bwHy Md
114. H. G. Reventlow, op. cit., pp. 318, 319. Reventlow's
designation of the
phrase
vb vymd as a declaration made by a cultic official brings
to our attention
his
area of disagreement with Koch, who in his article, "Gibt es ein Vergeltungs-
dogma
im Alten Testament," ZThK, 52,
1955, pp. 1-42, (hereafter cited as "Ver-
geltungsdogma")
argued that in the Old Testament there is no concept of a
"vergeltenden
Gottes" but rather of a "schicksalwirkender Tat." This basic
thrust
Koch
relates to the theme of bloodguilt in the Old Testament. Commenting on
Judg.
9:24, he writes: "Der Gedanke der schicksalwirkenden Tat ist hier mit dem
anderen
verbunden, dass bei einem Mord das Blut des Gemordeten auf den
Mörder
ubergeht, an ihm hz.ften bleibt..... Der Tod des
Mörders entnimmt seine
Umgebung der Sphäre seiner schicksalwirkenden Tat.
Die Wendung ‘sein Blut
komme auf sein Haupt’ soil bei der Tötung eines
Morders verhindern, dass diese
wieder
zum Mord wird, sich gleichsam zur Sphare erhebt, die einen anderen
blutdurchwaltet
`umhüllt.'" "Vergeltungsdogma," pp. 23, 24. H. G. Reventlow,
op. cit., p. 322,
argues against Koch "dass die Fluchformel vb vymd einen leben-
digen
Herrn als die hinter ihr stehende und ihre Straffolge ausfuhrende Instanz
voraussetzt."
His argument is twofold: (1) that this curse pronouncement is of-
fered
in a context of prayer. He cites I Kings 2:32 as one example and comments,
"Jahwe is die eigentliche Macht, die auf eine Tat
die ihr gebuhrende Strafe folgen
lassen kann. Das Gebet nimrat die Stelle des Fluches
ein"; op. cit., p. 323. (2) The
use
of the curse pronouncement by the prophets in connection with "des gött-
lichen
Ichs." He cites Ezek. 9:10; 11:21; 22:31; Joel 4:2, 4 (3:2, 4) and writes:
"In
der prophetischen Verkindigung tritt aber auch in der Form das gottliche Ich
als
der eigentliche Mittelpunkt hervor; wir können beobachten, wie das Ich
Yahwes
sich machtvoll Bahn bricht und der göttliche Richter sich selbst als die
alles
in der Hand habende und die Dinge lenkende Macht prasentiert"; op. cit., p.
324.
He summarizes his disagreement with Koch as follows: "Was uns als das
israelitische
Denken von der schicksalwirkenden Tatsphare und der unlöslichen
Verhaftung
von Handeln land seiner Folge klargeworden ist, stellt nur eine
Schicht,
und zwar eine sehr altertümliche, ins Unterbewusstsein abgesunkene
Urstruktur
des israelitischen Denkens dar.... Eine andere
Sphäre ist die des
Kultrechts, in der der deklaratorische Wahrspruch des
Kultbeamten vb vymd zu
hause ist: kultisch mächtiges Handeln, das in sich
die Kraft trägt, geheirne
Zusammenhänge
in Bewegung zu setzen.... Kultische Rituale und kultisches
Recht,
alles wird auf den Gott hin ausgerichtet, der sein persönliches Sein und
seinen
persönlichen Willen auf dem Bundesfest offenbart"; op. cit., pp. 325, 326.
It
is beyond the scope of our inquiry to go any deeper into the view of Koch and
of
the critique which Reventlow and others have offered. We believe that Revent-
low
has given, in principle, a valid criticism of Koch.
The Goel In
jpw Md xvhh—"Bloodguilt115 shall be
imputed116 to that
man
who has shed blood." For that matter, Leviticus 17:4 is
for
our argument not the best example of the connection
between
Md
and bloodguilt, since it refers to cultic violations
rather
than to the sin of murder. There are other cases where
the
plural Mymd
refers clearly to the guilt which comes from
shedding
blood (cf. Ex. 22:1-2 [2-3]; Num. 35:27; I Sam.
25:26,
33; Hos. 12:15 [14] ). It is possible that some of the
denunciations
by the prophets of the "blood" on the hands
of
judges, priests, and other cultic officials refer to instances
in
which a slayer should have been put to death because of
his
bloodguilt, but was allowed to offer compensation for his
crime
or perhaps to bribe a judge from whom the legal deci-
sion
would come. Perhaps such was the basis for the words in
Isaiah
26:21, "For behold, the Lord is coming forth out of
his
place to punish the inhabitants of the earth for their
iniquity;
and the earth will disclose the blood shed upon her,
and
will no more cover her slain," compare also Isaiah 1:15;
33:15;
59:3, 7; Ezekiel 7:23; 9:9; 16:36; Hosea 4:2, 6:8;
12:15
(14); Micah 3:10; Habakkuk 2:12, 17.
We can therefore conclude that in
tive
emphasis on the sanctity of human life. Human life is
sacred,
for man is created in the image of God. The crime of
murder
is a particularly heinous crime since it constitutes an
attack
on God himself, for which the murderer’s life is to be
115. The, connection between Md and bloodguilt
may be seen as well in
Deut.
17:8 which mentions legal cases regarding homicide (Mdl
Md Nyb).
H. G.
Reventlow,
op. cit., pp. 319, 320, notes the use
of the phrase Md jpw Nfml in
Ezek.
22:6, 9, 12: "Der Ausdruck dienit dort [v. 6] als Überschrift für
jeweils eine
ganze Reihe von Vergehen, von denen keines eigentlich mit
Blutvergiessen zu tun
hat."
Because of this and other texts he concludes that the best translation of
vb vymd, "Seine Verschuldung komme über ihn." "Das
Bewusstsein, dass es sich
dabei
ursprunglich um die Bezeichnung fur ‘Blutschuld’ gehandelt hat, ist mehr
and
mehr verschwunden."
116. G. von Rad, The Problem of the Hexateuch, 1966, p.
126, writes,
"Here,
too, the word bwH denotes a declaratory act which the
priest performs on
behalf
of Yahweh, although in this case it concerns a capital offence with regard
to
the cultus, for blood-guilt is to Yahweh the most heinous of all sins.
According-
ly
it attracts the extreme punishment, that of being 'cut off from among the
people.'"
118 The Goel In
taken
by the goel of blood. The goel acts as the agent of the
Lord
himself. Correctly does van Oeveren describe the duty
of
the goel of blood when he remarks, "Alleen de moord-
enaar
moet sterven. Niet door de willekeurige wraak van een
enkeling,
maar in het belang van de gemeenschap en op grand
van
Goddelijk gezag, Dese ‘bloedwraak’ is dan ook meer clan
een
recht; ze is een door God geboden plicht."117
The goel was the, instrument for the
administration, of
justice
in the early period, of Israelite history. According to
Tolluck,
"Blood-vengeance was the oldest form of criminal
justice
since it provided a means to make sure that a criminal
was
punished when there was no other way to assure that
such
punishment would be carried out. . . . Blood-vengeance
thus
was law, but law in a most imperfect, yet most necessary
manifestation.
When there was no other law, the imperfect
form
of law had to suffice."118
Both van Oeveren and Morgenstern,
though with differ-
ences,
sketch the historical development of blood vengeance
in
ancient
geance
was enacted upon the slayer without, regard to his
motive
or perhaps upon some other, member of his clan. This
was
followed by a second phase during which the state be-
came
active in regulating blood-vengeance and in which a
clear
distinction was made between murder and unintentional
homicide.
In this intermediate stage blood-revenge was car-
ried
out by the family, under the supervision of the state,
which
regulated the conditions under which vengeance might
be
enacted. In the third stage, according to Morgenstern, "the
practice
of blood-revenge, at least in its most literal and prim-
itive
form has given; way to execution by the state.”120 Van
117. B. van Oeveren, op. cit., p. 232. See chap. 3, nn. 79,
80.
118. J. Tolluck, op. cit., pp. 231, 232. Cf. also G. von
Rad, TOT, 1, 1962,
p.
31, "In Israel the blood-feud was in certain cases a legitimate
institution for the
repression
of violence."
119. B. van Oeveren, op. cit., pp. 228-232; J. Morgenstern,
"The Book of
the
Covenant, Part II," p. 57 n. 52.
120. J. Morgenstern, op. cit., p. 57 n. 52.
The Goel
In
Oeveren
sees the third phase as a further broadening of stage
two.
There is still a clear distinction between the intentional
and
unintentional taking of life, but now the cities of refuge
are
designated as an asylum, and there is evidence from
II
Samuel 14:8-11 that the state is seeking to curtail the prac-
tice
of blood-vengeance.121 These phases
may he accepted as
providing
us in a broad way with some
understanding of the
practice
of blood-vengeance in Israel.122
A major factor in controlling and
limiting blood-ven-
geance
was the rise of a constituted legal authority in the
form
of a state government.123 The ius talionis of Exodus
21:23-25124
restricted the retaliation to that which was con-
sistent
with the crime itself. The family must remain content
with
that measure of retaliation which was allowed it by the
state.
The principle of one life in place of one life restricts
the
exercise of vengeance. Of course, this was not always
carried
out, as can be seen in the case of Jehu, who acted as
God's
agent in avenging Naboth's death but who showed no
restraint
in his slaughter of Ahab's family (II Kings 9 and 10).
Unrestrained vengeance was limited as
well by the prac-
tice
of asylum at the altar. In the law of Exodus 21:12-14,
there
is a clear distinction drawn between intentional and
121. B. van Oeveren, op. cit., pp. 230, 231.
122. A detailed study of the
practice of blood vengeance in Israel would
require
attention to be given not only to the legal materials but to the following
passages
from the historical books: Judg. 8, 9:56; II Sam. 2;12-23; 3:12-29; 4:8-
11;
14:1-4; 16:5-8; 18:9-15; 20:4-10; 21:1-14; I Kings 2:28-28-34; I Kings 14:5, 6.
Cf.
B. van Oeveren, op. cit., pp.
234-237. He comments (p. 237), "Het 0. T.
vermeldt
bijzonder weinig gevallen van de uitoefening van de bloedwraak. Maar
we
moeten wel als zeker aannemen, dat de bloedwraak in Israel vaker is uit-
geoefend,
dan het 0. T. vermeldt."
123. G. Ch. Aalders, Genesis, KV, 19603, p. 233, comrnents on
Gen. 9:6,
"Ongetwijfeld
mogen we daarom ook wel aannemen, dat Gen. 9:6 in keim het
optreden
van de overheid bevat. De door God gestelde rechtsregel van de dood-
straf
voor de moordenaar leidt met noodzakelijkheid naar het optreden van de
overheid
heen."
124. Cf. D. Daube, Studies, pp. 102-152. In more recent
times, cf. S. Paul,
Studies in the
Book of the Covenant in the light of Cuneiform and Biblical Law
(SVT,
18), 1970, pp. 70-77, and B. Jackson, "The Problem of Exod. XXI 22-5
(Ius
Talionis)," VT, 23, 1973, pp.
273-30 (hereafter cited as "Ius Talionis").
120 The Goel In
unintentional
slaying. "Whoever strikes a man so that he dies
shall
be put to death. But if he did not lie in wait for him,
but
God let him fall into his hand,125 then I will
appoint for
you
a place to which he may flee. But if a man willfully
attacks
another to kill him treacherously, you shall take him
from
my altar, that he may die." Examples of asylum at the
altar
in
in
passages like Psalm 27:4-6126 antt Obadiah17.127 Here as
well
we see that homicide is no longer exclusively a private
matter
to be settled between families. The state has inter-
vened
and a clear distinction is drawn between premeditated
slaying
and the accidental taking of life. It is only legal to
take
the life of a murderer (Deut. 24:16). An important ques-
tion
connected with the interpretation of this law is: Who is
the
one to put to death the intentional killer? In verse 12, we
have
the well-known formula tmvy tvm. Because this
125. On the phrase, "God let
him fall into his hands," cf. B. van Oeveren,
op. cit., p. 70, who
gives the general interpretation of this verse, i.e., the uninten-
tional
slayer is an instrument in God's hand and thus God ensures his protection.
Of
interest is the explanation of D. Daube, "Causation," pp. 264-269,
who inter-
prets
the verse in the light a I Sam. 24:14 (13), "As the proverb of the
ancients
says,
'Out of the wicked comes forth wickedness'; but my hand shall not be
against
you." Daube suggests that the one who was delivered by the Lord into the
hand
of the accidental slayer was himself an evildoer. The passage in I Sam. 24
deals
in general with the theme of divine justice. In addition, there is similar
terminology
in the verb "to lie in wait," found only in Ex. 21:13 and I Sam.
24:12
(11). Daube writes (p. 268), "Here is Saul, a murderous "character,
who
cannot
be summoned before an earthly tribunal, but whom God will deliver over
to
vengeance. The wicked man—and only he—will end by others sinning against
him.
In fact, in a way, the judgment is beginning even at this moment: Saul in the
cave
could easily be dispatched by David, whose men advise him: 'Behold, the day
of
which the Lord said, I will give thine enemy into thine hand' (Remember that
in
Expd. XXI 13 God delivers the criminal into the homicide's hand). And David
himself
calls out to Saul: 'Thine eyes have seen how that the Lord hath given thee
today
into mine hand.'
126. Cf. B. Dinur, "The
Religious Character of the Cities of Refuge and the
Ceremony
of Admission into Them," Eretz-Israel,
3, 1954, pp. 135-146 (Heb.
with
a resume in English).
127. B. van Oeveren, op. cit., pp. 130-135, lists Ps. 5:5;
27:4-6; 61:5; and
Obad.
17 as texts which point toward the right of asylum by temple and altar.
128. For a comprehensive study of
this term, cf. H. Schulz, Das Todesrecht
im Alten
Testament
(BZAW, 114), 1969. Cf. also H. Boecker, op.
cit., p. 144,
who
understands the formula as a "Tatfolgebestimmung."
The Goel In
formula
is used in Numbers 35:16 18, 21, and 31, where the
goel
of blood was the one who took the murderer's life (vv.
19,
21) some have assumed that such was also the case in
Exodus
21:12. Thus Pedersen writes, "Now the question is:
Who
shall slay the slayer and possibly drag him from the
altar? There can be no doubt that it is
the go’el, the aven-
ger."129 Others see the
execution as being performed by the
state
and not by the goel of blood.130 In favor of the
latter
position,
we may cite Exodus 21:15-17, where the death
verdict
was enacted through the state.131 One might also
argue
that the "you" in Exodus 21:13 and 14 probably refers
to
Israel.132 Against this it can be said,
with Jackson, "that
Exod.
21:12 is formulated from the point of view of the
killer,
and is not concerned with the procedure to be fol-
lowed
by the family of the deceased. But it is clear from the
text
that he must flee from someone, presumably a kins-
man."133 We referred
above to the argument that the use of
tmvy tvm in Exodus 21:15, which involved
execution by the
state,
suggests that such was the case as well in Exodus 21:
12.
We also saw (n. 130) that Morgenstern regards the phrase
as
a technical one for execution by the state. He feels com-
pelled,
however, to make an exception in the case of the law
129. J. Pedersen, op. cit., p. 396.
130. So, for instance, J.
Morgenstern, "The Book of the Covenant, Part II,"
p.
60 n. 52, writes: "Our contention seems well established that mot yumat
technically
implies execution only by the state and not at all by the avenger of
the
blood, and that therefore, when used to designate the punishment for wilful
murder,
as in Ex. 21:12, it implies that the old institution of blood-revenge, even
in
its second stage of evolution, has been outgrown, and that in cases of murder
or
manslaughter
the determination of the guilt, degree of responsibility and corre-
sponding
character of the crime, the fixing of the penalty and its actual execution
are
all matters of the state alone." Morgenstern (p. 59) regards Ex. 21:13-14
as
assuming
the institution of blood-revenge and not state execution.
131. M. Lohr, Das Asylwesen im Alten Testament, SKGG, 1930, p. 211,
comes
to a similar conclusion as Morgenstern based on Ex. 21:15-17, "Die Formel
tmvy tvm gilt immer von der offiziellen
Urteilsvollstreckung, hier etwa Steinigung
durch
die Gemeindemitglieder. Ist das bei v. 15-17 sicher, so muss es auch in v. 12
gelten."
In Ex. 21:15-17, where the same term is employed, the law would not
have
required the parents to put their own children to death.
132. B. van Oeveren, op. cit., p. 69.
133. B. Jackson, "Criminal
Law," p. 33 n. 176.
122 The Goel In
of
the homicidal ox. "But if the ox has been accustomed to
gore
in the past, and its owner has been warned but has not
kept
it in, and it kills a man or a woman, the ox shall be
stoned,
and its owner also shall be put to death. If a ransom
is
laid on him, then he shall give for the redemption of his life
whatever
is laid upon him" (Exod. 21:29, 30). In this in-
stance,
according to Morgenstern, "the death of the owner
was
likewise not a mere matter of state execution, in punish-
ment
for his negligence, but was also an act of blood-revenge,
although
apparently under the supervision of the state. . . .
The
provision for ransom money in redemption for the life
of
the owner of the ox, in verse 30, likewise points to the
conclusion
that this was a case of execution in blood-revenge,
and
presumably by the family or clan of the slain man, and
not
yet by the state; for it is clear that the ransom money is
paid
entirely to the family or clan of the slain man, and that
it
is the family or clan which fixes, or at least takes the
initiative
in fixing, the amount of the ransom money.”134 If
the
interests of the family came to expression in the case
where
someone was killed by a goring ox, can such interests
be
excluded in regular cases of homicide?135 The involvement
of
the family in the legal matters incorporated in the cove-
nant
code can also be seen in Exodus 21:22 where the law
regulating
a miscarriage caused by a blow, stipulates that a
fine
is laid upon the offending party by the woman's hus-
band.136 In this
instance we see the private family parties
involved
in an active way in the judicial process.137
134. J. Morgenstern, op. cit., p. 92. On the goring ox law
see n. 159.
135. See the remarks of A. van Selms
in n. 159.
136. The RSV translates Ex. 21:22b,
"The one who hurt her shall be fined
according
as the woman's husband shall lay upon him; and he shall pay as the
judges
determine." The latter phrase "and he shall pay as the judges
determine"
presents
a problem coming directly upon the statement which apparently gives
the
husband the right to de termine the ransom (cf. the same verb "to lay
upon"
in
Ex. 21:30). For the various interpretations of the final clause Mllpn
Ntny cf.
B.
Jackson,
"Ius Talionis," pp. 277, 278.
"an
interpolation, representing the growth of state authority at the expense of
self-help."
S. Paul, op. cit., p. 72, believes that it can be translated "the payment
to
be based on reckoning."
137. Cf. F. C. Fensham,
"Aspects of Family Law in the Covenant Code in
The Goel In
There were occasions when the family
probably was
unable
to play a role in the enactment of justice. This can be
seen
in the law of Exodus 21:20: "When a man strikes his
slave,
male or female, with a rod and the slave dies under his
hand,
he shall be punished." The latter clause Mqny Mqn is too
weakly
rendered by the RSV, "he shall be punished." Rather
it
should be translated, "he shall surely suffer vengeance." We
must
undoubtedly see here the sentence of the court for
blood-vengeance.138 It is likely
that the execution of the ver-
dict
in this instance would have been through the instrumen-
tality
of public justice,139 since the
relatives of the slave
would
not have been in a position to avenge the slave's
death.140
Perhaps it is best to say that the law
of Exodus 21:12-14
presupposed
involvement by both the avenger (from whom
the
murderer has fled to the altar) and, to some extent, the
state
(which has laid down the guidelines for distinguishing
between
premeditated and unpremeditated homicide). Thus
Light
of Ancient Near Eastern Parallels," DI,
I, 1969, p. XIX: "Although most of
the
laws discussed have parallels and sometimes close parallels in ancient Near
Eastern
legal material, the legal approach is different. In some cases a spirit of
sympathy
with the situation of inferiors occurs. The value of the human life is
also
accentuated. The most striking peculiarity, however, is the strong sense of
family
solidarity."
138. U. Cassuto, A Commentary on the Book of Exodus,
1967, p. 490. The
view
of M. Sulzberger, The Ancient Hebrew Law
of Homicide, 1915, p. 137, that
"the
man whose slave died under his rod was punished by imprisonment and this
is
what is meant by nakom yinnakem,
"is unlikely.
139. J. Salmon, op. cit., p. 174, comments, "There are already signs in BC
(Book
of the Covenant) that public judicial authority was taking some of the
responsibility
for the punishment of murderers when there was no possibility of
familial
action." M. Greenberg, "Crimes and Punishments," IDB, I, p. 738, thinks
that
a foreign slave is in view and writes, "The last law is unparalleled for
its
interest
in the slave as human being rather than chattel: because he has no kin to
avenge
him—a foreign slave is intended—the law demands that he 'be avenged'
(Mqn) by Israelite
justice.” On the, basis of this law of Ex. 21:20 ff. A. Phillips,
Ancient Israel'
Criminal Law,
1970, p. 88, remarks, "Further, it may be deduced
from
this enactment that if a foreigner was murdered while in
munity
would exercise blood-vengeance on his behalf." Cf. also H. W. Wolff,
"Masters
and Slaves," Interpretation, 27,
1973, p. 267.
140. Contra, J. Pederson, op. cit., p. 402, who thinks fiat in Ex.
21:20 "it
must
be a question of an Israelite slave, whose kin may claim a penalty."
124 The Goel In
Falk,
citing Exodus 21:12 along with other verses, writes: "A
murderer,
on the other hand, was still extradited to the kins-
man
of the victim, who was to avenge the blood after the
official
judgment had been passed."141
The law of Exodus 21:12-14 points142
in the direction of
a
further institution which placed limitations upon the unre-
strained
practice of blood: the institution of the cities of
refuge.
This institution presupposes in the clearest way a
moral
distinction between premeditated and unpremeditated
killing.
Six cities of refuge were appointed143 where the acci-
141. Z. Falk, op. cit., pp. 40, 41.
142. Some interpreters identify the
place (Mvqm)
in v. 13 with the altar in v.
14.
Cf. B. van Oeveren, op, cit., p. 73,
for the varying opinions. J. Salmon, op.
cit., p. 162,
writes, "Clearly this place is not the altar, since vs. 14 shows that the
fugitive
slayer was already at the altar. Rather the law appears to refer to another
place,
to which the fugitive could presumably go in safety.... But there is im-
plied
in this law the existence of places of asylum, complementing the practice of
altar
sanctuary and providing for fugitives before the altar a more practical and
permanent
place of refuge from the avenger of blood.... Thus already 'in the
premonarchic
period ... there were appointed places (probably cities) of asylum
for
the manslayer." M. Greenberg, "The Biblical Conception of
Asylum," JBL,
78,
1959, p. 130, writes, "It appears, then, that the city of refuge as
conceived in
Numbers
is the necessary adjunct to, rather than a replacement of, the local altars.
The
altar gives temporary asylum from the immediate danger of pursuit by the
avenger;
the city alone provides for the expiation of bloodguilt which every
stratum
of biblical law associates with homicide." G. von Rad, Deuteronomy,
OTL,
1966, p. 128, writes, "In the course of abolishing the local sanctuaries
the
system
of asylum has to be regulated anew. But it is open to question whether the
establishment
of cities of refuge was an innovation first required by the Deuter-
onomist.
For what happened to those who sought protection at the altar? (Cf.
I
Kings 1:50 f.; 2:28 ff.) It is difficult to imagine that they all remained for
the
rest
of their lives in the confined area of the sacred precincts." B. van
Oeveren,
op. cit., p. 153,
distinguishes "the place" from "the altar" and says that
the word
Mvqm in Ex. 21:13 "een vagc heenwijzing
is naar de instelling der vrijsteden." Cf.
also
his remarks on p. 74.
143. B. van Oeveren, op. cit., p. 226, reaches the following
conclusions:
"(a)
Mozes zondert drie steden af in het Oostjordaanland; na de verovering van
Kanaän
heiligt Jozua nog drie steden in het Westjordaanland. (b) De vrijsteden
hebben
hoofdzakelijk hun functie als toevluchtsplaatsen kunnen uitoefenen
ongeveer
vanaf de periode der Richteren tot de scheuring van het rijk. Zolang de
steden
nog Kanaänitisch waren, was de regeling nog niet uitvoerbaar en ook na de
splitsing
van het rijk was de regeling niet uitvoerbaar. (c) Al zijn de vrijsteden
meer
ideaal dan werkelijkheid geweest, deze erkenning behoeft niets af to doen
van de historiciteit van dit instituut. (d) De pericopen
in de Pentateuch, welke
over de vrijsteden handelen (Ex. 21:12-14; Num. 35:6,
9-34; Deut. 4:41-43;
19:1-13),
zijn in hoofdzaak Mozaisch." N. H.Ridderbos, "Cities of Refuge,"
The Goel In
dental
manslayer might flee for refuge. Deuteronomy 19:4
deals
with the question of intent: "If any man kills his neigh-
bor
unintentionally (tfd ylbb) without being at enmity
with
him in time past," compare verse 6. Compare, too,
Joshua
20:3, "that the manslayer who kills any person with-
out
intent or unwittingly (tfd ylbb hggwb)"; Joshua
20:5,
"because
he killed his neighbor unwittingly having had no
enmity
against him in times past." The type of instrument
involved
in the death (Num. 35:16-18) is important in estab-
lishing
intent as is as well the previous enmity of the one
performing
the act. "And if he stabbed him from hatred, or
hurled
at him, lying in wait, so that he died, or in enmity
struck
him down with his hand, so that he died, then he who
struck
the blow shall be put to death. . . . But if he stabbed
him
suddenly without enmity, or hurled anything on him
without
lying in wait, or used a stone, by which a man may
die,
and without seeing him cast it upon him, so that he died,
though
he was not his enemy, and did not seek his harm"
(Num.
35:20, 21a, 22, 23).145 The accidental slayer gains
NBD,
1962, p. 235, regards the regulations governing the cities of refuge as
coming
in essence from the time of Moses. J. Tolluck, op. cit., p. 251, says the
cities
of refuge-“come from a period no later than the united monarchy.” A.
Phillips,
Ancient Israel's Criminal Law, 1970,
p. 102, argues that Hos., 6:89,
contains
a direct allusion to two pf the cities of refuge, Ramoth Gilead and
Sheckem:
"Thus as Hosea knew as cities of refuge two of those named in Josh.
20:7
ff. they cannot have been the product of Josiah's reform. In fact, their
establishment
must be attributed to the period of the united monarchy for only
then
would all these cities have been in
that
the Mdh lxg, was specifically connected with the cities of
refuge, II Sam.
14:4
ff. prima facie indicates that David
rather than Solomon established them."
144. Cf. D. Daube, The Sudden in the Scripture, 1964, p. 3.
145.
For a discussion of the Hebrew terms used relating to intent cf. B. van
Oeveren,
op cit., pp. 81-85, 141-142. Cf. also
D. Daube, "Causation," pp. 246-
249;
idem, "Error and Accident in the Bible," RIDA, 2, 1949, pp. 189-211. B.
Jackson,
"Ius Talionis," pp. 288, 289, writes: "Premeditation means that
the
action
in question was the result of a preconceived design, not of a desire formed
on
the spur of the moment. Thus not every intentional act is premeditated....
An
ambush was clear evidence of premeditation, but it was not the only possible
evidence.
Exod. XXI 14 used a more general test, whereby a man who plots
against
his neighbor to slay him craftily is
denied the privilege of asylum. To this
Deut.
XIX 4, 6 adds the test of previous hatred between parties.... Unpremedi-
tated
homicide is illustrated in Num. XXXV:22-3.... It is abundantly clear from
126 The Goel In
entrance
to the city of refuge through a preliminary decision
made
by the elders of that city (Josh. 20:4). "He shall flee to
one
of these cities and shall stand at the gate of the city, and
explain
his case to the elders of that city; then they shall take
him
into the city, and give him a place, and he shall remain
with
them."
The elders of the city then bring the
case before the
congregation
(hdf)
for final judgment (Josh. 20:6, 9; Num.
35:12).146 The hdf is best
understood as "de wettige ver-
tegenwoordigers
van het district, waarbinnen de vrijstad
lag.
"147 If the decision is in his favor,
he may stay and the
elders
of the city of refuge will not give the manslayer into
the
hand of the goel of blood (Josh. 20:5). If the decision
rendered
by the congregation is unfavorable, "then the elders
of
his city [the murderer's] shall send and fetch him from
there,
and hand him over to the avenger of blood, so that he
may
die" (Deut. 19:12).148 There is no
bloodguilt involved if
v.
22 that intentional but unpremeditated homicide was not regarded as murder.
In
legal terms there was no di ;ference between it and accidental homicide, as v.
23
and
Deut. XIX 5 well show." Cf. also Z. Falk, "Sociological Notes on
Deuter-
onomy,"
DI, 3, 1972, pp. XLI-XLIII for a
discussion on the connection between
the
type of material employed in causing a death and the question of premedita-
tion.
146. B. van Oeveren, op. cit., p. 125, writes, "De
oudsten lichten zo spoedig
mogelijk
de ‘eda in over het feit, dat een
naar hun oordeel onopzettelijke dood-
slager de toevlucht heeft gencmen in de vrijstad en dan
komt de ‘eda bijeen om de
zaak nader te onderzoeken en een definitief vonnis te
vellen." Josh.
20:6 appears
to
be saying that the one granted a temporary asylum may stay until his case
comes
before the congregaticn for judgment or until the death of the high priest,
but,
as van Oeveren (pp. 125, 126) has rightly pointed out, "de bepalingen van
Num.
35 zijn hier heel kort en beknopt samengevat. We moeten a.h.w.
tussen de
regels
door lezen: de laatste bepaling is alleen
van kracht, wanneer de `eda
eveneens het
onopzettelijk karakter van de doodslag bewezen acht en de dood-
slager naar de
vrijstad heeft doen terugkeren."
147. A. Noordtztj, Het Boek Numeri,
KV, 19572, p. 352. Because of the
verb
(vbywhv—restore)
in Num. 35:25, it is not likely that the hdf sat within the
city
of refuge. A. Phillips, op. cit., p.
107, argues that "the hdf was the central
appeal
court in
priest
(2 Chr. 19:8 ff.)." For other views, cf. B. van Oeveren, op. cit., pp. 85-88.
148. B.
van Oeveren, op. cit., p. 111,
comments, "Deut. 19:12 vermeldt
echter alleen, dat de
ziqne ha’ir (deze zijn de plaatselijke overheden van de stad,
waar de doodslager thuis hoort) de opzettelijke
doodslager vanuit de asylstad
(laten)
halen, opdat hij zijn gerechte straf ontvange. Dit veronderstelt, dat reeds
The Goel In
the
avenger of blood overtakes the manslayer and slays him
before
he can gain entrance to the city of refuge (Deut.
19:6).
The responsibility is placed upon the
community to
"prepare
the roads ... so that the manslayer can flee to
them"
(Deut. 19:3) and to situate them in various areas with-
in
the land so that the manslayer may find refuge (Deut.
19:6,
"because the way is long").149 If the
manslayer ven-
tures
beyond the bounds of the city of refuge and is slain by
the
goel of blood, there is no bloodguilt involved in this
killing
(Num. 35:26, 27). The homicide must remain in the
city
of refuge until the death of the high priest (Num. 35:25;
Josh.
20:6). The slaying of the homicide under the above
mentioned
circumstances and his exile in the city of refuge is
understandable
from the fact that an innocent man's blood,
even
when shed unintentionally, involves bloodguilt for
which
the manslayer was responsible. "The accidental homi-
cide
is, then, guilty, though not guilty of death."150 A very
difficult
question which has perplexed scholars has been that
of
the significance of the death of the high priest. Why was
the
unintentional slayer to remain in the city of refuge until
the
death of the high priest? Many have understood the death
of
the high priest as having an expiatory value.151 Others see
een
vonnis is geveld: de boze opzet van de dader is vast komen te staan. Hier
vullen
o.i. de bepalingen van Deut. 19 die van Num 35 am.... De ziqne ha’ir
hebben
nu niets anders to doen, dan de go’el
haddam de gelegenheid te geven het
reeds
gevelde vonnis uit te voeren."
149. Cf. B. van Oeveren, op. cit., pp. 113, 114, for discussion
of the details.
He writes (p. 147): "Deut. 19 legt er de nadruk op,
dat de Israëlieten er zorg voor
moeten
dragen, dat voor een onopzettelijke doodslager het bereiken van een
vrijstad
niet te moeilijk is, vss. 3, 6v." So also M. Greenberg, op. cit., p. 127.
150. M. Greenberg, op. cit., p. 128. He comments, "The
most striking legal
expression
of the objectivity of bloodguilt—i.e., its incurrence even without crimi-
nal
intent—is the law of Exod. 21:28 ff. concerning the homicidal ox. Here, where
there
can be no intent since the killer is a brute, the law nonetheless regards the
animal
as bloodguilty and requires that it be stoned."
151. A. Phillips, op. cit., pp. 107, 108, commenting on
the death of the high
priest
remarks: "This provision must be connected to the fact that the high
priest
had
acted as president of the hdf which determined
the question of the killer's
responsibility.
By deciding that the killer was not a criminal, the high priest must
have
been understood in some way to have taken upon himself responsibility for
the
inadvertent act and its expiation. His death was evidently understood to have
128 The Goel In
the
death of the high priest as bringing about a general
amnesty.152 Still others
see in the death of the high priest the
conclusion
of a definite period of time.153 A fourth idea
is
advanced
by Delekat on the basis of extrabiblical sources. He
writes,
"Der Hohepriester könnte dann ursprünglich als
Schutzpatron die Sicherheit des zunachst zum Altar geflüch-
teten Totschlägers garantiert habeas, der sich nun
in der
Levitenstadt als Schutzbürger niederlassen konnte. Es ist
vor-
stellbar, dass nach dem Tode des Hohenpriesters—dessen
Übernahme
des Patronats als Pflicht zu denken wäre—der
Nachfolger,
etwa urn das Asyl zu leeren, die Garantie im
allgemeinen
nicht verlängerte, und dass dies auch nicht not-
wendig
war, weil die öffentliche Meinung die Bluttat durch
die
lange Trennung von der Heimat als gesühnt ansah."154
According
to Delekat the one fleeing for sanctuary in the city
of
refuge is contracted to the high priest in a relationship
which
provides him with protection. "Der Flüchtling begibt
sich
zum Heiligtum, bittet Jahwe um Schutz, indem er sich
ihm
dediziert, und wird nach Anhören der Gegenpartei bzw.
Prozess
in der Heimatstadt von dem Oberpriester in ein
moneverhältnis
genommen oder richtiger entlassen, das ihm
zunachst
eine Anstellung im (niederen) Tempeldienst und ein
Auskommen
verschaf ft und weiterhin die Aussicht eröffnet,
beim
Tod des Hoheripriesters, u.U. auch schon früher, ganz
frei
zu werden."155
atoning
power for all unintentional shedding of blood for which during his life he
had
no means of offering expiation." For others holding to this view, cf. B.
van
Oeveren,
op. cit., pp. 162-165.
152. Cf. B. van Oeveren, op. cit., pp. 165, 166, for those
accepting this idea.
153. B. van Oeveren, op. cit., pp. 166, 167.
154. L Delekat, Asylie und Schutzorakel am Zionheiligtum,
1967, p. 303.
He
appeals (p. 304) to the paramonh< relationship
existing in the ancient world
between
an "Arbeitsnehmer" who pledges himself to an "Arbeitsgeber"
until his
death,
"d.h. in dessen Hause zu bleiben, alle ihm aufgetragenen Arbeiten willig
zu
verrichten....
Der Paramone—Herr gibt ihm dafür Wohnung, Kleidung, und
Nahrung."
He appeals as well to the evidence in the ancient world for the practice
of
"den Freilassungs—Adoptionsvertrag"; op. cit., pp. 305-307.
155. L Delekat, op. cit., p. 307. Of interest to his argument is the phrase in
Num.
35:25b, "the high priest who was anointed with the holy oil" (Hwm
rwx
wdqh Nmwb vtx) which he
explains (p. 317), "Der Totschläger soll im Asyl
The Goel In
Sometimes the mention of the high
priest is understood
in
connection with the altar. Thus Gispen writes, "Met deze
dood
en door deze dood komt voor zulk een doodslager een
bevrijding
tot stand, omdat de hogepriester de grote be-
dienaar
van het altaar was, dat asyl bood."156
Finally, some have explained the
significance of the high
priest's
death from the fact that the cities of refuge were also
Levitical
cities (Num. 36:5). Gispen writes, "Wonende in een
der
steden der Levieten genoot hij gastvrijheid van die stam,
die
hogepriester,
die men met de heilige olie gezalfd had."157 Van
Oeveren
as well argues, "Wanneer nu het hoofd van deze stam
sterft, d.i. de hogepriester, dan raakt ook de band met
de
asylstad los en kan de onopzettelijke doodslager naar
huffs en
familie
terugkeren."158 Of all the
above cited opinions on the
meaning
of the high priest's death the last, as given by Gispen
and
van Oeveren, is to be preferred.
The purpose of the cities of refuge
was to give asylum to
the
one who had unpremeditatedly taken the life of another.
He
was not to die; otherwise innocent blood would be shed
and
bloodguilt would be upon the community (Deut. 19:10).
On
the other hand, if a murderer sought refuge there the
elders
of the city were to hand him over to the goel of blood.
(Deut.
19:12) and thereby purge
innocent
blood (Deut. 19:13). "Blood pollutes the land and
no
expiation can be made for the land, for the blood that is
shed
in it, except by the blood of him who shed it" (Num.
35:33).
Israelite law forbade the taking of
ransom money either
for
the life of a murderer (Num. 35:31) or for allowing the
bleiben
bis zum Tode des Hohenpriesters, der ihn mit heiligem öl gesalbt
hatte."
The
anointing of the homicide serves as a visible proof of his relationship with
the
high
priest. Cf. B. van Oeveren, op. cit.,
p. 169, for arguments against Delekat's
position.
156. W. H. Gispen, Het Boek Numeri, 2, COT, 1964, p. 304.
157. Ibid.
158.
B. van Oeveren, op. cit., pp.
169, 170.
130 The Goel In
manslayer
to prematurely leave the city of refuge before the
death
of the high priest (Num. 35:32). In this the Israelite
law
stands apart from that of other Near Eastern cultures
which
followed the practice of blood money. In
taking
of life was not merely something which affected indi-
vidual
families, but shed blood was seen as polluting the land
in
which Yahweh dwelt (Num.35:34) and accordingly had an
effect
on the whole community. No blood money was there-
fore
allowed.159
Note should be taken of the specific
use of the verb hcr
in
Numbers 35. The participle of this verb is sometimes used
without
intent specifying n (35:6); sometimes it is employed
with
specific denials of murderous intent (35:11, 12). In
both
instances it is best translated by a neutral term such as
manslayer.
In other cases it is used in a context where intent
is
clearly present (35:16-19, 21, 30, 31), and the word is best
159. B. van Oeveren, op. cit., pp. 173-178. The law of Ex.
21:28-31 which
concerns
the homicidal ox specifies that under certain circumstances the owner
shall
be put to death. In exchange for the owner's life, however, a ransom may be
paid.
However, as Greenberg, op. cit.,.—p,
128, notes an “exception is here made only
because
the owner of the ox did not personally and with malice commit the
slaying"
A. vanSelms, "The Goring Ox in Babylonian and Biblical Law," Ar0r,
18,
4, 1950—P. 329, writes: "By killing the ox it was proclaimed that nobody
from
the community could be involved in a blood-feud. In this connection it also
becomes
clear why the ox has to be stoned. Stoning is never a private act, but
always
an action by the totality of the population.... Everybody who has taken
part
in the stoning is afterwards a witness in case the relatives of the dead man
would
try to lay the bloodguilt on the owner of the goring ox." Regarding the
ransom
allowed the owner, Van Selms comments (p. 329); "In reality the owner
can
only ransom himself because the ox will be killed. If the ox were not stoned,
the
owner would have been considered a murderer, who had to bear the burden of
the
bloodguilt." For a detailed argument that there was a period in which com-
position
for homicide was permitted, cf. B. Jackson, "Reflections on Biblical
Criminal
Law," JJS, 24, pp. 21-26
(hereafter cited as "Reflections"). For an
additional
study of this law in the light of other ancient Near Eastern codes, cf. R.
Yaron,
"The Goring Ox in Near Eastern Laws," ILR, I, 1966, pp. 396-406. J.
Tolluck,
op. cit., p. 238, argues that
"the story of the Gibeonites (II Sam. 21:1-
14)
and the sons of Saul would seem to suggest that compensation was accepted
during
David's time. He asked the Gibeonites what he could do for them. They
replied
it was not a matter of silver or gold but had to be settled by the death of
Saul's
descendents. The question and the reply seem to imply that such was the
practice
of the time, but as in other Near Eastern societies, the choice of ven-
geance
or compensation was left to the avenger." We cannot accept this conclu-
sion,
cf. B. van Oeveren, op. cit., p. 178.
The Goel In
translated
"murderer." The preponderant usage of this verb
shows
it to be connected with the institution of asylum, or of
blood-vengeance.160
The goel of blood is the nearest male
relative who func-
tions
on behalf of the deceased in avenging his death. It is
possible
that an order similar to that of Leviticus 25:48, 49
existed
for the performance of this duty. From the limited
examples
of blood-vengeance in the Old Testament we see
this
duty being performed especially by a brother of the
victim
(Judg. 8:19 ff.; II Sam. 3:27) or by a son of the victim
II
Kings 14:5), though undoubtedly a more distant relative
was
involved at other times Sam. 14:11; I Kings 16:11), as
was
the entire family in one instance (II Sam. 14:7).
160. According to some scholars
there is a connection between the use of
the
verb Hcr
in the asylum passages and its employment in the commandment,
hcrt xl. E. Nielsen, The Ten Commandments in New Perspective,
SBT, 7, 1968,
p.
111, believes "that the seventh commandment of the decalogueinthe form in
which...we
have it today is directed particularly against:blood-vengeance and not
merely
against in general." This verb has been the-subject of intensive
study
by J. J. Stamm who concludes that in contrast to the other verbs for killing
in
the Old Testament Hcr is "illegal killing inimical to
the community," The Ten
Commandments in
Recent Research,
SBT, 2, 1967, p. 99. Cf. also J. J. Stamm,
"Sprachliche
Erwagungen zum Gebot 'Du sollst nicht tOten,' " ThZ, 1, 1945, pp.
81-90.
This seems to best explain its use in cases of both premeditated and
unpremeditated
killing since both were inimical to the well-being of the commu-
nity.
It leaves unanswered the use of this verb in connection with the punitive
activity
of the goel of blood toward the murderer (Num. 35:27, 30) for such
cannot
be conceived of as "an illegal killing inimical to the community." H.
G.
Reventlow,
Gebot und Predigt im Dekalog, 1962, pp. 73, 75, notes the unusual
use
of this verb to describe the action of the goel of blood in Num. 35:27, 30.
"An
beiden Stellen wird namlich nun auch das strafende Tun des Blutrachers, des
Mdh lxg mit dem er die Tat an dem Hacero racht, mit dery
Ausdruck Hcr
bezeichnet:
Md vl Nyx Hcrh tx Mdh lxg Hcr. Also auch der Totschlag, der
nun
im Rahmen der Blutrache auf den zuerst begangenen Totschlag antwortet, ist
ein
Hcr,
und am Ende des Satzes wird in einer Deklarationsfonnel ausdnicklich
festgestellt,
dass diese Rachetat nicht als Md, Blutschuld,
angerechnet werden
soil....
Hcr ist
der erste Schlag und der Gegenschlag, auf den im ursprünglichen
Institut
ein neuer Schlag folgen kann, mit dem wieder die von der Rache be-
troffene
Partei antwortet. Wo die Blutrache in ungebrochener Geltung steht, ist
das
eine Kette ohne Ende. Es gibt nur den Ausweg des Asyls.... Der Ausdruck
Hcr blieb aber für alle diese Falle
erhalten; er bezeichnet sowohl die vorsätzliche
Tat wie die unvorsätzliche, sowohl die auslösende
Tat wie die Vergeltung. Aber
immer
bezeichnet er eine Tat, die in die Kette von Schlag und Gegenschlag, in den
Bereich
der Blutrache fällt." This is indeed a satisfying solution to the
difficulty
which
was raised above.
132 The Goel In
The laws regulating the activity of
the goel of blood make
it
evident, however, that the interests of the entire commu-
nity
were also involved, since the shedding of innocent blood
brought
bloodguilt upon the entire community (Deut. 19:10;
21:1-9).
The "innocent blood" of these passages may be that
of
the one slain by a murderer or unjustly slain by the aven-
ger
of blood. From Deuteronomy 19:6, it seems that the near
relative
may have succumbed to improper passions on some
occasions.
Therefore the state has intervened to assure that
justice
is enacted for all parties involved through the cities of
refuge.
Van Oeveren gives an excellent summary of the insti-
tution
of the cities of refuge in relation to the goel of blood:
"Allereerst
bevestigt ze de rechtvaardige uitoefening van de
functie
van de go’el wanneer hij iemand zijn
gerechte straf
moet
doen ondergaan; in de tweede plaats beteugelt ze het
misbruiken van die functie. De onopzettelijke doodslager
ontving
door dit instituut bescherming, maar deze zelfde
instelling
maakte de
zijn
verdiende straf onderging.”161
A question must be asked about what
happened to the
murderer
if the goel did not act on behalf of the murdered
kinsman.
Was the punishment of the murderer the exclusive
prerogative
of the avenger of blood? Since the family struc-
tures
within
period
of the settlement in
possible
that Israelite society depended entirely on the aven-
ger
of blood for the execution of murderers? There must
have
been periods in
case:
we think particularly of the period of the Judges when
the
structures of public, justice were weak. Pedersen writes,
"Where
kinship ends, there is no longer an avenger. The lone-
ly
and the kinless is like the accursed; anyone who comes
161. B. van Oeveren, op. cit., p. 161.
162. For the effects of urbanization
on kinship ties, cf. E. Neufeld, "The
Emergence
of a Royal-Urban Society in Ancient
31-31.
The Goel In
across
him may slay, him,"163 In the opinion
of Falk, "cases
of
murder ... were not originally considered to be of public
concern
but only of consequence to the relatives of the
victim."164
The laws governing blood-vengeance
show clearly an in-
volvement
of the public authorities, whose task it was to
limit
and regulate blood-vengeance in the interests of public
justice.
There is a responsibility which rests on the commu-
nity
to see that the land is not defiled through the shedding
of
innocent blood, but that expiation be made by the blood
of
the murderer. It is most likely then that in those cases
where
there were no relatives or where relatives were unwill-
ing
to undertake this duty, the judicial authorities intervened.
The
laws of Numbers 35 which speak of the involvement of
the
goel of blood in the executing task do not militate against
this
conclusion, for they apply to the case; where blood-
vengeance
is being actively pursued. We must say then with
van
Oeveren: "Ook wanneer de bloedwreker niet in staat zou
zijn
om in eigen kracht de bloedwraak uit te oefenen, zullen
zij
op zijn verzoek zeker handelend zijn opgetreden. Want
zelfs
afgedacht hiervan, of de bloedwreker zijn plicht vervult,
heeft de volksgemeenschap de plicht dááavoor
te zorgen, dat
de moordenaar de opzettelijke doodslag met zijn leven
boet.
Want
anders komt er een bloedschuld op het volk."165
Salmon suggests that public
intervention where the rela-
tives
were inactive can be seen in the execution of Joab for
the
slaying of Abner (I King 2) and in the execution of
Saul's
sons for the extermination of the Gibeonites (II Sam.
21).
“In both cases murder goes unpunished for a long time,
in
both cases this is probably to be attributed to the power of
the
murderer and his family and the relative weakness of the
family
of the victim and in both cases, the intervention of
163. J. Pedersen, op. cit., p. 390.
164. Z. Falk, op. cit., p. 79. He writes, "Biblical law, in fact, represents
the
transition
from tribal revenge to judicial procedure."
165. B. van Oeveren, op. cit., p. 160. Also J. Salmon, op. cit., p. 165.
134 The Goel In
public
authority is required to settle the matter.”166 At this
point
we would call attention to the statement of Daube:
"The
sources show that the moral leaders of the Hebrew
people
were fully awake to the inadequacy and iniquity of
the
system of redemption described. At some period, it ap-
pears,
they demanded that where a man had no relatives who
could
protect him from oppression, the state should inter-
vene
in his behalf. One Psalm contains a description of the
ideal
king, and it is said of him that he undertakes to redeem
you
if you are without relatives able to do it: 'He shall re-
deem
their (the needy's) soul from deceit and violence, and
precious
shall their blood be in his sight. . . .' The state ought
to
see to it that the laws concerning redemption be really
carried
out."167
An extreme exponent of the idea of
state intervention in
the
area of murder is Phillips, who argues "that from the
inception
of the covenant itself murder constituted a crime,
and
was therefore of no concern to the family or clan of the
deceased....
”168 Phillips believes that the goel
of blood is
not
to be identified with the goel who acts as a protector of
family
rights. The goel of blood is therefore not the de-
ceased's
nearest male relative who exercises blood-vengeance
on
his behalf, but rather "the officer appointed to act on
behalf
of the murderer's city.”169 Elsewhere he is called by
Phillips
“the duly appointed official of the court."170 He is
not
a relative of the deceased but the guardian of the commu-
166. J. Salmon, op. cit., p. 166.
167. D. Daube, Studies, pp. 45, 46. According to Daube (p. 46), "In conse-
quence
of the failure of the law on the matter, the social reformers pinned their
faith
on God.... They now declared that a man whose relatives were incapable of
redeeming
him, his land or his blood, would be helped by God Himself."
168. A. Phillips, op. cit. p. 84. Cf. also p. 104.
169. Ibid., p. 104.
170. Ibid., p. 105. Cf. also the
position of M. Sulzberger, The Ancient
Hebrew Law of
Homicide,
1915, p. 55, who sees as one of the new remedies
introduced
by Deuteronomy, "the abolishment of the ancient right of the family
go'el to receive the
warrant of execution from the zikne ha’ir,
and the compulsory
duty
of the latter to entrust it to a newly created federal officer for each
canton—the
go'el ha-dam—who is not the family go'el."
The Goel In
nity's
interests against the bloodguilt associated with murder.
The
legislation instituting the cities of refuge was to ensure
that
"the final decision as to whether or not the killer had
acted
intentionally should he removed from the elders of his
city."171 This would
ensure an impartial trial. When the effec-
tive
decision on the nature of the killing (whether premedi-
tated
or not) was removed from the killer's own city and
became
the prerogative of the elders of the city of refuge,
then
the elders of the killer's city "needed a representative
who
could plead their case at the city of refuge, and inflict
execution
on their behalf. This was the function of the
Mdh lxg. In choosing this title a
well-known legal term has
been
borrowed to which had been added Mdh, thereby indi-
cating
that like the lxg, this official, who may be designated
the
Protector of blood, had the duty of restoring something,
namely
the blood of the murdered man, to its legitimate
owner,
Yahweh (the Seeker of blood)."172
Phillips gives what he calls
"insuperable difficulties" to
identifying
the goel of blood and the goel. The first is that
the
Old Testament knows nothing of a blood-feud exercised
upon
fellow members of the covenant community. Second,
the
recovery of the blood of the deceased was the concern of
Yahweh,
the Seeker of the blood, and not the relatives.
Third,
no other qualifying word has been added to the term
"goel"
in respect of his other duties, as is the case with goel
of
blood.”173
Certain points must be raised in reply
to Phillips. Con-
cerning
his first point it should be noted that II Samuel 14:
1-24,
in which the term "avenger of blood" is used, indicates
that
blood-vengeance was practiced against fellow members
of
the covenant community.174 Furthermore, to
say that
171. A. Phillips, op. cit., p. 106.
172. Ibid., pp. 103, 104.
173. Ibid., p. 103.
174. J. Tolluck, op. cit., p. 199, comments, "Just
as surgery is often needed
to
restore the body to health, so blood-vengeance was used at times, as public
execution
was used later, to remove the family member whose presence was
136 The Goel In
Yahweh
was the ultimate Seeker of the blood, the one to
whom
the blood belonged and to whom it was released,
proves
nothing concerning the nature of the agent that He
employs
in the recovery of the blood. It does not supply any
reason
why the agent should be a public official rather than a
relative
of the deceased. It is also questionable whether any
major
significance can be attached to the qualifying designa-
tion
"goel of blood." It is true
that when it comes to the
other
responsibilities of the goel there is no additional quali-
fying
of the responsibility. Possibly since blood had a well
defined
meaning it was a convenient designation. Of course it
should
be noted that in at least one place (Nunn. 35:12) and
possibly
another (I Kings 16:11)175 the single term
"goel" is
used
to designate the avenger of blood. This fact unfortunate-
ly
is not incorporated into Phillip's discussion at all. We see
therefore
no compelling reason, following Phillips, for believ-
ing
that the goel of blood was not a family relative but an
officer
of the court.176 In rejecting his idea that
murder was
the
exclusive concern of the community, which is at the basis
of
his view that the goel of blood was a public official and
not
a relative of the deceased, we have no intention of deny-
ing
the early entrance of the state into the area of murder
and
blood-vengeance. Such became clear above when we
studied
Exodus 21:12-14, see especially verse 12. It is best to
say
then that the goel of blood operates in the interests of
the
kin group and as the agent of the state. We conclude with
the
summary given by Salmon of the interplay of private and
public
justice in
whoever
the victim, had indeed become a public offence by
the
time of BC [Book of the Covenant] . Not that the prac-
tice
of blood-vengeance had been abolished; we have already
bringing
sickness to the whole family. Only by that removal could the family be
restored
to wholeness."
175. J. Pedersen, op. cit., p. 390, interprets vylxg in I Kings
16:11 as
avenger.
So also J. Salmon, op. cit., p. 66;
B. van Oeveren, op. cit., p. 160 n.
9.
176. Cf. B. Jackson,
"Reflections," p. 33 n. 176, for a critique of Phillips'
attempt
to distinguish the goel from the goel of blood.
The Goel In
seen
that this was not the case. But the community became
the
guarantor that, whether by private or public action, the
innocent
blood should be avenged and the murderer pun-
ished.
More accurately, it was not that the community be-
came
the guarantor, but rather that the identity of the 'com-
munity'
shifted. In the presettlement period, and even to
some
extent thereafter, the 'community' which was the guar-
antor
of vengeance and punishment was a familial group: the
household,
clan, or tribe. But the settlement established new
patterns
of life and relationships, and the primacy of the
family
group gave way increasingly to other patterns of
organization—primarily
to that of the city. These other judi-
cial
structures, these other 'communities,' were forced in
many
cases to assume responsibilities formerly borne by
familial
groups. One of these was that of guaranteeing the
punishment
of murderers and the attendant expiation of the
pollution
caused by the shedding of innocent blood. Where
family
structures were still capable of executing these respon-
sibilities,
they were both allowed and expected to do so. But
where
they were not able to do so, the responsibility fell on
the
shoulders of the 'new community,' principally the
city."177
177. J. Salmon, op. cit., p. 173. According to Salmon the Book of the
Covenant
is premonarchic (p. 163) and places of asylum must be allowed for
"soon
after the settlement" (p. 180). On the date of the Covenant Code see chap.
10
nn. 21, 22. We see no reason to date these laws later than the Mosaic period.
Certainly
the juridical content is pre-Mosaic. As S. Paul remarks, "The legal
collec-
tion
of Exodus emerges as an integral component of a vast juridical canvas which
extended
throughout the ancient Near East. All indications point to an eclectic
adaptation
of native and fringe Mesopotamian legal traditions," op. cit., p. 104.
The
observations of A. van Selms on Pentateuchal law in relation to other Near
Eastern
law codes are important: "The historical setting of biblical law is the
more
remarkable because at the same time there is a prophetic and even eschato-
logical
tendency in the laws of the Pentateuch; these are the laws given with an
eye
to a future event, the invasion of Canaan where the theocracy is still to be
founded.
The laws regulate everything which is of importance for this theocracy."
"Law,"
NBD, p. 720. On the date of Ex.
21:12-14, cf. B. van Oeveren, op. cit.,
pp.
74,
75. He comments (p. 223), "Ex. 21:12-14 wordt wel algemeen voor oud
gehouden.
0.i. past deze pericoop zeker het best in de tijd, toen Israel nog niet in
Kanaän
woonde. Het is i miners duidelijk, dat de tekst, zoals hij voor ons light in
betrekkelijk
vage termen de aanwijzing van een asylplaats, wil men van een
138 The Goel In
Restitution to the
Goel, Numbers 5:8
The law in Numbers 5:5-10 is connected
with the law in
Leviticus
5:20-26 (6:1-7). The law in Leviticus deals with the
procedure
to be followed in cases where a man commits a
breach
of faith against the Lord (5:21a [6:2a] ). From the list
which
follows (Lev. 5:21b, 22 [6:2b, 3] ), it becomes appar-
ent
that the sins are those which a man commits against his
neighbor
(vtymfb)178 showing that
sins against the neighbor
are
also reckoned as against the Lord. Specifically, they are
sins
connected with the neighbor's property and concern the
mishandling
of human property. According to Noth these
cases
have more to do with deceptive ways of appropriating
property
than with forcible robbery or theft.179 In such
cases,
the guilty party "shall restore it in full and shall add a
fifth
to it and give it to him to whom it belongs on the day of
his
guilt offerings (Lev. 5:23, 24 [6:4, 5])." Naturally 'this
type
of sin would disrupt the internal fellowship and unity of
the
people and restitution would be a necessity.
Two new dimensions are added in
Numbers 5:5-10. There
is
the specific statement in Numbers 5:7, "he shall confess his
vrijstad
belooft." Further, he remarks
(p. 221), "M.i. valt te aanvaarden, dat de
pericopen in de Pentateuch, (Ex. 21:12-14; Deut. 19:1-13;
Num. 35:9-34) die
over
de vrijsteden handelen, in groote hoofdzaak uit de Mozaische tijd gam-
men....
Deze bepalingen werden gegeven met het oog op het leven in Kanaän; er
is
o.i. geen bezwaar te aanvaarden, dat ze reeds op de woestijntocht en tijdens
het
verblijf
in het Oostjordaanse zijn uitgesproken." See further n. 143.
178. The word occurs in Lev. 18:20;
19:11, 15, 17; 24:19; 25:14, 15, 17;
Zech.
13:7. M. Noth, Leviticus, OTL, 1965,
p. 49, writes, "It appears from its
occurrence
to be near in sense to the idea of 'fellow man„"neighbour' (rea’) and
to
designate the man living in one's circle, to whom therefore in practice it is
one's
duty to behave in the human fashion required by God."
179. Ibid. W. H. Gispen, Het Boek Leviticus, COT, 1950, p. 98,
comments
on
Nvdqpb,
(Lev. 5:21 [6:2]): "De bedoeling zal wel niet zijn, dat dit een panel is
of
iets, dat geleend wordt, doch dat het, b.v. in onzekere tijd, aan iemand ter
bewaring
is toevertrouwd. Zijn naaste komt het terugvragen en dan loochent hij,
dat
het hem ooit is gegeven." lzgb (Lev. 5:21
[6:2]) may point more clearly
toward
forcible robbery (cf. Gen. 21:25; Judg. 21:23; Job 20:19; 24:2) but
according
to Noth, op. cit., p. 49, "the
context scarcely suggests a forcible rob-
bery
or a regular theft, but rather some deceptive way of appropriating someone
else's
property."
The Goel In
sin,"180 and the added
regulation in Numbers 5:8, "But if the
man
has no kinsman (goel) to whom restitution may be made
for
the wrong, the restitution for wrong shall go to the Lord
for
the priest. . . ." We must assume in all likelihood the
death
of the one against whom the sin had been committed
and
to whom the restitution was to be made.181 In this event,
restitution
came to the deceased's goel who, as the responsi-
ble
head of the family, acted in the interests of the family.182
In
the event of the goel's death, restitution goes in principle
to
Yahweh though in practice to His representative, the priest.
180. Cf. W. H. Gispen, Het Boek Numeri, 1, COT, p. 86.
181. Cf. G. B. Gray, Numbers, ICC, 1903, p. 43; W. H. Gispen,
Het Boek
Numeri, 1, p. 88; J.
Marsh, "Numbers," IB, 2,
1953, p. 166. M. Noth, Numbers,
OTL,
1968, p. 47, however, is of a different opinion and writes, "The mention
of
the
'redeemer' presupposes that the wronged person has lost his legal and eco-
nomic
independence—either by incurring debt or by emigration—and thus is
apparently
no longer entitled to receive the restitution money." J. P. Lange,
Numbers, 1874, p. 35,
also suggests that the offended person may not be dead:
"It
is nearer the mark to see a goel (redeemer) in the qualified receiver of the
debt
(be
it the offended person himself or a kinsman). The redeemer or receiver be-
comes
here, in some measure, the freer of the guilty person that has confessed the
consciousness
of his guilt."
182. A. Jepsen, "Die Begriffe
des 'Erlösens' im Alten Testament," Solange
es
"Heute" heisst, Festgabe für R. Hermann, 1957, p. 158, writes,
"Um-
gekehrt scheint es auch zu den Aufgaben des go'el gehort
zu haben, veruntreute
Vermogenswerte
für die Sippe in Empfang zu nehmen and damit ihren Ver-
mögensstand
wieder zu stärken." H. Ringgren, “lxg,” TWAT, 1, p. 887, remarks,
"Em einziges Mal, Num. 5,8 erscheint der go’el als Empfanger von Sühnegeld, hier
natürlich
in seiner Eigenschaft als verantwortliches Haupt der Familie (Sippe)."
PART TWO
THE LEVIRATE AND
GOEL INSTITUTIONS
IN THE BOOK OF RUTH
5
The Date and Purpose of
the Book of Ruth
IN
discussions on the goel marriage in the book of Ruth
and
its relationship to the levirate law in Deuteronomy 25,
the
question of the date of the book is of some importance.
The
problem of dating the book of Ruth is linked to some
extent
with the purpose of the book. This will be particularly
evident
when we discuss the widely held opinion that the
book
of Ruth has a polemical purpose, that is, to counter-
act
the rigid nationalism becoming prominent during the
time
of Ezra and Nehemiah. We must therefore examine
the
arguments about the date and the purpose of the book,1
and
give particular, though not exclusive, attention to the
view
which dates the book in the postexilic period.
The Date of the Book of
Ruth
Arguments for a
Preexilic Date
In the ensuing discussion of the
arguments for a post-
exilic
date for the book of Ruth we shall have occasion to
1. For a survey of this question in
the early 1900's, reference should be
made
to two articles by Wolfenson, "Purpose ,of the Book of Ruth," BS, 69,
1912,
pp 329-344, (hereafter cital "Purpose") and "The Character,
Contents
and
Date of Ruth," AJSL, 27, 1911, pp. 285-300 (hereafter cited as
"Charac-
ter").
For amore recent survey cf. H. H. Rowley, "The Marriage of Ruth," The
Servant of the
Lord,
19652 pp. 171-194 and B. Vellas, "The Book of Ruth and its
Purpose,"
Theologia Athens, 25, 1954, pp.
201-210. For other articles worthy of
note,
cf. G. Glanzman, "The Origin and Date of the Book of Ruth," CBQ, 21,
1959,
pp. 201-207; O. Loretz, "The Theme of the Ruth Story," CBQ, 22, 1960,
pp.
391-399; M. David, "The Date of the Book of Ruth," OTS, 1, 1941-42, pp.
55-63 (hereafter cited as "Date") J. L. Vesco,
"La Date du Livre de Ruth," RB,
143
144 The Date and Purpose of the Book of
Ruth
introduce
certain counterarguments which suggest a preexilic
date
for the book. We begin here with a brief survey of
authors
who propose a preexilic date.
Several scholars are of the opinion
that the book of Ruth
has
gone through several stages of transmission. Myers be-
lieves
that “the book of Ruth as it now stands may thus be
said
to be the work of an exilic or early postexilic writer who
set
down in prose form an old poem transmitted orally for
several
centuries."2
In place of the twofold process as
suggested by Myers,
Glanzman
sees three phases in the total process. "At first
there
was an Old poetic tale which circulated for some time in
oral
form.... Later on, in preexilic days, in the 8th or possi-
bly
9th century, this story was put into prose and given a
precise
coloring of locale, religion, law, and custom which
involved
some expansion of the original nucleus. Finally, in
the
postexilic period, it wasresurrected and put into the
form
in which we have it today."3
Margaret Crook has offered another
solution, arguing that
Ruth
"is a twice-told tale, surviving in the form of a single
document.
. . . The Old Story is pre-Davidic; the Second Tell-
ing
is associated with the Yahweh-purist reforms of the ninth
century
B.C. in the southern kingdom."4 The book was circu-
lated
around 832 after the overthrow of Athaliah (II Kings
74,
1967, pp. 235-247. For a recent full length treatment cf. J. Myers, The
Linguistic and
Literary Form of the Book of Ruth, 1955.
2. J. Myers, op. cit., p. 64. He further remarks, "It is not claimed that
the
book
of Ruth in its present form is poetic, but that its original poetic form is
visible
through its present transparent prose form. That original poetic form
served
as the vehicle for its oral transmission"; op. cit., p. 2, Cf. A. Bruno, Die
Bücher Joshua,
Richter, Ruth,—Eine Rythmische Untersuchung, 1955. For a
criticism
of the work of Myers, cf. S. Segert, "Zum Problem der metrischen
Elemente
im Buche Ruth," Ar0r, 25, 1957,
pp. 190-200, and D. R. Ap-Thomas,
"The
Book of Ruth," Exp.T, 79, 1968,
p. 369. J. H. Kennedy, "Ruth," BBC,
2,
1970,
p. 465, suggests an approach similar to Myers. W. F. Albright has suggested a
possible
9th century date for the underlying poem. Cf. "The Old Testament and
Archaeology,"
in Old Testament Commentary ed. H. C.
Alleman and E. E. Flack,
1954,
p. 147.
3. G. Glanzman, op. cit., p. 203.
4. M. Crook, "The Book of
Ruth," JBR, 16, 1948, p. 155.
The Date and Purpose of the
Book of Ruth 145
11),
and the story of Ruth provided the people with-a.-reveal-
ing
contrast to Athaliah.
Cannon suggests that the book
originated in the time of
Hezekiah.
It was at this time that the prophetic voice pro-
claimed
that a king would arise to rule over
lehem
Ephrata (Mic. 5:1-5). Around this same time, in an-
other
oracle, Isaiah was saying that from the stump of Jesse
would
come the ruler in the power of the Divine Spirit to
establish
a kingdom of righteousness and peace (Isa. 11:1-
10).
This expectation "may possibly have aroused in the
author
of Ruth a desire to make known to his countrymen
generally
some of the local tradition of Ephrata about the
ancestors
of Jesse. ... He was most likely to write about the
family
history of Jesse at Ephrata at a time when the family
and
the village were prominent in prophetic aspiration."5
In more recent times a view which
commends itself to
some
is that which dates the book during the reign of Solo-
mon
and sees it to be linked with the literature of the Solo-
monic
enlightenment. Von Rad thus calls the story of Ruth
"an
extremely artistic guidance story" showing similarities of
style
and content to other literature coming from the period
of
the united monarchy.6
Gerleman agrees with the opinion of
von Rad. He feels
that
the Moabite ancestry of David could not have been in-
vented
in the postexilic period. "So unbefangen, wie es in der
Rutherzählung
geschieht, hat man in der exilischen oder
nachexilischen
Zeit von David und seiner Herkunft nicht
mehr
reden können. . . . Es muss ein ganz bestimmter, Behr
zwingender
Grund gewesen sein, der den Rutherzähler veran-
lasst
hat, seine Geschichte zu erzählen. Dieser Grund kann
kein
anderer sei- als eine alte Tradition von Davids Herkunft
aus
5. W. W. Cannon, "The Book of
Ruth," Theology, 16, 1928, p.
315.
6. G. von Rad, OTT, I, 1962, p. 52. Von Rad speaks of three major histori-
cal
works coming from this period, "the history of David's rise to power (I
Sam.
XVI—II
Sam. V.12), the history of the succession after David (II Sam. VI.12,
20
ff.—I Kings II), and the Jahwist history"; op. cit., p. 49.
146 The Date and Purpose of the Book of
Ruth
ist
kein sekundärer Zusatz zu einer alten Erzählung. Im
Gegenteil,
deise scheinbar beiläufige Notiz is als der ursprüng-
liche
Kern zu betrachten, um dessentwillen die Rutherzäh-
lung
entstanden ist."7 Hals also rejects the arguments for a
postexilic
date and concludes, "In summary then while com-
pelling
evidence fixing the date of the Book of Ruth is diffi-
cult
to find, none can be brought which demands a late date,
and
at least one powerful argument, i.e., that based on the
picture
of David, makes the date in the Solomonic era likely.
When
this is combined with the way in which the theology
and
style of the Ruth narrative are so closely linked to the
literature
of the Solomonic enlightenment, the conclusion
that
the Book of Ruth is indeed to be dated in this same
period
commends itself highly."8
Arguments for a
Postexilic Date
It will be well, at this point, to
consider more specifically
the
arguments that have been advanced for a postexilic dat-
ing9
of the book of Ruth. They can be grouped under the
following
headings:10
7. G. Gerleman, Ruth Dos Hohelied, BK, 18, 1965, pp. 7-8.
8. R. Hals, The Theology of the Book of Ruth, 1969, p. 73. For the implica-
tion
of the Davidic genealogy on the date of the book see n. 89. Similar argu-
ments
to those of Hals are presented by M. Lamparter, Das Buch der Sehnsucht,
BAT,
16, 1962, pp. 15, 16. C. Goslinga, Het
Boek Ruth, KV, 19522, p. 120, dates
the
book during the reign of Solomon and comments, "Misschien heeft Salomo
zelf
wel direct of indirect medegewerkt tot het doen beschrijven van de in ons
boek vervatte gebeurtenissen." G. Ch. Aalders, Oud-Testamentische Kanoniek,
1952,
p. 336, writes, "Misschien is het geschreven in den tijd van David zelf of
onmiddellijk
daama." Others holding to a date in the early monarchy include L.
Morris,
Ruth, TOTC, 1968, p. 239; J. Mittelmann,
Der altisraelitsche Levirat,
1934,
p. 16.
9. The following scholars express
themselves in favor of a postexilic date: D.
Harvey,
“Ruth,” IDB, 1962, p.-132; L. Smith,
"Ruth," IB, 2, 1953, p.
830; O.
Eissfeldt,
The. Old Testament: An Introduction,
1965, p 483; G. Fohrer, IOT,
1970,
pp. 251, 252; A Weiser, The Old
Testament: Its Formation and Develop-
ment, 1961, p. 304;
J. Gray, Joshua, Judges, Ruth, CB,
1967, p. 400; and many
others.
See below n. 11.
10. J. L. Vesco, op. cit., pp. 235-247, talks about the evidence for dating in
terms of "arguments litteraires, arguments
juridiques et arguments théologiques."
The Date and Purpose of the Book
of Ruth 147
(a) Arguments from a specific
"Tendenz"--in particular
that
the book was written to counteract the narrow exclusiv-
ist
marriage policies at the time of Ezra and Nehemiah.
(b) Arguments based on the fact that
Ruth takes its
place
in the Hebrew canon not in the prophets, but in the
third
division, among the five Megilloth.
(c) Arguments from the language; in
particular, the pres-
ence
of Aramaisms and words characteristic of late Hebrew.
(d) Arguments based on the social and
legal customs of
the
book.
Argument
from Purpose
The view which sees the book of Ruth
as a polemical
work
designed to refute and redress Jewish nationalism at the
time
of Ezra and Nehemiah has had many adherents.11 The
exponents
of the polemical view say that the book was com-
posed
to counteract the one-sided particularism coming to
exzression
in Ezra's policy of rooting out foreignly con-
tracted
marriages. It is, of course, true that the argument "for
11. Cf. H. H. Rowley, op. cit., p. 173 n. 1 and L. Wolfenson,
"Purpose," pp.
336-340
for older writers holding this view. L Bettan, "The Book of Ruth," in
The Five Scrolls, 1950, pp. 51,
52, writes, "Then, too, as to the purpose of the
book,
Geiger's supposition that it was written in protest of the stringent decrees
of
Ezra and his associates makes a strong appeal. It gives to the charming tale a
direct
and practical aim. It also satisfies our modern spirit of liberalism to know
that
the severe measures of Ezra, apparently devoid of religious toleration, did not
go
unchallenged in our literature." J. H. Kennedy, op. cit., p. 466, refers to the
emergence
of "an enduring literary form superbly suited to make the Moabitisch
ancestry
of David a challenge to racial arrogance and religious particularism in
a
bit of fiction produced during the troubleous days following the exile.... Its
motive
is not to be denounced by those who stop to consider the grave injustice
which
was done to the foreign women and to their children by the purists who
caused
them to be suddenly cast adrift from home, father and husband. Behind
the
beauty of this idyl of the days of antiquity lies the defence of marriages with
peoples
of other tongues." B. Anderson, The
Living World of The Old Testament,
1958,
p. 450, places the book in the postexilic period, affirming that "even if
the
author
did not intend a direct attack upon the policy of Ezra and Nehemiah, his
delightful
story, with its human interest and its spacious view of Yahweh's
sovereignty,
shows that tendencies other than narrow exclusivism were at work in
postexilic
Judaism." Similar opinions are held by A. Weiser, op. cit., p. 304; G. A.
Barton,
"Ruth," JE, 1905, p. 577;
J. Morgenstern, "The Book of the Covenant,
Part
II," HUCA, 7, 1930, pp. 177,
178; G. Knight, Ruth and Jonah, 19662,
p. 10.
148 The Date and Purpose of the Book of
Ruth
a
postexilic date does not depend entirely on the question of
purpose.
Rather, it is combined with other evidence such as
has
been suggested above. It seems obvious that the strength
of
the additional arguments will be gauged by whether the
book
is clearly seen to be composed as a
polemical attack on
Jewish
provincialism. If so, then additional arguments for a
postexilic
date will be viewed as solidifying the case. Some
who
date the book in the postexilic period, however, reject
the
idea that it was written to combat the harsh measures of
Ezra
and Nehemiah. Thus Eissfeldt argues, "Nor, as has often
happened,
may it be concluded from the fact that the narra-
tor
reports a mixed marriage and so evidently looks with
favor
on the foreign women (ii, 10), that we have here an
explicit
protest against the rigorous measures against mixed
marriages
which were carried out by Nehemiah and Ezra
(Ezra
X; Neh. 23-27). . . . For it is hardly possible to
speak
of a pronounced bias in the story. We may only say
that
the breadth of outlook towards another nation which
appears
here as in the book of Jonah is more readily intelli-
gible
in a later than in an earlier period."12 This position
should
be carefully distinguished from that which sees the
book,
more directly, as a polemical tract. It is universalist
without
being polemical.13
12. 0. Eissfeldt, op. cit., p. 483. Similarly J. Gray, op. cit., p. 400, writes,
"Quite
apart from the purpose of the book as a protest against the racial policy of
Nehemiah
and Ezra, which we do not admit, the liberal tone is related to the
practical
issues of the times, and we find that it has more relevance to the exilic or
postexilic
period than to any other." E. Würthwein, "Ruth," in Die Fünf
Megilloth, HAT, 18, 1969,
p. 5, maintains that the book had a purpose. The
author's
story was not merely told to entertain the hearer or reader. "Dieser
[Zweck]
ist gern dahin bestimmt worden, dass der Vf. mit seiner Erzählung von
der
treuen und tüchtigen Moabiterin gegen die rigoröse Praxis des Esra und
Nehemia
in der Mischehenfrage (Esra 9 f., Neh. 13:1 ff., 23 ff.) protestieren
wolle.
Aber diese Tendenz tritt nirgends so stark hervor, dass man Rt als Ten-
denzschrift
in diesem Sinne erklären könnte."
13. N. Snaith, "The Historical
Books," in The Old Testament and
Modern
Study, ed. H. H.
Rowley, 1951, p. 96. See also A. S. Herbert, "Ruth," PCB, 1962,
p.
31-6, who thinks of the book as a parable. "It's purpose was to awaken the
people
of God to their high privilege,and responsibility.The very exclusiveness of
Gentiles
into the community of
The Date and Purpose of the Book
of Ruth 149
More recent opinion has reverted from
the polemical
view.14
In fact, some of the strongest opposition to it ema-
nates
from those who, themselves, hold to a postexilic date.15
Among
opponents of this theory are those who view the
book
as having no particular purpose. R. Pfeiffer, who prefers
a
postexilic date for the book, suggests that the exclusivism
in
the postexilic community may have had an unconscious
influence
upon the author; yet "he simply set out to tell an
interesting
tale of long ago, and he carried out his purpose
with
notable success."16 Gunkel reacts very strongly against
the
search for any hidden lesson, other than the simply told
one
of human faithfulness: "So haben die Forscher nach
einer
verborgenen ‘Tendenz’ gesucht und dadurch—so sind
wir
überzeugt—die reizende Erzählung grausam miss-
handelt.
. . . Eine ‘Tendenz’ hat die Geschichte überhaupt
nicht."17
God
which must be kept free from the contaminations and dilutions of paganism,
yet
must be available for all, even a Moabite woman."
14. N. Snaith, op. cit., p. 96.
15. 0. Eissfeldt, op. cit., p. 483, rejecting the idea of
an explicit protest,
thinks
that "it is hardly possible to speak of a pronounced bias in the
story." G.
Fohrer,
op. cit., p. 251, reacts strongly
against it, saying, "Not a single sentence
suggests
such a purpose." Cf. P. Joüon, Ruth,
19532, p. 6.
16. R. Pfeiffer, IOT, 19525, p. 719. Cf. N. Gottwald, A Light to the Na-
tions, 1959, p. 519,
"It is certainly better to accept it as a warmhearted story
than
to strain after occult meanings." Cf. H. Gressmann, "Ruth," SAT, 19222, p.
279:
"Die meisten Forscher suchen im Buche Ruth nach einer verborgenen
Tendenz....
Und so wird man das Suchen nach einer besonderen Tendenz als
uberfltissig
betrachten, ja als geschmacklos. Der Erzahler will nichts weiter als
erzählen
und ergötzen, und empfängliche Herzen werden sich noch heute der
Schonheit
dieser vom zarten Duft der Poesie umflossenen Sage freuen." See also
H.
Gunkel, "Ruth," RGG, 1930,
p. 2182, "Die noch gegenwärtig häufig
geäusserte
Vermutung, das Buch wolle in den Kämpfen zu Esras und Nehemias
Zeit,
da alle Ehen mit Ausländerinnen getrennt werden sollten, für diese Partei
nehmen,
schiesst vorbei. Solche Mischehen werden in der Erzählung nicht ver-
teidigt,
sondern nur als zuweilen vorkommend vorausgesetzt: R. muss eine
Moabiterin
sein, weil der Verfasser auf diese Weise eine wahrhaft heroische Treue,
die
selbst das Volkstum tiberschreitet, darstellen kann."
17. H. Gunkel, "Ruth," in Reden und Aufsätze, 1913, pp. 88,
89. He con-
cludes
on this point, somewhat facetiously, "Wer aber ausser der einfachen Wahr-
heit
vom Lohn der Treue schlechterdings noch eine ‘Lehre’ mitnehmen will, dem
möchten
wir diese empfehlen, dass Manner gut tun, sich vor schönen und klugen
Frauen,
die ihren Willen durchsetzen wollen, in acht zu nehmen." Cf. L. Wolfenson,
"Purpose,"
p. 341, "There is, accordingly, no acceptable theory of the purpose of
150 The Date and Purpose of the Book of Ruth
The book, is remarkably restrained if
it is to be under-
stood
as a piece of protest literature. Cooke writes, "We may
question
whether Jewish readers in the time of Nehemiah
would
have detected a protest against his policy any more
readily
than we do in such a guileless piece of literature."18
Morris
aptly states, "Moreover, it is not easy to see how the
story
effects the postulated polemic. After all, Ruth was not
simply
a foreigner. She was devotedly attached to an Israelite
mother-in-law
and she was a convert to the Jewish religion.”19
A further objection to the polemical
view is to be found
in
the reply the near kinsman when he refuse to marry
Nehemiah
such would have, been the time to introduce the
Ruth.
In any attack upon the narrow approach of Ezra and
Moabite
lineage of Ruth, which would then have provided
the
opportunity for Boaz to repudiate such prejudices.20
Bewer has a different objection to the
polemical
view.
The book dealing with a very special case in which
Boaz
marries Ruth, according to the ancient levirate custom.
The
case of Boaz was extraordinary and would not have
served
to make a case for intermarriage under normal circum-
our
book which has thus far been proposed. It has, in fact, no set purpose any
more
than any other historical narrative." D.
"it
is precisely this lack of polemic which makes the book of Ruth a positive and
lasting
witness on the side of universalism in any human situation." R. K. Har-
rison,
IOT, 1969, p. 1061, remarks, "If
one of the sons of Joiada son of Eliashib
the
High Priest, had been able to appeal to Ruth as a recently written 'tract for
the
times,' the Samaritan situation at that particular period would probably not
have
taken the course which it did subsequently."
18. G. A. Cooke, Judges and Ruth, 1918, p. XIII.
19. L. Morris, op. cit., p. 240. Cf. also H. H. Rowley, op. cit., p. 173. See
also,
by the same writer,
20. Cf. H. W. Hertzberg, Die Bücher Josua, Richter, Ruth, ATD, 9,
1965, p.
258:
"Der 'Löser' lehnt nicht aus dem Grunde, weil Ruth eine Moabiterin
sei-
obwohl
ihm das von Boas gesagt wird—, die Heirat mit ihr ab. Lage das Thema des
Buches
in dieser Richtung, so ware hier der Ort gewesen, das anzubringen. Der
Löser
hätte so einen besseren Grund für seine Ablehnung als den jetzt angege-
benen
gefunden, und an Boas wäre deutlich zu machen gewesen, dass es recht und
gut
sei, sich über solche Vorurteile hinwegzusetzen." M. Weinfeld,
"Ruth," EJ,
14,
1971, p. 519, writes, "If the story intended to imply such a tendency this
would
have come to expression in one way or another in the story itself, for
instance,
as a reason in the mouth of the kinsman for not marrying Ruth or as an
opposition
to this reason in the mouth of Boaz."
The Date and Purpose of the Book of
Ruth 151
stances.
Thus "it does not seem possible that the author who
wrote
the story for this polemic purpose should have laid
himself
open to such an objection."21
Cannon writes similarly: "If the
book was meant for a
polemic
against Ezra's rule, it was singularly unsuited for that
purpose,
as it did not deal with a parallel case. The men
rebuked
by Ezra were residents in
wives
there. But in the story in Ruth, Machlon, when resident
in
she
came to
to
marry her, Moabite or not, or he could not redeem Mach-
lon's
land, as he was bound by social rules to do. It is quite a
different
situation from one combated by Ezra, and no use at
all
as an argument."22
Bertholet notes the sixfold repetition
of the term "Ruth
the
Moabitess" (1:22; 2:2, 6, 21; 4:5, 10) by the author as
well,
as his description of her as a "foreigner" (2:10). From
these
references, he believes a case can be made for dating the
book
in a period when the question of the permissibility of
foreign
marriages was a burning issue, which he sees as the
time
of Ezra and Nehemiah.23 However, we must ask whether
the
terms noted by Bertholet constitute an emphasis. In any
case,
it is questionable whether the blessing of the Lord upon
this
special case of intermarriage would argue for a general
liberalizing
trend. Wolfenson caustically points out that "to
cite
the case of the happy marriage of Ruth and Boaz, who
live
long before even David, ... when David and Solomon
and
many others had-foreign wives in still later times and
were
censured therefore, would have had as much effect on
the
minds of the people of the of Ezra and Nehemiah
as
it would have now, i.e., none at all."24 We believe there-
21. J. Bewer, "The Goel in Ruth
4:14, 15," AJSL, 20, 1903-1904,
p. 206.
Bewer's
arguments for the dating of the book and for the levirate passages as late
interpolations
are discussed in chap. 8, "The Double Responsibility."
22. W. Cannon, op. cit., p. 315.
23. A. Bertholet, Das Buch Ruth, KHC, 17, 1898, p. 52.
24. L Wolfenson,
"Purpose," pp. 339, 340. W. W. Cannon, op. cit., p. 315,
152 The Date and Purpose of the Book of
Ruth
fore,
that the book cannot be understood as having been
composed
for the specific purpose of counteracting the mar-
rige
policies of Ezra and Nehemiah.
Before leaving this point we wish to
devote some further
attention
to the opinion of those who believe that the book
of
Ruth is universalist without being polemical, and who seek
to
argue for a postexilic date from the universalistic character
of
the book; see above especially notes 12-15. It is certainly
valid
to speak of a universalistic tone in the book, but from
this
it is hardly possible to argue conclusively for a postexilic
date.
It must be noted that already during the reign of David
there
is evidence of a spirit of friendliness toward foreign-
ers.25
We do not accept all of von Rad's argument for linking
the
book of Ruth with the other so-called "Solomonic en-
lightenment"
literature, but such a view certainly has worth-
while
elements. In our opinion it is not possible to state
precisely
during which period of
a
universalistic tone may have been written.
Argument
from the Place of the Book in the Canon
A second argument adduced as proof for
a late date of
the
book is its place in the canon of the Old Testament. In
the
Hebrew Bible the book is found in the third division of
the
canon, among the Megilloth. It is important to note that
the
arguments on the date of the book are cumulative, and so
this
point must be seen as one among others.26 Weiser be-
remarks,
"If the book were regarded as polemical at all it would rather have to be
regarded
as directed against the severe enactment of Deut. XXIII:4 forbidding a
Moabite
from ever being admitted into the community of Jahweh as Ruth was.
But
we are quite unable to see any indication that the book has any controversial
design
of any sort." J. Schoneveld, De
Betekenis van de Lossing in het Boek Ruth,
1956,
p. 17 n. 40, asks, "Er blijkt immers nergens iets van een tegenstand, die
overwonnen
moet worden. Waarom zou de schrijver bovendien een onderwerp
gekozen
hebben, waarbij lossing en leviraat de hoofdaandacht vragen!"
25. Cf. I Sam. 22:3; II Sam. 6:10; 8:18;
10:2; 15:19 ff., 32 ff.; 11:27; 23:
37.
26. Cf. D. Harvey, op. cit., p. 132: "The combined
evidence of the author's
view
of the past, the language of the book, its content and its place in the canon,
points
clearly to a postexilic date."
The Date and Purpose of the Book of Ruth 153
lieves
that the book's "position in the canon also suggests the
period
after the reform of Ezra and Nehemiah when a place
could
no longer be found for it in the second part and it was
admitted
amongst 'the writings . . . ."'27 Late acceptance as
canonical
Scripture, however, does not necessarily mean an
equally
late composition.28 Apart from this, one must reckon
with
the very real possibility that the tradition preserved in
the
LXX, placing the book immediately after Judges, may
have
equal claim to be considered the earliest tradition.
Josephus,
in his enumeration of the twenty-two canonical
books,
probably reckoned Judges and Ruth as one book.29
The
early canonical list of Melito of Sardis places Ruth after
Judges.30
Audet has published an old Hebrew-Aramaic list of
the
books of the Old Testament in which Ruth is reckoned
not
among the "Writings" but as one of the historical
books.31
The difficulty of assessing this complex question
may
be seen in other evidence cited by Rudolph, who writes,
"Fügen
wir noch hinzu, dass im Prophetentargum, dem
sogen.
Targum Jonatan, Ru und Thr fehlen, also nicht zu den
Tropheten'
gerechnet wurden, so haben wir eine vom 1.
nachchristlichen
Jahrhundert nicht abreissende Tradition,
dass
im hebräischen Kanon Ru und Thr unter den Ketubim
27. A. Weiser, op. cit., p. 304. Also G. Fohrer, op. cit., p. 51.
28. J. Gray, op. cit., 1) 398. L. Wolfenson, "Implications, of the Place of
the
Book of Ruth in Editions, Manuscripts, and Canon of the Old Testament,"
HUCA, 1924, p. 175,
writes: "It is perfectly possible that a book could have
been
written in the times of David and then have been placed in the last division
of
a collection of books made as late as 100 or 150 of the present era, whose
arrangement
is as arbitrary as the relatively late Jewish classification into Prophets
and
Hagiographa."
29. Contra Apionen,
30. Eusebius, The Ecclesiastical History, IV, 26, 13-14, translation and
notes
H. Lawlor and J. Oulton, 1954, P. 133.
31. J. P. Audet, "A
Hebrew-Aramaic list of the Old Testament in Greek
Transcription,"
library
of the Greek patriarchate in
to
go back to the first half of the 2nd century. The list begins: Genesis, Exodus,
Leviticus,
Joshua, Deuteronomy, Numbers, Ruth, Job, Judges. P. Kahle,
Geniza, 19592, p. 218,
calls it "possibly the oldest list available to us."
154 The Date and Purpose of the Book of
Ruth
standen."32
Eissfeldt, in discussing the tradition represented
by
the LXX, writes, "Ruth, which in the canon of Jamnia
was
incorporated in the third part, the 'Writings,' here occu-
pies
its ancient position after the book of Judges."33 The
transfer
from the ancient position to the "Writings", may be
understood
in the light of its liturgical use at major festivals,
in
common with the other books found in the "Writings."34
Enough
has been said to demonstrate that no far-reaching
conclusion
of dating can be drawn based on the book's pres-
ence
in the third section of the Hebrew canon.
Argument
from Language
Any assessment on the date of Ruth
must take note of
two
undisputed factors: (1) that in general the vocabulary,
syntax,
and style are classical35 and (2) that the book con-
tains
some Aramaisms. It has sometimes been suggested that
the
author, the postexilic period, may have deliber-
ately
attempted to archaize.36 Myers rejects this, pointing out
that
in Ruth "regular forms and spellings predominate and
that
archaic forms are sporadic, a situation that would be just
the
reverse had there been a conscious attempt to archaize.
Spelling,
morphology, syntax, vocabulary, idiomatic phrases
and
expressions all appear to place Ruth in the same broad
32. W. Rudolph, Das Buch Ruth, Das Hohe Lied, Die Klagelieder, KAT, 17,
1962,
p. 24.
33. 0. Eissfeldt, op. cit., p. 570.
34. W. Cannon, op. cit., p. 318, writes, "For a period of at least 500 years
Ruth
was included in the 'Prophets.' But at some late time, which cannot be
defined,
a practice grew up among the Jews of reading liturgically certain books
upon
solemn occasions every year. These books were called 'the five Megilloth'
and
were read: the Song of Songs at Passover, Ruth at Pentecost, Lamentations at
the
9th of Ab, Ecclesiastes at Tabernacles, Esther at Purim."
35. S. R. Driver, Introduction to the Literature of the Old
Testament, 1912,
p.
426, (hereafter cited as Introduction) comments, "The general Hebrew style
(the
idioms and the syntax) shows no marks of deterioration; it is palpably
different,
not merely from that of Esther and Chronicles, but even from Nehe-
miah's
memoirs or Jonah, and stands on a level with the best parts of Samuel."
See
also R. H. Pfeiffer, op. cit., p.
718.
36. G. C. Cooke, op. cit., p. XV, M. David,
"Date," p. 61. R. H. Pfeiffer, op.
cit., p. 718,
acknowledges the style, syntax and vocabulary to be classical but goes
The Date and Purpose of the Book
of Ruth 155
category
with JE in the Pentateuch, Joshua, Judges, Samuel
and
Kings."37
David has argued38 for a
probable date of writing during
the
exile, basing his view on two main pieces of data: social
customs
and legal regulations, and linguistic considerations.
The
first will be referred to at a later point, but it will be well
to
examine his latter arguments. He acknowledges that the
style
of the book of Ruth is noticeably different from that of
Esther,
Chronicles, Nehemiah, and Jonah; but this he attrib-
utes
to the fact that the writer was well-versed in Hebrew
literature
and imitated the classical style. There are peculiari-
ties
of language in Ruth which belong to the vocabulary of a
later
period.39 These make it certain that the classic style
noted
by Driver40 and others was consciously imitated. Pri-
marily,
David refers to two Aramaisms:41 Nhl (therefore) in
1:13
and Myq (to
confirm) in 4:7. Lattey and
out
that there are only three places where lahen
occurs in
biblical
Aramaic (Dan. 2:6, 9; 4:24) and both agree that it is
open
to question whether it does occur in Aramaic in the
sense
of "therefore."42 It is possible that lahen should be
on
to say, "On the other hand the literary excellence of the book and the
occurrence
of a number of archaic verbal terminations may well be the manifesta-
tion
of a gifted author's good taste and wide reading." In a review of
Pfeiffer's
book,
in JBL, 61, 1942, p.124, W. F.
Albright expressed himself. strongly against
a
postexilic, date: "It is true that the orthography is sometimes pretty
bad, but
neither
vocabulary nor syntax suggests any Aramaic influence on the writer's
Hebrew,
so a post-exilic date is impossible, in the reviewer's opinion. Moreover,
the
background of custom and law is not only not post-exilic, but actually points
to
a pre-Deuteronomic The- reviewer would tentatively attribute the
original
composition of Ruth to about the 8th century B.C. and assume that the
story
was based on Bethlehemite oral tradition, which would account for the archa-
ism
of the customary law which it describes."
37. J. Myers, op. cit., p. 32.
38. M. David, "Date," pp.
55-63.
39. M. David, "Date," p.
61.
40. See n. 35.
41. It is true that additional words
are suggested as Aramaisms on the part
of
other scholars, but many recent commentators have argued that the number of
late
words are relatively few. Cf. P. Joüon, op.
cit., p. 11, who sets the number at
four
and W. Rudolph, op. cit., p. 28, who
argues that these four are not necessar-
ily
late.
42. C. Lattey, The Book of Ruth, 1935, p. XXXVII, "The case for a lahen
156 The Date and Purpose of the Book of Ruth
emended
to lahem, as recommended by various
scholars.43 G.
R.
Driver maintains that lahen is a
combination of a preposi-
tion
and a pronoun and renders, "for those things would ye
tarry
till they (my still unborn sons) were grown? for those
things
would ye stay from having husbands?"44 Gerleman
similarly
believes "[es] ist weder die aramäische Partikel
‘deshalb’
(Dan. 2:6, 9; 4:24) noch eine ungenaue Schreibung
für
Mhlh (etwa
mit einem auf Mynb gehenden Suffix), sondern
fem.
plur. mit neutrischem Sinn und bezieht sich auf die von
&oomi
gerade erwähnten Bedingungen. `Könntet ihr darauf
warten',
d.h., dass alle diese unsicheren und unwahrschein-
lichen
Dingen wirklich eintreffen werden."45
Myers, discussing Myq in 4:7, notes
the several middle
weak
forms in the piel in early documents. He denies the
relevance
of this fact for a date of the original composition:
"Since
it is in an explanatory insertion, an Aramaic borrow-
ing
would not affect the question of date of the original, but
only
that of its final prose edition."46
Many scholars today are expressing
caution on the use of
Aramaisms
in the dating of a book.47 We must therefore say,
meaning
'therefore' in Biblical Aramaic is thus so weak that it appears safer to
treat
it as a mistake here, no less than in Hebrew." R. K. Harrison, op. cit., p.
1061,
"There is, in any event, some doubt as to whether lahen ever occurs in
Aramaic
in the sense of 'therefore' and the reading in Ruth 1:13 is probably a
corruption
of lahem, ‘to them,' which some
versions adopted."
43. P. Joüon, op. cit., p. 40; C. Lattey, op.
cit., p. XXXVII; R. K. Harrison,
op. cit., p. 1061; J.
Mittelmann, op. cit., p. 17; J.
Myers, op. cit., p. 27.
44. G. R. Driver, "Problems in
Aramaic and Hebrew Texts," Analecta
Orien-
talia, 12, 1935, p.
64. Cf. also, S. R. Driver, Introduction,
p. 427, “Nhl
is the
word
which it is most difficult to reconcile with an early date; but it is possible
that
the Book, in spite of its interest in
the
N. kingdom, and preserves words current there dialectically."
45. G. Gerleman, op. cit., p. 19.
46. J. Meyers, op. cit., p. 19. Cf. S. R. Driver, Introduction, p. 427, "...Myq
cannot
be defended as old-Hebrew, but the word occurs in a verse which is not
needed
in the narrative, and has every appearance of being an explanatory gloss."
47. J. Barr, Comparative Philology and the Text of the Old Testament,
1967,
pp. 121-124; D. J. Wiseman, "Studies in Aramaic Lexicography," JAOS,
82,
1962, pp. 290-299. Cf. A. Hurvitz, "The Chronological Significance of
'Ara-
maisms'
in Biblical Hebrew," Israel
Exploration Quarterly, 18, 1968, p. 235:
"Aramaisms
may, however, be useful for arguing possible late date, but even then
only
after certain conditions have been fulfilled: (1) Distribution of the
particular
The Date and Purpose of the Book of
Ruth 157
along
with Bentzen, "The Aramaisms in the book are not
numerous
enough to account for a late date.”48 It is easier to
explain
the presence of a few late words in an early docu-
ment
than to account for early forms in a late document.49
Argument
from the Social and Legal Customs
Further arguments involving the laws
and customs fea-
tured
in Ruth have a definite bearing on the question of date.
Here
we enter into a discussion of issues directly involving
our
immediate subject. David suggests that Ruth's choosing
to
glean in the field (2:2) soon after her arrival presupposes
the
provision mentioned in Deuteronomy 24:19, and there-
fore
points to a time, after the Josian reformation for "it
cannot
be proved that in an earlier time a widow would have
had
the right to glean ears in a strange field without further
petition."50
However, even positing the Josian date for
Aramaisms
(outside the problematic text under investigation) should actually be
characteristic
of late Hebrew sources; and (2) the accumulation of Aramaisms
within
the problematic text should be considerable. . . ." In any case-the book
of
Ruth
gives no evidence of a heavy concentration of Aramaisms, which is one of
the
conditions he feels must be met. Cf. W. Rudolph, op. cit., p. 28, "Die anfang-
lich
recht umfangreiche Liste ist im Lauf der Zeit ziemlich zusammenge-
schrumpft."
48. A. Bentzen, IOT, 2, 1949, p. 185. Cf. also J. Myers, op. cit., p. 28, "The
number
of relatively late words is at best very small. Most of the above words are
much
too rare to be labelled unqualifiedly as late.” M. Weinfeld, "Ruth," EJ,
14,
1971, p. 522, examines the phrasei and expressions in Ruth which have
affinities
with early Israelite literature and believes that such a comparison shows
that
the considerable common phrases do not occur after the period of Elisha. He
writes:
"This may give an approximate clue for the date of the composition of the
Book
of Ruth and may also indicate the possibility that it was composed in
and
late linguistic traits in Ruth.... In the light of the other literary stylistic
affinities
with Northern literature, the strange words and forms in Ruth cited
above
may be explained as derived from the Northern Hebrew dialect." Cf. also S.
R.
Driver, Introduction, p. 427.
49. Cf. L. Morris, op. cit., p. 236. S. R. Driver, Introduction, p. 427, re-
marks,
"It seems to the writer that the general beauty and purity of the style of
Ruth
point more decidedly to the pre-exilic period than do the isolated expres-
sions
quoted to the period after the exile."
50. M. David, "Date," p.
56.
158 The Date and Purpose of the Book of Ruth
Deuteronomy,
it is quite possible that such a practice existed
as
a custom prior to the time of Josiah.51 Moreover, it is
possible
to argue for a pre-Deuteronomic date for the book
from
the harvest scene in chapter two. The suggestion has
been
made that the men were reaping the harvest and the
women
were engaged in picking up that which was left by the
reapers
and bundling it into sheaves. This procedure was in
violation
of the law of Deuteronomy 24:19 and could lead to
the
conclusion that the Deuteronomic law was not in force at
the
time the author is writing.52 Furthermore, there is an
emphasis
in chapter two on the chance53 encounter with
Boaz.
Through the kindness of God (2:20) Ruth has been
brought
to find some kindly person (2:13) who allows her to
glean
(2:22). There is a repeated stress on Ruth's being given
permission
to glean (2:7, 10, 13) and indeed it is suggested
that
in a different field Ruth might not receive such favorable
treatment
(2:22). All of this could be viewed as indicating a
situation
in which the law granting the widow permission to
glean
was not in force. Wolfenson concludes that it is "most
likely
that no Hebrew (or Jewish) writer, remembering all
that
this implies, could have written portraying a state of
affairs
so manifestly pre-Deuteronomic as Ruth unless he had
lived
in that period."54 In our opinion Wolfenson and
Rudolph
(cf. n. 52) have given telling arguments against those
presented
by David, but both arguments ignore the possibil-
ity
that the laws of God might have been set forth, but were
not
controlling the actions of men. Apart from such consider-
51. David's approach fails to take
into consideration the now more com-
monly
accepted differentiation between the date of a document and the date of
its
contents. Cf. W. Rudolph's remarks against David's identifying the age of a
custom
with the date of a document, op. cit.,
p. 27. See chap. 10, nn. 11-14.
52. L. Wolfenson,
"Character," p. 297. W. Rudolph,
op. cit., pp. 26, 27,
introduces
a similar type of argument, for an early date for Ruth, remarking,
"Auf
vordeuteronomische Zeit führt auch,
class in 1, 4 die Heirat der Söhne
Elimelechs
mit Moabiterinnen ohne Tadel berichtet wird: Wie ware das möglich,
wenn
Dt. 23:4 in Kraft gewesen wäre . . . “
53. Cf. chap. 7, n. 5.
54. L. Wolfenson,
"Character," p. 297.
The Date and Purpose of the Book
of Ruth 159
ations,
it is clear that
neighbors,
at a very early stage in its history, felt the obliga-
tion
to care for the poor, the widow, and the stranger.55 It
would
be wrong to interpret the harvest scene in an excessive-
ly
legalistic fashion.
David also seeks to prove a late date
for the book of Ruth
from
the fact that Naomi displays an erroneous understand-
ing
of the law of levirate marriage. Naomi in 1:11, 12, turns
to
her daughters-in-law and declares, "Turn back, my daugh-
ters,
why will you go with me? Have I yet sons in my womb
that
they may become your husbands? Turn back, my daugh-
ters,
go your way, for I am too old to have a husband. If I
should
say I have hope, even if I should have a husband this
night
and should bear sons, would you therefore wait till
they
were grown? Would you therefore refrain from marry-
ing?"
David's point is that Naomi is saying in effect that
"children
born from a father other than the deceased hus-
bands
are obliged to contract levirate marriages."56 Accord-
ing
to him, this would have worked contrary to the regula-
tion
of levirate marriage, since by such marriages Orphah and
Ruth
would have been cancelled as members of their dead
husbands'
family and would have joined another family. He
concludes,
"Such a wrong conception which is imputed to
Naomi
can be best explained by the supposition that it dates
from
a time when the levirate marriage was no longer the
custom.
Now this was at any rate the case in the time of the
exile
and in the postexilic period of
55. Cf. F. C. Fensharn, "Widow Orphans
and Poor in Ancient Near East
Legal
and Wisdom Literature," JNES,
21, 1962, p. 139: "It is, however, surprising
at
what early stage in the history of the ancient Near East the compulsion was
felt
to
protect these people. I do not think that it is correct to speak of borrowing
of
ideas
concerning our subject. It was a common policy, and the Israelites in later
history
inherited the concept from their forebearers, some of whom had come
from
Mesopotamia, some had been captive in
the
Canaanite world." Cf. N. Porteous, "Care of the Poor in the Old
Testament,"
Living the
Mystery,
1967, p. 154; H. von Waldow, "Social Responsibilities and
Social
Structure in Early
56. M. David, "Date," p.
58.
57. M. David, "Date," pp.
58, 59. J. Mittelmann, op. cit., p.
18, as over
160 The Date and Purpose of the Book of
Ruth
will
be discussed in greater detail later58 and so we will be
brief
at this point. In the face of the emotionally-laden scene
where
Naomi's words occur, it is improper that her words be
scrutinized
for exact legal terminology. The whole scene mili-
tates
against expecting at this point in the story precisely
worded
statements on the customs and laws involved.59
The statement concerning the ceremony
of the shoe (4: 7)
is
used as well for dating the book of Ruth. Some scholars are
of
the opinion that the necessity to explain the custom con-
cerning
property transactions arose because "a considerable
period"60
had intervened between the time of the narrator
and
the events in the story itself. The explanation must have
originated
in a period in which written contracts had taken
the
place of the shoe transaction ceremony. The question
then
becomes, When did written documents come into exis-
tence
in property transactions? One piece of biblical evidence
against
David maintains, "Dies ist einer von den Gründen, die uns hindern, das
Buch
Ruth, wie es die herrschende Meinung bisher tat, in die Zeit zwischen
Deuteronomium and Talmud zu datieren, sondern uns
veranlassen, vordeutero-
nomische
Entstehungzeit anzunehmen, da die Worte der Naomi (Ruth I, 11-13)
nur
in einer Zeit geäussert werden konnten, in der das deuteronomische
Levirats-
gesetz
mit den Worten ki jaesebu’ahim jahdaw noch
nicht in Geltung war." W.
Rudolph,
op. cit., p. 26, adheres to an early date for Ruth: "Für die chrono-
logische
Einreihung von Ru ist die Erkenntnis entscheidend, dass die hier vor-
ausgesetzten
Anschauungen fiber den Levirat alter sind als das Leviratsgesetz des
622
an die Öffentlichkeit getretenen, urn 700 enstandenen
Deuteronomiums...."
His
deduction from Ruth 1:11 is "dass Ru
älter ist als die deuteronomische
Gesetzgebung"; op. cit., p. 63.
58. See chap. 6.
59. A difference must be made
between drawing conclusions from the state-
ments
on laws and customs placed in the mouth of Naomi and those such as are
made
in 4:5, 7. We accept Mittelmann's
contention (arguing against the suggestion
that
the book of Ruth is_a literary work by one uninformed about legal matters)
"dass der Verfasser des Buches Ruth ausgezeichnete
Rechtskenntnisse besitzt";
op. cit., p. 19.
However, in portraying Naomi's despair, it may not have served the
author's
purpose to speak in precise legal terminology. His main intent was to
describe
her feeling of hopelessness.
60. 0. Eissfeldt, op. cit., p. 483. J. Gray, op. cit., p. 399, writes "The
explanation
of the custom in the transaction of redemption (4:7) clearly refers
back
to former times, to a custom long obsolete." Cf. R. Pfeiffer, op. cit., p. 518;
L.
P. Smith, op. cit., p. 830; N.
Gottwald, op. cit., p. 518. P. Joüon, op. cit., p.
86, writes: "La nécessité de l'explication se
comprend beaucoup mieux si
l'auteur écrit apres l'exil, alors que le long séjour en
Babylonie avait oblitéré en
partie la connaissance des anciennes moeurs."
The Date and Purpose of the Book of
Ruth 161
which
may provide a clue to written documents on property
transactions
is Isaiah 10:1, 2. In addition, we have the inci-
dent
of Jeremiah's purchase of the field (32:6-15), which
provides
us with a more detailed view of property transac-
tions.
Presumably—so it is argued—a writer in the early mon-
archy
would not need to give his readers an explanation of
the
older custom, whereas a writer at the time of Jeremiah or
at
the time of the exile or later would need to do so, since
the
older ceremony for transferring property was no longer
extant,
having been replaced by written contracts.
Mittelmann believes that Ruth 4:7
gives weighty evidence
for
an early date for the book. He maintains that 4:7 is an
editorial
insertion61 by a postexilic scribe who is explaining
to
his contemporaries the significance of a ceremony, whose
meaning
had been lost in the exile. This makes it necessary
that
the book itself be composed before the 7th century, at
which
time the ceremony of the shoe functioned in connec-
tion
with the laws for redeeming property. The statement
"before
the 7th century" is based on the fact that during the
lifetime
of Jeremiah written deeds served to attest geullah
property
transactions. The meaning of the shoe transfer was
different
in Ruth than in Deuteronomy. "Wenn auch die
Juden im babylonischen Exil die halisa des deuteronomischen
Schwagerehegesetzes
kannten, so konnten sie dennoch nicht
begreifen,
was die Schuhübergabe im Buche Ruth zu bedeu-
ten
hat. ... Um nun Missverständnisse bei den Lesern des
Buches
Ruth zu verhüten, hat der Glossator eingegriffen und
die
für den Rechtshistoriker Behr interessante Erklärung 4, 7,
gegeben."62
It is, however, questionable whether 4:7 should
be
seen as an editorial insertion.63 It was the use of written
61. J. Mittelmann, op. cit., pp. 23, 24. Also L. Wolfenson,
"Character," pp.
293,
294.
62. J. Mittelmann, op. cit., p. 24.
63. According to W. Rudolph, op. cit., p. 29, Ruth 4:7 is a hindrance
to
dating
the book during the time of David or Solomon. Rudolph is not inclined to
view
it as an editorial insertion. He writes: "Dass jener symbolische
Rechtsbrauch
so
früh schon hätte vergessen sein sollen, ist schwerlich denkbar, und in 4,
7 eine
spatere
Glosse zu sehen, liegt nicht der mindeste Grund vor; denn dass eine
162 The Date and Purpose of the Book of
Ruth
documents
in legal attestation of property transfers which
expunged
the memory of the use of the shoe in former times,
rather
than the gap of the exile.64 In my opinion serious
consideration
should be given to the view of Weinfeld, who
states:
"This change in the judicial-legislative reality does not
necessarily
imply a big gap in time between the event and its
description.
The establishment of the monarchy itself caused
a
great turning point in the economic-social life and even a
few
decades would be enough to create this transition in the
judicial
sphere."65
Sometimes an argument drawn from a
comparison of the
shoe
ceremony in Ruth with the one in Deuteronomy 25 is
offered
on the date of the book. Hals regards the ceremony
in
Ruth as preceding that of Deuteronomy. He writes: "It
seems
more natural to regard the shame attached to the re-
moval
of the sandal in Deuteronomy 25 as a later specializa-
tion,
in one particular direction, of an older, broader, morally
neutral
practice than it does to theorize that the simple at tes-
tation
ceremony envisaged in Ruth 4:7 could have evolved
out
of a prior ceremony of reproach as described in Deuter-
onomy,
of whose original distasteful significance the late
writer
of the Book of Ruth was no longer aware."66 Such
reasoning,
however, or its reverse is questionable in the lrght
of
the material differences67 between the two ceremonies
(e.g.,
the spitting in the face mentioned in Deut. 25 but not
in
Ruth 4).
We have examined the evidence for the
postexilic date of
the
book and can see no compelling reason to date the book
fliessende
Erzählung unterbrochen wird, wenn sich eine Erläuterung dazwischen-
schiebt,
ist nun einmal nicht zu ändern.... Meiner Meinung nach fehlt uns tieder
Anhaltspunkt,
um die Entstehungszeit von Ru innerhalb des Zeitraums von 1000-
700
genauer festzulegen, nur dass die Rücksicht auf 4, 7 näher an die untere
Grenze
heranzugehen heisst...."
64. W. Rudolph, op. cit., pp. 27-28.
65. M. Weinfeld, "Ruth," EJ, 14, 1971, p. 521.
66. R. Hals, op. cit., pp. 66, 67.
67. Cf. 0. Eissfeldt, op. cit., p. 483. For the differences
between the two
ceremonies,
see further chap. 8, "The Refusal of the Goel and the Ceremony of
the
Shoe."
The Date and Purpose of the Book of
Ruth 163
of
Ruth as postexilic. The wide variety of suggestions for
dates,
from Davidic times to the period after the exile, should
caution
us against being overly dogmatic.68 The book is
undoubtedly
later than the events it portrays. The Rabbinic
tradition
that it was composed, by Samuel (Talmud, Baba
Bathra,
14b) does not appear likely, particularly if one ac-
cepts
the genealogy as original to the composition of the
book.69
Our study has led us to rule out an exilic or post-
exilic
date for the book. We are inclined to follow authors
such
as von Rad, Gerleman, Hals, and Goslinga, and to date
the
book during the period of the Solomonic enlighten-
ment.70
We are unable, however, to be rigid on the point and
do
not feel that a dogmatic conclusion on the exact date is
crucial
to the discussion of the relation of goel marriage to
the
levirate law in Deuteronomy 25.71
The Purpose of the Book of Ruth
Examining the question of the purpose
of the book of
Ruth,
we are again confronted with a variety of opinions. It
is
our intention to briefly survey the suggestions which have
been
put forward. As will be seen, it is not possible to make
sharp
distinctions between the suggestions in every case, since
they
often overlap. In our discussion on the date of the book
of
Ruth we have already seen that some scholars say that the
purpose
of the book of Ruth is to offset the rigid exclusivist
68. A. Bentzen, op. cit., p. 185, comments, "The time from the later periods
of
the monarchy down into the post-exilic days is the land of wide possibility
with
which we have to reckon."
69. See chap. 9, "Boaz'
Son."
70. See nn. 6-8, 89.
71. The commonly accepted approach
to the question of the evolution of
the
levirate is as follows: If Ruth is a postexilic book, then the development of
the
levirate in
the
levirate. If Ruth is not postexilic but is written sometime in the early mon-
archy,
the development of the levirate follows a narrowing process; i.e., from
more
distant relatives performing the levirate to the Deuteronomic law (supposed-
ly
dating from the 7th century) where only brothers dwelling together" are
obligated
to the levirate responsibility. We do not accept the presuppositions of
this
method of reasoning. See chap. 10.
164 The Date and Purpose of the Book of Ruth
policies
of Ezra and Nehemiah. We have rejected this opinion
above.
The
Interesting-Story Purpose
There are some scholars who see the
book primarily as an
interesting
tale told with artistic skill. McKane represents
such
a position when he remarks, "It may be said in the first
place
that his intention was to tell a good story . . . . He found
pleasure
in the exercise of his gifts as a story teller and wrote
to
divert and entertain."72 Usually, that the story aspect of
the
book may not be undercut, this approach is combined
with
the rejection of the idea that the book contains any
hidden
purpose.73 Gunkel seeks to do justice to the unique
narrative
form74 of the book. In so doing, he limits the teach-
ing
of the book to the simple truth of how faithfulness is
rewarded.75
However, the recognition of the author's distinc-
tive
literary gifts need not curtail inquiry into his message. It
may
very well be that the author's consummate artistry en-
ables
him to to weave multiple purposes into the narrative. Most
studies
of the book of Ruth, while often suggesting One main
72. W. McKane, Tracts for the Times: Ruth, Esther, Lamentations, Ecclesi-
astes, Song of
Songs,
1965, p. 12.
73. Cf. nn. 16, 17.
74. Cf. too W. F. Albright, Archaeology and the Religion of Israel,
19533,
pp.
22, 23: "The Israelites had developed a previously unknown type of
narrative
style,
simple and direct, equally suited for recounting tales and for recounting
historical
episodes.... The delicacy of the story of Ruth remains unsurpassed
anywhere;
Ruth's loyalty to her mother-in-law, the scene between her and Boaz in
chapter
three, and the final episode with Naomi (4:14-17) are gems of world
literature."
For recent treatments of the literary form of Ruth, cf. S. Bertman,
"Symmetrical
Design in the Book of Ruth," JBL,
84, 1965, pp. 165-168; D.
Rauber,
"Literary Values in Ruth," JBL,
89, 1970, pp. 27-37. The latter is
particularly
helpful for an evaluation of how the literary form of the book relates
to
its purpose. He writes (pp. 35, 36): "But once it is admitted that Ruth is
an
artistic
creation of very high order, it follows that we must become more cautious
about
making easy judgments about its significance and purpose.... The task of
the
literary critic is to explore the complex world of the artist and to suggest
ways
in
which we can respond as fully as possible to its multiplicity, its
suggestiveness,
its
richness. But all of this is denied us, if lurking in the back of our minds is
the
secret
conviction that art is really little more than the decorative embellishment
of
the prosaic, that the purpose of a great literary artist can be reduced to
copybook
maxims."
75. H. Gunkel, "Ruth," in
Reden and Aufsätze, p. 89.
The Date and Purpose of the Book of Ruth 165
theme,
nevertheless go on to indicate supplementary pur-
poses.
The Exemplary
Purpose
Some have seen in the book an edifying
story, similar to
Job,
teaching the lesson of faithfulness under circumstances
both
of human felicity and misfortune.76
Eissfeldt feels the book is primarily
interested in portray-
ing
the fortunes of the two women, both of whom must be
regarded
as heroines. The religious content, though not
stressed,
is important as well. Yahweh cares for the widow
and
rewards fidelity in human affairs. Along with these two
features
the legal institution of redemption forms an addi-
tional
fascinating facet of the narrative, heightening its
tension.77
Bettan sees as the all-embracing theme
of the book the
law
of human kindness which transcends national boundaries.78
Vellas argues that the main point of
the story is its stress
on
family unity.79
Others conclude that through the story
of Ruth the read-
er
is granted an inside picture of the Israelites in the ordinary
events
of their lives, as lived under the influence of the
Torah.
80
76. G. Fohrer, op. cit., p. 251. He goes on to suggest that "the author gave
it
a more profound religious significance by connecting it with faith in Yahweh's
beneAcient
providence." Cf. also, E. Würthwein, op.
cit., p. 46, who calls the
book
a "Beispielerzahlung von echtem dsH.” On the
importance of this term in
the
book, see chap. 7, n. 7.
77. 0. Eissfeldt, op. cit., p. 482.
78. I. Bettan, op. cit., p. 53.
79. B. Vellas, op. cit., p. 209. Cf. also, N. K. Gottwald, op. cit., pp. 519,
520,
"In conclusion, there are probably two purposes in the book. As it stood
originally,
Ruth praised the strong family ties of Israelite society.... In the later
telling
of the story, the heroine's Moabitic ancestry came to be emphasized and
Jews
tended to draw the lessons of kindness and receptivity toward prose-
lytes...."
80. Cf. J. Carlebach, Einleitung in
das Buch Ruth, in Jüdische Studien Jozef
Wohlgemut zu
seiner. 60. Geburtstag, 1928, p. 3: "Das Buch Ruth ist das einzige,
das
uns einen Einblick in das Innenleben unseres Volkes in seiner klassischen Zeit
gewährt....
Hier werden wir leibhaftig nach Bethlehem geführt und werden
Zeugen,
wie unsere Väter unter Einfluss und Erziehung der Tora lebten und
166 The Date and Purpose of the Book of
Ruth
The Theological
Purpose
There has been a temptation, arising
from the skillful
literary
form of the book, to concentrate on the human per-
sonalities,
or at least on the human performances, involved in
the
story, and to place the activity of God in a secondary
light.
That several recent writers have emphasized the latter
as
the primary thrust of the book is to be welcomed.81 In the
opinion
of Rudolph, "Ru will wie der Grossteil des alttesta-
mentlichen
Schrifttums nicht von Menschen reden, sondern
von
Gott; nicht eine Galerie edler Menschen sollen wir be-
wundern,
sondern lernen, wie Gott handelt.82
Jepsen articulates the view that Ruth
is a book of com-
fort,
which wonderfully illustrates how hopelessness may be
transformed
into hope through divine intervention. Naomi,
Ruth
and Boaz appear as the main characters. Naomi's de-
spair
is changed into joy with Ruth and Boaz playing their
parts
as the instruments through which God works the impos-
sible
and brings the improbable into being. "So ist das Buch
recht
eigentlich ein Trostbuch fur verzagte und verzweifelte
Menschen,
weil es in aller scheuen Zurückhaltung eben doch
von
Gottes Handeln redet."83 Specifically, it is a book of
webten,
ja die geheimsten Regungen ihrer Seele werden uns in lichter Klarheit
verdeutlicht."
See also the title of the book of K. H. Miskotte on Ruth: Het
gewone leven, 1939.
81. One of the most helpful discussions
in this connection is that of R. Hals,
The Theology of
the Book of Ruth,
1969.
82. W. Rudolph, op. cit., p. 32. He adds, "Gewiss verwendet der Erzähler
alle
Sorgfalt auf die Zeichnung der einzelnen Charaktere.... Aber dass Ruth auf
den
richtigen Acker kommt, ist Jahwes Fuhrung; dass der kluge Plan der Noomi
gelingt,
ist Jahwes Gnade, und dass der Ehe des Boas der erwunschte Sohn
entsprosst
ist Jahwes Geschenk"; op. cit.,
p. 33. L. Morris, op. cit., p. 242,
comments,
"This book is a book about God. He rules over all and brings blessings
to
those who trust him." Cf. P. Humbert, op. cit., p. 284, "Dieu done est
l'acteur
supreme."
Cf. also H. W. Hertzberg, op. cit.,
pp. 259, 260.
83. A. Jepsen, op. cit., p. 423. Jepsen provides us with an example of one
who
argues directly from purpose to date. He draws a parallel between the themes
of
the book and the time of the exile. "Und wenn nun berichtet wird, wie
aller
Verzweiflung
und allem Zweifel zum Trotz der Naemi doch eine neue Nachkom-
menschaft
beschert wird, so war das gerade für die Verbannten in ihrer Verzwei-
flung
ein Wort, das sie aufrichten und mit neuem Mut erfüllen konnte. So wird
The Date and Purpose of the
Book of Ruth 167
comfort
for the people in exile. "So lassen sich die wesent-
lichen
Gedanken und Bilder des Buches Ruth aus Deutero-
jesaja
belegen. Damit dürfte es deutlich sein, dass der Sinn
des
Buches von den Hörern der Exilszeit ohne weiteres ver-
standen
werden konnte als ein Wort des Trostes für das Volk
in
all seiner Hoffnungslosigkeit, durch den Hinweis auf einen
goel,
der sich der Verlassenen annimmt."84
In this connection we would also
mention Gerleman (al-
though
he also belongs under the "Davidic-Ancestry" cate-
gory)
who describes the book as a "Führungsgeschichte."85
The
Divine activity is not to be seen in visible miracles but in
the
control over the human heart. This "Führungsgeschicte"
is
most notably related to the Moabite ancestry of David:
"Die
Ruthgeschichte will den Nachweis erbringen, dass der
moabitische
Einschlag in der Abstammung Davids von Jahwe
selbst
gewollt und bewirkt ist."86 The book very noticeably
brings
to mind the patriarchal history (famine, Gen. 12, 26;
childlessness,
Gen. 16 f.; 25:21; 29:31; 30; and
purchase of
property,
Gen. 23). This literary correspondence is grounded
in
their similar theological function: "Sie Sind Vorgeschich-
ten
der beiden grossen Heilssetzungen, auf welchen die ganze
Existenz
Israels vor Jahwe ruhte: Sinaibund und Davidbund."87
sich
nicht leugnen lassen, dass das Buch bei dieser Deutung gerade in der Exilszeit
gut
verständlich wird"; op. cit.,
p. 424. In further support of his contention he
draws
attention to the parallel terminology of childlessness (Isa. 49:21), unfruit-
fulness
(Isa. 54:1), and widowhood (Isa. 47:8, 9). "
unfruchtbare
Witwe, als das verlassene Weib von der Zukunft nichts mehr zu
erwarten,
so wenig wie die ihrer Kinder beraubte Witwe Naemi"; op. cit., p. 425.
84. A. Jepsen, op. cit., p. 427.
85. G. Gerleman, op. cit., pp. 9-11.
86. G. Gerleman, op. cit., p. 10.
87. G. Gerleman, op. cit., pp. 10, 11. H. Lamparter, Das Buch der Sehn-
sucht, BAT, 16, 1962,
p. 19, writes: "Was Ruth erlebt, ist nicht nur ein Stück
Familien
und Sippengeschichte. Ihr Individuelles Geschick ist von dem hohen Plan
des
Herrn umfasst, der in dem Davidsbund (2 Sam. 7, 1 ff.) zu seiner heilsge-
schichtlichen
Erfüllung kommt.... Der Verfasser will an dem Schicksal Ruths
zeigen,
wie der Herr, der Gott
Verachtete
erwahlt, Menschen zu Werkzeugen seines Heilsplans macht, der auf die
Heimkehr
aller,
168 The Date and Purpose of the Book of
Ruth
The
Davidic-Ancestry Purpose
As we saw already in the view of
Gerleman, the theologi-
cal
purpose of the book is sometimes related to the ancestry
of
David. According to Hals, "the story has a theological
purpose
which pervaded the entire book, namely, to bear
witness
to God's hidden control of history by tracing his
hand
in the ancestry of David."88
There are a number of scholars who
accept the tradition
of
a Moabite ancestry for David and regard the genealogy of
Ruth
4:18-22 as genuine. For such scholars the book's pri-
mary,
though not exclusive purpose, is to provide this geneal-
ogy;89
in greater or lesser measure they emphasize that the
88. R. Hals, op. cit., p. 75. After analyzing the direct and indirect references
to
God within the book he concludes (p. 19), "When the narrative 'trimming'
is
stripped
away, the story of Ruth takes its place as simply one more bit of
Heilsgeschichte, for it clearly
aims to trace the background of the great David. In
fact,
the story could well be described as messianic history, for it serves to trace
the
plans of God which lay behind the Davidic dynasty."
89. S. R. Driver, op. cit., p. 425; E. J. Young, IOT, 1949, p: 359; R. K.
Harrison,
op. cit., p. 1063; N. H. Ridderbos,
"Strekking en Betekenis van het
Boek
Ruth," offprint of an article in SVU,
52, 1952, p. ' Aafders, Oud
Testamentische
Canoniek,
1952, p. 336. L. Morris, op. cit.,
pp. 317, 318, does
not
believe that the genealogy is a later addition. However, he does not-think that
the
story was "written to lead up to the genealogy and thus to provide an
ancestry
for the great King David.... It is too obviously an appendix, a mere
addition
to the main story for this to be at all plausible." Nevertheless he states
(p.
318), "The issue of the marriage of Boaz and Ruth was to lead in due
course
to
the great King David, the man after God's own heart, the man in whom God's
purpose
was so signally worked out.... A genealogy is a striking way of bringing
before
us the continuity of God's purpose through the ages." P. Verhoef,
"Die
Genealogie
van Dawid," Ned. Geref. Teologiese Tydskrif, 5, 1964, pp.
114-117,
discusses
the question, Why was the mention of Ruth omitted from the genealogi-
cal
records in Samuel, Kings and Chronicles? He notes the mention of several
foreign
women (vv. 3, 17, 34, 35) within the genealogical registers of I Chron. 2
where
there is brief mention of David's ancestry. He concludes: "Die genealogie
van
Dawid ontbreek in die boek Samuel en word elders in die Ou Testament
onvolledig
weergegee, dit wil se, met die verswyging van sy Moabitiese stam-
moeder,
omdat die gegewens reeds volledig in die
boek Rut vermeld was"; op. cit.,
p.
116. Verhoef (p. 117) sees three implications from this conclusion. "Ten
eerste,
dat die skrywers van die boeke Samuel en Kronieke met die boek Rut
bekend
was, en dat die inhoud van laasgenoemde boek in die algemeen soveel
bekendheid
verwerf het dat die bedoelde skrywers dit oorbodig geag het om
dieselfde
besonderhede in verband met die geslag van Dawid in hulle eie geskrifte
to
verstrek; ten tweede, dat die boek Rut dus vóór die boeke Samuel
en Kronieke
The Date and Purpose of the Book of
Ruth 169
book
of Ruth shows how God's direction was present in the
ancestry
of David. The omission of a genealogy for David in
the
books of Samuel and the reference in I Samuel 22:390 to
David's
contact with
the
data supplied by the book of Ruth, and such a purpose
supplies
a plausible reason for the inclusion of the book in
the
canon.
Loretz ties in the Davidic ancestry
theme with the main
motif,
which he feels is the marvelous preservation of the
"name."
This preservation occurs through the conjunction of
divine
activity with the everyday events of the human partici-
pants
through which "the family of Elimelech and therefore
its
'name' has been preserved, and still more, has been found
worthy
to form the illustrious line of the Davidic ancestry."91
moes
tot stand gekom het... ; ten derde, dat die prim'ere doel van die boek Rut
dus
inderdaad daarin bestaan het om die genealogie van die groot koning Dawid te
bied...."
C. J. Goslinga, op. cit., p. 124,
remarks, "Reeds werd geconstateerd dat
de
bedoeling van het boek Ruth is om te laten zien, uit welke en uit hoe edele
voorouders
koning David gesproten is en hoe daarbij ook een heidin-van-afkomst
door
God niet is versrnaad, maar in het voorgeslacht van David opgenomen." G.
Gerleman, op. cit., p. 8, concludes that a
Moabite ancestry for David must be an
authentic
tradition but goes on to say, "Diese vorauszusetzende Tradition ist Behr
bald
als eine schwere Belastung empfunden worden. In dieser Lage is die Ruther-
zahlung
als ein Euphemismus entstanden. Es ist hier der Versuch gemacht worden,
die
harmvolle und zählebige Moabitertradition, die der davidischen Herkunft
anhaftete,
zu beschoriigen und unschadlich zu machen." This is accomplished
through
the Judaizing of Ruth! A. Bentzen, op.
cit., pp. 185, 186, does not
believe
the book gives much reliable evidence but acknowledges, "The only mo-
ment
of historical importance may be a tradition of David's Moabite ancestry, and
accordingly
the main part of the story of Ruth's marriage may be good history. P.
Joüon's terse statement is, "Une histoire edifiante
relative aux origines de David";
op. cit., p. 2. Cf. G.
Smit, Ruth, Ester, en Klaagliederen,
TU, 1930, pp. 9, 10; J. J.
Slotki,
"The Book of Ruth," The Five
Megilloth, ed. A. Cohen, 1946, p. 39. The
argument
that the genealogy in Ruth 4 is secondary because it conflicts with the
basic
thrust of the narrative is discussed in chap. 9, "Boaz' Son."
90. For a different opinion on I
Sam. 22:3, cf. J. Gray, op. cit., p.
402. 0.
Eissfeldt,
op. cit., p. 480, maintains that such
a verse "gives no more basis for
postulating
connections of kinship between the house of David and
does
David's flight to Achish of Gath suggest that we may conclude kinship
between
his family and the Philistines." No one, however, maintains that from
I
Sam. 22:3 alone it can be validly deduced that there was a connection of
kinship
between
the house of David and
ancestry,
as preserved in Ruth, makes the incident in I Sam. 22:3 understandable.
91. 0. Loretz, op. cit., pp. 398, 399.
170 The Date and Purpose of the Book of
Ruth
The Legal
Purpose
In concluding this survey, we must
make mention of an
approach
to the book which brings us most directly into
contact
with our immediate subject. Brongers affirms that
the
writer of the book of Ruth is attempting to revive and
expand
the old levirate practice.92 Reasoning from the data
in
chapter four, he remarks, "De inhoud van dit caput
nauwkeurig
bestuderende
dan
dat hier een poging wordt gedaan, aannemelijk te maken,
dat
het begrip lossing (geoella) onder bepaalde omstandig-
heden
de plicht van het zwagerhuwelijk (leviraat), ook in zijn
meest
uitgebreide vorm, behoort in te sluiten. Gepropageerd
wordt
hier een uitbreiding van de plicht tot lossing, een uit-
breiding
die er volgens de schrijver in de oude tijd altijd was
geweest,
maar in de tegenwoordige tijd in onbruik was
geraakt."93
It is writing designed to institute a social reform,
both
in the institution of the goel as well as in that of Levirate
marriage.
The writer skillfully weaves together a story com-
bining
the duty of levirate marriage with the duty of redeem-
ing
the family property. There are no laws which speak of the
goel
duty involving marriage to the widow. Correspondingly,
one
finds no suggestion within the levirate law that any one
other
than the brother of the deceased was to perform the
duty
of levirate marriage. There is therefore, according to
Brongers,
an extension of the goel function as well as the
levirate
idea. In Ruth 3:13 "de go'el
moet hier doen wat des
92. Some have seen the book as
recommending the practice; others as ex-
panding
the practice. E. B. Cross, The Hebrew
Family, 1927, pp. 164, 165, sees
the
book as a protest against the interdict on marriage with foreigners, but feels
in
addition
that the "narrator may have hoped that those who would render the
custom
of the levirate obsolete might in reading this be led to feel their compara-
tive
narrowness of spirit." S. R. Driver, Introduction,
p. 426, writes, "It is, how-
ever,
not impossible, considering the prominence given to this subject in C. 3-4,
that
it is a collateral didactic aim of
the author to inculcate the duty of marriage
on
the part of the next-of-kin with a widow left childless."
93. H. Brongers, "Enkele
Opmerkingen over Het Verband Tussen Lossing en
Leviraat
in Ruth IV," NedThT, 2, 1947-48,
p. 2.
The Date and Purpose of the Book of
Ruth 171
leviers is. Dat houdt
in zowel een uitbreiding van het loss-
ingsals
van het leviraatsbegrip. In de eerste plaats wordt hier
onder
Tossing ook het leviraat begrepen en in de tweede plaats
wordt
de leviraatsverplichting uitgebreid tot een familielid in
ver
verwijderde graad."94 The author wished to see a wider
application
of the levirate institution than was acceptable by
his
contemporaries. He wanted to see the levirate "niet alleen
als
een middel om de naam van de overledene in stand to
houden;
maar ook als een waarborg voor de sociale verzorging
van
de weduwe. De combinatie van deze beide, in een geheel
verschillend
vlak liggende, motieven is juist het ‘nieuwe,’ wat
de
schrijver propageren wil."95
Rather than misunderstanding the
levirate institution, the
author
of Ruth is well aware of it. His purpose is to breathe
new
life into an old custom and even to extend its
application.96
We have briefly surveyed the suggested
purposes of the
book.97
None of the authors named has established his case
to
the exclusion of the others. However, having said this, it
does
seem that certain views are more likely. There would
appear
to be no reason to maintain that the author had one
all-absorbing
purpose. Taking into consideration the supreme
literary
artistry of the narrative, we should steer away from
opinions
that characterize the book as a polemical work.98 It
94. H. Brongers, op. cit., p. 4.
95. H. Brongers, op. cit., p. 6.
96. H. Brongers, op. cit., p. 7. He dates the book in or
immediately after the
exile.
Above, we have already rejected an exilic or postexilic date for the book.
Moreover,
was the period of the exile or immediately thereafter the propitious
moment
for the introduction of an expanded application of the law? In any case,
we
need not wait till the exilic or postexilic times to find an application of a
law
which
transcends its literal sense. For this application of the law, see chap. 10,
n.
55. Finally, we cannot accept the book of Ruth as a contrived story.
97. The views of H. May,
"Ruth's Visit to the High Place at
JRAS, 75, 1939, and
W. E: Staples, "The Book of Ruth," AJSL, 53, 1937, that
the
book contains motifs drawn from fertility cult myths have not convinced
many
scholars. Cf. chap. 7, n. 34. For a modern attempt at interpreting the book
in
terms of an original fertility myth, cf. S. Shearman and J. Curtis,
"Divine-
Human
Conflicts in the Old Testament," JNES,
28, 1969, pp. 235-240.
98. I. Bettan, op. cit., p. 52, writes, "A great artist is not a pamphleteer;
and
172 The Date and Purpose of the Book of Ruth
is
not inconsistent to ascribe to the author compound pur-
poses,
such as that of portraying everyday life in
the
activity of God in the ordinary affairs of the average
Israelite.
The introduction of the theme of the activity of God
in
the history of the ancestry of David adds an even deeper
dimension
to the story. Finally we agree with Schoneveld's
opinion
that, though the author may have had other motives,
the
book of Ruth may be described as "een loflied op de
ware
goel."99 The data in the book of Ruth about law and its
application
and development provides valuable information
for
our understanding of the role of the kinsman redeemer in
book.
We agree with Lévy-Buhl when he writes: "L'histoire
des amours de Ruth et de Booz n'est pas seulement une
gracieuse pastorale: elle est un document saisissant de
la force
des institutions cornmunautaires dans l'antiquité biblique."101
a
propagandist who was so artful in his ways as to keep the true character of his
work
concealed, not only from his contemporaries, but from an almost endless
posterity
as well, was probably no propagandist at all.”
99. J. Schoneveld, op. cit., p. 12.
Cf. also all. G. " Archer, A Survey
of Old
Testament
Introduction,
1964, p. 267: "Perhaps most important of all this brief
narrative
is designed to exhibit the function of the goel or kinsman redeemer."
100. D. Rauber, op. cit., p. 36, remarks, "That the author of Ruth had a
certain
interest in the legal situation is obvious, but that it was not his main
interest
should be equally apparent." We may accept this statement as a warning
against
limiting the value of the book to one overriding purpose. We would
maintain,
however, that the legal material is of fundamental importance in the
book.
101. H. Lévy-Bruhl, "Le Mariage
de Booz," Evidences, 17, 1951,
p. 33.
6
Naomi and the Levirate
WE wish to inquire into a point in the
very
beginning
of Ruth which has repercussions for
our
understanding of the marriage of the goel to
Ruth.
Our inquiry concerns the words of Naomi to her
daughters-in-law
in Ruth 1: 11-13. The problem which pre-
sents
itself is Naomi's words imply a misunderstand-
ing
of the levirate custom. If Naomi's words
show an error in
her
understanding of the levirate custom, it may well be
argued
that the author of the book has an inaccurate under-
standing
of the levirate elsewhere; in particular, when he por-
trays
the goel as raising up seed for the dead, a duty pre-
scribed
in the law for the brother-in-law. We are primarily
interested
in the interpretation of Naomi's words as they bear
directly
on the activity of the goel. It is not without signifi-
cance
that David concludes from Naomi's failure in Ruth
1:11-13
to reckon with the possibility of a more distant rela-
tive
marrying Ruth, "dat de auteur van het boek Ruth de
instelling
van het familie (go’el)—huwelijk niet
kende en dat
de
Tossing in het bock Ruth alleen betrekking
gehad
op het verwerven van grondbezit."1 In view of such
1. M. David, Het Huwehjk van Ruth, 1941, p. 14 (hereafter cited as Huwe-
lijk);
cf. also his further remark (pp. 7, 8) "Maar uit de hierboven aangehaalde
woorden
van Noömi in hoofdstuk 1 vs. 11 v.v., waarin zij haar schoondochters
adviseert,
naar haar ouderlijk huis terug to keeren, blijkt nog lets anders, nl. dat zij
zelfs
niet rekent met een huwelijk van haar schoondochters met familie van haar
man
(resp. haar gestorven zonen). Dit is van groote beteekenis. Want daardoor
er
twijfel rijzen, of er in den tijd, dat het boek Ruth werd geschreven, zoals men
algemeen
aanneemt, een overigens in de bronnen niet vermelde regeling heeft
bestaan,
volgens welke een kinderlooze weduwe ook door andere bloedverwanten
van
den man behalve diens broers moest worden gehuwd."
173
174 Naomi and the Levirate
import
attributed to her words we shall give further consider-
ation
to this passage.
Naomi, in 1:11-13, says to her
daughters-in-law: "Turn
back,
my daughters, why will you go with me? Have I yet
sons
in my womb that they may become your husbands?
Turn
back, my daughters, go your way, for I am too old to
have
a husband. If I should say I have hope, even if I should
have
a husband this night and should bear sons, would you
therefore
wait till they were grown? Would you therefore
refrain
from marrying? No my daughters, for it is exceedingly
bitter
to me for your sake that the hand of the Lord has gone
forth
against me." One of the arguments presented by David
for
the late date of Ruth is the author's misunderstanding of
the
levirate custom. He maintains that the words of Naomi
are
difficult to reconcile with the levirate law of Deuter-
onomy
25, which only requires levirate marriage of "brothers
dwelling
together."2 Furthermore, sons born to Naomi, from
another
husband, would not be the sons of Elimelech. They
would
be step brothers on the mother's side and therefore
would
not be responsible for performing the levirate duty
toward
Ruth and Orpah.3 With regard to David's first piece
2. M. David, Huwelijk, p. 5. Referring to the Deuteronomic phrase "dwell-
ing
together" David remarks, "Aan welke opvatting men nu ook de voorkeur
geeft,
in ieder geval, zijn deze woorden in tegenspraak met de meening van
Noomi,
dat ook later geboren broeders tot een zwagerhuwelijk zijn verplicht." Cf.
Th.
C. Vriezen, "Two Old Cruces," OTS, 5, 1948, p. 88 n. 7, "The
words of
Naomi
contain an inaccurate idea of the levirate marriage.... In the light of the
narrative
this is not a serious mistake, and it is not allowed to conclude from this
text
that the author no longer had a good idea of the levirate."
3. M. David, Huwelijk, pp. 6, 7. "Immers, uit de aangehaalde woorden van
Noomi
als
tot een leviraatshuwelijk verplicht houdt. Maar zulke kinderen waren toch van
Machlon
en Kiljon, de gestorven echtgenooten van Orpa en Ruth, in werke-
lijkheid
slechts stiefbroers van moederszijde. Als zoodanig zouden zij evenwel
nooit
tot de familie van Elimelech kunnen worden gerekend." This same objec-
tion
is raised by J. L. Vesco, "La Date du Livre de Ruth," RB, 74 1967, p. 242.
Since
we cannot say who Naomi had in mind as a father for the sons who would
marry
the widows, it is illegitimate to proceed on the assumption that she must
have
been in error. If we wish to operate with such a method, there is nothing to
preclude
us from following the view propounded by C. F. Keil, Joshua, Judges
and Ruth, 1887, p. 474,
who answered this hypothetical objection by remarking
Naomi and the
Levirate 175
of
evidence, it should be pointed out, as we have seen in
chapter
2, "The Persons Involved," that, while the Deutero-
nomic
law does not expressly require the levirate duty of
anyone
other than a brother who had resided with the
deceased,
it does not expressly exclude it of another brother.
We
must allow for the possibility that the law does not
stipulate
the exclusive conditions for the levirate but the
normal
and customary circumstances under which the levir-
ate
situation would operate. Furthermore, we must not ne-
glect
the immediate context of Naomi's words and their place
in
the total story. She is overwhelmed with the absolute
hopelessness
of the situation and sees no options available.4
The
first situation which she names, that is, that she still
has
sons in her womb, is highly improbable. She is past
childbearing
age and even in the hypothetical situation that
she
were not and sons were born, this would provide no
solution,
since it would not be feasible for the widows to
wait5
for them.
that.
when Naomi considered "the possibility of a future pregnancy, she might
even
then be simply thinking of an alliance with some brother of her deceased
husband
and therefore of sons who would legally be regarded as sons of Elime-
lech."
Cf. also n. 10.
4. E. Robertson, "The Plot of
the Book of Ruth," BJRL, 32,
1949-50, p.
209,
remarks, "The theme of the book is the upward struggle of a weak widow
woman
with the dice heavily loaded against her from a pit of despair to ultimate
triumph."
See also E. Würthwein, "Ruth," in Die
Fünf Megilloth, HAT, 18, 1969,
p.
11, "Das Hoffnungslose und Sinnlose, das in dem Sichverhinden mit Naemi
liegt,
zu betonen, war offensichtlich ein Anliegen des Erzählers. Darum lässt
er an
dieser
Stelle, im Gegensatz zu der bisher überaus knappen Schilderung, Naemi so
beredt
und breit werden."
5. There is one explicit reference
to the Judah-Tamar story in Ruth 4:12
and
possibly a veiled reference to the same incident in the words of Ruth 1:13
(vldgy
rwx df hnrbwt).
Cf. Gen. 38:11 (ldgy df ... ybw). Cf. H. H.
Rowley,
"The Marriage of Ruth," in The
Servant of the Lord, 19652, p. 190 n. 3,
"It
is possible that some reference to the story of Tamar lies in the suggestion of
waiting
for them to be grown up. Tamar had to "wait some years for the brother-
in-law
who was then denied her; but to wait for unborn sons would be unthink-
able!"
For a modern case of levirate where the widow waits for fifteen years, see
S.
D. F. Goitein, "Zur heutigen Praxis der Leviratsehe bei Orientalischen Juden,"
JPOS, 13, 1933, p.
163 n. 1 E. Robertson, op. cit., p.
211, believes that the tale
of
Judah and Tamar was heavily drawn upon by the writer in unfolding his story.
He
seeks to draw a comparison between Tamar and Naomi as well as Judah and
Boaz:
"Tamar, in a less difficult position perhaps than Naomi, did not quietly
176 Naomi and the Levirate
Rowley is unwilling to press Naomi's
statement in any
mechanical
fashion. "Naomi is not implying that any children
she
might possibly have borne as the result of a new marriage
contract
with a husband unrelated to Elimelech could have
been
looked to, [for the levirate responsibility] but stressing
the
complete impossibility of her providing them with fathers
of
their children."6
Rather than finding a contradiction to
the levirate cus-
tom,
Rudolph sees Naomi's remark as fitting the levirate cus-
tom
in Genesis 38: "Doss zwischen Gn 38 and Ru kein
Widerspruch
besteht, folgt auch aus Ru 1, 11 ff., wo Noomi
doch
wohl als selbstverstandlich voraussetzt, dass, wenn sie
accept
rebuff, but used her ingenuity and her womanhood to triumph over Judah.
Can
Naomi succeed by the employment of similar means?" He sees Naomi in
Ruth
1:11-13, considering and rejecting the possibility of the levirate as a
solution
to
the family difficulties and then adds, "Whatever solution is found, the reader is
well
and truly warned, it does not lie in that direction. Nor could the reader
really
expect
it, for if it did provide a way out for Naomi the story would collapse at
this
point. The fact that escape for Naomi is thus cut off only adds to the
hopelessness
of her situation, and intensifies the interest and curiosity of the
reader."
It is true that no interpretation of Naomi's words which fails to reckon
with
her emotional state and her bleak circumstances does justice to the immedi-
ate
context, or the context of the passage in the whole book and to that extent
we
concur with Robertson. His postexilic dating, however, as well as his stress on
the
book's literary finesse lead him to allow for "the existence of fictional
ele-
ments
and the much embellishing of fact to produce effect." Ibid., p. 208.
Robertson
sees no levirate or goel marriage responsibility devolving upon Boaz,
but
rather the duty of arranging for a suitable marriage for Ruth. Since no
assistance
was forthcoming from Boaz, he "must pay for his neglect and in the
same
way as Judah.... The problem of the writer was how to contrive a situation
where
Ruth and Boaz could be brought together as were Tamar and Judah." Ibid.,
p.
227. The writer used Hosea's reference, to "the harlots hire on every threshing
floor
of corn" (Hos. 9.1) and construced by a late night scene bringing the two
together.
The parallel with Judah is clear in that Boaz, being in a drunken state,
finds
himself outwitted by Naomi, who sends Ruth to him at the opportune
moment.
Ibid., pp. 226, 227. This comparison, however, raises various questions.
In
addition to the rather drastic distance between fact and fancy which it pre-
supposes,
it is far more likely that the goel's duty was to marry the widow Ruth
than
merely to arrange for the marriage. On Boaz' supposed drunkenness, see
chap.
7, nn. 35, 36.
6. H. H. Rowley, op. cit., p. 191. Rowley continues: "At this moment the
idea
of a levirate marriage for either herself or her daughters-in-law does not
occur
to
her as a practical proposition. For her it was out of the question by reason of
her
age, as well as by reason of the fact that she knew of no likely relation...."
Naomi and the Levirate 177
Sane
hätte, diese ihre Schwiegertochter pflichtgernäss
ehelichen
würden."7
Cooke says that although Naomi's
"language is colored
by
reference to a well-known social institution, the reference
is
not exact, nor intended to be taken literally."8
Mittelmann discusses Naomi's remarks
and concludes that
they
present considerable difficulties, when related to the law
in
Deuteronomy. Accordingly, he feels that the legal outlook
expressed
by Naomi must predate the Deuteronomic law of
the
levirate.9 He cannot accept the fact that step-brothers
were
obligated to perform the levirate or that the author of
Ruth
is unfamiliar with legal matters. This leads him to ac-
cept
the opinion "class Noomi bie dem in 1, 12 erwähnten
Manne
nicht an einen beliebigen Mann denkt, sondern an
einen
der go'alim des Elimelech, urn
allerdings diesen Ge-
danken
mit Rilicksicht auf ihr Alter sofort zurückzuweisen."10
A general reference to the levirate
cannot be excluded
from
Naomi's words.11 She is preoccupied with the fact that
God
is against her. This feeling of despair keeps her from
7. W. Rudolph, Das Buch Ruth, Das Hohe Lied, Die Klagelieder, KAT, 17,
1962,
p. 62. See also,
p.
188: "Offenbar hat No'omi dabei die Pflicht der Leviratsehe im Sinne,
welche
in
die altesten Zeiten Israels hineinreicht, vgl. Gen. 38.... No'omi hat also
wesentlich
die Sitte in ihrer älteren Form vor Augen." Cf. G. Smit, Ruth, Ester,
Klaagliederen, TU, 1930, p.
23, and C. J. Goslinga, Het Boek Ruth,
KV, 19522, p.
132;
E. Neufeld, AHML, 1944, p. 35, sees
in Naomi's words the evidence for an
older
levirate custom where later-born brothers were responsible to marry their
deceased
brother's wife.
8. G. A. Cooke, The Book of Ruth, 1918, pp. 3, 4. So
riage,"
EB, p. 2949, "Naomi's purpose is not to secure posterity for her son, but
to
gain a husband for her step daughter [sic]; not the continuance of the name of
Mahlon,
but the well-being of Ruth is her real desire (1:11 f; 3:1)."
9. J. Mittelmann, Der altisraelitische Levirat, 1934, p.
18.
10. J. Mittelmann, op. cit., p. 19.
L. Epstein, Marriage Laws in the Bible
and
the Talmud, 1942, p. 85,
writes: "If she were of the childbearing age, she might
be
persuaded to submit to a ge'ullah marriage
for herself. If she did that, there
would
be a chance for the daughters-in-law, for a child born of that marriage
would
count as son to Elimelech and brother-in-law to the younger widows, who
cad
marry them on the principle of succession or levirate or ge'ullah, which ever
it
might be."
11. The Targum to the book of Ruth
makes the following comment on
1:13a:
"As a woman who keepeth herself (chaste) for a little brother-in-law to
178 Naomi and the
Levirate
acceding
to the expressed desires of her daughters-in-law to
return
with her. Bertholet's statement, "Es muss nämlich vor
Allem
auffallen, dass es nach dem Kontext Naemi lediglich
urn
das Glück ihrer Schwiegertöchter und nicht etwa um die
Erhaltung
des Andenkens der Verstorbenen zu thun ist, und
doch
ist dies der eigentliche Sinn des Levirates,"12 cannot be
accepted,
for it does not reckon with the agitation of mind
evident
from her later words: "She said to them, 'Do not call
me
Naomi, call me Mara, for the Almighty has dealt very
bitterly
with me. I went away full, and the Lord has brought
me
back empty. Why call me Naomi, when the Lord has
afflicted
me and the Almighty has brought calamity upon
me?"
(Ruth 1:20, 21). Naomi's despair is related to the loss
of
her husband and sons, leaving her destitute and her
daughters-in-law
childless widows. It is this which lies so
heavily
upon her heart.13
The author's intent is to portray a
turn of events whereby
a
completely hopeless situation is altered through the gra-
cious
intervention of God. The extent of that despair is por-
trayed
in Naomi's rhetorical statement.14 In such a portrayal
it
does not serve the author's purpose to speak in precise,
take
her to a husband." Cf. A. Saarisalo, "The Targum to the Book of
Ruth,"
StOr, 2, 1928, p.
94. A few scholars affirm that Naomi's words are not to be
understood
in terms of the levirate, in any case not of a levirate marriage of
Naomi's
daughters-in-law. Cf. P. Joüon, Ruth,
19532, pp. 38, 39: "Noemi ici ne
pense pas au manage leviratique, par lequel ses brus, en épousant ses fils a nattre
donneraient une descendance légalé á Elimèlek. Car si
Noémi se remariait, ce
serait elle-meme qui contracterait un manage léviratique, et ce sont les fils issus de
ce manage qui seraient légalement les fils d'Elimèlek." Cf. also, I. Bettan, "The
Book
of Ruth," in The Five Scrolls,
1950, p. 59; P. Volz, "Rut," ThLZ,
26, 1901,
pp.
348, 349.
12. A. Bertholet, Das Buch Ruth, KHC, 18, 1898, p. 58.
13. Clear reference to Naomi's
concern for reviving the name of the dead
may
be seen in the story as early as Ruth 2:20. Cf. chap. 7, n. 8.
14. Th. and D. Thompson, "Some
Legal Problems in the Book of Ruth,"
VT,
18, 1968, p. 97, write: "Though the statement of Naomi is merely
rhetorical,
it
has no rhetorical value unless it could be true." They believe that
Naomi's
statement
may be evidence of a further extension of the levirate. A son born to
Naomi
from another husband would inherit the property from Naomi, and on the
marriage
of this son to Ruth the property would return directly into Elimelech's
line.
Naomi and the Levirate 179
minutely-defined
legal terms. Naomi is concerned merely
with
the practical impossibility of any answer, since it is
obvious
to her that the "hand of the Lord" is against her. In
such
circumstances we should not expect a calm and finely
worded
statement on all the legal possibilities which could
solve
the womens' problem.
A reference to a marriage between
Naomi and one of
Elimelech's
relatives cannot be rejected out of hand.15 Such a
reference,
however, cannot be proved. Naomi may not have
considered
a marriage to a relative because of her state of
mind
or because of the Moabite ancestry of her daughters-in-
law,
which made it seem even more evident that all hope was
gone.
Realizing her depressed condition, we hardly may ex-
pect
a calmly thought-out evaluation of all of the possibilities
for
a solution to this unfortunate position. She saw herself as
the
object of divine displeasure and was anxious that her
daughters-in-law
not be further affected by that displea-
sure.16
Under such circumstances, to remain behind provided
the
Moabite widows with a happier prospect, for Naomi
would
be unable to provide them with domestic happiness in
words,
following David,17 that the only activity of the goel
apparent
in the book of Ruth is in connection with property.
Naomi's
words do not preclude the possibility that the goel
function
might include marrying Ruth and raising up seed for
Elimelech.
Such a solution was not evident to her for the
reasons
suggested above; yet it was brought about by the
gracious
intervention of God, and it is that which the remain-
ing
story will eventually unfold.
15. Cf. n. 10.
16. Cf. E. Würthwein, op. cit., p. 11: "Sie ist eine,
gegen die die Gottheit
entscheiden
hat, eine von ihr Geschlagene and Gezeichnete (13b). Nach einer
weitverbreiteten,
auch von
schaft
mit einem solchen Menschen ein, sondern meidet ihn, urn nicht in seine
Unghickssphäre
hineingezogen zu werden."
17. Cf. n. 1.
7
Naomi and the Goel
The Discovery of a Goel, Ruth
2:20
UPON Naomi's return from
the
barley harvest, the reader is immediately intro-
duced
to Boaz, the man who shall figure prominent-
ly
in the solution of the plight of the two widows. He is
designated
by the term "kinsman" in 2:11 and 3:2 and is a
relative
on Elimelech's side.2 Because of this relationship
with
Elimelech, the narrative refers to him subsequently as
goel.
Additionally, he is said, to be lyH rvbg wyx. The NV
translates
this a "zeer vermogend man"; the RSV "a man of
wealth."
It is a phrase which has a meaning in the Old Testa-
ment
ranging from physical prowess and martial valour to
material
substance and social status.3 It is this latter sense
which
is conveyed by the narrative.4 The meeting and conver-
1. In place of the kethibhy fdym
"acquaintance" it is best in 2:1 to follow the
qere
rin, particularly in the light of vntfdm in 3:2. KB
translates "entfernter
Verwandter."
The only other use of this word is in Prov. 7:4.
2. hwyxl fdvm (2:1) is to be
understood as expressing the indeterminative
genitive.
Cf. GKC § 129 C.
3. Cf. W. McKane, "The Gibbor
Hayil in the Israelite Community," GUOST,
17,
1957-58 pp.8 30 (hereafter cited as "Gibbor Hayil"). C. Gordon, The World
of the Old
Testament,
1960, p. 228, comments, "The Hebrew term is literally 'a
hero
of valor,' which had evolved from its original sense of `stalwart warrior' to
‘upstanding
landowner' who could be counted on to meet economic obligations.
Boaz,
in the book of Ruth, who hears that title, is just such a man."
4. W. McKane, "Gibbor
Hayil," pp. 32, 33, discusses the theory of M. Weber
in
Ancient Judaism, 1952, who seeks to
explain the coalescence of the martial,
economic
and social factors in the phrase by reference to the armed patriciate of
the
Canaanite city states. He finds Weber's explanation inadequate. The gibbor
hayil
appears in the Conquest period, when the contact between
Canaanite
city states was just beginning. The common factor in the varying usage
according
to McKane is status. Once the conquest was over and the monarchy had
begun,
the warrior meaning did not survive. "In this new historical situation a
181
182 Naomi and the Goel
sation
of Boaz and Ruth is described in chapter two and the
discerning
reader is made aware that divine providence has
arranged
it.5 Ruth's successful meeting with Boaz is the first
hint
that Naomi's despairing words in 1:11-13 will eventually
be
transformed into words of praise.
Upon her return, Ruth is pressed by
her mother-in-law as
to
the success6 of her day's activities. She shows Naomi what
she
has gleaned and mentions the name of her kind benefac-
tor
as being Boaz. Naomi breaks forth into praise and cries,
"Blessed
be he by the Lord, whose kindness has not forsaken
the
living or the dead!" (Ruth 2:20a). At this moment Boaz
is
unaware that his prayer to the Lord to reward Ruth (2:12)
is
to be granted and that he is to be the answer to that
revaluation
of skills was called tor, and where the soldier did not matter so much,
the
merchant came into his own.... More generally gibbor hayil was applied to
men
of ability who could hold positions of responsibility in the community, and
hayil
was used with reference to ethical worth...." Ibid., p. 35. Cf. also E.
Neufeld,
"Royal Urban Society in Ancient
5. Ruth 2:3 and in particular hrqm
rqyv
is no evidence for the opposite
viewpoint.
W. McKane, Tracts for the Times: Ruth,
Esther, Lamentations, Ecclesi-
astes, Song of
Songs,
1965, p. 19, comments, "Here (chapter, 2) chance takes a
hand
and assists the unfolding of the story, whereas in chapter 3 a further impetus
is
given, not by chance but by design, when Naomi intervenes in order to hurry on
events
to the desired conclusion." More correctly does R. Hals, The Theology of
the Book of Ruth, 1969, p. 12,
remark, "By calling this meeting an accident, the
writer
enables himself subtly to point out that even the 'accidental' is directed by
God."
G. Gerleman, Ruth Das Hohelied, BK,
18, 1965, p. 25, correctly states,
"Hier
bedeutet hrqm
‘Zufall,’ d.h. das, was ohne den Willen oder das Zutun des
Betroffenen
vorfallt, and druckt somit die Uberzeugung des Erzahlers aus, dass
die
Menschen den Gang des Geschehens nicht bestimmen können. Andererseits ist
es
ihm klar, dass die Fuhrung Jahwes auch hinter diesem Zufall steht." M.
Wein-
feld,
"Ruth," EJ, 1971, p. 520,
remarks: "The Book of Ruth, which also recounts
a
natural story in which everything moves by human agents and, as it were,
without
divine interference, actually serves as a testimony for the wondrous ways
in
which God leads man toward his destiny.... The occurrences which look like a
chain
of natural happenings evolving one from the other reveal themselves in the
end
as the outcome of God's plan."
6. The word hnx in 2:19 in most
cases accompanies verbs of motion like
jlh (cf. Gen. 16:8; 32:18; Ps. 139:7; Neh.
2:16) or hlf (Deut.
1:28). As such the
word
directs the attention to the goal or end of the activity. In 2:19 it is con-
nected
with hWf
and is the one instance where both KB
and BDB give the
meaning
"where." Because of this, W. F. Stinespring, “Note on Ruth 2:19,”
JNES, p. 101,
writes: "But 'work' also can have a goal or end. May we
not,
therefore, preserve the 'directive' force of the form hnx here and translate
'to
what
end' or 'to what purpose' or 'to what result.'
Naomi and the
Goel 183
request.
In Naomi's reference to God's7 kindness to the
dead8
there is an anticipation of the later activity of the goel,
7. N. Glueck, "Das Wort Hesed
in Alttestamentlichen Sprachgebrauch,"
BZAW, 1927 = N.
Glueck, Hesed in the Bible, 1967, p.
38, writes, "In ancient
a
family or a tribal community was called hesed."
Glueck refers the phrase xl rwx
vdsH bzf in Ruth 2:20 to Boaz and not to
Yahweh. He cites II Sam. 2:5 as "an
exact
parallel to Ruth 2:20." Moreover, according to Glueck, (p. 41) "if we
accept
the commonly held view according to which bzf xl rwx is in
apposition
to
hvhyl,
this would be the only place in the Hebrew Bible where the hesed of
God
is mentioned in reference to the dead. The relationship between God -and
man,
very frequently expressed by hesed,
requires of man the fulfillment of
certain
conditions. Only those who serve God in faithfulness participate in com-
munion
with him and receive hesed from him.
It is very doubtful whether the
dead,
who in the Hebrew Bible generally are described as having absolutely no
relationship
with God, can appear here as receiving hesed
from God." It should be
noted,
however, that Ruth 1:8 speaks of the exercise of hesed on the part of the
widows
toward their dead husbands. If it can be said that the widows may display
hesed toward the
living and the dead, can not the same be said of Yahweh? While
it
is grammatically possible to refer the clause in question to Boaz, it is
preferable
to
refer it to Yahweh. We then have a sharp contrast in attitude between Naomi's
previous
bitterness toward the Lord (Ruth 1:13, 20, 21) and her present trust in
the
Lord's hesed toward the living and
the dead. The opinion of Glueck on Ruth
2:20
is followed by P. Humbert, "Art et lecon de l'historie de Ruth," RThPh,
26,
1938, p. 271 and A. MacDonald, "Ruth," NBC, 1953, p. 260. There is
merit
in
the observation of E. Würthwein, "Ruth," in Die Fünf Megilloth, HAT, 18,
1969,
pp. 5, 16, "Wenn auch die Beziehung auf Boas in 2:20 nicht sicher ist, so
kann
doch kein Zweifel bestehen, dass das, was Boas gegenuber den beiden
Frauen
and den Toten aber auch gegentiber dem unbekannten Loser tut, unter
den
Begriff dsH
fällt ... In dem dsH des Boas aber darf man Jahwes dsH am
Werk
sehen, der sich in ihm ein Werkzeug geschaffen."
The term hesed in Ruth (1:8; 2:20; 3:10) is, according to A. G. van Daalen
"een
van de sleutelwoorden voor een goed verstaan van het verhaal.... Het
woord
‘trouw’ horen wij telkens in verband met andere woorden: ‘levenden en
gestorvenen',
‘zegenen, gezegend’, ‘losser’, en zo wordt ons dan duidelijk de struk-
tuur
van het verhaal: De trouw van Ruth,
de Moabitische, die zij zelf aan gestor-
venen en aan levenden bewezen heeft, wordt de trouw van JHWH. De trouw die
JHWH
zou bewijzen aan Ruth, wordt bewezen door Boaz, de door JHWH ge-
zegende;
hij ziet haar trouw, en zo ziet hij
Ruth, de Moabitische, als niet-vreemde
aan.
Boaz' gezegend-zijn blijkt uit zijn losserschap. Dit losserschap is een
bijzonder
losserschap,
is er een namens JHWH, aan
wordt
daar gegeven en ontvangen, zegt het boek Ruth, waar gezegenden zijn, die
trouw zijn aan levenden en gestorvenen, en elkaar
herkennen: als niet-vreemden
aanzien."
M. de Groot, F. Hoogewoud, A. G. van Daalen, "Naar een idiolekte
vertaling,"
Rondom het Woord, 1970, pp. 413, 14.
See our discussion n. 45. The
connection
between dsH
and lxg
is seen clearly in Ex. 15:13a.
8. P.
Jouon, Ruth, 19532, pp.
63, 64, writes: "Sa bonte envers les morts, car
Booz etant un goel, Noemi espere et prevoit qu'il èpousera
Ruth et suscitera ainsi
une postérité a son marl défunt. Cette parole de Noémi prépare
très habilement ce
184 Naomi and the Goel
who
would function on behalf of the dead in raising up seed
to
the widow Ruth.
Naomi then explains the source of her
extreme happi-
ness:
"The man is a relative of ours; one of our nearest kin"
(Ruth
2:20b). Since this is the first explicit use of the term
goel,9
it will be necessary to consider this verse in greater
detail. Verse 20b reads: xvh
vnlxgm wyxh vnl bvrq.
bvrq is a general
word used in several places to describe a
kinship relationship. It is found in family
contexts in com-
bination
with vrxwl
(Lev. 21:2; Num. 27:11) and in .Leviti-
cus
25:25 in the phrase bvrqh vlxg Ruth 3:12 one
meets
the
phrase ynmm bvrq lxg. It stands alone in II Samuel 19:43
(42)
in the phrase ylx jlmh bvrq, "the king
is near of kin to
me."
According to KB it is employed in a
"verwandtschaft-
licher
menschlicher Beziehung."
Staples maintains that "there can
be but one go’el at a
time.
On the death of one go’el, or on his resigning his rights,
the
next person in line may become the go'el, but not before
qui va suivre." Cf. J. Gray, Joshua, Judges, Ruth, CB, 1967, p. 416; Knight,
Ruth
and Jonah, 1966, p. 35; H. Hajek, Heimkehr
nach
61,
sees in the mention of "the dead," "die Thematik der
Erzahlung." Cf. also L.
P.
Smith, "Ruth," IB, 2, 1953, p. 843. The importance of our
interpretation of
this
phrase may be seen when compared with a statement by G. Cooke, Judges
and Ruth, 1918, p. 10,
"In her plan for a next of kin marriage, Naomi's only
concern
is for Ruth's future; the perpetuation of the name of her dead childless
son
is left for Boaz to mention (IV. 5, 10)." It cannot be said that Ruth was
the
exclusive
point of Naomi's concern, if the kindness toward the dead refers to the
levirate.
W. Rudolph, Das Buch Ruth, Das Hohe Lied,
Die Klagelieder, KAT, 17,
1962,
p. 51, explains the reference to the dead in terms of "das Denken des
Vergeltungsglaubens....
Der Tod der drei Männer im unreinen Ausland war nicht
nur
für Noomi, sondern auch für diese selbst `ein Zeugnis Jahwes gegen sie' (1,
21)
gewesen; erwies sich jetzt Jahwe den überlebenden Witwen gnadig, so waren
damit
auch die toten Manner rehabilitiert." H. W. Hertzberg, Die Bucher Josua,
Richter, Ruth, ATD, 9, 19653,
p. 271, writes, "Der Segen fur die Toten betrifft
zugleich
die Lebenden; nach alttestamentlicher Sicht könnte die göttliche
Gnade
den
Toten ja nicht anders zuteil werden, als dass sie die Lebenden trifft."
The
reference
to the dead is explained by L. Morris, Ruth,
TOTC, 1968, p. 280, as due
to
the "strong sense of family, so that any kindness that God might show to
Ruth
and
Naomi is a kindness to their dead relatives as well as to themselves."
9. H. W. Hertzberg, op. cit., p. 271, "Der Begriff des
Lösers tritt von hier an
bis
zum Ende des Buches als der entscheidende hervor."
Naomi and the Goel 185
the
first is definitely out of the picture."10 He argues that
there
is only one place in the written text of the Old Testa-
ment
where the plural is found, that is, I Kings 16:11, and he
suggests
in this instance a change from vylxg to vlxg.11 The
traditional
understanding of Ruth 2:20 and Ruth 3:12 must
be
revised if this position of Staples is to be accepted. In the
Hebrew
consonantal text of Ruth 2:20 we have iltnun, but
there
is manuscript support for seeing this as a case of scrip-
tio
defectiva.12 According to
Meek, the Massoretes, like the
author
of I Kings 16:11, "manifestly believed that go'el
could
mean 'relative' as well as 'next-of-kin' and led astray by
the
preposition min, which they
interpreted as partitive, they
pointed
the word as plural. Instead of that it is clearly singu-
lar,
and the preposition min would seem to be separative:
‘The
man is a relative of ours, he is next after our next-of-
kin.'"13
Staples writes, "Our study of the word forbids a
plural,
and so a partitive."14 He offers three possibilities for
interpreting
min. The first is to take it as a
negative similar to
its
usage in Hosea 6:6, in which case the translation would
be:
"The man is near unto us, [but] he is not our go'el."15 A
second
possible way to handle the min is
paralleled in Job
17:12
and would give the translation: "The man is closely
10. W. Staples, "Notes on Ruth
2:20 and 3:12," AJSL, 54, 1937,
p. 63. A
similar
viewpoint is presented by T. Meek, "Translating the Hebrew Bible," JBL,
79,
1960, pp. 332-334.
11. W. Staples, op. cit., p. 65. T.
Meek, op. cit., p. 333, emends the
text to
read
frv lxgv, "whether next-of-kin or friend," whereby
he remarks, "if the text
is
by any chance original, it can only mean that go'el took on the meaning of
‘relative’
in the latter period. It surely did not have that meaning earlier." The
words
vhfrv vylxgv in I Kings 16:11 are awkward. Rather than changing
the
plural
vylxgv to the singular as suggested by Staples, certain
other scholars take
vhfr as an unusual plural form (M. Noth, Könige,
BK, 9, 1968, p. 325) or else
emend
it to a plural. The latter is the position of J. Gray, I, II Kings, OTL, 1970,
p.
359, who writes, "The plural for MT singular, though a conjecture unsupported
by
the versions, is almost certain."
12. Cf. W. Rudolph, op. cit., p. 51.
13. T. Meek, op. cit., p. 333.
14. W. Staples, op. cit., p. 64.
15. Ibid.
186 Naomi and the Goel
related
to us; he is next to our go’el."16 A third possibility is
to
take min as having the force of "on the side of," as in
I
Samuel 20:21, 22, in which case we would translate, “The
man
is closely related to us, he is close to our go'el (in
relationship).”17
Staples and Meek are arguing that the
term "goel" was
never
applied to any one other than the nearest kinsman and
that
no such term could have been used of Boaz prior to the
renunciation
of the responsibilities by the goel in chapter
four.
With this in mind, one question immediately springs to
our
attention. Why did Ruth (3:9), at the strong encourage-
ment
of Naomi, approach Boaz with her request and base her
entreaty
on the fact that Boaz was goel? Staples regards
Ruth's
visit to Boaz as a strategem employed by Naomi and
Ruth
to pressure the real god into assuming his responsibil-
ities
or renouncing them.18 According to Meek, both Naomi
and
Ruth knew that Boaz was not the goel.
Yet Boaz is
addressed as the goel by
Ruth on her evening' visit. Meek
explains
such conduct as part of the "wily ways of a woman
to
get her man. It is one of the delicate touches in the book
that
Ruth should be represented as slightly exaggerating the
status
of Boaz in order to further his interest in her."19 In
our
opinion such behaviour would go far beyond slight exag-
geration.
To posit a degree of planning and female resource-
fulness
is in line with the character of Naomi, but Meek's
scheme
presupposes characteristics and conduct on the
women's
part which go beyond what the text allows. The
supposition
that Naomi and Ruth employed the nighttime
tactics
described in the text, while being aware that Boaz was
indeed
not immediately answerable, is not at all convincing,
nor
is it at all necessary.20 We must challenge the basic as-
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid., p. 63.
19. T. Meek, op. cit., p. 333.
20. Cf. H. H. Rowley, "The
Marriage of Ruth," in The Servant of
the Lord,
19652,
p. 188 n. 3. His verdict is that the suggested renderings of Staples are not
187 Naomi and the Goel
sumption
that the term "goel" can not be applied to anyone
other
than the nearest relative. We have seen that Leviticus
25:25
uses the term brqh vlxg to designate the nearest
responsible
relative. Such a designation confirms that the
term
"goel" by itself need not be understood as implying the
nearest
relative.21 Further, in Ruth 3:12 Boaz states, "And
now
it is true that I am a near kinsman [goel] , yet there is a
kinsman
nearer than I." If our understanding of this verse is
correct
then Boaz' statement is fatal to the views presented
by
Meek and Staples. This verse is very difficult textually and
emendation
has been suggested by some scholars.22 As this
passage
will figure in our later discussion we will make only
brief
reference to it at this point. Staples takes the text as it
is,
including the kethibh Mx which is, in his opinion, a nega-
tive
similar to the usage in passages such as Judges 5:8 and
Numbers
14:23. The first in is combined with Mnmx and the
second
is introductory, as in Genesis 42:18, and could be
rendered
"surely" or "really." Nm is translated
as in Ruth
2:20.
He therefore translates, "But now, as a matter of fact, I
am
really not (your) go’el, but you do
have a go'el, one who
is
more closely related (to you) than I."23 According to many
other
scholars, it is far more likely that Mx is to be
omitted
and
explained as a case of dittography from Mnmx.24
We do
not
therefore believe that Staples or Meek have successfully
natural.
He comments, "The sincerity of Naomi and Ruth must then be impugned
in
the interests of these unnatural renderings...." Cf. J. H. Kennedy,
"Ruth,"
BBC, 2, 1970, p.
475, who objects to any idea of pretended ignorance and
remarks,
"Besides, she would have known full well that court procedures at the
village
gate made such tactics utterly futile." Cf. Excursus.
21. Cf. W. McKane, "Ruth and
Boaz," GUOST, 19, 1961-62, p. 37
n. 3.
22. Ruth 3:12a reads: yknx lxg Mx yk
Mnmx yk htfv.
P. Joüon, op. cit.,
P. 75, "Je lirais simplement yknx
lxg Mnmx htfv malgré la difficulte qu'il y a à
expliquer la présence du double yk et de Mx (ketib)."
23. W. Staples, op. cit., p. 65. T. Meek, op.
cit., p. 334, translates the verse
in
much the same way as Staples. Mx yk he takes as an
emphatic negative as in
I
Sam. 25:34. Mg has the force
of "another." He translates, "But now, as a matter
of
fact, I am really not next-of-kin, but there is another who is next-of-kin, one
nearer
than I."
24. Cf. L. Morris, op. cit., p. 292; G. Gerlemen, op. cit., p. 30; W. Rudolph,
op. cit., p. 55. For an
identical case of dittography, cf. II Sam. 13:33; II Sam.
15:21;
and Jer. 39:12. C. F. Keil, Joshua,
Judges and Ruth, 1887, p. 485, retains
188 Naomi and the Goel
established
their positions.25 The significant question which
remains
from Naomi's recognition of Boaz as goel is, What
did
she expect from Boaz? The nocturnal visit of Ruth to
Boaz
becomes one of the keys to the unraveling of this
question.
The Approach to Boaz, Ruth
3:1-9
Preparation for
the Visit, Ruth 3:1-4
The appearance of Boaz as goel (2:20)
brings the first ray
of
hope into the shattered life of Naomi. The events of chap-
ter
three will show whether the initial contact which Ruth
made
with Boaz was merely accidental or whether it was
divinely
designed to lead to the alleviation of the plight of
the
widows.26 It is the appearance of Boaz, bringing new
possibilities
for solving Naomi's problem, which will domi-
nate
the remainder of the book.27 However, we must ask
what
Naomi was seeking from the goel. Examining the legal
sections
of the Old Testament we have seen that the goel
operated
in cases of extreme poverty in order to retain the
property
within the family (Lev. 25:25). It is not surprising
therefore
that Hertzberg sees in Naomi's remark in Ruth 2:20
"einen
ersten Hinweis darauf, dass von Elimelech her noch
Grundeigentum
vorhanden sei. ..."28 In Ruth 3:12, in the
phrase,
"there is a goel nearer than I" (ynmm bvrq lxg), we
find
terminology similar to that of Leviticus 25:25 (vlxg
Mx and takes Mx
yk as
expressing emphatic assurance after an oath. Cf. GKC
§
163d.
25. W. Rudolph, op. cit., p. 55, commenting on the idea of Meek and
Staples
that there can be only one goel (nearest relative) writes, "Der
potentielle
Löser
konnte geradesogut go'el heissen wie
der wirkliche (vgl. 4:4, 6a)."
26. H. W. Hertzberg, op. cit., p. 271, commenting on the
introduction of
the
goel concept for the first time in Ruth 2:20 remarks: "Der Leser aber soil
von
dem
Kapitel Abschied nehmen mit der Erkenntnis, dass der Herr sich dieser
Witwen
in erstaunlicher Weise angenommen hat, und wohl auch mit der Hoff-
nung,
dass dank der gnädigen Gottesftihrung hier etwas begonnen hat, das eine
Fortsetzung
finden kann, wozu gerade der Begriff des Losers einen besonderen
und
konkreten Anhaltspunkt bietet."
27. H. W. Hertzberg, op. cit., p. 271.
28. Ibid.
Naomi and the Goel 189
brqh). Yet despite the similar terminology,
the events in
chapter
three point overwhelmingly to Naomi contemplating
the
possibility of a marriage between Boaz and Ruth. It re-
mains
to be seen whether Naomi considers Boaz bound to
perform
the levirate duty or whether she considers it to be
his
duty as goel or whether she knows a marriage is not
obligatory
but something which might be offered, in which
case
she then takes things more directly in hand in order to
activate
and encourage a willingness on Boaz' part. The
events
of chapter three provide us with one of the most
delicate
and intriguing parts of Old Testament narrative.29
Having
learned of Ruth's "chance" encounter with Boaz and
of
his interest30 and kindness toward Ruth, Naomi proceeds
to
the formation of a plan of action which has as its final goal
the
marriage of Boaz to Ruth. "My daughter, should I not
seek
a home for you, that it may be well with you?" (3:1).
The
word Hnvm
means ,"resting place." It is translated in the
NV
by "rust." "Mijn dochter, zou ik voor u geen rust
zoeken...?"
The RSV translation "home" gives the same idea
since
Naomi likely has in mind the precarious existence of
widowhood,
which the two women shared from day to day.
Her
concern is to find a solution for such a situation. She
wants
it to be well for Ruth (3:1b). In the Old Testament,
marriage
would be the most obvious way to alter a widow's
unenviable
situation. This is the clear statement of 1:9 where
29. Discussion concerning the
morality of what was done by Naomi and
Ruth
often swings between extremes. M. David, Het
Huwelijk van Ruth, 1941, p.
9
(hereafter cited as Huwelijk), denies that Ruth is requesting marriage from
Boaz
as
goel, on several grounds, one of which is that he finds such a consideration to
be
out of keeping with the favorable portrait of her character in the rest of the
book.
On David's argument, see chap. 7, "The Appeal of Ruth." At the other
end
of
the spectrum is the position of E. Robertson, "The Plot of the Book of
Ruth,"
BJRL, 32, 1950, pp.
225, 228, who portrays Naomi as operating on an "end
justifies
the means" mentality. Boaz is "outwitted by Naomi, who takes him at a
disadvantage....
It was a woman's way of solving her problem." In Robertson's
view
Ruth comes out unscathed in reputation since she is acting obediently to-
ward
her mother-in-law.
30. The phrase dgh
dgh
in 2:11 suggests that Boaz was aware of Ruth
before
their meeting. G Gerleman, op. cit.,
p. 26, remarks, "Was er jetzt zu sagen
hat,
verrät aber, dass er die junge Moabiterin recht gut kennt."
190 Naomi and the Goel
Naomi
remarks, "The Lord grant that you may find a home
(hHvnm), each of you
in the house of her husband," Taken in
combination
with the other circumstances in the chapter, it is
most
likely that Naomi was thinking of marriage.31
Naomi then adds further explicit
directions. "Wash there-
fore
and anoint yourself, and put on your mantle32 and go
down
to the threshing floor" (3:3a). Such preparation need
not
be interpreted as "part of the accepted ritual before mar-
riage,"33
for it was not at all certain how Ruth would be
received.
However, such preparations are certainly part of the
total
pattern of chapter three whereby Ruth is signifying to
Boaz
her desire to marry him.
The time and place have been carefully
chosen by Naomi.
Ruth
was to approach Boaz in the night at the threshing
31. Cf. I. Bettan, "The Book of
Ruth," in The Five Scrolls,
1950, p. 64, "A
woman's
status in lifeWas made secure through Marriage; in family life she found
her
rest." H. W. Hertzberg, op. cit.,
p. 273, writes, "Zu Beginn fällt wieder das
wichtige
Wort von der Ruhestatt. Wie, 1, 9 meint es
konkret die Ehe." G. Coats,
"Widows
Rights: A Crux in the Structure of Genesis 38," CBQ, 34, 1972, pp.
464,
465, seeks to argue that the security which Naomi sought for Ruth did not
of
necessity, involve marriage. He cites Deut. 28:65; Lam. 1:3, and Isa. 34:14 as
instances
where the word manoah, is used as a
term for security without reference
to
marriage, He concludes, “The content of Naomi s advice does not aim obvious-
ly
to secure marriage. Its aim is sexual intercourse. It may be that behind the
plan
lies
some social pressure on the man who conceives a child with a woman he has
not
yet married. But if that is the case, the intention does not find clear expres-
sion.
Naomi instructs Ruth to seek sexual contact with Boaz without any clear
guarantee
that he will marry her." It is true that the word "rest" is
found in
contexts
where marriage is not involved. But where the term is used in connection
with
a widow, as it is in Ruth 1:9, we see conclusively that marriage is involved
for
it
was this which gave stability and security to the woman. For the same reason,
JNES, 28, 1969, p.
237, are incorrect when they refer to the central event in
Ruth
3 as a "seduction." This is in line with their contention (p. 236)
that
"beneath
the didactic formulation of the story of Ruth, there is an older story
that
in no way intends to edify."
32. RSV translates, "your best
clothes." C. Lattey, The Book of
Ruth, 1935,
p.
14, writes, "Nor is it likely that Ruth in her poverty would possess 'best
clothes.'
" It is preferable to read the singular jtlmw, in which case
what is meant
is
the large outer garment, which served to keep Ruth from being recognized.
33.
Contra W. E. Staples, "The Book of Ruth," AJSL, 53, 1937, p. 155.
The
similarity of terms between Ruth 3:3 and Ezek. 16:9 leads H. W. Hertzberg,
op. cit., p. 274, to a
similar conclusion, "Ruth soil rich dem Boas zur Ehe
anbieten
and sozusagen als Braut zu ihm kommen." As for the first part of this
Naomi and the
Goel 191
floor,34
(goren) to take note of the place where he would lie
down,
and to wait until he had finished eating and drink-
ing.35
Then when he had gone to bed for the night she was
instructed
to uncover his feet and lie down and she would be
told
what to do. The preparations for the visit, the time and
place
and the method of approach all make it clear that Ruth
is
about to request marriage from Boaz.
sentence
there can be little doubt, though the second part is questionable. In
Ezekiel
indeed, the bathing, washing, and anointing come after the conclusion of
the
covenant and the spreading of the skirt, but of course, not all bathing and
anointing
is in preparation for being a bride.
34. Cf. J. Gray, "The Goren at
the City Gate: Justice and the Royal Office in
the
Ugaritic text ‘Aqht,’" PEQ,
1953, pp:118-123; S. Smith, "On the Meaning of
Goren,"
PEQ, 1953, pp. 42-45; S. Smith,
"The Threshing Floor at the City Gate,
I
Kings 22:10," PEQ 1946, pp.
5-18. In the latter article, Smith (p. 12) argues for
the
existence of threshing floors at some of the city gates. "The reason may
be
that
many citizens in early times had small cultivated plots in the immediate
environs,
but no suitable space for threshing and winnowing, and no adequate
means
for protecting their grain from theft after winnowing. Winnowing was
generally
done at night, in order to take advantage of the breeze, and the grain
could
not be removed immediately. In Ruth 3:2, Boaz slept by his corn when the
work
was done; so apparently he did not trust his own servants in this matter.
Such
conditions would naturally lead to the use of some patch of communal
hardground
for communal threshing, preferably in a position where the guardians
of
that city would protect the grain. Hence the threshing floor at the city gate."
H.
G. May, "Ruth's Visit to the High Place in
78,
denies that Boaz was spending the night guarding the grain. Rather he was
spending
the night at the
rites
and sacred prostitution were performed; particularly at harvest time. Women
wishing
children visited the sanctuary for such a purpose, and Naomi, wanting an
heir,
sent Ruth properly prepared to the local sanctuary at
to
support such a view from the connection between threshing floors and sacred
prostitution
in Hos. 9:1 and from the sexual euphemisms which he claims are
found
in Ruth 3:7, 9, and from the gift of six omers of barley sent back with
Ruth.
Such a view, however, has not gained much acceptance and has been
strenuously
attacked by H. H. Rowley, op. cit.,
p. 189 n. 2. From May's position
(also
that of W. E. Staples, "Book of Ruth," pp. 155, 156), it would have
to be
concluded
that "the precaution for Ruth's unobtrusive return (v. 14) and the
fundamental
question of the levirate marriage is meaningless"; so rightly J. Gray,
Joshua,
Judges, Ruth, CB, 1967, p. 417.
35. The scene has been portrayed by
E. Robertson, op. cit., p. 217, in
very
extreme
terms. He writes, "When the swift eastern darkness had closed over the
threshing
floor and those who took part in the festivities had removed themselves
from
the immediate area, Boaz, too, who had eaten and drunk till 'his heart was
merry,'
staggered to the end of the heap of corn and lay down in deep drunken
slumber."
Such an interpretation cannot be supported from the phrase in v. 7
alone
as is shown by a comparison with its usage in other passages. Cf. Judg.
18:20;
19:6, 9; I Kings 21:7;11 Kings 25:25; Eccles. 7:3. It is rather necessary to his
192 Naomi and the Goel
The Appeal of
Ruth, Ruth 3: 7-9
"When Boaz had eaten and drunk,
and his heart was
merry,36
he went to lie down at the end of the heap of grain.
Then
she came softly, and uncovered his feet,37 and lay
down.
At midnight the man was startled, and turned over,38
and
behold a woman lay at his feet! He said, 'Who are you?'
And
she answered, 'I am Ruth, your maidservant; spread
your
skirt over your maidservant, for you are next of kin.'"
Verse 9 is crucial in our
understanding of Ruth's under-
taking,
particularly the words, yk jtmx lf jpnk twrpv
htx lxg. The phrase jpnk
twrpv
provides us with the key
interpretative
problem. Many manuscripts have jypnk. Prob-
ably
the Massoretes conceived of jypnk as a
defectively writ-
position
which accentuates the "plot" aspect of the events in chapter three.
"That
Boaz
should be in a drunken stupor was essential for the purposes of the narra-
tive.
Thus in a plausible manner the two are brought together in the way desired
by
the writer and paralleled in the tale of Tamar and Judah"; op. cit., p.
227. See
chap.
6, n. 5. L. P. Smith, "Ruth,"
IB, 2, 1953, p. 845, correctly describes
Naomi's
advice as “a bit of homely knowledge of human nature.”
36. The phrase vbl
bFyyv
need not convey the idea of excess. It is here used
to
indicate state of, satisfaction: Cf. J. Gray, op. cit: 13. p. 418. See above, n. 35.
37. The only other occurrence of the
word tlgrm
is in Dan. 10:6. Some
scholars
have noted the possibility that this expression is a sexual euphemism, as
in
Ex. 4:25. However, the word is not identical with that of Ex. 4:25 (lgr) and
such
a suggestion must remain speculative. On the other-hand the nanrative in
chapter
three contains several words which suggest sexual connotations. H. W.
Hertzberg
lists fdy,
bkw
(Gen. 26:10), xvb (Gen. 16:2), in Jnk
hlgy
(Deut. 22:30;
27:20)
and remarks, "Offenbar soil gerade durch die Mehrdeutigkeit der ver-
wendeten
Worte die Gefährlichkeit der durch Naemis Rat und Ruths Gehorsam
herbeigefuhrten
Lage sichtbar werden"; op. cit.,
p. 275. The Targum on 3:8 com-
pares
Boaz to Joseph. Cf. A. Saarisalo, "The Targum to the Book of Ruth," StOr,
2,
1928, p. 98.
38. The translation of this verb is
problematic. It is found elsewhere only in
Judg.
16:29 and Job 6:18. In the former place, the qal is translated
"grasp." G.
Gerleman,
op. cit. p. 30, suggests,
"drehte sich herum." H. Hajek, op.
cit., p. 71,
writes,
"Wenn Boas 'mitten in der Nacht' vor Kälte wach wird und aufschrickt,
dann
offenbar erst, die in seiner Nahe liegende Gestalt wahrnimmt und sich `vor-
beugen'
muss, urn erst daraufhin zu erkennen, dass 'ein Weib zu seinen Fussen'
liegt,
dann kann Ruth keinesfalls in so unmittelbarer Nahe neben Boas gelegen
haben,
wie das vielleicht im Plan der Naomi vorgesehen war." 0. Loretz, Das Buch
Rut: Gotteswort
and Menschliche Erfahrung, 1963, p. 56, translates "tastete sich
ab."
W. Rudolph, op. cit., p. 55, remarks,
"Die gewöhnliche Übersetzung ‘sich
vorbeugen’
ist zwir nicht dem Wortlaut nach, aber der Situation entsprechend
richtig."
Naomi and the Goel 193
ten
dual. The phrase would then mean "spread your wings"
as
in Deuteronomy 32:11 and Ruth's words would then
simply
be a request for protection (cf. 2:12). The alternative
to
this is, following the versions,39 to read the word as a
singular
and in the light of Ezekiel 16:8 and Deuteronomy
22:30
and 27:20 to translate the sentence, "spread your skirt
over
your maidservant." This would be a delicate expression
by
which to refer to marriage.
David has argued for the first
alternative on two main
grounds.
He finds it out ofkeeping with the character of
Ruth
in the remainder, of the book to believe that Ruth was
approaching
Boaz requesting marriage. "Nu gelooven wij niet,
dat
Ruth van Boaz verlangde, dat hij haar zou trouwen, ja dat
zij
hem dit min of meer als plicht tegenover haar voorstelde.
Dit
zou moeilijk in overeenstemming zijn te brengen met de
schildering
van het bescheiden en bekoorlijke karakter, die
wij
overigens in den tekst van haar vinden."40
A second reason, more important than
the above, he
finds
in Boaz' reply in verse 13: "Remain this night, and in
the
morning, if he will do the part of the next of kin for you
(jlxgy
Mx),
well; let him do it; but if he is not willing to do
the
part of the next of kin for you (jlxgl CpHy xl Mxv
then,
as the Lord lives, I will do the part of the next of kin
for
you (jytlxgv). Lie down until the morning." Such a pas-
sage
recalls the legal regulation in Leviticus 25 concerning
redemption
of property. David concludes "Indien wij nu aan
de
hand van deze gegevens trachten, de geciteerde woorden
van
Boaz te interpreteren, dan kunnen zijn plannen, die hij
ten
gunste van Ruth in overweging neemt, slechts betrekking
hebben
op de afdoening van financiëele verplichtingen te
haren
opzichte en wel in verband met een verkoop van grond-
bezit.
. . . In het bezonder
39. LXX: peribalei?j
to> pteru<gio<n sou. The Targurn renders the phrase in
an
explanatory form: "Let thy name be called upon thine handmaid to take me
for
a wife." Cf. A. Saarisalo, op. cit.,
p. 98.
40. M. David, Huwelijk, p. 9. Cf. n. 29.
194 Naomi and the Goel
hebben
op de verplichting tot het aangaan van een
huwelijk.41
Since the morality factor has been
cited as an objection
against
seeing Ruth's words (3:9) as a direct request for mar-
riage,
it will be necessary to comment on this factor. Proce-
dures
as described in Ruth 3 would indeed be out of place, if
they
were employed in the arrangement of an ordinary mar-
riage.
Such is not the case under discussion; indeed if it were,
the
marriage would have been arranged by the parents and
not
through procedures such as are mentioned in this chap-
ter.
Ruth's request must be understood in terms of her own
explanation,
"for you are next of kin."
Gunkel has well stated, "Doss
sich aber Ruth auf eine so
peinliche
Situation einlässt, das ist Heroismus der Treue.
Nicht
für sich selbst begehrt sie etwas, sondern einen Erben
für
ihren Mann."42 We must also note the fact that Boaz
praised
her for what she had done, invoked the blessing of
Yahweh
upon her (3:10a) and acknowledged further that his
fellow
townsmen' knew her to be a woman of worth (3:
41. Ibid., pp. 11, 12. J. de Fraine,
Rechters Ruth, BOT, 3, 1955, pp. 154,
155,
writes, "Ruth trekt dus de aandacht van Boiiz op zijn verplichting als
losser,
d.i.
als beschermer in het algemeen.... Booz begrijpt zeer goed wat Ruth van
hem
verlangt, narnelijk de bescherming van een losser (en niet per se een
huwelijk)."
The position of Th. C. Vriezen, "Two Old Cruces," OTS , 5, 1948,
p.
86, is worthy of brief mention at this point. He concurs with David in the idea
that
Ruth 3:9 does not directly suggest a marriage proposal on the part of Ruth.
He
remarks, "Ruth does not directly make a proposal of marriage, she is
speaking
in
a very modest and general way and only asks for protection (cf. 2:12), al-
though
her real intention of getting married glimmers through her covert terms;
the
whole situation staged by her in the threshingfloor-scene indicates her aim
viz.
the
marriage with Boaz." For a more detailed discussion of Vriezen's position,
cf.
chap.
8, "The Double Responsibility."
42. H. Gunkel, "Ruth," in
Reden and Aufsätze, 1913, p. 76. He further
comments
(p. 77): "Er ist weltkundig genug, urn das Motiv, das sie hierhergeführt
hat,
sofort richtig zu verstehen. Und er ist ganz geruhrt davon, dass sie so die
weibliche
Scheu hat überwinden können.
43. The words ymf
rfw lk
either refer to the whole population of the
city
or (in light of the Old Testament use of rfw to the elders.
The first is
advanced,
with citation of comparative Akkadian data, by E. Speiser, "Coming
and
Going at the City Gate," BASOR,
144, 1956, p. 31. The main point is the
same
on either view, i.e., that not only is her reputation untarnished in his eyes,
but
as well, in those of the general community.
Naomi and the Goel 195
11b).44
This response of Boaz is of decisive importance in
evaluating
Ruth's request. Boaz understood clearly what she
was
requesting and commended her highly for what she had
done.
This is made particularly evident in his statement, "You
have
made this last kindness (NvrHxh jdsH) greater than
the
first,
in that you have not gone after young men whether
poor
or rich" (3:10). Her coming to him as she had done, he
calls
"this last kindness," an act of loyalty even greater than
that
which she performed when in commitment to her dead
husband's
family, she chose to leave the
her
mother-in-law. As Würthwein has written, "Ruth folgt
nicht
ihrem eigenen Interesse (obwohl das nach dem Willen
Naemis
eingeschlosssen ist, 3, 1), erst recta nicht ihrer
Begehrlichkeit,
sondern dem Interesse der Familie. Das lässt
der
Erzähler durch Boas noch ausdrücklich festhalten: ware
Begehrlichkeit
Motiv ihres Handelns, so hätte sie sich an die
jungen
Männer gehalten. Ihr aber geht es jetzt wie schon
früher
darum, dass dsH geschehe, d.h. die Treue, die sie der
Familie
ihres Mannes seit der Heirat schuldet and von der sie
sich,
wie ihr ganzes bisheriges Verhalten zeigt, (lurch den Tod
ihres
Mannes nicht entbunden betrachtet."45
One further point must be made
concerning Ruth's ad-
vances.In
Genesis 38 as well as in the Deuteronomic law one
can
talk, in a certain sense, of the widow's initiative. In the
44. lyH twx, KJV and RV render,
"virtuous woman," NV, "deugdzame
vrouw."
As L. Moms, op. cit., p. 291,
suggests, "it denotes ability or efficiency or
attainment
in any one of a number of directions...." The RSV rendering,
"woman
of worth" suggests this comprehensiveness.
45. E. Würthwein, op. cit., p. 18. N. Glueck, Hesed in the Bible, 1967,
p.
40: "The hesed which Ruth had demonstrated to her husband even after his
death,
by leaving her native land and father's house and following Naomi, was
surpassed
by the sense of love and loyalty she subsequently demonstrated. Instead
of
marrying a younger man, Ruth preferred to turn to the older Boaz, her hus-
band's
kinsman, in order, by virtue of this marriage, to have offspring for her
husband
who had died childless. Here hesed
indicates a development beyond the
ordinary
use of the term in the older sources, since hesed
in this context refers
more
to a subjective mode of conduct willed by an individual, and not simply to
an
attitude of obligation." On the importance of the term hesed in the book of
Ruth,
cf. n. 7.
196 Naomi and the Goel
latter
case it is the woman who takes the initiative and insti-
tutes
the proceedings in which the elders urge the recalcitrant
brother
to perform his obligation (Deut. 25:7, 8a).46
Though
there is a distinction in the methods employed, the
point
made by Schoneveld: "deze dingen moeten niet met
een
bekoorlijk of bescheiden karakter in verband gebracht
worden,"
is valid also in the case of Ruth.47
Ruth's visit to Boaz and her request
for marriage to him
are
commended by Boaz in the highest terms as evidence of
her
loyalty to her family. There is no reason, therefore, to
believe
that her request for marriage must be viewed as a
stain
upon her character. David's first reason for denying that
Ruth
is requesting marriage must be set aside. However, we
must
now return to what he calls the decisive" evidence for
not
interpreting Ruth 3:9 as a request for marriage. That
evidence
is to be found in Boaz' words in Ruth 3:12, 13,
which
he translates: "Maar al is het waar, dat ik losser berr, er
is
nog een losser, die nader verwant is dan ik. Blijf bier den
nacht
over en morgenochtend, wanner hij (voor) U lossen wil,
goed,
laat het hem doen; heeft hij Been lust, om (voor) U te
lossen,
dan zal ik (voor) U lossen, zoo waar als God leeft."49
He
then adds, "
doelt,
is het noodig, de woorden ‘losser’ en 'lossen' hebr.
go’el, ga’al, op grond van
het bestaande materiaal aan een
nadere
beschouwing te onderwerpen."50 Since there is men-
46. See chap. 2, "The Ceremony
of Refusal."
47. J. Schoneveld, De Betekenis van de Lossing in het Boek
Ruth, 1956,
pp.
4, 5. D. R. G. Beattie, "Kethihh and Qere in Ruth 4, 5," VT, 21, 1971,
p.
493, follows the kethibh in 4:5 and translates, "On the day you acquire
the
field
from Naomi's hand, I am acquiring Ruth the Moabitess, the wife of the
deceased,
to raise up the name of the deceased over his inheritance." His sugges-
tions
are discussed in considerable detail in chap. 8, "The Double
Responsibility."
For
the present our interest centers on one of the reasons he cites for following
the
first singular reading. He claims that Boaz had already married Ruth the night
before
and therefore could hardly be informing the other goel of his obligation to
do
so! Such an idea is without foundation in the text.
48. M. David, Huwelijk, p. 9.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
Naomi and the
Goel 197
tion
of a piece of property in chapter four which must be
redeemed
and since there is a law in Leviticus 25:25 where
the
goel functions to redeem the property, then Boaz must
merely
have had in mind "de afdoening van financiëele ver-
plichtingen
te haren [Ruth] opzichte en wel in vefband met
een
verkoop van grondbezit."51
Is this understanding of Boaz' reply
correct? In the light
of
all the data of chapter three, we do not think so. The
preparations
for the meeting, the place of the meeting, and
the
timing of the meeting may be better understood as a
request
for marriage than as a request for the solution of
financial
difficulties. Indeed, the total scene described in
chapter
three would be very strange if what the widows pri-
marily
wanted was a solution for their financial distress.52
Ruth's
words in 3:9, "spread your skirt over your maid-
servant,"
are better understood as a definite request for mar-
riage.53
This is the way Boaz understood Ruth, as is evident
from
his word of commendation to Ruth: "You have made
this
(latter) kindness greater than the first, in that you have not
51. Ibid., p. 11. M. David (p. 14)
asks, "Zou het evenwel, in het algemeen
gesproken,
gerechtvaardigd zijn, op grond van deze eene brpn, i.c. het bock Ruth,
te
concluderen tot het bestaan van een familie huwelijk, waarvan wij overigens
geenerlei
spoor vinden?"
52. J. Schoneveld, op. cit., p. 5: "Wij vragen ons af:
moest Ruth nu dr-
voor
Boaz in de nacht opzoeken en zich
neerleggen ender zijn voetendek?
Bovendien,
als het alleen maar ging om het land van Elimelech, dan zou Naomi
zelf
de aangewezen persoon geweest zijn om zich met Boaz in verbinding te
stellen."
Similar objections are raised by C. Goslinga, Het Boek Ruth, KV, 19522,
p.
166.
53. Such is the position of the
overwhelming majority of scholars. Cf. W.
Rudolph,
op. cit., p. 56; E. Würthwein, op. cit., p. 18; H. W. Hertzberg, op. cit.,
p.
274; I. Bettan, op. cit., p. 67; A.
Bertholet, op. cit., p.134; G. Cooke,
op. cit.,
p.
11; J. Gray, Joshua, Judges, Ruth,
CB, 1967, pp. 414, 41E.; H. Gressmann, Ruth,
SAT,
1, 19222, p. 273; M. Haller, "Ruth," in Die Fünf Megilloth, HAT, 18, 1940,
p.
14; C. Lattey, op. cit., p. XXIII; E.
Robertson, op. cit., p. 217; W.
McKane,
"Ruth
and Boaz," p. 30; C. Goslinga, op.
cit., p. 147. H. H. Rowley, op. cit.,
p.
188, suggests that both protection and union are involved in this symbolic act.
Cf.
W. R. Smith, Kinship and Marriage in
Early
the
Jahiliya, when a man's father or brother or son died and left a widow, the
dead
man's heir, if he came at once and threw his garment over her, had the right
to
marry her under the dowry (mahr) of (i.e., already paid by) her deceased lord
(sahib)
or to give her marriage and take her dowry. However, if she anticipated
198 Naomi and the Goel
gone after (yrHx
tkl)54
young men, whether rich or poor"
(3:10).
It should also be noted that there is some suggestion
in
3:13b whch points in the direction of marriage. Boaz says
to
Ruth: "Remain this night, and in the morning, if he will
do
the part of the next of kin for you, well; let him do it; but
if
he is not willing to do the part of the next of kin for you
(jlxgl
CpHy xl Mxv),
then as the Lord lives, I will do the
part
of the next of kin." In this we have terminology similar
to
that employed in the levirate law in Deuteronomy 25:7a:
"and
if a man` does not wish to take his brother's wife"
(vtmby
tx tHql wyxh CpHy xl Mxv).
Finally, and most important of all, in
3:,13 Boaz speaks
of
redeeming Ruth. Three times the word "redeem" is
used
with
the second feminine singular suffix. In each case David,
in
his translation, inserts in parenthesis the word "voor."
"Wanneer
hij (voor) U lossen wil ... om (voor) U te lossen,
dan
zal ik (voor) U lossen." This translation is necessary if the
property
is the object of the goers activity rather than Ruth.
However,
the Text does not,allow the change from. Ruth to
the
property as the object of the goers activity (jytlxgv;
jlxgy).55 NV correctly
translates 3:13, "Indien hij u lossen
wil,
goed, laat hem lossen; maar is hij niet genegen u te los-
sen,
dan zal ik u lossen." It is in the light of this verse that
Jepsen
correctly remarks, "Nur unter der Voraussetzung
einer
ganz umfassenden Verpflichtung des goel wird verstand-
lich,
dass Boas die Ruth losen' kann 3, 13."56 There is in-
deed
some connection between the marriage request to Boaz
and
his being goel, despite the fact that no definite laws are
him
and went off to her own people then the disposal of her hand belonged to
herself."
Smith cites this symbolical act as being the same as in Ruth 3:9. Cf. als
Granquist,
Marriage Conditions in a
J.
Lewy, "Les Textes paleo-assyriens et l'Ancien Testament," RHR, 110, 1935,
p.
32. T. Gaster, Myth, Legend and Custom in
the Old Testament, 1969, p. 448,
cites
more recent parallels in other cultures for this custom.
54. For the use of jlh with sexual
overtones, cf. Ezek. 23:29-31.
55. J. Schoneveld, op. cit., p. 17 n. 27.
56. A. Jepsen, "Das Buch
Ruth," ThStKr, 108, 1937-38, p.
121.
Naomi and the
Goel 199
to
be found which specifically mention
marriage as an area in
which
the goel must act.
David's rejection of any connection
between marriage
and
the duty of the goel stems from the absence of a law
which
states such a marriage duty. The consideration of this
question
is of paramount importance in our study of the goel
concept
in
juridical
sphere.57 This explains his censure of Jepsen's defini-
tion
of the goel when the latter writes: "Goel ist immer der
ndchste
Sippenangehörige, der zu der jeweils nötigen Hilfe-
leistung
imstande ist. Diese Hilfe erstreckt sich auf alles,
was
eine Hilfe nötig erscheinen lasst, also nicht nur auf die
gesetzlich
geregelten Fälle des Mordes und Totschlags, des
Bodenverkaufs
und des Verkaufs in die Sklaverei, sondern auf
alle
Notstände, die den nächsten Sippenangehörigen treffen
konnten."58
It is the "nicht nur auf die gesetzlich geregelten
sondern
auf alle Notstände," which is subject to
dispute
and which, in David's opinion, "mist eenigen bewijs-
grond."59
In his discussion on the goel and the marriage of
Ruth,
David has not given sufficient attention to the passages
in
the Old Testament where Yahweh is presented as Goel.
Several
of these passages imply a broader approach to the
57. Cf. C. Goslinga, op. cit., p. 166, "Zijn
scherpzinnig betoog gaat te zeer
den
juridischen kant uit, miskent de hoge betekenis van de volkszede als norm
voor
het handelen, en verraadt bovendien de tendens om het ontstaan van het
boek
Ruth zo laat mogelijk te Stellen."
58. A. Jepsen, op. cit., p. 420. Cf. similarly, H. Ringgren, "lxg," TWAT,
1,
1971, p. 887, who comments: "Daneben zeigen einige Stellen, an denen go’el
in
übertragenen
Sinn gebraucht wird (Spr. 23, 11; Jes. 50, 34; Kl. 3, 58; Ps. 119,
154;
Hi. 19, 25), dass der go’el als
Helfer im Rechtsstreit auftreten sollte, um
seinem
Schutzling sein Recht zu verschaffen. Wer keinen go’el und keinen rea’
(fr)
hinterlässt (I Kon. 16, 11) hat niemand, der sich urn seine Rechte und
seine
Ehre
kümmert." E. Neufeld, "Ius Redemptionis in Ancient Hebrew Law," RIDA,
8,
1961, p. 34, writes, "The go’el
was a claimant and his function was the restric-
tion
of a breach. In other words, any duty which a man could not perform
himself
devolved on the next-of-kin in his group; and any right possessed by a
member
of a group, which lapsed through the holder's inability to perform the
duties
attached to such rights, had to be assumed by this next-of-kin."
59. M. David, Huwelijk, p. 10 n. 12.
200 Naomi and the Goel
function
of the goel. Particularly instructive in this connec-
tion
is Proverbs 23:10, 11: "Do not remove an ancient land-
mark or enter the fields of the fatherless for
their Redeemer
(Mlxg) is strong; he
will plead their cause against you." Even
more
conclusive is the mention in Isaiah 54:4, 5 of Yahweh
as
Goel who acts on his people's behalf so that the reproach
of
their widowhood will no longer be remembered, arid who
will
be their husband.60 Passages such as Psalm 119:154 and
Lamentations
3:58 present the verb lxg, parallel with the
verb
byr
"to take up a cause." Such passages suggest that the
activities
of the goel must be viewed in a more comprehensive
fashion
than David does. Schoneveld is closer to the truth
when
he argues "dat de losser niet behoefde to blijven binnen
de
grenzen van het gecodificeerde recht."61 David correctly
states
that there is no teaching in Ruth concerning "de ver-
plichting
tot het aangaan van een huwelijk."62 However, it is
this
word, verplichting, which sometimes
causes confusion.
David's
emphasis on the written laws regulating the function
of
the goel causes him to reject the thought that Boaz could
be
approached by Ruth requesting marriage, since such a
function
for the goel is not prescribed in the laws of the Old
Testament.
Yet as we have seen, the evidence is entirely con-
vincing
that Ruth was asking Boaz to marry her on the basis
of
his being a goel. This suggests that the key to the problem
is
in the term "verplichting.'63 David is thinking in terms of
the
written laws explicitly prescribed in the Old Testament
when
he says that the book of Ruth contains no evidence for
the
"verplichting tot het aangaan van een huwelijk." This
satisfactorily
explains the unusual initiatives of the women in
chapter
three, which are less understandable if Boaz was
60. For the evidence from Isa. 54:4,
5 that the reference to Yahweh as
husband
and kinsman-spouse is based on the human goel figure in
Stuhlmeuller,
Creative Redemption in Deutero-Isaiah,
1970, pp. 115-122.
61. J. Schoneveld, op. cit., p. 7.
62. M. David, Huwelijk, p. 12.
63. See our discussion of Vriezen's
use of the term "voluntary levirate" in
chap.
8, "The Double Responsibility." See also, chap. 8, n. 92.
Naomi and the
Goel 201
bound
by written law to alleviate Ruth's distress as a widow.
Though
we have pointed to the resemblance between the
initiative
of Ruth in chapter three and the widow who comes
to
the elders in Deuteronomy in order to suggest that the
morality
of Ruth's more aggressive approach cannot be seri-
ously
questioned, the fact remains that the unique advance
initiated
by the two widows fits better with the idea that
Boaz
was under no legal compulsion to act
on Ruth's behalf.
Schoneveld's
statement is very important in defining the
sphere
of operation for the goel and in providing us with the
reason
why Ruth came to Boaz requesting marriage. "Van
een
losser wordt dus niet slechts verwacht, dat hij zijn voor-
geschreven
plichten nakomen zal, maar dat hij bij voor-
komende
-gelegenheden zijn chesed, d. zijn
bereidheid tot
helpen
op grond van een bestaande relatie, tonen zal. . . . Hoe
vermogender
een losser was, des to meer kon hij
doen en hoe
meer
chesed hij had, des to meer wilde hij doen."64
The Response of Boaz, Ruth 3:10-15
We have already included in our
previous discussion of
Ruth
3:9 some remarks having to do with the reaction of
Boaz
to Ruth's request at the threshing floor. We reached the
conclusion
that Boaz understood her as requesting marriage
and
that he interpreted this request as an even greater act of
loyalty
than was seen when she accompanied Naomi back to
the
and of
going
after younger men. This alternative is contrasted with
her
overtures to Boaz and thus is evidence of the specific
nature
of her request. He promises to do for her that which
she
asks (3:11). However, there is a reason which prevents
him
from taking up her request immediately. He is indeed a
near
relative, yet there is a nearer kinsman (3:12).65 Though
64. J. Schoneveld, op. cit., pp. 3, 12.
65. In the interests of his cultic
interpretation of the book, W. Staples, "The
Book
of Ruth," p. 153, relegates the unnamed kinsman to the realm of the
unimportant
saying, "The reason for introducing a kinsman more nearly related
202 Naomi and the Goel
the
phrase bvrq lxg recalls the property redemption law in
Leviticus
25:25, the verb CpHy (3:13) recalls the language of
the
levirate refusal in Deuteronomy 25:7. The levirate termi-
nology
is even more explicit in Ruth 4. Moreover, in Genesis
38
we see that an order existed for the performance of the
levirate.
Ruth 3:13 does not detract from the view that it is
marriage66
to Ruth which is implied in the writer's use of the
verb
lxg.
Ruth, herself, is the object of the redemptive ac-
tion
which Boaz promises.67
Ruth remains the night as it would be
much too danger-
ous
for her to be sent home in the middle of the night. She
leaves
early in the morning. Boaz' remark,68 "Let it not be
known
that the woman came to the threshing floor," was
simply
a judicious precaution to avoid misunderstanding.
"His
caution to her when she took her leave of him before
dawn
is not incriminating. He does not yet know whether he
is
entitled to play a kinsman's part towards her, and, until
this
uncertainty is resolved, it is common prudence to keep
to
Elimelech than Boaz is not clear. It adds little to the story and the kinsman
is
not
considered of sufficient importance to mention his name"; to which Rowley
rightly
replies, "This neatly evades the issue why a cultic text should be
burdened
with
what is cultically meaningless"; op. cit., p. 189 n. 2.
66. L. Epstein, op. cit., pp. 85-88, uses the term "geullah marriage" to
describe
the marriage of Boaz to Ruth. It is similar to the levirate in motive in
that
its purpose is to raise up the name of the dead. It differs from the levirate
as de-
scribed
in Dent. 25:5-10 in that it was performed by brothers not dwelling together
or
in the absence of such by another next-of-kin. Additionally, it was completely
optional.
J. Schoneveld, op. cit., p. 17 n. 28,
accepts, in principle, the idea behind
this
differentiation, but feels, correctly in our opinion, that separate terms are
not
advisable.
Cf. also S. Belkin, "Levirate and Agnate Marriage," JQR, 60, 1969-70,
p.
288.
67. C. Goslinga., op. cit., p. 148, emphasizes that it is
Ruth, herself, who is
to
be the object of the god's activity ("Indien hij u lossen wil"). He
explains,
"want
als de losser zijn plicht niet te eng opvatte, dan zou hij niet alleen het
familiegoed,
maar ook Ruth zelf lossen' door haar te huwen." H. Brongers,
"Enkele
Opmerkingen over het Verband tussen Lossing en Leviraat in Ruth IV,"
NTT,
2, 1947-48, p. 4, writes, "Maar in Ruth 3:13 betekent het [lxg] zonder
enige
twijfel huwen."
68. Because of the definite
reference to "the woman," rmxyv may be here
understood
as a reference to Boaz' own thoughts, as for instance, in Gen. 20:11,
I
Sam. 18:21, and Ruth 4:4, and not as addressed to Ruth. Rabbinic comment
interprets
these words as part of a prayer to God. Cf. J. Slotki, "Ruth," in The
Five Megilloth, ed. A. Cohen,
1946, p. 59.
Naomi and the Goel 203
silent
about the episode of that night."69 The gift with which
he
sent her back confirms his feeling of goodwill toward
Ruth.
It is possible that Ruth had related Naomi's concern to
Boaz
and that he was anxious to let it be known to Naomi that
her
request was sympathetically received. It would appear that
Naomi
understood it in such a fashion, since she assured Ruth
that
Boaz would not rest until the issue was settled.70 The hand
of
God has been unmistakably present throughout the whole
experience.
"Yahwe hat zu ihrem Plan gnädig Ja gesagt."71
69. W. McKane, Tracts for the Times: Ruth, Esther, Lamentations, Ecclesi-
astes, Song of
Songs,
1965, p. 23. L. Morris, op. cit., p.
293, calls attention to the
provision
in the Mishnah Yeb. 2:8), whereby a man suspected of having sexual
relations
with a gentile woman was excluded from performing the levirate with her.
70. In accordance with his cultic
theory, W. Staples, "The Book of Ruth,"
p.
156, pictures Ruth as a cultic prostitute under Naomi and the gift is her hire.
Such
an idea has been almost universally rejected. It is mentioned as a possibility
by
Smith, op. cit. p. 846; Smith sees an
argument for this theory in the
word
tHpFmh
(3:15), which she translates as veil. On the unlikelihood of that
translation,
cf. G. Gerleman, op. cit., p. 33.
Since the gilt appears to have been
sizeable
it could not have been carried by a flimsy article such as a veil. This gift
has
been interpreted by E. Würthwein as a kind of "Ehepfand," op. cit., p. 19. Cf.
also,
E. Robertson, op. cit., p. 219, D.
Daube, The Exodus Pattern in the Bible,
1963,
p. 88. M. Haller, op. cit., p. 15,
suggests: "ein Ehepfand oder ein
Brautgeschenk."
A. Bertholet, op. cit., p. 65, sees
it as a sign of Boaz' favour,
which,
however, "auch dazu dienen soil, Ruth's Gang vor Missdeutungen zu
sichern."
On the other hand, W. McKane, Tracts for
the Times, p. 23, says, "It
may
represent no more than an act of kindness." It is difficult to justify the
gift,
as
L. Morris appears to do, by terms such as "his prospective bride" and
"a man
who
has just become engaged"; op. cit.,
p. 294. The gift, and particularly the
words,
"You must not go back empty-handed to your mother-in-law" (3:17),
bring
to mind Naomi's statement in 1:21 that the Lord had brought her back
empty
and may be one of the author's ways of hinting that a solution will be
forthcoming,
reversing Naomi's original feeling toward Yahweh.
71. W. Rudolph, op. cit., pp. 57, 58. Naomi's words, "How did you fare my
daughter?,"
v. 16, reflect a degree of tension concerning the outcome of the
nocturnal
visit. Her goal has been to encourage
Boaz to marry Ruth, but behind
these
events is the hand of God. R. Hals, The
Theology of the Book of Ruth,
1969,
p. 13, remarks, "Since the story is one which traces God's guiding hand in
the
lives of this family, the question could also be phrased, Will God bless this
plan?
However, this question is, of course, never asked in so many words." H. W.
Herzberg,
op. cit., p. 275, comments on chapter three, "Flier wird die gottliche
Fuhrung,
die das Buch tiberhaupt bezeugt, aufs neue hervorgehoben." The tension
between
the human and the divine in the nighttime scene is somewhat overstated
by
Gerleman when he characterizes the scene with these words: "Sie trägt
den
it
Stempel einer vollkommenen Profanität," and then adds, "Und dock
is auch
theses
Geschithen in all seiner Zeitlichkeit eine gottliche Führung. Alles is von
Gott
in sein Werk eingerechnet"; op. cit.,
p. 33.
EXCURSUS
The Initiative of Naomi
IN
discussions of the legal complexities in Ruth, insuf-
ficient
attention has been given to the initiative of Naomi
and
its implication for our understanding of the levirate
and
goel functions. The modern reader cannot help but be
surprised
by the set of instructions given by Naomi to Ruth
by
which she is to bring herself to the attention of Boaz in a
most
direct fashion. In terms of the Old Testament, it is
difficult
to say how unique the approach of Ruth to Boaz
was.
It is not paralleled elsewhere, which should caution us
from
following one recent commentator who says that "Ruth
is,
clearly conscious of taking part in a well-recognized ritual
by
which such a claim as hers was regularly made as a matter
of
course, and which was so venerable, that her action was
devoid
of even a suggestion of immodesty."1 It is preferable
to
acknowledge that it is simply not possible to know to
what
extent such a procedure might have been in practice,2
though
it would be wrong to underestimate its uniqueness.
As we have seen, in sending Ruth to
Boaz, Naomi is
seeking
to arrange for a marriage, based upon Boaz' relation-
ship
as goel. Yet we find no law prescribing marriage to a
childless
widow as one of the duties of the goel. To make the
1. A. MacDonald, "Ruth," NBC, 1953, pp. 260, 261. Cf. also J.
Baldwin,
"Ruth,"
NBCR, 1970, p. 281: "Naomi's instructions are explicit; behind them
may
lie some accepted custom."
2. L. Morris, Ruth, TOTC, 1968, p. 287, states, "But why it should be done
in
this way we do not know. Nor do we know whether the was a widely practiced
custom
or not." Later he argues (p. 293) that Ruth's visit and request must have
conformed
to custom in some way since "Boaz needed no explanation, but
realized
from the action alone what Ruth meant and what he should do."
205
206 The Initiative of Naomi
problem
more complex, chapter four refers to the marriage
of
Boaz and Ruth as a levirate marriage. McKane suggests
that
"in sending Ruth to Boaz Naomi takes the decisive step
and
confronts him with the duty of levirate marriage in an
inescapable
way."3 Haller calls the marriage of Boaz and
Ruth
a "Pflichtehe." Naomi resorts to such measures to bring
Boaz
to the consciousness of his levirate duty.4 Certain quali-
fications
of the phrase "duty of levirate marriage" are neces-
sary.
In the levirate law, the initiative was to be taken by the
relative
(the brother), and only upon his failure to perform
the
duty was it taken by the widow. If Boaz was under
obligation
to act, his failure to do so would be more directly
stated,
or at least hinted at, in the narrative, but such is not
the
case. In addition, Boaz regards Ruth as deserving of the
highest
commendation because she had not taken the oppor-
tunity
of going after a younger person within the community
(3:10);
this implies a certain freedom of choice which we do
not
see in the levirate in Genesis 38, nor in the law of Deuter-
onomy
25.
According to Smit, "Noómi
verbindt in haar plan het
losserchap
met het Leviraat, maar dat laatste in ruimer zin
opgevat
dan vermeld staat in Deut. 25:5."5 This would ex-
plain
why Boaz was approached as goel (the closest relative)
and
is in line with our previous discussion of Deuteronomy
25,
where we concluded that the law defines only the custo-
mary
way in which the levirate was performed, not the exclu-
sive
way. There would be cases, such as described in Ruth,
where
the more distant relative would be called upon to
come
to the aid of the widow, but in such a case, "custom
would
press less heavily on the more distant relations."6
Boaz'
failure to take the initiative can be understood from
3. W. McKane, Tracts for the Times: Ruth, Esther, Lamentations, Ecclesi-
astes, Song of
Songs,
1965, p. 21.
4. M. Haller, "Ruth," in Die Fünf Megilloth, HAT, 18, 1940, p.
13.
5. G. Smit, Rath, Ester en Klaagliederen, TU, 1930, p. 27.
6. H. H. Rowley, op. cit., p. 181. C. F. Keil, Joshua, Judges and Ruth, 1887,
pp.
482, 483, writes: "The reason why she adopted this plan for the
accomplish-
The Initiative of
Naomi 207
the
fact that he, as a more distant relative, was not under
legal
compulsion to act. It is apparent from his growing
appreciation
of Ruth that he would have been willing to act,
had
it not been for the nearer relative. It was Boaz' knowl-
edge
of the presence and prior right of the nearer relative
which
precluded his taking the lead and offering himself to
Ruth.
Naomi's role in relation to the nearer
kinsman is less
easily
understood. If she did not know of the presence of the
nearer
kinsman, her initiatives toward Boaz, while perhaps
somewhat
exceptional, are understandable, given her intense
concern
for the welfare of Ruth and the recognition that
Boaz,
though goel, was not bound to offer his services.
Naomi
may have been thinking that a factor such as Boaz'
age,
was keeping him from acting, and that what he needed
was
tangible evidence that Ruth did not view the difference
in
age as a difficulty. Naomi would have been encouraged in
this
venture by Boaz' previous kindness to Ruth (2:8-16). It
is
conceivable that Naomi may have reasoned, as well, that
the
Moabite background of her daughter-in-law was keeping
Boaz
from the final commitment.7
If Naomi did know about the nearer
kinsman, several
ment
of her wishes, and did not appeal to Boaz directly, or ask him to perform
this
duty of affection to her deceased husband, was probably that she was afraid
lest
she should fail to attain her end in this way, partly because the duty of a
Levirate
marriage was not legally binding upon the redeemer, and partly because
Boaz
was not so closely related to her husband that she could justly require this
of
him, whilst there was actually a nearer redeemer than he."
7. W. Rudolph, Das Buch Ruth, Das Hohe Lied, Die Klagelieder, KAT, 17,
1962,
p. 53, feels that Naomi's hopes had risen immediately after she first learned
that
Ruth had come into contact with Boaz, particularly when she returned to his
field
(2:23a) and gleaned until the end of the barley and wheat harvests. With this
contact
Naomi was hopeful that something definite would develop but her expec-
tations
were disappointed, and at the end of the harvest Ruth was still at home
(2:23).
His explanation of Boaz's reluctance is that "Boas war offenbar nicht
mehr
der jüngste, vielleicht war er selbst schon verheiratet, auch war Ruth
Ausländerin,
so dass es ihm trotz aller Zuneigung schwerfiel, sich zu jenem
Entschluss
aufzuraffen, zumal da der erste Sohn aus dieser Ehe ihm nicht
zugerechnet
wurde." Such an explanation may plausibly represent Naomi's
thoughts
about Boaz' reluctance and help to explain the measures she undertook
to
assure him of their interest in him.
208 The Initiative of Naomi
possibilities
exist. As previously mentioned, one could argue
that
the advances toward Boaz were part of a plan of Naomi's
(and
possibly also of Ruth's, though her reputation could be
spared
because she would be seen as the obedient child, fol-
lowing
her mother-in-law's wishes with unquestioning loyal-
ty)
for pressuring the prior goel to come forward. We have,
however,
previously rejected such a consideration.8 Another
possibility
might be that Naomi, knowing of the nearer goel,
nevertheless
approached Boaz out of preference,9 or because
she
felt that he would be more likely to accept because of
previous
contact with Ruth.10 It is perhaps best to assume
that
Naomi, though knowing that Boaz was not the only
goel,
compare Ruth 2:20, was unaware of the existence of
the
nearest kinsman when Ruth was sent on her nocturnal
visit.11
8. See our discussion, chap. 7,
"The. Discovery of a Goel," and nn. 18-20. C.
Goslinga,
Het Boeu Ruth, KV, 19522, p. 148 n.
2, refers to the role of the nearer
kinsman,
which he says, throws some light upon Naomi's vigorous measures. In
answering
the question, shouldn't Naomi have waited for the goel to offer his help
rather
than taking the lead herself, he writes, "Maar blijkbaar was de losser
niet
verplicht
om zich aan to bieden. Boaz wilde dit allicht wel, maar kon niet, omdat
hij
niet de naaste was. En die naaste losser was niet bij uitstek genegen (h.4:6),
zodat
hij de zaak op haar beloop liet. Daarom moest Naomi wel den eersten stap
doen,
vgl. Deut. 25:7." This suggests, though it is not directly stated, that
Naomi
knew
of the prior goel's unwillingness and conceived her plan as a result of if.
9. J. Baldwin, op. cit., p. 282, writes, "If Naomi knew of the existence of
this
other relative, she must have decided that she would prefer Ruth to be under
the
protection of Boaz."
10. L. Morris, op. cit., p. 292, remarks, "But Naomi probably calculated
that
Boaz was more likely to take action than the other, and therefore arranged
for
Ruth to meet him rather than the unnamed closer relation."
11. Cf. M. Haller, op. cit., p. 15, "Boas weiss, was
auch Naemis Scharfblick
entgangen
ist." E. Würthwein, op. cit., p.
18, uses the expression, "was Naemi
‘übersehen
hat' " to refer to Naomi's stance toward the nearer relative. H. H.
Rowley,
"The Marriage of Ruth," in The
Servant of the Lord, 19652, p. 188, says
that
it is surprising that Naomi did not know, but leaves it with that comment,
accepting
that such was the case.
8
Boaz and the Goel
The
Administration of Law at the Gate, Ruth 4:1, 2
IN
Ruth 4, we find one of the more detailed accounts of a
legal
transaction in the Old Testament.1 The legal detail is
a
factor which has sometimes been ignored in discussions
of
the combination of duties placed upon the goel. We must
carefully
take note of these legal proceedings; only then can
we
come to a proper understanding of the transaction be-
tween
the parties.
The chapter opens with Boaz at the
gate.2 Perhaps this
1. Cf. chap. 2, n. 64. In addition
to the literature therein cited, two articles
by
G. Tucker give important information bearing on the legal procedures in Ruth
4,
"Witnesses and Dates in Israelite Contracts," CBQ, 28, 1966, pp. 42-45 (here-
after
cited as "Witnesses and Dates") and “Covenant Forms and Contract
Forms,”
VT, 15, 1965, pp.
499-502. For additional discussion of the procedures in Ruth
4,
cf. R. de Vaux, Ancient Israel, 1961,
p. 153 and H. J. Boecker, Redeformen
des Rechtslebens
im Alten Testament,
1964, pp. 160-175. The opinion of A.
Phillips,
Ancient Israel's Criminal Law, 1970,
p. 19 n. 31, that Ruth 4 cannot be
used
in any discussion on the administration of justice in
the
majority of scholars and is based on his postexilic dating of the book.
2. hlf zfbv (4:1) is
translated by the KJV, "Then Boaz went up," and by
correctly
states that the construction employed is intended to direct attention
away
from the time sequence. "The author simply indicates that Boaz went up,
but
he does not indicate whether this was before, after, or simultaneous with the
preceding.
It is a piece of paragraphing technique, turning our attention to Boaz."
See
also G. Gerleman, Ruth Das Hohelied,
BK, 18, 1965, p. 35. E. Robertson,
"The
Plot of the Book of Ruth," BJRL,
32, p. 220, is of the opinion that there
must
have been a meeting between Boaz and Naomi after the events of chapter
three
for Boaz to have known of Naomi's willingness to sell the property and for
him
to have been empowered to act on her behalf. Such a meeting was suppressed
by
the author for "had details of this meeting been given it would have
robbed
the
encounter of Boaz and the nearer kinsman of all, or almost all, piquancy."
H.
W.
Hertzberg, Die Bücher Josua, Richter,
Ruth, ATD, 9, 19653, p. 280, however,
writes—in
my opinion correctly, "Offenbar ist die Meinung die, dass Boas, der als
Bauer
and Sippenzugehöriger die Sachlage kennt, die ihm von Ruth vorgetragene
209
210 Boaz and the Goel
scene
transpires in the early morning,3 as Boaz goes to the
gate
through which the citizens must pass on the way to their
work
in the fields. He sits down and waits, obviously expect-
ing
that the man he wants to meet will be passing. The man
appears
and is asked by Boaz4 to sit down. Boaz proceeds to
call
forth ten elders who, along with the other citizenry,
constitute
the witnessing agency to observe the transaction of
the
two parties. The participation of the other citizens is
clear,
from 4:4, "Buy it in the presence of those sitting here
and
in the presence of the elders of my people,"5 and partic-
ularly
from 4:9, 11, where the elders and the people are
mentioned.
The terminology "you are witnesses ... we are
witnesses"
(4:9-11) is the formulation of the Israelite law
courts.6
Tucker writes, "One sees the use of similar formulae
whether
the witnesses were summoned during a trial (I Sam.
12:5,
Isa. 44:8; 43:9-10, 12) or called to verify a legally
binding
agreement (Ruth 4:9-11). The formulae show that in
both
procedures the witnesses were called by the parties
themselves,
not by a judge or other permanent court officer.
Bitte,
Löser zu sein, selbstverstandlich auch auf die Bereinigung der Eigentums-
angelegenheit
beziehen musste." The verb hlf may be employed
in contrast to
the
verb dry
in 3:3. Possibly it is to be understood as legal terminology (cf. Deut.
17:8
and more particularly Deut. 25:7) and the similarity to Deut. 25:7 would
constitute
another small evidence of the presence of the levirate concept in Ruth.
3. Cf. L. Kohler, Hebrew Man, 1956, pp. 151, 154.
4. V. 1 uses the term ynmlx
ynlp;
KB "a certain one." It is equivalent to
the
expression, "so and so" and is found in two other places in the OT: I
Sam.
21:3
(2); and II Kings 6:8. It is a form of address indicating a definite person
without
expressly naming the person. On the goel's name, W. Rudolph, Das .Ruch
Ruth, Das Hohe
Lied; The Klagelieder, HAT, 17, 1962, p. 65,
writes, "Im Tor
wartet
er auf den go'el, dessen Namen der
Erzahler nicht kennt oder der
Erwähnung
nicht für wert hält." H. W. Hertzberg, op. cit., p. 279, offers another
possible
explanation: "Der Name war bekannt, wurde aber absichtlich unter-
druckt,
um das Haupt einer Sippe mit dieser fur ihn immerhin etwas blamablen
Angelegenheit
nicht blosszustellen." He points out correctly that in the other
cases
where the expression is found, "handelt es sich um absichtliche Verschwei-
gung,
so dass es auch hier so sein könnte."
5. C. F. Keil, Joshua, Judges, Ruth, 1887,, p. 488, treats the waw as explana-
tory,
but in the light of the Mfh lk in 4:9, 11, it is perhaps more
likely that the
waw means "and
especially."
6. Cf. H. J. Boecker, op. cit., p. 162; G. Tucker,
"Witnesses and Dates,"
p.
43.
Boaz and the Goel 211
The
expressions also demonstrate how the court—the elders
and/or
all the citizens present 'in the gate'—validated oral
contracts
by responding to the formal call to bear witness.
Through
the use of these formulae in legal transactions the
court
performed its notarial function.”7
The scene present—grin this chapter
gives ample evidence
of
the fact that Boaz was proceeding to the fulfillment of his
sworn
oath (3:13), in accordance with the customary legal
procedures
of his day.8
The Sale of the Property,
Ruth 4:3
Boaz assembles a lawfully constituted
judicial body and
proceeds
to put the case in hand before the goel. For the first
time
explicit mention is made of a piece of property belong-
ing
to Elimelech (4:3). The introduction of the property is
indeed
a new feature in the story. The connection between
the
sale of the property and the marriage of Ruth is the
perplexing
question confronting the reader of the book. We
shall
undertake to give an answer to the problem later in our
discussion.
At this point we must seek an answer to two
7. G. Tucker, "Witnesses and
Dates," p. 43. Additional evidence of the legal
background
in our passage is the date formula mentioned in 4:9, 10. The term
hayyom is prominent in
other Old Testament examples of oral contracts (I Sam.
12:5;
Gen. 31:48; 47:23). Tucker (p. 45) writes, "The use of hayyom in the
Israelite
transactions issintilat to this Akkadian pattern:ineinpports the conclu-
sion
that such date formulae,' originated in oral agreements. As in the Akkadian
textffrom
Ras Shamra, the formula in Israelite legal affairs indicated the consum-
mation
and perpetual validity of a transaction."
8. On the extraordinary amount of
legal detail in chapter four, H. Gunkel,
"Ruth,"
in: Reden und Aufsätze, 1913,
pp. 78, 79, comments, "Den Verfasser
ergotzt
es, jetzt einen verwickelten Rechtsfall zu schildem und zu zeigen, wie er
nach
altem Rechte entschieden worden ist; darum hat er diese Szene so weit
ausgeführt."
His explanation is not entirely satisfactory. If the motive were merely
the
literary pleasure of the author or his attempt to build suspense, it would be
difficult
to account for the juridical complexity
involved in the narrative. G.
Gerleman,
op. cit., p. 9, criticizes Gunkel's
explanation of the legal detail in Ruth
4.
He gives the following reason for the legal detail: "Solite die
Einverleibung
Ruths
in das Volk
erforderlich
als fromme Worte und Wtinsche. Den entscheidenden Beweis für die
Zusammengehörigkeit
der Moabiterin Ruth mit Juda kprinte nur eine rechts-
gultige
Handlung liefern. Dazu dient die weit ausgeführte Schlussszene 4:1-12."
212 Boaz and the Goel
questions
which Boaz' statement raises. The first question is,
How
is it that Naomi was in possession of the property, since
the
Old Testament laws seem to preclude an inheritance by a
widow?
Succinctly stated, the law of Numbers 27:8-11 grants
no
right of inheritance to the widow. The second question is,
Had
Naomi already sold the property or was she in the pro-
ces's
of selling it?
To the first question, which has long
puzzled commenta-
tors,
varied answers have been given, and we shall survey
some
of the leading suggestions. Caspari suggested that
Naomi
was the real possessor of the property from the very
beginning
which she inherited in a situation similar to that
legislated
in Numbers 27.9 In accordance with this he gives a
special
exegesis of the words of Boaz in 4:9.10 The normally
accepted
translation reads, "You are witnesses this day that I
have
bought from the hand of Naomi all that belonged to
Elimelech,
and all that belonged to Chilion and to Mahlon."
Caspari,
however, rather than taking the phrase ymfn dym
with
the verb ytynq,
brought it into the relative sentence and
translated,
"Ich erwerbe heute alles, was Elimelech, Kilion
und
Machlon aus der Hand Noomis besassen," and went on
to
conclude, "Demnach hatte Elimelech durch Heirat sein
Gut
erlangt."11
Jepsen followed Caspari in his opinion
that the property
was
inherited by Naomi from her family and belonged to her.
He
expressed himself cautiously on Caspari's handling of the
phrase
"from the hand of Naomi" in verse 9, simply citing it
as
a possibility, but went on to remark, "Sonst sind diese
Worte,
wie in 4, 5 so zu verstehen, dass der goel aus der Hand
der
Erbtochter das Recht der geulla und damit nach dem
9. W. Caspari, "Erbtochter und
Ersatzehe in Ruth 4," NKZ, 19,
1908,
p.
118, "Im übrigen ist aber die Erbtochter die einzige Frau, die eines
Grund-
besitzes
rechtlich fähig ist. Eine solche Grundbesitzerin wird nun Ruth 4:3 und 9
vorausgesetzt;
nur ist es nicht Ruth, sondem Noomi."
10. Nvylkl rwx
lk txv jlmylxl rwx lk tx ytynq yk Mvyh Mtx Mydf
ymfn dym NvlHmv
11. W. Caspari., op. cit., p. 118.
Boaz and the Goel 213
Kauf
das Eigentumsrecht empfdngt. Dann ist Elimelech wohl
Besitzer
des Feldes, 4, 3, nicht aber Eigentümer."12 Jepsen
supported
Caspari's theory further by saying that a sale could
only
have taken place after Naomi's return on the supposi-
tion
"dass Naemi Erbtochter war; denn als Witwe ware sie
keinesfalls
erbberechtigt gewesen, vielmehr wäre der Besitz
nach
dem Tode Elimelechs and seiner Söhne sofort an den
nachsten
männlichen Verwandten, also wohl an den ungenann-
ten
goel gefallen."13
The theory that the property was
originally Naomi's must
be
regarded as unlikely and Caspari's novel approach to 4:9
as
strained, particularly in light of the mention of the prop-
erty
as belonging to Elimelech (4:3).14 Jepsen's suggestion
that
what was received from the hand of Naomi (4:5) was the
right
of redemption is equally artificial. Moreover, if the
property
originally belonged to Naomi, the goel must be re-
lated
to Naomi, which would seem unlikely; see 2:1, where
12. A. Jepsen, "Das Ruch
Ruth," ThStKr, 108, 1937-38, p.
420. The idea
that
Naomi was an "Erbtochter" makes it necessary on two grounds to under-
stand
Elimelech as a relative of Naomi. First, the law of Num. 36 would require
Naomi
to marry within her clan Second, the god who buys the property must
belong
to the family of the one the property; in this case, Naomi. Since
the
goel was a kinsman of Elimelech (2:1) one must then assume that Elimelech
was
related to Naomi.
13. p. 420 n. 17. For Jepsen such an
argument is purely hypothetical
since
he holds that the property had already been sold before Naomi's return.
Ibid.,
p. 419. See note 31. J.
p.
93, sees a similar difficulty: "The redeemer is the next agnate, and thus,
ac-
cording
to the most natural conception, the heir. How then can he be made to
buy
the property of his near kinsman from a widow who does not belong to the
family?"
This objection would not apply if the property were given to Naomi by
Elimelech
or if Naomi were the legal heir, following an uncodified custom. See
further
below. Cf. yet W. McKane, "Ruth and Boaz," GUOST, 19, 1961-62,
pp.
35, 36, "Nor is the conclusion demanded that the go'el should always be the
heir....
The go'el indeed acquires the
property of his kinsman, not, however, by
a
normal process of inheritance but by the special process of ge'ullä."
14. P. Joüon, Ruth, 19532, p. 10 n. 1, comments on Caspari's idea, "Cette
théorie
n'a pas de fondement dans le texte et meme lui fait violence." Joüon's
opinion
is shared by H. H., Rowley, op. cit.,
p. 184.
214 Boaz and the Goel
Boaz
is mentioned as being related to Elimelech, and 4:3,
where
Boaz speaks of Elimelech as "our brother.”15
De Vaux has suggested that since the
land is regarded as
the
property of the two sons, Chilion and Mahlon (4:9),
Naomi
is acting as the guardian of their rights.16 In a similar
fashion,
Mittelmann envisages Naomi as the one whose task it
is
to regulate the inheritance. "Noomi ist zwar nicht Eigen-
tümerin
des Grundstücks, jedoch ist sie berechtigt, die Erb-
folge
mit den Erben zu regeln."17 On this hypothesis, the
question
still remains unanswered as to why the goel should
be
asked to buy the property of Naomi.18
Several scholars are of the opinion
that the practice of
allowing
the widow to inherit was a very late development in
very
late mode of inheritance.... It is agreed that the law
,concerning
the inheritance of daughters, in case there were
no
sons, is late, and it will not be doubted that the custom,
though
we have no law concerning it, where the inheritance
15. A. Jepsen attempts to counter
the objection by suggesting that Naomi
and
Elimelech were related. See above, n. 12. M. Burrows, "The Marriage of
Boaz
and
Ruth," JBL, 59, 1940, p. 448,
rejects Jepsen's conclusion as does W. Ru-
dolph;
op. cit., p. 66 n. 2; M. David, Het Huwelijk van Ruth, 1941, p. 15 n. 17
(hereafter
cited as Huwelijk); E. Neufeld, AHML,
1944, p. 241 and J. Schoneveld,
De Betekenis van
de Lossing in het Boek Ruth, 1956, pp. 7, 8.
16. R. de Vaux, op. cit., p. 54; E. Würthwein, "Ruth," in Die Fünf Megil-
loth, HAT, 18, 1969,
p. 21. Cf. P. Joüon, op. cit., p. 10,
"Nous disons: le champ
d'
Elimèlek. Apres la mort de celui-ci, ses héritiers Mahlon et Kilyon devinrent
légalement
propriétaires du champ; mais à leur mort le champ est censé appartenir
de
nouveau a l'ancien propriétaire Elimèlek (4:3): sa veuve, Noémi, ne le possé de
que
pour le transmettre à un descendant légal d'Elimèlek."
17. J. Mittelmann, Der altisraelitische Levirat, 1934, p.
20. Cf. also J. Mor-
genstern,
"The Book of the Covenant, Part II," HUCA, 7, 1930, p. 174, "Naomi
inherits
from her dead sons, not the family-estate itself, but the right to dispose of
it,
or rather to have it redeemed, no doubt for a nominal price, by the next of
kin."
W. Rudolph, op. cit., p. 66, writes,
"Aber wenn die ge'ulla, bei der
die
Witwe
mit zu übernehmen ist, freiwillig war, (s.o.) und es deshalb unter Um-
ständen
länger dauern konnte, bis sich ein go
'el zu ihr entschloss, musste die
Witwe
fur die Zwischenzeit ein Nutzungsrecht und auch ein gewisses Ver-
fügungsrecht
über den Besitz ihres Mannes haben."
18. H. H. Rowley, "The Marriage
of Ruth," in: The Servant of the
Lord,
19652,
p. 185 n. 2.
Boaz and the Goel 215
reverts
to the widowed mother in case of the death of her
sons
who leave no offspring, is also late. ..."19
Such a conclusion is, however, not
necessarily to be pre-
sumed
from the book of Ruth, or from the law in Numbers
27,
where daughters are allowed inheritance rights. This law
is
attributed to the so-called P. document and is said to
contain
the late abrogation of the levirate. It may be, how-
ever,
that this regulation is confined to such cases where
there
is no son and where, because of the advanced age of the
widow,
the bearing of a son was no longer possible.20 Apart
from
this, it is significant that the law in Numbers 27 speaks
of
daughters and that Bewer finds it necessary to presuppose
a
similar late custom for widows. In a more recent full scale
study
of inheritance laws in the Old Testament, Brown sug-
gests
the possibility that Genesis 31:14-16 refers to the inher-
itance
portion of Leah and Rachel, in which case he feels that
"E,
in telling the story, was familiar with a law similar to that
in
Numbers 27 and was implying its substance by the words
of
Leah and Rachel."21 Furthermore, Brown is of the opin-
ion
that "the legal sequence of heirs was known in Hebrew
culture
before the recording of the law in Numbers 27."22
19. J. Bewer, "The
Ge'ulläh in the Book of Ruth," AJSL,
19, 1903, p. 148
(hereafter
cited as "Ge'ulläh"). Cf. M. David, "The Date of the Book
of Ruth,"
OTS, 1, 1941-42, pp.
57, 58 (hereafter cited as "Date") and G. Cooke, Judges
and Ruth, 1918, p. 16.
20. J. Ridderbos, Deuteronomium, KV, 1951, p. 59, remarks,
"Blijkbaar
moet
Num. 27:8 v. zo worden opgevat, dat de dochters of de broeder erfgenamen
zijn,
als er geen zoon is en er ook niet meer een (uit een te sluiten huwelijk) is te
wachten,
by. doordat de weduwe boven den leeftijd was." Cf. also W. H. Gispen,
Het Boek Numeri, COT, 2, 1964,
p. 180. H. H. Rowley, op. cit., p.
184 n. 2,
rejects
Bewer's conclusion and remarks, "But we have no solid grounds for this
assumption."
21. A. M. Brown, The Concept of Inheritance in the Old
Testament, unpub-
lished
PhD dissertation,
is
made in Gen. 30:35 and 31:1 to Laban's sons it is necessary to interpret this
in
a
broader sense, in terms of his household or perhaps as in Gen. 31:28, 43, as
the
children
of his daughters. On the other hand, Brown also recognizes that such a
practice
may not be descriptive of Israelite custom but o f the custom of the
people
of
22. Ibid., p. 27. His argument is
that the amendment to this law is in Num.
36
and is clearly P. "It seems unlikely that P would have originated both the
law
and
its detailed amendment and not included them together." J. van der Ploeg,
216 Boaz and the Goel
It is debatable whether Naomi's
possession of the prop-
erty
is best understood as a case of inheritance. Several schol-
ars
take the position that Hebrew law or custom would have
made
some provision for the support of older childless
widows.
Thus Mace writes, “Naomi's statement, 'I am too old
to
have a husband' (Ruth 1,:12), suggests that the levirate did
not
apply to women who were past childbearing age; which is
of
course what we should have expected. Yet such widows
must
have been numerous, and it is only natural that their
future
would have been safeguarded. The obvious way to do
this
would be to require the heir to the property to give
shelter
also to the female dependants. It is possible that the
unusual
fact of Naomi's right to dispose of Elimelech's land
was
the result of her failure to find a kinsman who would
take
it over, because it was too small to compensate him for
the
burden of supporting Naomi and Ruth."23 Similarly,
Lattey
maintains that in cases where the widow was past the
age
for marriage, as was so with Naomi (1:12), it may have
been
the custom that she be given possession of her dead
husband's
property.24 Such a possibility cannot be excluded
"Studies
in Hebrew Law," CBQ, 13, 1951,
p. 41, writes: "The right of inheritance
of
daughters is judged to be of recent date, but why? This law is only compre-
hensible
if it were in force at the time when the distinction among the tribes had a
great
practical importance."
23. D. Mace, Hebrew Marriage, 1953, pp. 108, 109.
24. C. Lattey, The Book of Ruth, 1935, p. xxiv, remarks, "It may also be
presumed
that in the general law of Num. XXVII the wife is supposed to be dead,
but
that she would be given a prior claim over the daughters if alive."
Comment-
ing
on the question of Naomi's rights in the land, L. Morris, op. cit., p. 301,
writes,
"Our best guess is that a common-sense custom gave them to her." C.
F.
Keil, The Pentateuch, 3, 1864, p. 489, points
out that the law of Num. 27 does
not
explicitly mention the time when the property is to pass to the relatives,
whether
immediately, or after the death of the widow. The widow had the posses-
sion
of the property as long as she lived and in cases of dire need she had the
right
to
sell the land since the land reverted at the year of jubilee. C. Goslinga, Het
Boek
Ruth, KV, 19522, p. 155,
takes a position similar to that of Keil. E. Ham-
mershaimb,
Some Aspects of Old Testament Prophecy
from Isaiah to Malachi,
1966,
p. 73, believes that Naomi's possession of the property "might be under-
stood
as a rare example of the right of the widow to inherit the property of the
husband."
Boaz and the
God 217
since,
clearly, there are other examples of the growth of oral
law
in the Old Testament.25
If, however, we do not think of Naomi
possessing the
land
in accordance with uncodified Hebrew customary law, it
may
have come to her as a gift from her husband. There is
clear
evidence of this in extrabiblical texts and the possibility
cannot
be ruled out in Israel.26 This idea has been ably ar-
gued
by Schoneveld who cites numerous examples from the
ancient
Near East of husbands leaving goods and property to
their
wives. His conclusion is that it is "niet onmogelijk to
achten,
dat Naomi als weduwe de beschikking gehad heeft
over
de nalatenschap van haar man, zodat de erven deze niet
konden
opeisen."27
25. J. Weingreen, "The Case of
the Daughters of Zelophehad," VT,
16,
1966,
p. 522, writes, "The laws preserved in the Pentateuch are but a few items
culled
from a large corpus of law which was operative in ancient
even
be argued, a priori, that no
organized society could have been regulated
solely
on the scanty pentateuchal legislation, but a volume of legislative material
grew
progressively to meet the demands of a developing
fore,
point to at least three examples of laws which were operative in ancient
(a)
the law (Num. 27:3) which exacts the confiscation of the property of a person
convicted
of treason, (b) David's military rule providing for the distribution of the
spoils
off war among non-combatants, as well as among fighting troops (I Sam.
30:24,
25) and (c) Jeremiah's reference (Ier. 17:21, 22) to the prohibition against
the
carrying of burdens on the Sabbath." Cf. also J. van der Ploeg,
"Studies in
Hebrew
Law," CBQ, 13, 1951, p. 43; "In the period of the kings there existed
an
uncodified
civil law which regulated civil life in cases unforeseen by the Penta-
teuch."
Ample evidence for the presence of uncodified law is given by H.
Schmokel,
in his study Das angewandte Recht im
Alten Testament, 1930.
26. H. H. Rowley, op. cit., p. 184 n. 2.
27. J. Schoneveld, op. cit., p. 10. Cf. G. Smit, Ruth, Ester, en Klaagliederen,
TU,
1930, pp. 31, 32. Cf. Z. Falk, Hebrew Law
in Biblical Times, 1964, p. 159,
"The
property was perhaps promised to Naomi as a marriage-gift or bequeathed
to
her at marriage to provide for her husband's predeceasing her without leaving a
child."
Falk mentions that the Qara'ites understood that Naomi sold her hus-
band's
estate to draw her marriage portion. F. Buhl, "Some Observations on the
Social
Institutions of the Israelites," AJT,
1, 1897, p. 736, reasons that Elimelech,
prior
to his death, had obtained for his wife the possession of his property in
tom.
On inheritance in
Or,
34, 1965, pp. 12-14. For Nuzi material, cf. C. Gordon, "Status of Women
Reflected
in the Nuzi Tablets," ZA, 43,
1936, p9,162, 163. Examining the inheri-
tance
laws in other lands, A. Brown, op. cit.,
p. 150, comments, "In light of the
request
of Zelophehad's daughters for a share in the inheritance of the promised
218 Boaz and the Goel
Our present passage is not the only
one where the prac-
tice
of inheritance, seemingly, went beyond that which was
prescribed
in the written law. Job's daughters are given a
share
in the inheritance along with their seven brothers (Job
42:13-15).
We also find the widow in II Kings 8:1-6 being
restored
to the possession of her land and home after a
seven-year
sojourn in the land of the Philistines, a situation
with
striking similarities to that pictured in the book of
Ruth.
The announcement, made in the presence of the law-
fully
assembled body, that Naomi was selling the property,
went
unchallenged; thus there can be little doubt that she
was
lawfully in possession of the property. The complications
which
this may appear to bring are to be seen rather as an
indication
that the author is portraying a real situation.28
In reconstructing the actual course of
events in the book
of
Ruth, it becomes necessary to deal with the second main
question
which emerges from Boaz' initial words to the near-
er
kinsman in 4:3. It involves the interpretation of hrAk;mA.29
Are
we to understand that the property had already been
sold
by Naomi, in which case Boaz is calling upon the goel to
purchase
it back? Such would be the usual way in which the
perfect
would be translated; or are we to understand that the
sale
has not yet taken place? This is possible either by point-
ing
the verb as a participle or by seeing the verb as a perfect
of
certainty, "has resolved to sell," or of instantaneous action,
"is
now selling."30
land,
it is significant that there were situations in the ancient Near East where
daughters
did receive a share of inheritance."
28. Cf. M. Burrows, "Marriage
of Boaz and Ruth," p. 453.
29. LXX: h{ de<dotai. L. Epstein, op. cit., p. 85 n. 17, suggests that this
(given
to Naomi) may indicate that Naomi's possession of the property was con-
sidered
an alienation due to the fact that she is not of Elimelech's family. LXX is
of
little help, however, and the manuscript evidence is not uniform. Cf. W. Ru-
dolph,
op. cit., p. 59.
30. A. B. Davidson, Hebrew Syntax, §41a, cites this as a
case of the perfect
of
certainty. S. R. Driver, Hebrew Tenses,
§ 13, calls this "a striking instance" of
the
perfect of certainty. P. Joüon, op. cit.,
p. 81, says "C'est done tin present
d'action
instantanée: Noémi vend,
c'est-A.-dire met en vente, par la
déclaration
meme
que je to fais."
Boaz and the
Goel 219
If Naomi had already sold the
property, either before
returning
or shortly thereafter, we have added confirmation
of
the bleak circumstances which surrounded her return.31
Moreover,
if Naomi is presently in possession of a piece of
property,
Why is it necessary for Ruth to glean in the field of
Boaz?32
However, plausible suggestions can be put forth
which
explain that notwithstanding Naomi's ownership of a
piece
of property the widows found themselves in a lowly
condition.
Bettan stresses the importance of 1:22 where the
reader
is told that the widows "came to
beginning
of the barley harvest." This may account for
Naomi's
poverty despite her owning the land, in that the
season
was too far advanced for cultivation of the land.33 If
the
piece of property which belonged to Elimelech was a
portion
of a communal field34 it would be understandable
why
Naomi had not been able to dispose of the property
earlier,
thus explaining how the plight of the widows is corn-
patible
with possession of a piece of property.35 One might
31. A. Jepsen, op. cit., p. 419, feels that the property was sold before
Naomi's
return. "Vielmehr muss angenommen werden, class der Besitz schon beim
Wegzug
Elimelechs verkauft worden ist; denn sonst hatte Naemi wohl nicht als so
arm
dargesteilt werden können, hätte wohl auch kaum so lange mit dem
Verkauf
ihres
Ackers gewartet." This argument is also given by M. David, Huwelzjk, p. 21,
and
J. Pedersen, op. cit., p. 93. H.
Gunkel, op. cit., p. 81 n. 2, reasons
in the
opposite
direction, "Auch würde Noomi, wenn sie den Acker veräussert hätte,
eine
wohlhabende Frau sein: was der Meinung der Sage völlig widerspricht."
32. This question is raised by M.
Burrows, "Marriage of Boaz and Ruth,"
p.
447. The answer of E. Neufeld, AHML,
p. 37, that Ruth was sent to glean
merely
to bring herself to the attention of Boaz in the hope of marriage is to be
rejected.
With regard to the initial encounter the emphasis of the narrative seen as
a
whole is on the providence of God behind what seemed to the participants to be
a
chance meeting. See chap. 7 n. 5.
33.
H.
Rowley, op. cit., p. 183. W. Rudolph,
op. cit., p. 66, objects,
"Ackerland ist zu
kostbar,
als dass man es jahrelang verwildern liesse," but it is not at all
necessary
to
assume that the land stood unused for a long time.
34. K. H. Henrey, "Land Tenure
in the Old Testament," PEQ, 41,
1954,
P.
9.
35. L. Morris, op. cit., pp. 270, 271, 300. H. W. Hertzberg, op. cit., pp. 279,
280,
writes: "Das Wort helkat hassada (Ackersttick) scheint so gebraucht zu
sein,
als
wenn hälek (Anteil) da stände. Das macht sofort erklärlich,
warum dieses
‘Land'
für Naemi and Ruth nicht praktisch realisierbar war.
220 Boaz and the Goel
query,
as well, how the property would have solved the finan-
cial
problems without any husband to work the land.36 There
is
no way of knowing how large the property was, though
Burrows
feels it can be presumed that it was not very large.
Naomi
may have felt that she could manage her own support
through
the sale. This would have provided all the more rea-
son
for her wanting to arrange a suitable home for Ruth.37
All
the above are plausible considerations which explain the
possession
of the property by Naomi and the very meager
circumstances
in which the two widows found themselves.
Of
particular importance to the question of the transla-
tion
of the verb hrAk;mA in Ruth 4:3 is the argument
based on
the
property redemption law of Leviticus 25:25. Jepsen re-
marks,
"Vor allem aber wäre ein Kauf dtifeh-einen Verwand-
ten
kaum eine hlA.xuG; gewesen. Der Eintritt des goel setzt einen
früheren
Verkauf voraus. Es muss also bei der Lesart des MT
hrAk;mA 'N. hat verkauft' bleiben."38
However, it is not at all
certain
that the law in Leviticus 25 must be understood as
applying
exclusively to repurchase.39
It is preferable to understand the
sale in the light of
Jeremiah
32, particularly since there are noticeable similar-
ities
of terminology.40 Both are cases involving the prior right
stücke,
die mehrere Besitzer haben, verpachtet, urn genutzt werden zu können.
Daher
bedeutet diese Erbschaft fur Naemi in der Tat so gut wie nichts."
36. C. Smit, op. cit., p. 31, "Het terug ontvangen van den akker neemt
Noomi's
en Ruth's armoede niet weg. Zij kunnen den akker niet bewerken. Man-
nenzorg
is daarvoor noodig."
37. M. Burrows, "Marriage of
Boaz and Ruth," p. 448.
38. A. Jepsen, op. cit., p. 419, W. Nowack,
Richter, Ruth and Bucher
Samuelis, HK, 1902, p.
197, remarks: "Offenbar hat N. aller Mittel bar das
Grundsttick
veraussert, das jetzt aus der Hand des Käufers zu losen Aufgabe des
Goël
ist vgl. Lev. 25:25. Ob N. den Acker von
Ruckkehr
verkauft hatte, lässt sich nicht mit Sicherheit ausmachen." Cf. Th.
W.
Juynboll,
"Het boek Ruth uit het oogpunt der vergelijkende Rechtswetenschap,"
ThT, 40, 1906, p.
162.
39. Cf. our discussion of this law
in chap. 4, "Goel-Redemption of Prop-
erty."
40. jl hnq (Jer. 32:8 and
Ruth 4:8). Commenting on the verb in Ruth 4:3,
J.
J. Stamm, "lxg," THAT, 1, p. 386, remarks, "Es kann somit nicht sicher
entschieden
werden, ob Vorkauf oder Rückkauf vorliegt."
Boaz and the
Goel 221
to
purchase a property offered for sale. We do not think that
Jepsen
has established his point.
If the property were being repurchased
by the goel from
the
one to whom Naomi had already sold it, we should ex-
pect
to find such a one present at the transaction; but, as a
matter
of fact, what we are expressly told is that the prop-
erty
is being bought from the hand of Naomi
(4:5, 9).
Bertholet's
explanation," dass die Abfindungssumme des
Goel
an den fremden Käufer durch die Hand des ursprüng-
lichen
Besitzers zu gehen hatter" is strained.41 It would seem
best,
in the light of the phrase "from the
hand of Naomi," to
conclude
that the property had not previously been sold, but
was
now being put up for sale by Naomi.
At the turn of the century, Gunkel
cited II Kings 8:1-6 as
providing
a clue to the events in Ruth. This passage concerns
a
widow who sojourned in the land of the Philistines for
seven
years. Upon her return, she appealed to the king for her
land
and house, evidently because it was confiscated by
some
one while she was gone. In response to her appeal an
official
was appointed who restored all that belonged to her.
Gunkel's
suggestion, based upon this passage, was that Boaz
was
acting in behalf of Naomi, who had abandoned all efforts
to
get back her confiscated property. With Boaz as her repre-
sentative
and with the law on her side, she would be able to
press
her claim on the property and to proceed to offer it for
sale.42
41. A. Bertholet, Das Buch Ruth, KHC, 17, 1898, p. 66. J.
Pedersen, op.
cit., p. 511, calls
his theory artificial! J. Mittelmann, op.
cit., p. 20, writes: "Auch
müsste
anderenfalls der Eigentümer des Grundstücks anwesend sein and mit den
Go'alim
verhandeln. Auch würde eine dritte Person das Grundstück nicht ohne
Geldzahlung
hergeben, von der jedoch in Kap. 4 nicht die Rede ist."
42. H. Gunkel, op. cit., pp. 79, 80. Also W. Rudolph, op. cit., p. 66. This is
also
the position of Robinson., History of
Israel, 1, 19513, p. 318 n. 1,
who
writes: "The stories of Ruth and of the Shunamite woman (2 Kings 8:1-5)
show
how even wealthy families might be reduced through famine. In these cases
the
sufferers were compelled to migrate, but that was their only hope of surviving
and
it normally meant the loss of their land." H. H. Rowley, op. cit., p. 184,
writes,
"It may even have been that Naomi was unaware of her title to it, or that
she
would have been powerless to secure possession, but for the support of
Boaz."
222 Boaz and the Goel
We are not in a position to say dogmatically
whether such
was
the case or not, but it is an interesting parallel in many
respects
and another indication of the accurate picture of
Israelite
life given in the book. Perhaps during the long so-
journ,
the property may have been held in pledge by a
friend,43
or farmed by others within the family.44 These are
only
possibilities and must remain so for lack of additional
detail.
The main issue is clear however; upon her arrival in
in
some way this sale was connected with the marriage of
Ruth.
Boaz' words to the goel (4:3) are best understood as
applying
to an impending transaction similar
to Abraham's
commercial
transaction with Ephron, the Hittite, (Gen. 23:
11)
at the gate., in which the language employed bears close
resemblance
to that of our present passage.45
The Double Responsibility, Ruth
4:5, 10
Boaz urges the goel to buy the
property which Naomi is
selling,
since he has the prior claim upon it; yet at the same
time
Boaz assures him that he is next in line and is willing to
assume
the task (4:4). The goel, however, maintains his right
of
redemption, responding emphatically, "I will redeem it"
(4:4).
In the course of our study, we have had occasion to
discuss
individual problems of interpretation, all of which are
necessary
links in piecing together the situation described in
the
book. We come now to the most difficult and crucial
problem:
the goers dual responsibility of marrying Ruth and
Some
are of the opinion that the passage in II Kings provides an example of
confiscation
by royalty. K. Henrey, op. cit., p.
12, writes, "The possibilities here
are
that the land was a fief granted to the male line of the family, probably on
condition
that certain services were performed to the Crown ..., and that if the
father
died the land passed to the son who forfeited possession by prolonged
absence."
43. M. Burrows, "The Marriage
of Boaz and Ruth," p. 447.
44. H. H. Rowley, op. cit., p. 184.
45. hyttn jl vb
rwx hrfmhv jl yttn hdWh (Gen.
23:11). Cf. G.
Gerleman,
op. cit., p. 35.
Boaz and
the Goel 223
redeeming
the property, a question complicated by textual
difficulties.
In response to the goel's acceptance of the call to
redeem
the property, Boaz counters with the remark, "The
day
you buy the field from the hand of Naomi, you are also
buying
Ruth the Moabitess, the widow of the dead, in order
to
restore the name of the dead to his inheritance" (4:5).46
This
text of Scripture bristles with textual and interpretative
difficulties.
On the textual side, it is immediately evident that
the
phrase tvr txmv, as it appears in the MT, constitutes a
difficulty.
The KJV retains these words and renders the verse,
"What
day thou buyest the field of the hand of Naomi, thou
must
buy it also of Ruth the Moabitess, the wife of the
dead."47
The property which is referred to as Elimelech's
(4:3)
and Elimelech's, Mahlon's, and Chilion's (4:9) and
which
is spoken of as being sold by Naomi (4:3, 9), would,
following
the KJV, be understood as in some way belonging
to
Ruth. Such a view is unlikely. An even stronger objection
to
this translation would be that the phrase, "thou must buy
it
also of Ruth the Moabitess, the wife of the dead, to raise
up
the name of the dead upon his inheritance," does not
unambiguously
refer to a marriage responsibility. Yet it is the
introduction
of the marriage with Ruth which leads to the
goel's
change of mind. Furthermore, Boaz' statement in 4:
10a
pleads against this translation. See below.48
L. Kohler solves the difficulty
involved in the phrase
46. ytynq tmh
twx hybxvmh tvr txmv ymfn dym hdWh jtvnq Mvyb
vtlHn lf tmh Mw Myqhl
47. A similar translation is given
by C. Smit, op. cit., p. 17, cf. also
p. 32.
Then
our text would be comparable to a passage such as Gen. 25:10, rwx
hdWh
tH ynb txm Mhrbx hnq, but with the
significant difference that the verb has
an
object which it does not have in Ruth 4:5. It should be noted, however, that
no
object is found with the verb in Ruth 4:4, 8, though it May be understood.
48. Cf. W. Nowack, op. cit., p. 197, who cites, among his
three objections to
retaining
txmv,
the fact that it is "neben vorhergehendem dym auffallig."
The MT
reading
is defended by L. Morris, op. cit.,
p. 304: "AV gives the more difficult
reading
and this may be right.... If this is so then Boaz is saying that Ruth also
has
a stake in this field, and since she is the widow of a childless kinsman this
involves
marrying her to raise up a child for the deceased as well as treating it as a
Property
matter." Cf. also, I. Bettan, op.
cit., p. 69, J. Slotki, "Ruth," in The
Five Megilloth, SB, 1946, p.
61, for similar views.
224 Boaz and the Goel
tvr txmv by omitting it, in which case
the verse reads, "Am
Tage,
wo du den Acker aus dem Besitz der Naemi, der Frau
des
Toten, kaufst, kaufst du ihn, urn...."49 He gives two
reasons
for the change. "Warum wird Ruth, 'die Frau des
Toten'
genannt, nicht aber Naemi, da doch nicht von Ruth's
Mann,
wohl aber von dem der Naemi `unserm Bruder Elime-
lek'
(4:3) die Rede war? Und: 'du kaufst Ruth, indem du den
Acker
kaufst' ist sonderbar, obwohl der Freier fur die Braut
ein
Kaufgeld zahlt."50 These are not adequate reasons for
removing
the phrase. The "dead" in 4:5 may well have refer-
ence
to Mahlon, as it apparently does in 4:10, and in the
raising
up of Mahlon's name that of Elimelech would also be
continued.51
The supposed difficulty which is caused by the
statement,
"du kaufst Ruth, indem du den Acker kaufst," is
obviated
when we shall see52 that the verb in 4:5b is best
understood
as meaning "acquire." We prefer, following the
great
majority of commentators,53 to read , tvr tx Mg. This
49. L. Kohler, "Ruth," SThZ, 37, 1920, p. 10 (hereafter cited
as "Ruth").
50.
L. Kohler, "Ruth," p. 10. His explanation for the insertion is
unconvinc-
ing.
He writes, "Es ist die Ueberweisheit eines Lesers, der der Meinung lebte,
auch
Ruth
habe zu dem Verkaufe etwas zu sagen."
51. E. Würthwein, op. cit., p. 22 n. 1, objects to Köhler's
approach and
remarks,
"Von Naemi kann nicht gesagt werden, dass mit ihr des Toten Namen
aufrecht
erhalten werde, da von ihr keine Kinder mehr zu erwarten sind (1:14)."
W.
Rudolph, op. cit., p. 67, sees Ruth
as a replacement for Naomi in the levirate
situation.
Her designation as "wife of the dead" is explained as "eine in
solchen
Substitutionsfällen
übliche Formulierung." The contention of P. Volz, "Rut,"
ThLZ, 26, 1901, p.
348, that the phrase "wife of the deceased" (being in his view
Elimelech)
in 4:5 is evidence for an original story where Boaz married Naomi
must
similarly be rejected.
52. Cf. below, for instance n. 65.
53. For instance, A. Bertholet, op. cit., p. 66; W. Nowack, op. cit., p. 197;
C.
Lattey, op. cit., pp. 20, 21; W.
Rudolph, op. cit., p. 59; J. Morgenstern, op.
cit., p. 175 n. 227;
H. H. Rowley, op. cit., p. 193 n. 1;
H. W. Hertzberg, op. cit.,
p.
278. Suggestions have been put forward by two scholars who have not resorted
to
changing the MT but have not retained the traditional interpretation of it. F.
I.
Anderson,
The Hebrew Verbless Clause in the
Pentateuch, JBL Monograph Series,
14,
1970, pp. 48, 124 n. 13, cites examples of the enclitic mem attached to the
conjunction
and lists Gen. 41:32; Judg. 13:19, and Amos 6:10 as examples of
such
occurrences. His suggestion is that txmv is another
example of an enclitic
mem attached to the
conjunction. "A literal translation with min, misses the
point;
the field is not to be acquired from
Ruth as well as from Naomi; rather,
when
the field is acquired from Naomi, Ruth must be acquired with it, and is the
Boaz and the
Goel 225
brings
the verse into harmony with ytynq. .
tvr tx Mgv,
4:
10,
and supplies an object to the verb hnq which it seems
to
require.54
In addition to this change, we must
follow the qere tynq
for
the kethibh ytynq. As we shall see, there have been
two
notable
attempts to retain the kethibh, but despite the con-
siderable
ingenuity displayed in these renderings, they cannot
be
followed.
With these two textual changes we have
come part way to
clearing
up some of the difficulties that accompany this
verse.
To summarize so far we see that Boaz has told the
goel,
"The day you buy (acquire) the field from the hand of
Naomi,
you are also buying (acquiring) Ruth the Moabitess,
the
widow of the dead... ."
We now turn to the interpretative
problems connected
with
the verse. Of prime importance is the verb hnq,55
found
here
as well as in 4:10. The verb is employed in commercial
transactions
involving the acquisition of a field (Gen. 25:10,
33:19;
49:30; 50:12; Lev. 27:24; Josh. 24:32; II Sam. 24:21,
object
of the following verb." He cites other possible examples in II Sam. 16:5;
Job
6:22; 7:14; 10:14; 19:2b; 21:20. B. Wambacq, "Le Mariage de Ruth,"
Melanges Eugene
Tisserant,
1, 1964, p. 456, translates 4:5, "Le jour òu tu as
acquis (qanita) le champ de la main de Noémi et
du déftunt, tu as acquis (qanita)
Ruth,
la Moabite, la femme du défunt." He explains the presence of the aleph in
txm (for tm) either as an
Aramaism or as being similar to the presence of the aleph
in
Judg. 4:21 (txlb) or II Sam. 12:1, 4 (wxr). He writes,
"L'expression: ‘Noémi
et
le défunt' reprend ce, qui avait ete dit dans le verset précédent: la piéce de
terrain
qui appartient à Elimélek, notre frère (le défunt), Noémi le met en
vente."
These
two attempts are very interesting but also very hypothetical. Preference
should
be given to the reading tvr tx Mg for the reasons given above.
54. T. Ch. Vriezen, "Two
Old-Cruces," OTS, 5, 1948, p.
81. LXX is unhelp-
ful,
having combined both possibilities in its translation: to>n a]gro>n e]k Xeiro>j
Nwemw kai> para> Rouq . . . ,
kai> au]th>n kth<sasqai se dei?. Cf. R. Thornhill, "The
Greek
Text of the Book of Ruth," VT,
3, 1953, p. 244. Similarly the Targum
adds
the comment, combining both positions, "Thou a-t bound to redeem and
seek
to marry her, and to take her to wife"; cf. A. Saarisalo, "The Targum
to the
Book
of Ruth," StOr, 2, 1928, p. 100.
55. Cf. P. Humbert, "Qana en
Hebreu biblique," in Festschrift A. Bertholet,
1950,
pp. 259-266; P. Katz, "The Meaning of the Root hnq," JJS, 5, 1954,
pp.
126-131. On the use of this term in Ruth 4, cf. Z. Falk, op. cit., pp. 140, 141;
H.
J. Boecker, op. cit., p. 168; D.
Weiss, "The use of hnq in connection with
Marriage,"
HTR, 57, 1964, pp. 244-248.
226 Boaz and the God
24;
I Kings 16:24; I Chron. 21:24; Neh. 5:16; Jer. 32:8, 9,
15,
25, 43-44). In each of the above passages the sum of
money
involved in the transaction is mentioned. Because of
the
use of this verb in the present context with marriage, this
passage
constitutes an important piece of data in the discus-
sion
of whether the Old Testament knows of marriage by
purchase.
KB lists as one of the meanings of
this verb, "to
purchase,
to be one's wife." Katz concludes that the root
meaning
is that of "ownership through acquisition."56 Into
the
much disputed problem of marriage by purchase, we have
no
wish to enter other than to the extent the passage under
question
necessitates. Scholars are of varying opinions on this
issue
and, as in so many other questions as complex as this
one,
the differences are to some extent semantic. Neufeld
cites
the passage (4:5, 10) as one of three which supports the
concept
of marriage by purchase.57 This is objected to by
Driver
and Miles, who assert that the verb does lot necessi-
tate
a translation of purchase but may refer to acquisition in
genera1.58
Burrows remarks in relation to Ruth 4:10, "Since
the
verb here used indicates acquisition in general, not neces-
sarily
by purchase, and since a peculiarly puzzling combina-
tion
of marriage, inheritance, and redemption is involved in
the
transaction, I prefer to reserve discussion, calling atten-
tion
merely to the fact that a close connection of some kind
between
marriage and property is implied. In none of these
cases
[Gen. 31:14-16; Hos. 3:2; Ruth 4:10] can it fairly be
claimed
that marriage by purchase is demonstrated by the use
of
a verb meaning 'buy' or 'sell,' though marriage and the
transfer
of property from one owner to another were evident-
56. P. Katz, op. cit., p. 131.
57. E. Neufeld, AHML, p. 98 n. 2. Similarly, J. Bewer, "Ge'ullah," p.
146.
E.
Robertson, op. cit., p. 221, remarks,
"He has in effect purchased Ruth with the
property."
Cf. J. R. Porter, "Legal Aspects of Corporate Personality," VT, 15,
1965,
p. 376.
58. G. R. Driver and J. C. Miles, The Babylonian Laws, 1, 1952, p. 263.
Cf.
also,
P. Joüon, op. cit., pp. 83, 84,
"Ici hnq
n'est certainement pas pris au sens
restreint
acquerir a prix d'argent, acheter .
Le goël qui epousera Ruth n'aura
rien
a payer aux parents de Ruth (enMoab!), et encore moins à Noémi."
Boaz and the Goel 227
ly
thought of in similar terms. That this should be so was
quite
natural, as we have already seen, given the fundamental
idea
of compensation."59
According to Bornstein, it is
incorrect to give to the verb
in
4:5, 10 the meaning "purchase," for "die eigentliche
Beereutung
von hnq
ist eben nicht `kaufen' sondern ‘er-
werben,'
rechtsgültig
der
Mischna und der verwandten Literatur vorherrscht."6°
Rudolph is strongly opposed to the
notion that Ruth was
purchased:
"Boas kauft die Ruth nicht und kann sie nicht
kaufen,
da er ja den mohar (Gn 34:12; Ex
22:15f.) in diesem
Fall
an sich selbst zu entrichten hatte."61 There is no mone-
59. M. Burrows, Basis of Israelite Marriage, AOS, 15, 1938, p. 29. Cf. also
his
statement (p. 15), "Our thesis may be briefly summarized. The basis of
ite
marriage was the continuance of the husband's family. This required securing a
wife
from another family, which had to be induced to give her up, and this was
done
by a gift, creating an obligation, sealing a contract, and establishing a fam-
ily-alliance."
Cf. also 0. Baab, "Marriage," IDB,
3, 1967, p. 284: "Too many
difficulties
stand in the way of the idea of purchase marriage to justify its unquali-
fied
acceptance." W. Plautz, "Die Form der Eheschliessung im Alten
Testament,"
ZAW, 76, 1964, pp.
317, 318, concludes: "Fassen wir zusammen: Die Eheschlies-
sung
war in
das
bei der Eheschliessung dem Vater der Braut gezahlte Geld kein Kaufpreis in
unserem
Sinne. Man kann höchstens in formalrechtlicher Hinsicht von einem Kauf
sprechen,
der dem Kauf von Grossgütern gleicht. Nur in dieser Beziehung ist die
Frau
Objekt eines Geschäftes. Fur ihre Stellung in der Ehe ergibt sich damit
ein
Positivum.
Ihre persönliche Würde wird durch den Akt der Eheschliessung nicht
angetastet.
So wie sie nicht wie eine Ware zur Ehe gekauft wird, wird sie in der
Ehe
auch nicht als Sache behandelt. Die Zahlung eines Brautgeldes emiedrigt sie
nicht.
Sie ist als Ausgleich dafür notwendig, dass die Familie der Braut eins ihrer
Glieder,
eine zukünftige Mutter, verliert. Der Familien-verband ist so fest und
stark,
dassnich einfach ein Glied ausscheiden kann, ohne dass er eine bestimmte
Gegenleistung
erhält." See further n. 104.
60. D. J. Bornstein,Ruth," Encyclopaedia Judaica, 10, 1905, p. 934.
Cf.
D.
Jacobsen, Social Background of The Old
Testament, 1942, p. 42: "Ruth 4:5,
10
uses the word hnq for acquiring a wife. hnq
need
not necessarily mean ‘to
buy";
in Ps. 74:2, it is parallel with lxg, which meaning
could very well apply
here."
J. H. Kennedy, "Ruth," BBC,
2, 1971, p. 477, comments: "Ruth was not
one's
property and therefore she could not be bought. Apparently Boaz meant
only
that one redeeming the land must assume certain obligations to Ruth."
61. W. Rudolph, op. cit., p. 64. J. R. Porter, op.
cit., p. 376 n. 4, objects to
Rudolph's
argument, "The miihar only applies to virgins, as Ex. 22:16 clearly
shows,
and would not be in question in the case of Ruth, who was a widow."
Porter's
comment actually supplies a reason against translating hnq in the Ruth
passage
"buy." Cf. W. Plautz, op. cit.,
pp. 314, 315: "Denn es handelt sich um
228 Boaz and the Goel
tary
transaction in the purchase of the field by Boaz because
he
acquires the widow along with the field, and he will fulfil
the
marriage obligation in cases where the childless widow
still
of marriageable age. "Diese Unterhaltspflicht tritt an die
Stelle
des Kaufpreises."62
There can be no thought of Boaz
purchasing Ruth.63 The
text
is affirming that in the purchase of the property frorr
Naomi,
the goel acquires64 Ruth in combination with the
property;
and since she is of marriageable age, the goel will be
asked
to perpetuate the name of the dead through marrying
Ruth.
The use of hnq in Ruth 4:5, 10, while ill-suited for
regular
case of marriage because of its purchase connotation,
was
used in this connection since the marriage is mentioned
in
connection with a commercial transaction, in other words
the
sale of Elimelech's property. As Weiss suggests, "When
marriage
(or betrothal) is discussed in conjunction with sal-
eine
Heirat ohne mohar; die Ehe, die Boas
mit der Ruth schliesst, ist ein Levir-
atesehe,
bei der eine Brautgeldzahlung nicht notwendig ist, weil die betreffende
Frau
sich schon im Be:;itz der Familie ihres Mannes befindet. qnh heisst denn auch
an
dieser Stelle (v. 5b) ausnahmsweise nicht `kaufen' im Vollsinn, sondern ist mit
‘erwerben’
wiederzugeben."
62. W. Rudolph, op. cit., p. 64. He reasons that since the verb in 4:5b means
"erwerben"
and not "kaufen," such must also be the meaning in 4:5a. From this
he
concludes, "Dann kann auch rkm in v. 3 kein
eigentliches Verkaufen bedeuten,
sondern
ist mit 'veräussem' zu tibersetzen ..." Similarly, F. Horst,
"Das Eigentum
nach
dem Alten Testament," Gottes Recht,
1961, p. 209. M. Burrows, "The
Marriage
of Boaz and Ruth," p. 451, states: "Since the child would inherit the
estate
of his mother's previous husband, one is driven to ask what Boaz got for
the
money he paid for the land. Doubtless the amount was small, as always in
cases
of forced sale. Possibly, indeed, as we have already noted in passing, the
price
was merely nominal and the transaction a sale in form only.... It may be
that
the transfer of the property to Boaz had to be made in the form of a sale to
be
legal."
63. Cf. H. H. Bewley, op. cit., p. 185 n. 2, "But Ruth
was no more part of
the
property than was Orpah, and she is nowhere spoken of as property to be
exploited
by a purchaser, but as one to whom the next-of-kin owed a duty." For
a
contrary opinion, cf. H. J. Boecker, op. cit., p. 170 n. 5.
64. Cf. Z. Falk, op. cit., p. 141, "In Ruth the term
was already used to
signify
legal acquisiticn as distinguished from taking possession." If in 4:7 the
goel
is divesting himself of his right of redeemership (and not of the field) then
the
verb hnq
used in the address of the goel to Boaz in 4:8 (jl hnq) does not
mean
buy (the field) but acquire or obtain (the right of goel). Cf. LXX: kth?sai
seaut&? th>n a]gxistei<an mou.
Boaz and the Goel 229
able
objects (like the belongings of Elimelech, etc., or the
field
of Naomi) biblical Hebrew, just as Mishnaic, uses a term
which
will embrace the latter as well; hence the term ytynq in
Ruth
4:10. This usage is merely stylistic and devoid of any
institutional
significance."65
There have been two significant
departures from the
majority
opinion, which accepts the qere in 4:5. Recently
Beattie
has argued for retaining the first person singular
(kethibh)
and has proposed an explanation for how the sec-
ond
person singular came to be read.
According to Beattie, "there had
been a certain degree of
mystery
about Boaz's words to Ruth (3:12, 13) about 're-
deeming'
and a 'redeemer,' and a vagueness about Naomi's
reference
to 'settling the matter' which arouses curiosity." It
is
in chapter four that the "reader learns for the first time
that
it is the future ownership of Elimelech's property that is
in
question, and this is what Boaz's words about redemption
referred
to."66 Boaz, with sweet reasonableness, informs the
goel
about the property to be claimed, in which he (Boaz)
has
an interest, but concerning which the goel has prior claim
in
law. When the goel declares his intention of redeeming the
field,
Boaz' approach becomes somewhat menacing and he
places
the goel in a position where he will be forced to retract
his
offer on the property (v. 5).67 Infollowing the qere in
65. D. Weiss, op. cit., p. 248. Weiss (p. 246) suggests that in Mishnaic He-
brew
"hnq
is applied to marriage only in contexts embracing other transactions in
which
hnq
in its proper sense of 'purchase' (acquire property) is applicable. Thus,
in
association with levirate marriage or the purchase of slaves or other salable
objects,
MP is uniformly employed."
66. D. R. G. Beattie, "Kethibh
and Qere in Ruth IV 5," VT, 21,
1971,
pp.
491, 492.
67. D. R. G. Beattie, op. cit., p. 492, follows arguments put
forward by W.
McKane,
"Ruth and Boaz," p. 38, which revolve around the sudden change of
mind
on the part of the goel. R. Tamisier, Le
Livre de Ruth, La Sainte Bible,
1949,
p. 323, is of the opinion that the goel's original answer was quite indefinite.
He
writes, "Le goal donne une reponse qui n'est ni ferme ni definitive, comme
l'insinue
l'emploi du futur: ii se déclare simplement disposé à racheter la propriété
d'
Elimélek." In a similar vein J. de Fraine, Rechters • Ruth, BOT, 3, 1955, p. 157,
remarks,
"Er is een positief antwoord, cloth het is zo weinig beslist, dat het
eerder
230 Boaz and the Goel
verse
5, one is faced with an unsolvable dilemma. One thing
obvious.
Boaz' second statement contains requirements not
anticipated
by the goel at the time of his original acceptance.
Furthermore,
it would be difficult to see a legal basis for
linking
marriage with Ruth to the duty of redeeming the
property.
Otherwise, the goel would have known what was
expected
from him and this would have influenced his initial
decision.68
Was such a legal basis lacking for linking marriage
to
Ruth and the redemption of the property? Given the ex-
tensive
juridical emphasis within this chapter the answer can
hardly
be in the affirmative, for if so, we must assume that
the
elders or the goel himself would have raised objections to
Boaz'
requirements in verse 5.69 The
only way to avoid the
dilemma
is by following the kethibh.
There are two additional reasons why
Beattie retains the
kethibh
reading. The narrative suggests that Boaz is anxious
to
acquire both Ruth and the land; when the qere is fol-
lowed,
he "is depending for the realization of his aims on the
redeemer's
unwillingness to do just what he wants to do him-
self,
and such a situation, coming at the climax of a scene in
which
dramatic tension has been built up carefully by the
author,
is by all the laws of story-telling inconceivable."70
Furthermore,
according to Beattie, Boaz had already "mar-
ried"
Ruth, in other words, slept with Ruth the night before
and
therefore could not be informing the goel of his duty to
marry
Ruth! What Boaz said in 4:5 is, "On the day you
acquire
the field from Naomi's hand, I am acquiring Ruth the
Moabite,
the wife of the deceased, to raise up the name of
the
deceased over his inheritance."71 Boaz is informing the
goel
that he is marrying Ruth and intends to claim the field
eventually
through the children of the union with Ruth. Thus
bij
een velleiteit blijft. Het imperfectum 'eg'al
is veel minder scherp dan het
perfecturn
ga’alti (dit zou doen onderstellen
dat de zaak in kannen en kruiken is).
68. D. R. G. Beattie, op. cit., p.
492.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid., pp. 492, 493.
71. Ibid., p. 493.
Boaz and the
Goel 231
the
god will be acquiring it for a limited period of time. This
is
the new information in Boaz' second speech causing the
char,
of mind.
The qere came in through a false
impression received
from
4:9, 10, where the narrative asserts that Boaz took
Ruth
as his wife at the same time that he took the property
from
Naomi. It was assumed that these two belonged to-
gether
and that the prior goel had marriage with Ruth pre-
sented
to him as a condition attached to the property trans-
action.
Thus the first singular was taken to be second singu-
lar.
An impetus toward this change came, as well, from two
other
places in the consonantal text where a first person
singular
has been altered by a qere to a second person
singular.72
We wish to make several comments on
Beattie's novel
handling
of 4:5. On the positive side he has taken account of
two
factors which have escaped the attention of many: the
implications
of the change of mind on the goel's part, after
the
mention of the added requirement of marriage to Ruth,
and
the bearing which the legal detail in chapter four has on
the
question of whether any arbitrary conditions could have
been
imposed by Boaz. While he rightly has taken these two
factors
into account, we do not believe he has drawn the
correct
conclusions from them.
Can one deduce from the goel's change
of mind that the
additional
condition imposed by Boaz could not have had a
basis
in law, since if so, it would have been anticipated by the
goel
and his change of mind would be inexplicable? This is
not
the only explanation for the alteration of his attitude. It
is
conceivable that the god was not aware of the existence of
the
widow Ruth. If so, quite a variant picture would then be
presented
to him, radically altering his prior willingness to
redeem
the property.73 Boaz had told the goel that Naomi
72. Ibid., p. 494. The verbs are dry
(3:3)
and bkw (3:4).
73. D. R. G. Beattie, op. cit., p. 492 n. 3, labels this
proposal "unrealistic"
in
the light of the declarations made in 1:19, 2:11, and 3:11. Such declarations,
232 Boaz and the Goel
was
selliug.the land, and the likelihood was that the goel was
reckoning
with her as the widow. Because of her advanced
age
he figured that the land was a reasonable proposition
since
it became his and would only revert back when a levir-
ate
child was born to the widow. Such would certainly not be
the
case with Naomi as the widow, and with this in mind he
made
his original calculation and decision. It must also be
affirmed,
in connection with the argument from the goel's
change
of mind, that a great deal depends on the concept of
law
which is being presupposed. It is conceivable that the
goel
was unaware that customary moral conduct dictated the
combination
of the widow with the property.
We believe that Beattie is correct in
pointing to Boaz'
desire
to acquire Ruth and the property but wrong in reason-
ing
that his interest in Ruth would have prevented him from
acquainting
the goel with his prior claim in these matters.
Viewed
exclusively in terms of a commercial transaction,
whoever
acted on Ruth's behalf would not be gaining a great
advantage for himself. Apart from the motive
of love (which
was
present with Boaz) the proposition put forward to the
goel
was not attractive. Boaz may have had grounds for be-
lieving
that the goel would not carry through with an act
requiring
such sacrifice and devotion. We may also assume
that
his own strong interest in Ruth was intentionally dis-
guised
by the manner in which he presented the property
first
and then, only later, mentioned Ruth as involved in the
transaction.
It is also possible that Boaz, due to his own
personal
circumstances, may have been in a position to help
the
widows in their plight, and knew that the same circum-
stances
were not present with the prior god.74
however,
surely are not meant to imply that everyone was aware of the plight of
the
two widows, though it would be possible to argue that of all people, the
relatives
of Naomi must have been. However, since Naomi sent Ruth to Boaz,
apparently
unaware of the presence of a prior goel, the assumption that the prior
goel
did not know the exact situation gains extra credibility.
74. Cf. B. Wambacq, op. cit., p. 454, "Si Booz semble
tellement stir du
succès
de son entreprise, n'était-ce pas parce qu'il prévoyait que le go W, pour des
Boaz and the Goel 233
One further point must be noted. If
the marriage with
Ruth
is not connected in some way with the property re-
demption
transaction, how do we account for the use of the
verb
hnq
to describe the marriage of Boaz to Ruth? As we
saw,75
the employment of this verb for marriage is best under-
stood
in cases where the marriage takes place in association
with
some form of commercial transaction.
Apart from these considerations,
Beattie's reconstruction
of
the situation is unconvincing because of his interpretation
of
chapter three. Ruth has approached Boaz requesting mar-
riage,
because he is the goel. Boaz replies that he must ac-
quaint
the prior goel with his responsibility, to see whether
he
will act as kinsman toward Ruth or not (3:13). Whatever
else
we say, we must assume that it was necessary to inform
the
goel of his marriage responsibility toward Ruth since she
made
an explicit request for marriage.76 Perhaps mention of
the
property was also made during the course of Ruth's even-
ing
encounter with Boaz, but the expressed request was for
marriage.
If so, it is inconceivable that Boaz would have gone
ahead
and "married" Ruth that night. It is clear that marriage
was
uppermost in the mind of Boaz, in his understanding of
the
nature of Ruth's request. If so, it was necessary for Boaz
to
present the request of Ruth in some fashion to the goel,
since
there was a proper order for the exercise of this respon-
sibility.
Beattie's first singular translation cannot be har-
monized
with the unfolding of events as described in chapter
three.
Vriezen also attempts to maintain the
kethibh in 4:5.
Noting
that the verb hnq requires an object,77 which
it does
not
have without the emendation of txmv to tx
Mg Vriezen
motifs
qui nous échappent, ne ferait jamais l'achat dans les c rconstances
concrètes?"
75. Cf. n. 65.
76. Cf. chap. 7, "The Appeal of
Ruth."
77. Th. C. Vriezen, "Two Old
Cruces," OTS, 5, 1948, p. 82. It
should be
noted
that in 4:4 and 4:8 this verb is also used without an object. Cf. J. Myers,
The Linguistic
and Literary Form of the Book of Ruth, 1955, p. 26, who, noting
234 Boaz and the Goel
proposes
to derive the verb from xnq,78 a verb not requiring an
object.
In this suggestion there would then be a play upon
words
between hnq
in 4:5a and xnq in 4:5b. He retains txmv
unaltered
and following the usage in Deuteronomy 18:3,
translates
it "with regard to."79 The verb xnq has the mean-
ing
of "to be jealous of" and "to maintain energetically the
right
of someone" and it is the latter which he employs in his
translation
of 4:5: "What day thou buyest the field of the
hand
of Naomi, then I maintain with regard to Ruth the
Moabitess,
the wife of the dead, the rights to raise up the
name
of the dead upon his inheritance."80
Under these circumstances the goel
refuses to redeem the
property,
since his right to the property must be eventually
given
over to the child born of the levirate marriage.
The
significance of Vriezen's translation for the interpre-
tation
of the legal developments in Ruth is far-reaching, and
is
summarized in his statement, "The author still kept ge 'ulla
and
levirate apart; he did not think of Boaz charging the go 'el
with
the levirate, but he represents Boaz as voluntarily taking
upon
himself the charge of the levirate."81
Vriezen maintains that "the
supposition of the narrative
is
that levirate marriage may also be contracted, besides by
the
brothers of the deceased . . . voluntarily at least, by some
other
of the nearest male relatives of the deceased husband,
in
case no sons [sic] are left to consummate the levirate
marriage."82
this
lack of an object in 4:4 and 4:8 suggests the possibility of reading hAn,q; for
hneq; in these two places.
78. Following Vriezen, we must read ytynq with the
incorrect spelling due
to
a mixture of the verba tertiae x and h, an
irregularity of mixed form elsewhere
found
in the Old Testament and supported by a similar irregularity in the verb
tmcv from xmc in 2:9. Th. C.
Vriezen, op. cit., p. 81. His
proposal is accepted by
KB.
79. Ibid., pp. 83, 84. According to
Vriezen, Boaz is maintaining the rights
for
himself rather than defending the rights of Ruth, since for this latter sense l
would
be better employed than txm.
80. Ibid., p. 81.
81. Ibid., p. 85.
82. Ibid., p. 87.
Boaz and the Goel 235
However, here is where an objection to
his proposal must
be
recorded. In his employment of the concept of voluntary
levirate,
which we in a certain sense accept, Vriezen has failed
to
raise the question of whether such did not operate in a due
and
proper order. One is left with the impression that he is
assuming
that no order existed for the performance of this
voluntary
levirate, but surely such concerns, involving as as
they
did the well-being of people, did not operate indepen-
dent
of a proper order. It was such an order which Boaz was
at
pains to preserve when he responded to Ruth's request at
the
threshing floor. Again, we are confronted with the crucial
nature
of the events in chapter three and can see how one's
interpretation
of these events affects his understanding of the
transaction
in chapter four. It is at this point that Vriezen's
argument
must be faulted. He is aware that 3:9 constitutes a
difficulty
for his interpretation of 4:5, for he asks, "If the
author
has rightly distinguished ge'ulla and
levirate marriage,
what
then is the meaning of the words spoken by Ruth in III,
9?"83
He suggests that Ruth's words in 3:9 are only a request
for
protection and not directly a request for marriage. How-
ever,
this statement is immediately followed by a recognition
that
her real intention was marriage with Boaz.84 Further-
more,
Vriezen grants that Naomi's words in 3:1 point in the
direction
of marriage and that Boaz understood Ruth's
"covert"
suggestion in terms of marriage. One is puzzled over
his
distinction between a direct and covert suggestion of mar-
riage.
His use of this distinction is clarified somewhat when
he
remarks that if Ruth is asking to be married by Boaz
because
he is goel, "then after all ge'ulla
and levirate would
have
been mixed up."85 Apparently by denying that Ruth is
directly requesting
marriage from Boaz (who is goel) and
speaking
rather of a "covert" suggestion, Vriezen feels able to
maintain
a complete distinction between the levirate and
83. Ibid., pp. 85, 86.
84. Ibid., p. 86. Cf. chap. 7 n. 41.
85. Ibid.
236 Boaz and the Goel
geullah,
thus avoiding what he would regard as a confusion of
the
two concepts. However, his recognition that all parties
involved
understood Ruth's proposal as a marriage request,
makes
one wonder how hidden her suggestion was and
demonstrates
that chapter three points convincingly to a di-
rect
request by Ruth for marriage with Boaz as goel. Since
such
was the case, Boaz's words that he must acquaint the
prior
goel (3:13) with this request before he could do any-
thing,
can only mean that in 4:5 Boaz must be informing the
goel
of the marriage request which he must now consider.86
Boaz
is then saying, "When you buy the field you must also
acquire
Ruth to raise up the name of the dead."
To state, as Vriezen does, that
"it is quite impossible to
think
that Boaz could try to oblige the other goel to marry
Ruth.
There was no obligation at all,"87 confuses the argu-
ment,
for there did not exist, either for Boaz or the prior
goel,
a compulsory legal obligation to redeem the property or
to
enter into a levirate responsibility. Yet Boaz must have
operated
out of some sense of duty. Since Ruth approached
him
as goel, requesting marriage, she must have had a basis
for
expecting him to answer in the affirmative. That basis was
that
he was goel. If so, there can be no grounds for excluding
the
man whom Boaz calls a nearer kinsman (bvrq lxg,
3:12)
from an opportunity of performing the voluntary levir-
ate,
a deed which Vriezen labels as a "specially pious
deed."88
Indeed, if the many commentators are correct who
see
a contrast in the narrative between Boaz and the nearer
goel,
then it becomes a necessary part of that contrast to
allow
the prior goel the same option. His refusal will then
accentuate
the magnanimous nature of Boaz and what he is
86. H. H. Rowley, op. cit., p. 193 n. 1, commenting on
Vriezen's argument
writes,
"It offers no explanation of Boaz's insistence that Ruth's night visit
should
he
kept secret, and robs his reference to a nearer kinsman, before any question of
the
property arose, of any point."
87. Th. C. Vriezen. op. cit., p. 88.
88. Ibid., p. 87.
Boaz and the Goel 237
prepared
to do for Ruth and Naomi. We must, therefore,
decline89
to follow Vriezen in his attempt to maintain the
first
singular. Boaz does invite the prior goel to redeem the
property
and to acquire Ruth at the same time, "to raise up
the
name of the dead upon his inheritance."
We have come to the place in our study
where we must
ask,
Why did Boaz tell the goel that when he chose to redeem
the
property from Naomi, he would be acquiring Ruth? How
are
we to understand this coupling of responsibilities? Is it
simply
a literary device of the author designed to heighten
the
tension of an exciting story? Was this something arbitrar-
ily
imposed by Boaz with no basis in law? Is it to be under-
stood
as a private condition of sale imposed by Naomi? Has
Ruth
been purchased with the property, or did customary
law
dictate that where a younger widow was connected to
the
property, the goel's responsibility included not only the
redemption
of the property but marriage with the widow as
well?
Those whose approach to the book is
predominantly
literary
propose that the combining of the property redemp-
tion
with the marriage is a device which heightens the tension
in
the story. According to Robertson, at the moment when it
appears
that the developing romance between Boaz and
Ruth
will be shattered, Boaz introduces his trump card,
that
is the hidden condition which Naomi has attached to
the
sale.90 The purchaser must marry Ruth! The goel quickly
rejects
the new arrangement and Boaz marries Ruth, compar-
ing
himself with the levir. "His marriage to Ruth is thus
rescued
from sordidness—and Boaz shines in the role of a
noble
benefactor. . . . The whole is a parody of levirate mar-
89. W. Rudolph, op. cit., pp. 59, 60, rejects Vriezen's argument on addi-
tional
grounds. "Aber abgesehen davon, dasz xnq nirgends die
behauptete Be-
deutung
hat, wird dann die ganze Situation unverstandlich ... V. 10 bleibt der
zutreffende
Kommentar zu v. 5."
90. E. Robertson, op. cit., p. 221.
238 Boaz and the Goel
riage,
well-sustained to the end."91 Robertson's approach is
too
drastically literary to commend itself.
David maintains that Boaz arbitrarily
linked marriage to
Ruth
with the redemption of the property, to make certain
of
adequate provision for Ruth. He sees in this arbitrary
imposition
an explanation of why the goel was not asked to
marry
Naomi, who was in the first place the widow of the
dead.
A religious flavor was given to the arbitrarily imposed
condition
of marriage by the attachment of the levirate mo-
tive,
derived from the levirate law of Deuteronomy 25.92
Rowley views Ruth's action in
bypassing the prior goel as
a
serious mistake and an infringement of his rights. After the
analogy
of Tamar (cf. Gen. 38:24), giving oneself to anyone
other
than the nearest goel would be adultery. For this rea-
son, Boaz sent Ruth home early an the morning.
He did not
want
the nearer goel to be able to use Ruth's indiscretion
against
her. In his meeting with the goel, Boaz kept his inter-
est
in Ruth hidden and put the property in the foreground.
"It
was his masterstroke to introduce the question of the
land
into the matter at all. Naomi may well not have thought
of
selling, but Boaz perceived that by bringing in the prop-
erty
he could place the next-of-kin in a real dilemma. And
thus
he manoeuvred him into a renunciation of his rights and
duties,
and then dramatically assumed what the other had
declined."93
We cannot accept David's contention
that the marriage to
91. Ibid., p. 222. P. Humbert,
"Art et lecon de Phistoire de Ruth," R Th Ph,
26,
1938, p. 282, states, "C'est une combinaison inédite dont le conteur use
fort
habilement
pour prépater et justifier la retraite du g'41." L. P. Smith,
"Ruth," IB,
2,
1953, p. 849, writes: "The storyteller, of course, was not interested in
the legal
points:
the unnamed kinsman served merely to prolong the suspense and as a
contrast
to Boaz..." If such were so it is remarkable that the story revolves
around
so
much legal detail.
92. M. David, Huwelijk, pp. 17, 18. It is important in understanding David's
position
to see how he uses the term arbitrary. He writes (p. 17): "Willekeurig in
zooven-e,
dat deze voorwaarde wettelijk niet is voorgeschreven."
93. H. H. Rowley, op. cit., p. 190. C. Goslinga, op. cit., p. 156, "Hij heeft
nog
een pijl op den boog." R. Tamisier, op.
cit., p. 323, comments, "Toute
l'habileté
de Booz consiste à lier irrévocablement les deux points."
Boaz and the
Goel 239
Ruth
was an arbitrary condition attached to the land redemp-
tion
transaction. We are certain of this: the author of the
book
of Ruth did not intend the marriage requirement to be
understood
in this way. For this reason, there is a strong
juridical
stress found throughout the fourth chapter. The
elders
and people constituted a lawfully assembled body
whose
function it was to witness the oral transaction, thus
legalizing
all that took place. The encounter with the goel
takes
place at the gate, the scene where justice was enacted.
Is
it conceivable, under these circumstances, with all of the
emphasis
in chapter four on proper legal procedure, that
Boaz
could have arbitrarily imposed such a condition upon
the
goel? Would not the elders, or the goel himself, have
objected
if there were no other basis for the joint demand
than
a privately imposed condition?94 On the contrary, we
find
them witnessing a transaction in law where the goel
formally
relinquishes his right of redemption (4:7, 8) to
Boaz.
The elders who preside over this transfer even com-
mend
Boaz' conduct, wishing him a fruitful marriage.95 It is
unlikely,
then, that Boaz could have imposed anything upon
the
goel contrary to the interests of justice. This is made
evident
further by the goel's answer, "I cannot redeem it,"
(4:6)
which signifies some form of personal inability rather
94. It is the contention of D. R.
Ap-Thomas, "The Book of Ruth," ExpT,
79,
1968, p. 372, that the stipulation concerning Ruth is "a privately imposed
‘condition
of sale,’ with only a sufficient approximation to tribal custom to
make
it seem morally appropriate in the circumstances." Boaz was executing
Naomi's
wish in this affair. Similarly, G. Smit, op.
cit., p. 32. Does this explana-
tion,
however, do justice to the emphasis on law found in chapter four? Would a
widow,
selling property because of extreme poverty, be in a position to stipulate
such
a condition if no basis in customary law existed for such a condition? For
this
reason, W. Rudolph, op. cit., p. 67,
argues against the idea of a privately
imposed
condition of sale, "Dagegen spricht die kategorische Art der Rede, ganz
abgesehen
von der Frage, ob Noomi berechtigt war, von sich aus solche For-
derungen
zu erheben." C. Goslinga, op. cit.,
p. 156, speaks as well of a condition
of
sale, but adds, "Omdat het bier betreft het land van een geslacht, dat op
uitsterven
staat en omdat een der eigenaressen nog jong genoeg is om uit haar een
zaad
te verwekken, rust op hem een morele verplichting cm haar ten huwelijk te
nemen."
95. For a discussion of the blessing
pronounced upon Boaz and Ruth by the
240 Boaz and the Goel
than
an objection based upon the extraordinary nature of the
new
set of circumstances.
We can accept Rowley's use of the
phrase "masterstroke"
to
describe Boaz' bringing in the property but only in the
sense
that Boaz made a skillful use of the possibilities which
resided
in the customary law. More open to question, how-
ever,
is his statement: "But it seems likely that the property
was
but a counter in the game, and that Boaz skillfully used
it
to secure his end."96 Rather, for Naomi it was indeed very
important
that the land be redeemed. We do not deny that
Boaz
employed what in modern terms would be called a
degree
of psychology in his handling of the goel. This can be
seen
in the mariner in which he first mentioned the property
without
mentioning Ruth. However, no scheme which Boaz
put
forward can be construed in any way as being out of
harmony
with customary law. While Rowley may not intend
to
imply that such was the case, his use of the words. "skill,"
"resource,"
and "masterstroke" to describe the role of Boaz
might
be taken in this way.
Wambacq stresses that in the book of
Ruth one is not
confronted
purely with the question of a levirate marriage,
since
the marriage itself is only a clause in the purchase of a
piece
of property. Therefore, the primary question is not to
reconcile
the idea of levirate marriage found in Ruth with
that
of Deuteronomy. The fundamental question is rather
why
the purchase of the property of a deceased man had, as
an
adjoining clause, the requirement to marry the widow.97
His
answer lies in the legal position of the woman in the
ancient
period presupposed in the book." The one wishing
assembled
elders and people, cf. C. J. Labuschagne, "The Crux in Ruth 4:11,"
ZAW, 79, 1967, pp.
364-367.
96. H. H. Rowley, op. cit., p. 183. He also writes (p.
187): "To beget chil-
dren
by Ruth without marring his estate the kinsman could have considered; to
buy
Naomi's land without taking Ruth he could also have considered. It was the
bringing
of these two things into relation with one another that made both
impossible
for him. And it was here that Boaz's resource became apparent."
97. B. Wambacq, op. cit., p. 454.
98. In our earlier discussion on the
date of the book of Ruth, we called
Boaz and the Goel 241
to
succeed the deceased must acquire the entire property
including
the wife. The wife changes owner along with the
rest
of the possessions.99 One cannot assume, however, from
the
book of Ruth, that every purchase of a deceased's prop-
erty
demanded marriage with the wife).100 The point which
the
story of Ruth demonstrates is that a property acquisition
could have a marriage
clause attached to it where a man left
property
and a childless widow. In such a situation the one
acquiring
the property was obliged to satisfy the demands of
the
levirate. The reason for this was that the woman was part
of
the inheritance which became his property.101 Under such
circumstances,
intervention by the goel did not lead to an
increase
of his own goods, since he did not become the owner
of
the property. The child born of the levirate union came
into
eventual possession of the property. Because of this,
intervention
by the goel was an act motivated by the highest
level
of devotion and was not compulsory.102
attention
to arguments for a late date from legal customs mentioned in the book.
See
chap. 5, "Argument from Social and Legal Customs," (d). B. Wambacq, op. cit.,
pp.
456, 457, claims that the book of Ruth reflects the social conditions of the
Elohist
decalogue. Cf. also, H. Levy-Bruhl, "Le Manage de Booz,"Evidences,
17,
1951,
p. 32: "L'archaisme du levirat du livre de Ruth se manifeste donc en
premier
lieu en ce qu'il touche tous les parents agnatiques, tandis que les frères
seuls
sont cités dans le Deua'ronome.
99. B. Wambacq, op. cit., p. 456: "Celui qui veut succeder au defunt doit
acquérir
la propriété entière, y compris Pepouse. La femme change de proprietaire
avec
le reste de la possession." So also, R. Patai, Family, Love, and the Bible,
1960,
p. 89, and J. Bewer, "Ge'ulläh," p. 146. J. Morgenstern, op. cit., p. 176,
comments,
"To this transaction Ruth was only incidental; she came with the rest
of
the estate." Rather than dating the book early because of this, he places
the
basic
story of Ruth in the next to the last stage in his reconstruction of the
levirate.
100. This he deduces from the fact
that the levirate custom in 1:11 makes
no
mention of a piece of land, nor does-the-story of Tamar. B. Wambacq, op. cit.,
pp.
456, 457.
101. Ibid., p. 457: "Si donc le
cas se présentait qu'un défunt laissait une
possession
et une veuve sans fits, celui qui acquerait la possession, était tenu
satisfaire
aux exigences du lévirat. Ceci, parce que la femme faisant partie de
Pheritage
devenait sa propriété...."
102. Ibid., p. 456, 457. Later (in
the Deuteronomic law) the obligation to
continue
the name exists, but since the wife no longer represents part of the
inheritance,
the levirate can no longer be the clause in a purchase. As evidence for
his
understanding of the development of the levirate from Ruth to Deuteronomy,
242 Boaz and the Goel
Having established to his satisfaction
the reason why the
woman
was included in the property transaction, Wambacq is
prepared
to conclude that the marriage of Ruth and Boaz
may
be described as a levirate marriage in conformity to the
customary
law of the pre-Deuteronomic period. "A cette
époque
reculée, le lévirat pouvait etre une
annexe d'un achat,
parce
qu'alors la femme était regardée comme faisant partie
des
biens du defunt. Qui acquerait la possession, l'acquérait
tout
entiére, cela veut dire la femme comprise, mais dans ce
cas,
avec l'obligation de perpetuer le nom du défunt."103
The explanation that the woman was
regarded in a similar
fashion
to other possessions and therefore as a part of the
property
transaction is not convincing. It is not at all certain
that
the woman was regarded at any stage in
as
a piece of property to be inherited.104 This connection
between
the widow and the property which his explanation
he
cites the contrast between the lack of initiative of the women, Naomi and
Ruth,
with the initiative of the women in Deuteronomy. As a matter of fact, as
we
saw, Ruth and Naomi exercised considerable initiative in approaching Boaz
initially.
In his reconstruction of the levirate development, Wambacq affirms that
the
basic intent of the Deuteronomic law is not to emphasize the levirate duty,
but
to inculcate the halisah ceremony, since the levirate had become obsolete. His
evidence
for this is that the law in Deuteronomy leaves several questions unan-
swered,
such as, Would it be necessary for the widow to address herself to each of
the
brothers in turn? Would she have to perform the halisah at the moment the
first
brother-in-law refused or after all had refused? In case of the latter, would
the
halisah be performed to the first brother or to all of them? When was she free
to
marry another? Wambacq, op. cit., p.
458 n. 2, then concludes: "Si l'attention
du
législateur avait porte en premier lieu sur l'observation de la loi,
n'aurait-il pas
envisagé
toutes ces éventualités? S'il ne l'a pas fait, n'est-ce pas un indice, que
c'est
en premier lieu la haltsit qui l'interessait? La possibilité n'est dons pas
exclue
que
ceux qui ont recueilli les vieilles traditions d'Israel n'ont pas jugé nécessaire
de
conserver
des anciennes traditions concernant le lévirat, devenues désormais
inutiles."
However, it is hardly consistent with any concept of Israelite law to
expect
every eventuality to be codified. The questions specified by Wambacq as
being
left unanswered would hardly lead to his conclusion that the halisah was of
first
interest to the lawgiver, for the unanswered questions revolve around it; and
if
it were being promoted, one would expect the lawgiver to be more specific in
this
area.
103. Ibid., p. 458.
104. H. H. Rowley, op. cit., p. 177, comments, "So far
as the Old Testa-
ment
is concerned the conception of the women as property belonging to the
relatives
nowhere appears." Cf. n. 59.
Boaz and the Goel 243
presupposes
is negated by two passages in the earlier sections
of
the book. Ruth was not under obligation even to return to
the
property by any principle which links her with the prop-
erty.
Moreover, Boaz recognized a certain
freedom of choice
which
Ruth had to marry anyone she wished. This freedom is
a
proper deduction from Boaz' complimentary remark to
Ruth:
"You have made this last kindness greater than the
first,
in that you have not gone after young men, whether
rich
or poor" (3:10). For this reason we cannot agree that
Wambacq
has adequately explained the combination of the
two
factors under discussion. He has rightly seen, however,
that
the combination of the two responsibilities must be
traced
to the procedures of customary law current in
This
opinion has been put forth by a considerable number of
scholars105
and alone does justice to the legal emphasis in the
meeting
between Boaz and the prior goel.
In declaring the combination of duties
to be in accor-
dance
with customary law, we have not finished, for we must
seek
some explanation for this combination. Is there any way
in
which such a combination of duties can be understood in
the
light of the Old Testament data on the levirate duty and
105. C. F. Keil, Joshua, Judges, Ruth, 1887, p. 490: J.
Ridderbos, op. cit.,
p.
58 n. 1; C. Goslinga, op. cit., p.
156; I. Bettan, op. cit., p. 66; A.
Bertholet, op.
cit., p. 66; C.
Lattey, op. cit., p. 25; L. Morris, op. cit., p. 301. W. Rudolph, op.
cit., p. 67, says,
"Was Boas sagt, entspricht sicher dem Recht and dem Herkom-
men.
.. ." D. Mace, op. cit., p. 106,
"There is an authority in the words of Boaz
which
gives them every indication of having the backing of law." M. Burrows,
"Marriage
of Boaz and Ruth," p. 452, "The redeemer's obligation to buy the
property,
to assume the support of the widow, and also, when possible, to raise
up
a son to preserve the name of his dead relative, was a duty imposed by custom
and
public opinion in the interest of the family, in spite of its conflict with the
individual's
own interests." On this double responsibility, H. Gressmann, Ruth,
SAT,
1, 19222, p. 272, writes, "Diese Verhältnisse, die uns
verwickelt erscheinen,
waren
den alten Israeliten so geläufig, dass der Verfasser des Buches Ruth über-
haupt
kein Wort dartiber verliert."
Gesetz
über die Lösung des aus Not verkauften Ackers Lev. 25:23 ff. weiss von
der
hier an den Goël gerichteten Forderung, die überlebende kinderlose Witwe zu
heiaten
urn den Namen des Verstorbenen auf seinem Erbe aufzurichten, nichts:
offenbar
liegt bier eine wohl in der Sitte begriindete Combination mit dem Ge-
danken
der Leviratsehe vor."
244 Boaz and the Goel
property
redemption? One of the most penetrating and satis-
fying
explanations of this combination has been given by
Cruveilhier.
Simply stated, he suggests that the deceased's
name
must be revived in both property and
person. In those
cases
where the childless widow was connected to property
which
was in danger of being lost to the family through
poverty,
the deceased's name was not merely revived through
the
birth of a son but through the redemption of his patri-
mony
as well. In such a set of circumstances, if the goel had
only
married the widow and not redeemed the land, the de-
ceased's
name would not have been revived, for the children
would
not have had any land attaching them to their de-
ceased
father, thereby reviving his name. The two obligations
are
not of an entirely different nature but are closely
related.106
106. P. Cruveilhier, "Le
lévirat chez les Hébreux et chez les Assyriens," RB,
34,
1925, p. 531, writes: "D'après ce texte le go'el avait le double devoir de
racheter
le domaine de son parent défunt et d'épouser sa veuve. Mais it ne faut pas
croire
que ces deux obligations soient de natures absolument hétérogènes. Elles
étaient
au contraire solidaires l'une de I'autre. Booz déclare en effet que le rachat
de
la propriété et le mariage de la veuve sont choses nécessaires pour faire
revivre
le
nom du défunt sur son héritage, IV, 5, 10. Cette déclaration prouve done qu'en
Israël
le nom de famille était plutot attaché à la propriété qu'à la personne. Dans
ce
pays, on ne concevait pas de famille dénuée de patrimoine foncier. Si le go'el
épousait
simplement la veuve de son parent, sans se mettre en peine de racheter
son
patrimoine, c'est en vain qu'iI se serait flatté de faire revivre le nom du
defunt.
Les
enfants issus du nouveau manage n'auraient eu aucune terre les rattachant au
premier
epoux de leur mere et leur permettant de faire revivre son nom. On
concoit
du reste que la perpétuité reve't un caractère d'importance tout autre
quand
elle s'attache simultanément aux personnel et aux propriétés." Cf. also,
H.
Lévy-Bruhl,
op. cit., p. 33, who comments on the
combination of these two
responsibilities:
"C'est que, dans une vente de ce genre, ce n'est pas le point de
vue
économique qui domine, mais bien plut6t le souci de la perpétuation de la
famille,
dont le patrimonie est, en quelque sorte, l'aspect matérial. En achetant la
terre
d'un parent, comme en acceptant sa succession, on acquiert, au moins par-
tiellement,
sa personnalité." H. Ringgren, "lxg," THAT, 1, p. 886, writes,"Nicht
nur
die Mitglieder einer Sippe, sondem auch ihr Besitz bilden eine organische
Einheit,
und jeder Bruch dieser Einheit gilt als unerträglich und muss wieder-
hergestellt
werden." R. Westbrook, "Redemption of Land," ILR, 6, 1971, p. 372,
remarks:
"The levirate therefore works alongside redemption. Just as the right of
redemption
restores to the family property that is lost (or threatens to be lost) by
alienation,
so the duty of the levirate restores a family to the property from
which
it is separated by extinction of the male line." Cf. also G. Knight, Ruth and
Jonah, 19662,
p. 37.
Boaz and the
Goel 245
The book of Ruth, then, shows that the
levirate law of
Deuteronomy
has been extended in both its subjects and
objects.
The obligation of marrying a childless widow con-
cerned
all relatives and operated in order of their degree of
relationship.
This explains the substitution of the goel for
Mby especially when the levirate law
includes property re-
demption.
There is no contradiction between the legislation
in
Deuteronomy and in Ruth; it is merely a question of the
case
portrayed by the latter being more complex. Deuter-
onomy
speaks of a widow without children, but the book of
Ruth
adds to that the situation of a widow about to be
dispossessed
of the land which belonged to her husband. Be-
cause
circumstances would arise where the obligation of
acquiring
the property of the deceased would be combined
with
the duty of raising up children, the number of subjects
needed
to be extended, since in this undertaking, recourse
would
need to be made to successive relatives before one
would
be found willing and able to assume this dual
responsibility.107
The sudden introduction of a land
purchase into a trans-
action
which hitherto had concerned only the widow must
not
be understood principally as some shrewd manoeuvre by
Boaz.
The dual purpose involved in the levirate law—to raise
107. P. Cruveilhier, op. cit., p.
532, gives the following cogent argument: "II
n'y
a pas de contradiction véritable entre la législation qui est formulée, Deut.
XXV
5-10 et
dans
le livre historique est plus complexe que celui sur lequel a statué le code
deutéronomique.
Tandis que ce dernier parle simplement d'une veuve dépourvue
d'enfant,
le livre de Ruth suppose de plus que cette personne est dépossédée du
domaine
ayant appartenu à son mari. Pour susciter une postérité, uniquement, a
un
défunt, personne n'est plus qualifié que son propre frére; c'est pourquoi on
concoit
aisément que la loi, Deut. XXV 5-10, n'ait d'autre sujet que le beau-frère,
iabham, levir. Mais quand a
cette obligation vient se surajouter
un
domaine patrimonial aliéné, it est tout naturel qu'on recourt successivement et
dans
l'ordre de leur proximite aux divers parents pour s'acquitter de ce double
devoir.
Aussi la substitution du go'el au iabham, beau-frére, ne doit pas surprendre
dans
le livre de Ruth." Cf. W. Rudolph, op.
cit., p. 70: "Boas nimmt Ruth zur
Frau
(dass es sich urn eine Tevirats'—Ehe handelt, ist nach dem Bisherigen selbst-
verstandlich;
deshalb ist der term. techn. Mby Gen. 38:8; Dt.
25:5, 7 entbehrlich,
zumal
da Boas nicht Mby ist....)"
246 Boaz and the Goel
up
descendants for the deceased, thereby preventing the
alienation
of the family property108 is that which is fulfilled
by
Boaz when he marries Ruth and redeems the property.109
In the light of these considerations,
the attempt of
Bewer110
to remove the levirate references in Ruth 4:5, 10
must
be judged as unnecessary and his arguments invalid.
According
to Bewer, a combination of geullah and the levir-
ate
must be assumed in the most ancient stage of these insti-
tutions.
When the goel, who was the heir, received the inheri-
tance,
part of which was the widow, the goel performed the
levirate.
However, in Ruth, the goel has as well to buy
the
field.
The thought that, in addition, the goel should be asked
to
take upon himself the levirate duty is impossible)" Yet it
is
not possible to say that the writer does not understand the
levirate.
He obviously does not conceive of a levirate marriage
taking
place, because when Boaz marries Ruth he builds up
his
own house, rather than that of the dead, which is the
essential
purpose of the levirate.112 Naomi makes no mention
of
Boaz being obliged to the levirate because he is the goel:
her
concern is only for Ruth and for her secure and prosper
108. Cf. chap. 2, "The Purpose
of the Law."
109. Many scholars give no
explanation of the combination of responsibil-
ities,
but simply state it to be in accordance with customary law. A. Jepsen, op.
cit., p. 421,
states that when the goel exercised his right to redeem the property,
at
the same time he took over a duty to care for the family to whom the property
originally
belonged. Th. and D. Thompson, "Some Legal Problems in the Book of
Ruth,"
VT, 18, 1968, p. 98, say, "Ruth
is dependent on the estate as a daughter-
in-law
in the undivided house of Elimelech and has a claim on the estate for a
potential
heir." E. Neufeld, AHML, p. 40
and
Jewish
Law," Studies in Jewish Literature
in honor of Kaufman Kohler, 1913,
p.
215, see the combination as additional evidence for the primary purpose of the
levirate,
which is to take care of the widow. I. Mattuck, op. cit., p. 215, writes:
"The
redemption of the estate involves the duty of marrying the widow. It shows
how
completely the two were united. This identification of the woman with the
estate
of her husband assured her rights, which she would not otherwise have
possessed,
above all, the right to look for support, in the event of the husband's
death,
to the heir."
110. J. Bewer, "Ge'ullah,"
pp. 143-148; Idem, "The Goel in Ruth 4:14,
15,"
AJSL, 21, 1904, p. 206; Idem,
"Die Leviratsehe im Buch Ruth," ThStKr,
76,
1903, p. 331.
111. J. Bewer, "Ge'ullah,"
p. 146.
112. J. Bewer, "Die Leviratsehe
im Buch Ruth," p. 311.
Boaz and the Goel 247
ous
future; not that her son's name might be raised up in
concept
is not original to the book.113 The levirate insertions
were
made by the rigorist party at the time of Ezra and
Nehemiah.
The liberal party was able to cite the case of a
foreign
marriage between Boaz and Ruth as an argument in
its
favour, but once the levirate interpolations were added
their
weapon was removed because now the reply could be
made
that Boaz could not avoid marrying Ruth, since he was
bound
by the ancient levirate law.114
However, allusions to the levirate are
not found merely in
chapter
four. There is every reason to believe that Naomi's
reference
to "the dead" in 2:20 is an allusion to the levirate
custom.115 Boaz' words in 3:10 point convincingly
in the
same
direction. Boaz contrasts Ruth's previous hesed with
her
latter hesed. The former hesed must be her loyalty to the
family,
of her husband in accompanying Naomi back to
The
latter hesed must be the devotion to her husband and
family
in offering herself to Boaz for a union of the levirate
type.116
Moreover, in 3:13 where Boaz states that the willing-
ness
of the goel to redeem Ruth must be tested, he uses the
verb
CpHy which
is the vocabulary of the levirate law (Deut.
25:7).
The mention of Tamar in the marriage benediction in
4:12
demonstrates that the levirate idea is not found exclu-
sively
in 4:5, 10. In 4:14-17, we see that the birth of the
child,
Obed, has great significance for Naomi. For this reason,
Bewer's
idea that Naomi was only concerned for Ruth's wel-
fare
and not for the raising up of the family name through a
son
cannot be accepted. Finally, if the reference to the levir-
ate
is removed, is there an adequate explanation for the goel's
refusal?
Because the child born to the widow will be reck-
oned
as belonging to the family of Elimelech (the levirate
113. J. Bewer,
"Ge'ulläh," p. 147.
114. J. Bewer, "The Goel in
Ruth 4:14, 15," pp. 215, 216.
115. Cf. chap. 7 n. 8.
116. M. Burrows, "Marriage of
Boaz and Ruth," p. 450; E. Würthwein, op.
cit., p. 18.
248 Boaz and the Goel
situation)
he will in due time obtain the property which the
goel
is being asked to purchase. On this basis the goel changes
his
mind. If we remove the levirate situation, how can his
change
of mind be explained?
There is no reason to deny then that
one of the responsi-
bilities
which fell to the goel was that of marrying the child-
less
widow in a levirate-type responsibility).117 Such a respon-
sibility
is not to be conceived of legalistically. The fact that
the
goel in Ruth was not the brother of the deceased as
prescribed
by the Deuteronomic law is not a serious objec-
tion,
since the law in Deuteronomy does not prescribe the
exclusive
conditions under which the levirate is performed.118
The
application of the law in Ruth and Genesis 38 must be
allowed
at least equal weight, if not more, than the Deuter-
onomic
law, in any understanding of this institution. There is
nothing
at all incongruous in the goel assuming this marriage
responsibility
in the light of the other duties which we know
he
performed. The motivation for the activities of the goel is
the
family bond.119 This responsibility to the kin group dis-
played
itself in redeeming property (Lev. 25:25, 26), emanci-
pating
the family member who had been forced to sell him-
self
into bondage (Lev. 25:47-49), avenging the death of a
member
of the family unit (Num. 35), and receiving, as
trustee,
payment due in cases of restitution (Num. 5:8).
These
are the duties prescribed in the legal sections of the
117. According to D. R. G. Beattie, Studies in Jewish Exegesis of the Book
of Ruth from the
Ancient Versions to the Mediaeval Commentaries, unpublished
PhD
dissertation,
exegesis
was divided in its understanding of the marriage of Boaz and Ruth. Rashi
believed
that marriage to Ruth was an arbitrary condition connected to the
redemption
of the field. Salmon ben Yeroham saw it as a straight case of levirate
Marriage
since he believed that the word "brother" in Deut. 25:5 referred not
to
blood
brother but to a more distant relative. David Qimhi did not regard the
marriage
as a levirate marriage in terms of the law of Deuteronomy but it repre-
sented
a similar custom, by which if a man died leaving a childless widow and
there
was no brother then the obligation to marry the widow fell on his next-of-
kin.
118. Cf. chap. 2, "The Persons
Involved."
119. See the remark of J. J. Stamm
in Introduction, n. 2.
Boaz and the
Goel 249
Old
Testament.120 The story of Ruth is the story of hesed
motivating
beyond the letter of the law.121 The activities of
the
goel were not confined merely to those prescribed by the
law,
but the specific laws were pointers or guides showing in
concrete
fashion how hesed might operate within the family.
Schoneveld
has admirably given us the Old Testament picture
of
the goel in relation to his duties or responsibilities when he
states:
"Hoe vermogender een losser was, des te meer kon hij
doen
en hoe meer chesed hij had, des te
meer wilde hij
oen."122
The story of Ruth is therefore the story of the true
goel,123
for it gives us a picture of hesed at work, capturing
the
spirit of the levirate law and operating in a manner consis-
tent
with the other activities of the goel on behalf of family
members.124
The Refusal of the Goel
and
the Ceremony of the Shoe, Ruth
4:6-8
When the goel learned that Ruth was to
be acquired with
the
property, he was no longer disposed to act favorably on
120. Cf. chap. 4.
121. J. Carlebach, "Einleitung
in das Buch Ruth," Jüdische Studien
Jozef
Wohlgemut zu
seinem 60 Geburtstag,
1928, p. 7, writes: "Wollte jemand aus dem
Buch
Ruth Gesetze der Reinheit und Unreinheit, des Erlaubten und Verbotenen
ablesen,
so würde er völlig fehlgehen. Er würde etwa die Geltung einer Jibbumver-
pflichtung
für Falk feststellen, in denen eine solche durchaus nicht mehr vorliegt,
oder
er würde die Einrichtung des Goël missverstehen und glauben, dass jeder
Goël
gleichzeitig eine Heiratspflicht mit in den Kauf zu nehmen hätte. Alles
dies
hat
aber im Buch Ruth nicht gesetzlichen Charakter, sondem lediglich den freier
Liebestätigkeit,
der reinen Dankbarkeit, der tiefen Menschlichkeit. Das Gesetz ist
nur
der Lehrmeister, der Richtungsweiser, der feinfühlig für die Not des Lebens
macht
und deshalb Massnahmen lehrt, die aus Chesed, der letzten Gottes- und
Menschenliebe
heraus ihre Rechtfertigung erfahren."
122. J. Schoneveld, op. cit., p. 12. On the use of hesed in
Ruth, cf. chap. 7,
n
7.
123. Ibid. G. Cooke, op. cit., pp. 14, 15, comments, "It
was in fact a work
of
charity, going beyond the strict letter of the law but sanctioned by ancient
usage,
and thoroughly in keeping with the generous, kindly disposition of Boaz."
Cf.
also C. Goslinga, op. cit., p. 167.
124. E. Neufeld, AHML, p. 39, comments, "It is
natural and logical, there-
fore,
to find the levirate duty as one of the Go 'el's responsibilities." The
view of
H.
Brongers, op. cit., p. 4, is, on the surface, similar to what we have
put forth,
when
he comments on 3:13: "De go’el
moet bier doen wat des leviers is.
Dat
250 Boaz and the God
behalf
of the family of Elimelech, because the resulting situa-
tion
offered no benefits to him which would offset that
which
he would expend. To act as goel under these circum-
stances
was a service of great devotion, for great obligations
were
assumed with no corresponding benefits.125 He replied,
"I
cannot redeem it126 for myself, lest I impair my own
inheritance."
No disgrace attached itself to one who declined
to
perform this noble act. A procedure was followed by
which
the goel transferred his right of redemption. Such a
ceremony
involved the removal of a shoe and reminds us of
that
which took place in the levirate law of Deuteronomy
95.127
Speiser, calling upon parallels from
Nuzi, says that the
shoe
is a token payment by which an otherwise illegal trans-
action
becomes legally valid. Boaz' legal right to Ruth must
be
purchased from the goel (4:8). The shoe is the symbolic
expression
of the purchase price which validates the new ar-
rangement.128
One notes, however, that Ruth is not being
purchased,
and that the property does not belong to the goel.
Moreover,
if the shoe constitutes a symbolic payment, we
houdt
in zowel een uitbreiding van het lossings -als van het leviraatsbegrip. In de
eerste
plaats wordt hier onder lossing ook het leviraat begrepen en in de tweede
plaats
wordt de leviraatsverplichting uitgebreid tot een familielid in ver ver-
wijderde
graad." On the position of Brongers, cf. chap. 5, nn. 93-96.
125. Other ideas have been suggested
for the goel's refusal. F. Buhl, "Some
Observations
on the Social Institutions of the Israelites," AJT, 1, 1897, p. 736,
argues
that the goel would have had possession of the field until the son born had
come
of age. Such a situation could hardly be called an impairment of his own
possessions.
"The answer of the relative is only a courteous circumlocution for
the
thought that he did not wish to marry Ruth. Such considerate indirection at
any
rate would be genuinely oriental." P. Cassel, Joshua, Judges, Ruth, 4, A
Commentary
on the Holy Scriptures, ed. J. P. Lange, 1872, p. 47, cites Ruth's
Moabite
ancestry as the underlying cause of the goel's change, for he feared a fate
similar
to that which had resulted from Ruth's first marriage. The Targum has the
goel
commenting, "For I have a wife, and I am not able to take another in
addition
to her, lest there be contention in my house"; cf. A. Saarisalo, op. cit.,
p.
101.
126. H. J. Boecker, op. cit., p. 160, calls the goel's
statements, "eine Bereit-
schaftserklarung
bzw, eine Verzichterklarung aus dem Löserccht."
127. Cf. our discussions on the shoe
ceremony in Deuteronomy, chap. 2,
"The
Ceremony of Refusal."
128. E. Speiser, "Of Shoes and
Shekels," BASOR, 77, 1940, p.
18.
Boaz and the Goel 251
should
expect Boaz to give it to the goel and not the other
way
around.129 Thus we feel Speiser's argument must be re-
jected.
Lacheman also draws upon parallels
from Nuzi to explain
the
significance of this ceremony in Ruth. He sees the shoe
functioning
in a way which makes real estate transfers more
valid.
In Nuzi, a man lifts up his foot from his property and
places
the foot of the other man on the property. The bibli-
cal
tradition goes a step further. There the lifting up of the
foot
has developed into the pulling off of the shoe.130
Lacheman's explanation has more to
commend itself than
Speiser's,
particularly if we see the shoe as symbolizing the
right
or power over the property. It is not that the shoe
symbolizes
the transfer of the property, as some have sug-
gested,
since the goel did not have the ownership of the
property
at the time of the ceremony. It still resided in
Naomi's
hands.131 What the god was relinquishing was his
prior
right to act in a certain situation.132 This usage is in
accordance
with that of a significant number of other pas-
sages
where the shoe represents power or authority.133
129. Th. and D. Thompson, op. cit., p. 91, dispute Speiser's
interpretation
of
the evidence from Nuzi saying, "The shoes in these texts ought to be
inter-
preted
as no more than shoes."
130. E. Lacheman, "Note on Ruth
4:7-8," JBL, 56, 1937, p. 56.
131. G. Cooke, op. cit., p. 15, remarks, "When property was transferred, as
in
the present case, to take off the sandal and hand it to the person in whose
favour
the transfer is made, gave a symbolic attestation to the act and invested it
with
legal validity." In the same sense, D. Jacobson, op. cit., p. 298. W. Rudolph,
op. cit., p. 68, speaks
of the transfer of shoe as symbolizing the transfer of a
Possession
or a right.
132. L. P. Smith, op. cit., p. 849; H. H. Rowley, op. cit., p. 182; R.
de
Vaux, op. cit., p. 22; L. Epstein, Marriage Laws in the Bible and the Talmud,
1942,
p. 114.
133. Cf. C. Smit, op. cit., p. 33, for an extensive list
of passages. He com-
ments,
"Zoo is de schoen teeken van macht en het is to begrijpen, dat bij rechts-
handeling
de overdracht van den schoen het bewijs is geworden, dat men afstand
van
zijne macht, van zijn recht doet." According to J. Mittelmann, op. cit., p. 22,
the
transfer of the shoe was a "Publizitatsmittel bei
Rechtstibertragungen." Simi-
larly,
E. Neufeld, AHML, p. 42.
252 Boaz and the Goel
In 4:7, we have a statement explaining
a custom134 of
former
times: "Now this was the custom in former times
concerning
redeeming and exchanging" (4:7a). This latter
term
(hrvmth)
is found elsewhere only in Leviticus 27:10,
33,
and in Job 15:31; 20:18; 28:17. The law in Leviticus 27
governs
the substitution and exchange of animals vowed for
sacrifice.
In Job, the word is used for exchanges of various
kinds.
In Ruth, it is clearly connected with the exchange135
whereby
Boaz receives the goel's redemption rights and re-
sponsibilities.
"To confirm a transaction,136
the one drew off his sandal
and
gave it to the other, and this was the manner of attesting
(hdvfth )137
in
monies
are presented in the latter part of 4:7.138 The first is
the
practice of confirming by the ceremonial shoe procedure,
which
"signified the effective accomplishment or conclusion
of
the legal step."139 Attesting refers to something other than
the
ceremony of the shoe, probably to the validation of the
shoe
ceremony by the witnesses who testify that the transac-
tion,
including the final act of transfer, has indeed taken
place.140
134. The word "custom" or
"practice," though not found in MT, must be
understood.
135. In the light of the usage in
other Old Testament passages the word
"exchange"
is to be preferred over McKane's use of the work "bargain." Cf. W.
McKane,
"Ruth and Boaz," p. 32.
136. The phrase rbd
Myql
occurs in Ezek. 13:6 and is used of the false
prophets
who speak without being sent and then expect the Lord to fulfill or
confirm
their word.
137. Found elsewhere only in Isa.
8:16, 20, where reference is made to
written
attestation. KB takes the customary view that in Ruth 4:7 hdvfth has
reference
to the gesture made with the shoe.
138. G. Tucker, "Witnesses and
Dates," p. 44.
139. Ibid. G. Tucker notes the use
of the verb nip in Old Testament exam-
ples
of ownership transference in Gen. 23:17, 20 and Lev. 25:30; 27:19.
140. Ibid. Cf. A. Bertholet, op. cit., p. 67, "hdvfth ist die
Bezeugnung
and
nicht die Sitte." According to G. Tucker, "Witnesses and Dates,"
p. 44,
"Written
documents with witnesses in later times, then, did not replace the shoe
removal
ceremony, but the solemn oral contract itself, with witnesses secured by
the
proper and legally binding formulae." Z. Falk, op. cit., p. 98, suggests that the
people
present served the transferee by witnessing the transfer, but "the whole
act
Boaz and the Goel 253
There are significant differences
between the shoe cere-
mony
in Ruth and the procedure described in the halisah in
"Deuteronomy
25 which make it very improbable that the
two
were in any sense identical.141 Rudolph even claims they
have
nothing to do with each other,142 but this may go too
far.
The differences, however, in the two transactions are
noticeable.
In Deuteronomy, the woman brings the levir to
justice,
forcing him to appear before the elders since he has
acted
improperly toward her deceased husband.143 In Ruth,
neither
Naomi or Ruth appear to be present during the cere-
mony
of the shoe performed in the presence of the elders.
Deuteronomy
presupposes a degree of shame and insult con-
nected
with the levir's refusal which is not at all apparent in
Ruth.144
In Deuteronomy, the woman as the final step, pulls
off
the shoe (vlfn hclHv) whereas in Ruth, it is the goel
who
draws off his sandal (vlfn Jlwyv).145
The ceremony of
the
shoe in Ruth was performed in a situation where a man
was
transferring a right to another; in Deuteronomy it was
performed
where a man refused to accept his obligation
under
family law.
was
again called 'a testimony,' meaning the formal gesture preceding the docu-
ments
of transfer." '
141. M. David, "The Date of the
Book of Ruth," OTS, 1, 1941-42,
p. 59
16.
However, D. Mace, op. cit., p. 99,
calls it "a form of the ceremony in
Deuteronomy
25:9 which omits the element of disgrace."
142. W. Rudolph, op. cit., p. 68. 0.
Eissfeldt, The Old Testament: An Intro-
duction, 1965, p. 483,
says the practices are similar though by no means identical.
143. Cf. chap. 2, "The Ceremony
of Refusal."
144. Th. and D. Thompson, op. cit., p. 81 n. 1, argue that the
levirate in
Ruth
may be just as obligatory as that of Deuteronomy. "Quite clearly the go'el
cannot
buy the property unless he marries Ruth, which is, as we shall see, the
binding
force we find in Deuteronomy. Secondly, the fact that Boaz, before the
go'el refused, had
already offered to take upon himself the responsibility, may
well
be in itself sufficient to explain the apparent lack of obligation."
145. To these words, "and he
drew off his sandal" the LXX adds: kai>
e@dwken au]t&?.
9
Obed
Naomi's Goel, Ruth 4:14
THE closing scene in the book of Ruth
begins by
focusing
our attention upon Naomi. The women
who
met Naomi upon her sad arrival from the land
of
stances,
sharing with her the blessing of the birth of the child,
Obed.
They praise the Lord, whose hand has guided all of
these
very human proceedings. "Blessed be the Lord, who has
not
left you this day without next of kin [goel] ; and may his
name
be renowned in
life
and a nourisher of your old age; for your daughter-in-law,
who
loves you, who is more to you than seven sons, has
borne
him" (4:14, 15).1
There are two main positions regarding the identification
of
the goel in 4:14. One is that the goel refers to the new-
born
child, Obed. This seems to be the more obvious meaning
of
the text. The second possibility is to see Boaz as goel since
he
has been featured in this role throughout the book. The
latter
position has been defended by several scholars.2 Bettan
comments,
"The reference is to Boaz, who fulfilled the obli-
gation
of a near kinsman; and this very day, having secured
an
heir for Mahlon, has given full effect to his office."3
1. The Hebrew text of 4:14 which
will engage our attention is: hvhy jvrb
lxrWyb
vmw xrqyv Mvyh lxg jl tybwh xl rwx
2. G. Cooke, Judges and Ruth, 1918, p. 17;
in
The Five Scrolls, 1950, p. 71; A. S.
Herbert, "Ruth," PCB, 1962,
p. 317; A.
Hervey,
Ruth, The Holy Bible, 2, 1900, p.
239; J. Bewer, "The Goël in 4:14, 15,"
AJSL,
20, 1903-1904; L. P. Smith, "Ruth," IB, 2, 1953, p. 850.
3.
255
256 Obed
Herbert
affirms that one should place the full stop after the
next-of-kin
and begin the new sentence: "May his name (the
child's)
be famous in
change
of person from the goel (Boaz) in the first part of the
sentence
to the child, Obed, in the second part but Smith
answers
this by saying, "the change of reference is preferred
Hebrew
style. "5
Bewer has marshalled several arguments
against the idea
that
the goel is the child, Obed. In addition to noting the
prominence
of Boaz as goel in the whole previous narrative,
he
suggests that " 'the day,' to which the whole story moves
from
the beginning, is the day when the fortune of Ruth is
made,
that is the day when Yahweh has not left Naomi
without
a Goel. . . . But the whole story bears witness that
Naomi
had not been planning how to raise seed for her son,
Mahlon,
but how to secure Ruth's fortune, and this was se-
cured
on the day when Boaz married her."6 He further ob-
jects
that if there is o levirate marriage in Ruth (which he
holds
adamantly), then one cannot accept the common inter-
pretation
that Obed can be called goel because he is the son
of
the dead who continues the name of the dead. His solution
to
this is a drastic rearrangement of the passage 4:13-17. He
places
4:14, 15a first, followed by 13 and 17a (which is now
addressed
to Naomi: vl
and Mw
being omitted), and then
15b,
16, 17b. The advantage of this reconstruction, he feels,
is
that it provides a balanced climax to the final scene with
the
elders and people witnessing the transaction (4:9, 10),
followed
by the elders offering congratulations to Boaz at the
gate
(4:11, 12); this in turn being followed by the women
coming
to Naomi to rejoice with her in Yahweh's kindness in
giving
her a goel in Boaz.7 However, we must reject Bewer's
4. A. S. Herbert, op. cit., p. 317. Herbert's translation
does not do justice to
Mvyh, which word he neglects to mention.
5. L. P. Smith, op. cit., p. 850.
6. J. Bewer, "The Goël in Ruth
4:14," p. 203.
7. Ibid., pp. 203, 204. His
rearrangement would read: "And the women said
unto
Naomi, Blessed be Jehovah, who hath not left thee this day without a Goël;
Obed 257
argument
since the levirate idea is found in too many places
to
remove it from the book8 and Bewer's rearrangement
seems
to be almost entirely the result of his rejection of the
levirate
in Ruth.
Earlier we mentioned the two main
options for under-
standing
who the goel is in 4:14, 15: either Boaz who appears
as
such throughout the book, or Obed. Before looking at the
latter
position we must note that a third possibility has been
mentioned:
to interpret the goel as Yahweh. This is suggested
by
Caspari: "tybwh könnte hier aber einmal mit
Dativ (Jer.
48,
35) stehen, und lxg auf das Subjekt, Jahve, bezogen
werden:
er liess dich nicht umkommen, heute lösend, scil.
dich;
das Fehlen tines Objekts von lxg ist angesichts
der
Mittelstellung
von jl
zwischen beiden Verben zu ertragen;
ein
Dativ jl hinter
lxg
wäre sogar (vgl. v. 6) irreführend.
Daher
ist es vielleicht vorzuziehen, dass die Frauen Jahve den
Löser
nennen."9 This is a very awkward rendering and leaves
4:14b,
where the reference cannot be to Yahweh, entirely
disconnected.10
It is preferable to see Obed as the
goel, for in so doing we
do
justice to Mvyh, which refers to the birth of the child
just
mentioned
in 4:13. It allows us to take Inv (his name) as the
(and)
let his name be famous in
and
a nourisher of thine old age. And Boaz took Ruth and she became his wife;
and
he went in unto her, and Jehovah gave her conception and she bare a son.
And
the women, her neighbors shouted saying. There is a son born to Naomi! For
thy
daughter-in-law, who loveth thee, who is better to thee than seven sons, hath
borne
him. And Naomi took the child and laid it in her bosom and became nurse
unto
it. And they (the women) called his name Obed: he is the father of Jesse, the
father
of David."
8. Cf. chap. 8, "The Double
Responsibility," and nn. 110-114, for our dis-
cussion
of Bewer's position and our reasons for rejecting it.
9. W. Caspari, "Erbtochter und
Ersatzehe in Ruth 4," NKZ, 19,
1908,
p.
127. This interpretation is also defended by H. Hajek, Heimkehr nach
BStN, 33, 1962, pp.
85 and 86, who translates the verse, "Gesegnet seist du dem
Herrn,
der als (dein) Er-Löser es nicht mit dir hat zu Ende gehen lassen
heutigen-
tags,"
and comments, "Wenn Jahwe selber der `Goel' ist, dann kommt in der Tat
von
ihm ‘Erquickung’ (v. 15)."
10. W. Rudolph, Das Buch Ruth, Das Hohe Lied, Die Klagelieder, KAT, 17,
1962,
p. 69 n. 14.
258 Obed
goel's,
which is the most normal and immediate antecedent.
It
is also most natural to relate the goel to the phrase "who
hath
born him" in verse 15. The
question then becomes, In
what
sense may Obed be referred to as goel? Some see Obed
as
the heir who returns the property to the family. Gressmann
comments,
"Yahve schenkt dem jungen Paar einen Erben, der
als
Sohn der Verstorbenen . . . gilt. Jetzt ist die Familie
Naemis
wirklich ‘gelöst, da ihr Name nicht ausstirbt. . . ."11
Epstein
presents a similar sentiment when he writes, "In a
sense,
the child is the ultimate go'el of
the estate, for he takes
it
out of the hands of the kinsman and sets it up in possession
of
one bearing the original family name."12 The continuance
of
the family name by the child is seen in the latter part of
the
verse (vmw xrqyv) by some scholars. Thus, Vincent
translates,
"Béni soit Yahvé qui a fait aujourd'hui qu'un
proche
parent ne manquat pas au défunt pour perpétuer son
nom
en Israël."13 This translation involves the substitution of
tmv for jl, in which case vmw (his name)
refers to Elime-
lech's
name. However, it is preferable to maintain MT and
following
RSV and NV, to translate 4:14b, "May his name be
famous
in
11. H. Gressmann, Ruth, SAT, 1, 19222, p. 275. The same
view is defended
by
A. Bertholet, Ruth, KHC, 17, 1898, p.
68; M. Haller, "Ruth," in Die
Fünf
Megilloth, HAT, 18, 1940,
p. 19; H. Gunkel, "Ruth," in Reden
und Aufsätze,
1913,
p. 83; W. Nowack, Richter, Ruth und
Bucher Samuelis, HK, 1902, p. 199;
J.
Gray, Joshua, Judges, Ruth, CB, 1967,
p. 423.
12. L. Epstein, Marriage Laws in the Bible and the Talmud, 1942, p. 87.
Similarly,
Th. and D. Thompson, "Some Legal Problems in the Book of Ruth,"
VT, 18, 1968, p.
99.
13. A. Vincent, Le Livre de Ruth, 19582, p. 164. P. Joüon, Ruth, 19532,
p.
93, writes, "Je lirais donc tml, qui n'est pas
graphiquement très éloigné, et
dont
l'altération en jl a pu se produire facilement chez un
scribe emporte par la
pensee
de Noémi à laquelle s'adressent les femmes." So also, J. de Fraine,
Rechters • Ruth, BOT, 3, 1955,
pp. 159, 160.
discussion,
"May the dead man's name be kept alive in
tory
since vmw
goes back to the goel Obed. Another translation which differs from
the
usual is that of J. Fischer, Rut, Echter Bibel, 1952, p. 14, who follows the
LXX
(kai> kale<sai to> o@noma sou) and renders,
"der dir heute einen Löser nicht
versagt
hat, so dass dein Name genannt wird
in
Obed 259
thing
for Obed as the men have previously prayed for Boaz
(v.
14).14
The description in 4:15 of what the
goel will do for
Naomi
gives us the clearest indication of how the child may
be
referred to as goel. "He shall be to you a restorer of life,
and
a nourisher of your old age." We can say that in a very
general
way the child is viewed as the protector of the
widow,
Naomi.15 The word "goel" is probably not employed
here
in a technical sense.16 Such usage demonstrates that the
words
"goel" and "gaal" are sometimes employed with a
more
general meaning. As Schoneveld remarks, "Hoeveel
‘ruimte’
er zitten
ook
uit het slot van het boek Ruth. De vrouwen van Bethle-
hem
prijzen Jahve, omdat Hij Naomi een losser niet onthou-
den
heeft. Deze losser is het kind, dat aan Ruth geboren
is.
. .. Naomi
haar
opkomen zal en haar niet aan haar lot zal overlaten, als
zij
hulp nodig heeft."17
14. On the blessing pronounced upon
Boaz by the elders and in particular
4:
1 lb, cf. C. Labuschagne, "The Crux in Ruth 4:11," ZAW, 79, 1967, p. 366. He
proposes
the translation, "engender procreative power in Ephrathah and so act as
Name-giver
in
only
be that Boaz was not so young any more, and, because of his age, stood in
need
of a wish of this kind."
15. G. Smit, Ruth, Ester en Klaagliederen, TU, 1930, p. 35. He also speaks
of
Obed, the goel, as "de rechtsverdediger van Noomi," ibid. J.
Mittelmann, Der
altisraelitsche
Levirat,
1934, pp. 26, 27, writes, "Die GO'él-Ehe soil also nicht nur
für
die verstorbenen Manner Elimelech und Machlon zur Bewahrung ihrer Namen
vor
der Vergessenheit einen mannlichen Nachkommen schaffen, sondern auch den
auf
dieser Erde lebenden Frauen Noomi and Ruth zur Versorgung dienen." C.
Goslinga,
Het Boek Ruth, KV, 19522, p. 161,
believes that the "woord hier den
ruimen
zin heeft van bevrijder en helper."
16. Th. C. Vriezen, "Two Old
Cruces," OTS, 5, 1948, p. 86 n.
4. Cf. W.
Rudolph,
op. cit., p. 70, "Da lxeGo
14a
durch v. 15 erläutert wird, liegt auf der
Hand,
dass hier nicht der streng rechtliche Begriff des ‘Lösers', sondern die
allge-
meinere
Bedeutung `Beschittzer' vorliegt..." H. Lamparter, Das Buch der Sehn-
sucht, BAT, 16, 1962,
p. 54, writes: "Das Wort ist hier nicht in dem speziellen
Sinn
gebraucht, den es im israelitischen Familienrecht besass. Löser ist der
Knabe
insofern,
als Naemi an ihm einen Trost und Versorger in den Tagen ihres Alters
haben
wird."
17. J. Schoneveld, De Betekenis van de Lossing in het Boek Ruth,
1956,
p.
12.
260 Obed
Naomi's Son, Ruth 4:16,
17
The narrator of the book continues to
emphasize the
contrast
between Naomi's present happiness and her previous
emptiness.
The difference has been made by Ruth's marriage
to
Boaz and the birth of their son, Obed. "Then Naomi took
the
child and laid him in her bosom, and became his nurse"
(4:16).
This shows Naomi in a tender and human fashion as
the
affectionate grandmother with her special child.18 There
is
a question, however, whether there is something beyond
this
which is being conveyed by Naomi's loving handling of
the
child. This question has been answered positively by sev-
eral
scholars. One of the exponents of the idea that we have
in
4:16 a case of adoption was Bertholet who commented,
"Was
Naemi thut, bedeutet eine Art mütterlicher Adoption
(vgl.
Hi. 3:21; Gen. 30:3)."19 This was further argued by
Köhler,
who cited certain parallels20 and also suggested that
the
words of the women in 4:17a, "a son has been born to
Naomi,"
confirmed his view.21 Dijkema affirmed that the act
of
Naomi clearly pointed to an adoption22
which had as its
purpose
to guarantee the pure Israelite origin of David.23
18. H. Gunkel, op. cit., p. 84, speaks of the "zartliches Bild"
presented in
4:16,
17.
19. A. Bertholet, op. cit., p. 68.
20. L. Kohler, "Die
Adoptionsform von Rt. 4:16," ZAW,
29, 1909,
pp.
312-314. Cf. also T. Gaster, Myth,
Legend, and Custom in the Old Testament,
1969,
pp. 448, 449. The parallels cited by Köhler are too remote to be
considered
decisive.
Cf. W. Rudolph, op. cit., p. 71.
21. L Kohler, "Ruth," SThZ, 37, 1920, p. 12. He rejects
Gunkel's concept
of
the incident and remarks, "Nicht urn ein zärtliches Bild, sondem urn
einen
Rechtsritus
handelt es sich. . . ."
22. F. Dijkema, "Ruth
4:17-22," NThT, 24, 1935, p.
115. Similarly H.
Gressman, op. cit., p. 275, comments, "Naemi
legt das Kind an den Busen, zwei-
fellos
um es zu adoptieren, and wartet es gem, wie Grossmütter zu tun pflegen."
23. F. Dijkema, op. cit., p. 115. "Want door de adoptie wordt de zoon van het
Ruth
en Boaz ten voile Noomi's zoon eo ipso zoon van Noomi en Elimélech. Dat
wil
het slot 4:14-17a duidelijk aantoonen: Ruth en Boaz worden geelimineerd en
Noomi
blijft met haar geadopteerden zoon alleen over. En nu wil m.i. de inter-
polatie
van vs. 17b niets anders aantoonen dan dit: David stamt dus of van
echt-Israëlietische
Bethlehemsche echtpaar: Elimélech en Noomi. Zijn echt-
Israëlitische
afkomst is hiermee gewaarborgd." Similarly G. Gerleman, Ruth Das
Obed 261
Jepsen saw this adoption as an
argument for excluding
the
idea of a levirate marriage between Boaz and Ruth. "Die
Adoption
aber wäre unnötig, wenn Obed schon als Sohn des
Machlon
und damit Enkel der Naemi gegolten hätte, so dass
auch
von hier aus die Annahme einer Leviratsehe unmöglich
erscheint."24
Furthermore, if the child were considered as the
son
of Boaz, a presumption which might appear to be valid
from
the genealogy in 4:18-22, then Naomi would need to
adopt
the child in order to provide a legal heir for Mahlon
and/or
Elimelech.
Würthwein explained the adoption as
resulting from
Ruth's
substitution for Naomi. Naomi had, as legal advisor
for
her sons, the right of disposal for the family property.
"Wenn
Ruth an ihrer Stelle als diejenige, von der Nachkom-
menschaft
zu erwarten war, die Ehe mit Boas eingegangen
war,
so war doch Naemi die Rechtspartnerin beim Erwerb des
Grundstückes
durch Boas geblieben (4:9). So ist es wohl ver-
ständlich,
dass Naemi durch die Adoption das Kind förmlich
in
die Familie aufnimmt und zum Erben des Besitzes seines
fiktiven
Grossvaters Elimelech und seines fiktiven Vaters
Machlon
macht."25
It is questionable whether this
gesture of Naomi's really
signifies
that she is adopting the child.26 David remarks, "Wij
Hohelied, BK, 18, 1965,
p. 37, writes: "Dem Erzahler ist es nicht genug, Ruth in
die
judäische Volksgemeinschaft einzuverleiben. Er gibt rich noch dazu Mühe,
durch
eine besondere Adoptionshandlung dem Neugeborenen eine echtjudäische
Mutter
zu geben." If this is so clearly an adoption for the purpose of declaring
that
David is not the son of Boaz and Ruth but is the son of Naomi and Elimelech
it
is completely overlooked by the final genealogy. F. Dijkema, op. cit., p. 118,
affirms
that "een latere bewerker heeft gedachteloos en kritiekloos de genealogie
uit
Kronieken daaraan toegevoegd, niet gevoelende, dat Obed in de voorgaande
verzen
door adoptie geen zoon meer was van Boaz."
24. A. Jepsen, "Das Buch
Ruth," ThStKr, 108, 1937-38, p.
422.
25. E. Würthwein, "Ruth,"
in Die Fünf Megilloth, HAT, 18, 1969,
p. 23. L
Morris,
Ruth, TOTC, 1968, p. 315, writes:
"It is possible also that the expression
should
be understood along the lines that Boaz was primarily go’el to Elimelech
(4:3,
9). He should accordingly have married Naomi to raise up a child to Elime-
lech.
However, since she was too old Ruth was a substitute and the child in a
sense
was Naomi's."
26. For additional literature on
adoption in
Driver
and J. C. Miles, The Babylonian Laws,
1, 1952, p. 384, cite this as a
262 Obed
zullen
derhalve in de handelwijze van Naomi, die Obed op
haar
schoot legde, slechts een blijk mogen zien van tedere
liefde
en zorg voor het kind, dat de vroegere echtgenote van
haar
zoon heeft gebaard, zonder dat wij hieraan enige jurid-
ische
betekenis kunnen hechten."27
The reference to Naomi as a nurse ( tnmx) cannot be used
as
evidence for an adoption, as Köhler indicates,28 for it is
not
likely that Naomi was involved in feeding the child as his
analogies
would necessitate. Rather, the word should be
understood
in the more general sense of guardian.29 It may
even
be, as Rudolph affirms, that this general designation is
"der
beste Beweis dass von der Fürsorge der Gross-
mutter
für ihren Enkel and nicht von einer Rechtshandlung
die
Rede ist."30
By placing the child on her bosom,
Naomi was recogniz-
ing
the child as in some way belonging to her (cf. Num.
11:12).
This is in fact what the neighbour women affirm
when
they say, "A son has been born to Naomi" (4:17a).31
possible
instance of adoption. So also Z. Falk, Hebrew
Law in Biblical Times,
1964,
p. 163; E. Neufeld, AHML, 1944, p.
126 n. 1; Th. C. Vriezen, op. cit.,
p. 87
n.
7. R. de Vaux, Ancient Israel, 1961,
p. 51, remarks on Gen. 30:3-8; 48:5, 12;
and
Ruth 4:16, 17: "But these are not adoptions in the full sense, for they
all
take
place within the family.... The legal consequences of such an adoption are
therefore
not far-reaching."
27. M. David, "Adoptie in het
oude
Nederlandse
Akademie van Wetenschap, Afdeling Letterkunde, 18, 1955, p. 4. J.
Bewer,
"The Göel in Ruth 4:14, 15," p. 25, denies that 4:16 contains a
statement
of
Obed's adoption. Similarly G. Wood, Ruth,
Jerome Bible Commentary, 1968,
p.
609, writes: There is no need to see in this action some form of adoption (cf.
Nm.
11:12). She merely held the child affectionately and regularly pacified
him."
28. L Kohler, "Die Adoptionform
von Rt. 4:16," p. 313.
29. F. Dijkema, op. cit., p. 112. J. de Waard, "Translator's Handbook of
Ruth,"
BT, 21, 1970, p. 168, translates,
"and she looked after the child" or "and
she
became the child's guardian."
30. W. Rudolph, op. cit., p. 71.
31.
the
name of Mahlon, Naomi's son, the new-born child could not but be consid-
ered
as Naomi's grandchild." Cf. J. de Fraine, op. cit., p. 160, "Legaal gezien is
Ruth's
zoon Noomi's afstammeling; er hoeft dus geen adoptie plaats to heb-
ben.
. .." So also C. Lattey, The Book of
Ruth, 1935, p. 25, and A. Vincent, op.
cit.,
p. 164
Ecclesiastes,
Song of Songs,
1965, p. 23, refers to the statement "a son has been
born
to Naomi" as "an inexactitude for 'a son has been born to
Mahlon.'" L.
Obed 263
There
is therefore no need of any adoption
where the levirate
situation
was in effect.32 Throughout all this final scene, "de
liefde
spreekt zich uit, niet het recht."33 In no sense can we
accept
Jepsen's contention that we have a formal adoption,
thereby
excluding a levirate marriage.
It is somewhat surprising that the
women give the name
to
the child born of Boaz and Ruth (4:17).34 Dijkema ex-
is
plains this as resulting from Naomi's adoption of the child.
"Nu
echter Noomi het kind adopteert is het niet aan Ruth of
Boaz
om hun kind een naam te geven en treden de vrouwen,
de
naburinnen, als naamgeefsters op.35 If one accepts an
adoption,
it would appear to be more reasonable to expect
that
the giving of the name might be taken over by the one
doing
the adopting, in other words, Naomi.36 It is exceeding
the
limits of our knowledge to say, as Ehrlich does, that
"Nachbarn
batten kein Recht, einem fremden Kinde den
Namen
zu geben."37 The naming by the women might repre-
Epstein,
op. cit., p. 87 writes, "Here
the ge'ullah child bears the name of
the
Elimelech
family in that he is called 'a son of Naomi.' "
32. W. McKane, Tracts for the Times, p. 24, remarks, "The phrase 'a son has
been
born to Naomi' establishes Boaz's role as a levir.
. . ." Cf. P. Joüon, op. cit.,
p.
94, "Le geste n'a donc pas pour but d'indiquer l'adoption de l'enfant par
Noemi;
celle-ci n'a pas à adopter l'enfant: it est déjà sien." R. de Vaux, op. cit.,
p.
38, cites 4:17 as an evidence for the levirate in the book of Ruth.
33. G. Smit, op. cit., p. 36. Similarly, W. Rudolph, op. cit., p. 71.
34. One can point, however, to Luke
1:57 ff. for something comparable.
For
a study on the giving of names, cf. A. Key, "The Giving of Proper Names in
the
Old Testament," JBL, 83, 1964,
pp. 55-59; cf. C. Vos, Women in Old
Testa-
ment Worship, 1968, pp.
160-164.
35. F. Dijkema, op. cit., p. 113 n. 2.
36. E. Würthwein, op. cit., p. 24, comments, "Bei der
Rolle, die Naemi in
16
als Adoptionsmutter spielt, ist wahrscheinlich, dass sie als Namengeberin
gedacht
war." The text is emended by P. Joüon and W. Rudolph. W. Rudolph, op.
cit., p. 69,
removes Mw
from 4:17a and suggests in v. 17b a change from third
feminine
plural (hnxrqt)
to either third masculine or third feminine singular. In
this
case 4: 17a has nothing to do with the giving of the name whereas 4:17b has
the
child being named either by Boaz or Naomi. The latter finds support from
Josephus
who (
op. cit., p. 160,
comments, "De legale moeder Noomi is beter gequalificeerd dan
de
buurvrouwen om een naam te geven."
37. A. B. Ehrlich, Randglossen zur hebräischen Bibel,
7, 1914, p. 29.
264 Obed
sent
a local custom or possibly the women's kindness to Boaz
and
Ruth prompted an acceptance of their suggestion.38
It is rather commonly asserted39
that Obed was not the
name
originally given to the child since one would expect to
find
some connection between the name "Obed" and the
statement,
"a son has been born to Naomi."
Recently Eissfeldt, reversing his
previously expressed
opinion,40
has presented an explanation for the name
"Obed"
which retains its genuineness. He maintains that it is
wrong
to seek a name for the child which echoes with that of
Naomi.
"Solche Änderungen gehen von der wohl mehr still-
schweigend
und unbewusst gemachten Voraussetzung aus,
dass
in den Worten der Nachbarinnen der Ton liege auf
‘No`omi':
der No’omi ist ein Sohn geboren. Aber
dem ist
nicht
so. Der Nachdruck liegt vielmehr auf` eM Sohn': der
No’omi
ist ein Sohn geboren. Auf diesel
'Sohn' schlagt
‘Obed’
zurück, das zwar nicht lautlich an No`omi anklingt,
aber
dem Sinne nach 'Sohn' nicht nur wieder aufnimmt,
sondern
noch vertieft, indem ‘Versorger’—das bedeutet hier
‘obed—noch mehr
besagt als ben 'Sohn.' . In 4, 17
klingt
das
ben 'Sohn' zwar nicht lautlich, aber
urn so mehr bedeut-
ungsmassig
an ‘obed ‘Versorger’ an... "41
38. L Morris, op. cit., p. 315.
39. As a representative of this
argument cf. 0. Eissfeldt, The Old Testa-
ment: An
Introduction,
1965, pp. 479, 480. He opts for ben-no’am as originally
standing
in the narrative and remarks (p. 480), "So Ruth's child, adopted by
Naomi,
was given the name Obed with the
removal of the name ben-no'am which
originally
stood in the narrative. In other words, the Ruth narrative had originally
nothing
at all to do with David, but has only secondarily been made into a
narrative
concerning David's ancestors." However, D. R. Ap-Thomas, "The Book
of
Ruth," ExpT, 79, 1968, p. 371,
remarks, "I cannot find in the Old Testament
any
example of a name explicitly given to commemorate another person, whether
father
or mother or grandmother. It would therefore be unique if Ruth's son had
been
called Ben-noam...."
40. Cf. n. 39.
41. 0. Eissfeldt,
"Sohnespflichten im Alien Orient,"
Cf.
0. Eissfeldt, "Wahrheit und Dichtung in der Ruth-Erzählung," Sitzungs-
berichte der Sächsischen
Akademie der Wissenschaften zu
historische
Klasse, 110, 1965, p. 27, "Der physisch von der Ruth geborene, aber
ethisch
der Noomi zugeschriebene Sohn (ben)
erhält darum den Namen Obed
(‘obed 'Diener' oder `Pfleger'), weil er
seiner Grossmutter die einem Sohne oblie-
Obed 265
Obed's name then is to be understood
in terms of the
service
of care which he, as son (cf. Mal. 3:17), would per-
form
for Naomi (4:15) personally. In addition, we may say
with
Goslinga, that "zijn taak en bestemming was dienen,
nl.tot
instandhouding van zijn geslacht, dat anders uitgestor-
ven
ware.”42
Boaz' Son, Ruth 4:21
It is well-known that scholars are
divided in their views
concerning
the genuineness of the genealogy (4:18-22) in the
book
of Ruth. By many scholars, it is regarded as a later
addition,
but others accept the genealogy as genuine (and as a
reliable
account of the ancestry of David).43 While there are
many
facets to this difficult question, we intend to discuss
briefly
one final legal point which results from the genealogy.
Within
the genealogy we are told that Boaz was the father
of
Obed (v. 21). It is felt by many44 that this is in contradic-
genden
Liebesdienste erweisen wird. Zwischen dem Ausruf der Nachbarinnen:
‘Geboren
ist ein Sohn der Noomi!’ und dem von ihnen diesem Sohn gegebenen
Namen
Obed besteht also eM enger Sinnzusammenhang, wie dieser denn auch
schon
4, 14-15 anklingt, wo die Frauen Noomi dazu beglückwünschen, dass
Jahwe
ihr einen ‘Löser’ (go’el), was hier etwa dasselbe wie ‘obed bedeutet, gege-
ben
hat, der ihr Freude machen und sie in ihrem Alter versorgen kann."
42. C. Goslinga, op. cit., p. 162.
43. Cf. chap. 5, n. 89. M. Weinfeld,
"Ruth," EJ, 14, 1971, p.
519, accepts
the
genealogy as an integral part of the book. According to M. Johnson, The
Purpose of the
Biblical Genealogies,
1969, p. 52, one of the purposes of a geneal-
ogy
was "to establish continuity over those periods of time not covered by
material
in the tradition.... The Toledoth of Perez appended to the book of
Ruth
(4:18-22) may similarly be intended to establish continuity during the time
of
the judges, that is, from the conquest to the beginning of the Davidic mon-
archy."
44. P. Joüon, op. cit., p. 96; M. Burrows, "The Marriage of Boaz and
Ruth,"
JBL, 59, 1940, pp.
445, 446; L Epstein, Marriage Laws in the
Bible and the
Talmud, 1942, pp. 87,
88; I. Bettan, op. cit., p. 72; A.
Bertholet, op. cit., p. 68;
E.
Würthwein, op. cit., p. 24; S. B.
Gurewicz, "Some Reflections on the Book of
Ruth,"
Australian Biblical Review, 5, 1956, p. 46; M. Haller, op. cit., pp. 19, 20;
L
P. Smith, op. cit., p. 851; W. Rudolph, op.
cit., p. 71. C. Lattey, Ruth,
1935,
p.
25, on the contrary, feels that it would be difficult to attribute the
genealogy
to
a later writer, since he "would have been more careful of the apparent
require-
ment
of the narrative." He further remarks: "As a matter of fact, however,
there
does
not appear to be in the Old Testament any certain case of a genealogy being
266 Obed
tion
to the whole spirit of the narrative, which portrays the
marriage
of Boaz and Ruth as a levirate marriage. In such a
case,
the child, Obed, being a levirate child, belonged rather
to
Mahlon and/or Elimelech. This is then taken to be further
support
for the view that the genealogy could not come from
the
hand of the author of the book of Ruth. In other words,
those
who accept the child of Ruth and Boaz as a child of
Elimelech
and Mahlon through a levirate or geullah marriage
generally
feel compelled to delete the genealogy as an integral
part
of the book.
Goslinga, however, affirms that the
above argument "gaat
uit
van een doctrinaire opvatting van het leviraatshuwelijk en
zijn
gevolgen. Ook al kon Obed treden in de rechten van
Ruth's
eersten man, dit neemt niet weg, dat Boaz hem ver-
wekt
had zoals vs. 21 zegt. Dat kon van MachIon niet gezegd
worden.”45
A little noticed facet of this
question is 4:11b, 12. The
witnesses
at the gate express the wish, "May you prosper in
Ephrathah
and be renowned in
house
be like the house of Perez, whom Tamar bore to
this
young woman."46 In these verses we have the hope ex-
pressed
that the house of Boaz will be like that of Perez
because
of the children whom the Lord will give to Boaz
through
Ruth. This seems to indicate that not only in the
genealogy
but in the narrative as well, the child of Ruth is
regarded
both as a levirate child and thus belonging to the
taken
through a God without explanation; and one obvious explanation of the
diversity
in Our Lord's genealogy between Matthew and Luke is that a genealogy
might
indicate either the real or the legal father."
45. C. Goslinga, op. cit., p. 165. He argues as well:
"Het hoogste in het boek
is
dan ook welbeschouwd niet het geslacht van Elimelech, maar het geslacht van
David.
In diens voorgeslacht moest naar Gods beschikking Boaz een eervolle plaats
bekleden.
Hij is, meer nog dan Ruth zelf, de hoofdpersoon. Maar hij is dat als
voorvader
van David." L. Morris, op. cit.,
p. 317, writes: "Notice that Mahlon is
not
mentioned and Obed is treated simply as the son of Boaz. In a sense he
carried
on Mahlon's name and succeeded to his property. But in an official geneal-
ogy
he was reckoned as the son of his true father."
46. Cf. n. 14.
Obed 267
family
of Mahlon and as belonging to the family of Boaz.47
Such
being the case, the fact that the genealogy lists Boaz as
the
father of the child cannot be regarded as contradictory to
the
spirit of the narrative section of the book.48 We believe
that
Rowley's explanation does the most justice to all the
facts.
He writes: "If Boaz had no child hitherto, then Ruth's
first
child would be the child of Mahlon by a legal fiction,
and
also the child of Boaz by actual paternity; and if Boaz
had
taken Ruth to be his legal wife, and had not merely
played
the part of kinsman, then the same child would be his
heir
as well as Mahlon's.. . . There is thus no conflict on this
view
between the appendix and the preceding verses. "49
47. L P. Smith, op. cit., pp. 849, 850, explains the reference to the house
of
Boaz differently: "Objection to these verses on the ground that the child
will
be
reckoned to Mahlon and not to Boaz ignores the fact that no woman was
content
with one child.... All children after the first would be reckoned to Boaz.
The
wish is therefore the very obvious one that Boaz should be rewarded for
doing
his duty by a family of at least twelve sons!" We do not regard these
remarks
as completely satisfactory. J. de Fraine, op.
cit., p. 159, remarks,
"Misschien
was Boöz een kinderloze weduwnaar. Het is enigszins bevreemdend
dat
hier het perspectief van het 'huis' van Elimelek uit het oog verloren
wordt."
48. Cf. chap. 2, n. 19.
49. H. H. Rowley, "The Marriage
of Ruth," in The Servant of the Lord
19652,
pp. 193, 194. H. H. Rowley, op. cit.,
p. 193 n. 2, while rejecting the idea
that
there is a conflict of viewpoint between the story and the genealogy, believes
that
it is likely that the genealogy was added by another hand. L Morris, op. cit.,
p.
312 n. 1, and Th. and D. Thompson, op.
cit., p. 99, also see no conflict be-
tween
the genealogy and the story. The view of J. Gray, op. cit., p. 423, that the
narrator
may have momentarily lost sight of the levirate situation is singularly
unconvincing.
PART THREE
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
10
Summarizing Considerations
on the Levirate Institution
In
IN bringing our study to a conclusion
we shall discuss
several
attempts made at tracing the development of the
levirate
institution in
in
considerable detail the legal material of the book of Ruth,
we
are in a position to see how the story of Ruth and the
levirate
law of Deuteronomy are to be integrated.
Representative Views
One of the most significant
contributions to this topic
has
come from the pen of M. Burrows, who has published
four
articles on this and related subjects.1 Since his views
have
exerted a widespread influence, we will seek to give a
recapitulation
and evaluation of his position. Such a discus-
sion
will bring us into contact with the law of the levirate in
Deuteronomy
25:5-10, for this passage is considered by Bur-
rows
to be the basic source for normal levirate practice in
Israel.2
1. M. Burrows, "Levirate
Marriage in
idem,
"The Ancient Oriental Background of Hebrew Levirate Marriage," BASOR,
77,
1940, pp. 2-15; idem, "The Marriage of Boaz and Ruth," JBL, 59, 1940,
PP.
445-454; idem, The Basis of Israelite
Marriage, AOS, 15, 1938. His
discussion
of
the levirate is found in all the above mentioned works, but his concentrated
attempt
at an explication of levirate marriage in
that
title.
2. M. Burrows, "Levirate
Marriage in
ly
from the picture and remarks, "We cannot use the story, therefore, to show
271
272 Summarizing Considerations on the Levirate
Noting that the levirate law of
Deuteronomy 25 fits into
the
well-known category of Hebrew law which Alt labeled
casuistic,
(which was of Canaanite origin according to Alt)
Burrows
concludes "that levirate marriage was one of the
practices
adopted by the Israelites after the occupation of
fied
and codified under Canaanite influence."3
As found in Deuteronomy 25:5-10, the
law showed clear
evidence
of Israelite revision: in Deuteronomy 25:6, "so that
his
name may not be blotted out of
onomy
25:7, "he refuses to perpetuate his brother's name in
does
he see any perceptible Deuteronomic editing.4
Having no direct evidence for the
Canaanite practice, he
turns
for evidence to the common legal tradition permeating
western
gests
to Burrows that the origin of the levirate may have been
bound
up with the conception of marriage as ownership, in
which
case the widow passed to the other family members as
inheritable
property.5
Burrows' conclusion is that in
of
the levirate was changed. Instead of being based on a form
of
inheritance, the essential motive for the levirate in
was
to raise up a son for the dead man to preserve his name.6
A possible Canaanite law is
reconstructed by Burrows as
follows:
"If brothers live together and one of them dies leav-
ing
no son, the dead man's wife shall not be married outside
to
a stranger. Her brother-in-law shall come in to her and take
what
was the prevailing law or custom in ancient
possible
variations it may be relevant, but for information as to normal procedure
it
has little value, except as it confirms what can be learned from other
sources."
Cf.
chap. 2, n. 3.
3. Ibid., p. 25.
4. Ibid., pp. 25, 26.
5. Ibid., p. 27.
6. Ibid., p. 33. Burrows writes (p.
30): "It may be that the Canaanites, like
other
peoples of
inheritance,
whereas from the earliest times the motive of preserving the dead
brother's
name was a distinctive element of the Israelite custom."
Summarizing Considerations on the
Levirate 273
her
to himself to wife. But if it does not please the man to
take
his sister-in-law, he shall go up to the gate to the elders
and
say, 'It does not please me to take her;' and he shall take
off
his sandal from his foot."7 Of significance is the proposed
reconstruction
of the removal of the shoe. The removal of
the
shoe is an act not of the woman but of the man, which
indicates
that he has voluntarily renounced his right (by in-
heritance)
to the woman.8
Burrows concludes his discussion by
noting that the
Israelite
alteration of the law involved two changes:
"(1) levirate marriage was taken
out of the category of
inheritance
and made a means of carrying on the life and
name
of the dead. (2) this made it a duty rather than a right,
and
the widow was authorized and required to demand the
fulfillment
of the obligation by her brother-in-law, while
refusal
on his part was punished by subjecting him and his
family
to public disgrace."9 The stages which Burrows pro-
poses
in his reconstruction of the levirate development are an
early
Canaanite stage, followed by the transition exemplified
in
the book of Ruth where redemption marriage is a clan
affair,
and a final stage in which the more restricted levirate
marriage
of Deuteronomy is an affair of the immediate
family.10
The two key aspects of Burrows'
treatment of the levirate
development
are his suggestion of a kind of direct borrowing,
with
modification, from the Canaanites and his view of the
levirate
marriage of Deuteronomy as the final stage in the
evolution
of the levirate responsibility.
In any attempt to understand the
development of the
levirate
custom, the date for the Deuteronomic law assumes
considerable
importance. A continuing stream of literature
flows
forth on the date of Deuteronomy. It should be noted
7. Ibid., p. 30.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. M. Burrows, "The Marriage
of Boaz and Ruth," pp. 451, 454.
274 Summarizing Considerations on the
Levirate
that
much current scholarship which connects the book with
the
seventh century is of the opinion that Josiah's reforma-
tion
was a movement of restoration;11 so that whatever date
is
given to Deuteronomy in its fixed literary form is not
determinative
for the date of the content of the book.12
Recently, Wijngaards has argued force
fully for a cultic
dramatization
of the Exodus and the Landgiving in a proces-
sion
celebrated as an amphictyonic rite during the period of
the
judges, from 1250 to 1050.13 Accordingly, he maintains
that
the Deuteronomic law finds its setting in the covenantal
instruction
at Succoth and was operative from that period.14
11. J. Muilenburg, "The Form
and Structure of the Covenantal Formula-
tions,"
VT, 9, 1959, pp. 348, 349, states:
"The following conclusions commend
themselves
to a large number of scholars: the present book of Deuteronomy is
composed
of various strata of tradition, but at its base there is a Grundschrift
emanating
from a much earlier period than the time of Josiah.... It is now
generally
held that the Reformation of 621 was a movement of restoration, and
that
its ultimate origin is to be discovered in the amphictyony of Shechem."
12. W. Eichrodt, Theology of the Old Testament, 1, 1961, p. 72, remarks,
"In
its present form it is a product of the later monarchy, to be exact of the
seventh
century.... The law-material in it, however, shows that it goes back to a
far
earlier age." W. F. Albright, From
the Stone Age to Christianity, 19572,
pp.
319, 320, writes, "The materials contained in the book were really
believed to
go
back to Moses and probably do reflect, in general, a true Mosaic atmosphere....
The
legislative portions reflect a juristic phase prior to Jehoshaphat's
reorganiza-
tion
of the judicial system of
also,
E. W. Nicholson, Deuteronomy and Tradition,
1967, p. 121.
13. J. Wijngaards, The Dramatization of Salvific History in the
Deutero-
nomic Schools, (OTS, 16), 1969, p. 29.
14. Ibid., p. 111. On the question
of date he comments: "It is obvious that
our
reconstruction of the ancient Sheckemitic rites throws a new light on the
deuteronomic
code of law. ... The newly discovered setting for the law in the
covenantal
instruction at Succoth would suggest that it was effective during that
period
(i.e., 1250-1050 B.C.)." Cf. also, J. L'Hour, "L'Alliance de
Sichem," RB,
69,
1962, p. 359, who argues that the Deuteronomic legislation precedes the
Book
of the Covenant Code. It is interesting to note Wijngaards' recognition
(pp.
21, 22) that the similarity of structure between Deuteronomy and the Hittite
suzerainty
treaties is rightly employed in an early dating of the Deuteronomic law.
Cf.
M. Kline, Treaty of the Great King,
1963, and K. Kitchen, "Ancient
Orient,
`Deuteronism' and the Old Testament," in New Perspectives on the Old
Testament, ed. J. B.
Payne, 1970, pp. 1-24. The argument for a Mosaic origin of
Deuteronomy
based upon a common treaty form between Deuteronomy and
Hittite
treaties is disputed by R. Frankena who maintains that the closest parallels
with
Deuteronomy are to be found in the seventh century vassal treaties of
Esarhaddon.
Cf. R. Frankena, "The Vassal Treaties of Esarhaddon and the Dating
of
Deuteronomy," OTS, 14, 1965, pp. 122-154. See also, M. Weinfeld,
"Traces of
Summarizing Considerations on the
Levirate 275
In
any event, most writers, regardless of their position on the
finalization
of the book of Deuteronomy, recognize the levir-
ate
to be a reflection of an ancient custom. Accordingly, our
understanding
of the evolution of the custom should not be
dictated
by the dating of a document which admittedly con-
tains
very ancient materia1.15
Deuteronomy 25:5-10 forms a part of
the Deuteronomic
legislation
for which there is no parallel in the other legal
codes
of the Old Testament.16 It is part of a series of laws
Assyrian
Treaty Formulae in Deuteronomy," Biblica,
46, 1965, pp. 417-427. Of
particular
interest is the recent work of G. Wenham, The
Structure and Date of
Deuteronomy, Ph.D.
dissertation, University of
Making
elaborate comparison of the laws in Deuteronomy with extra-legal codes
he
asserts, "The concerns of Deuteronomy are very typical of the legal
literature
of
the second millennium.... Yet by comparison with extrabiblical law their tone
is
much less secular.... This is as might be expected if Dt. was used in the
covenant-renewal
ceremony. At the same time the numerous parallels between Dt.
and
the extrabiblical collections perhaps reinforce the hypothesis that under the
monarchy
the Israelite covenant-renewal ceremony was equivalent to the Baby-
lonian
mesarum act. Some of the so-called ‘law codes,’ with which we have been
comparing
Dt., were set up by rulers as a witness to their faithfulness in ruling
according
to law (sar mgarim)." He concludes (p. 303), that "the book of Dt.,
in
substantially
its present form, may derive from the period of the united mon-
archy."
See also G. Wenham, "Deuteronomy and the Central Sanctuary," TB, 22,
1972,
p. 118.
15. H. H. Rowley, "The Marriage
of Ruth," in The Servant of the
Lord,
19652,
p. 180, believes that the book of Ruth preserves an older levirate custom
than
Deuteronomy, a true tradition of pre-Deuteronomic conditions. He then
remarks,
"And this it ought to do, if it narrates things that happened centuries
before
Deuteronomy was written." Such an argument ignores the possibility that
Deuteronomy,
itself, if a product of the seventh century, in the law of the levirate
might
be reflecting a much earlier practice. Having said this it should be noticed
that
another factor enters in his evaluation of the development of the levirate in
16. See G. von Rad, Deuteronomy, OTL, 1966, p. 13, for a
detailed list of
the
comparable legal material of Ex. 21-23 and Deuteronomy. 0. Eissfeldt, The
Old Testament:
An Introduction,
1965, pp. 222, 223, sees the relation between
the
two codes in terms of the later neutralizing and silencing the former. Von
Rad,
ibid., challenges the assumption that Deuteronomy replaced the covenant
code
as the authentic Sinai revelation: "The question would remain unanswered,
why
so large a part of the ordinances in the Book of the Covenant (amounting in
all
to about fifty percent) were passed over and omitted." Interesting in this
con-
nection
as well are the remarks of M. Noth, The
Laws in the Pentateuch and Other
Studies, 1966, p. 9:
"In the latest parts of the law there is scarcely a theme that
was
not already known to the oldest portions; and no subject of the oldest
legislation
ever becomes completely lost in the course of further legislative devel-
opment.
No instance appears of a particular legal point being judged in a funda-
276 Summarizing Considerations on the
Levirate
(21:15-17,
18-21a; 22:13-21a; 22:22a; 22:28 f.; 24:1-4a, 5,
7a;
25:1 f., 5-10)17 constructed in the well-known casuistic
style18
characteristic of the Book of the Covenant. Alt be-
lieves
that a legal culture was adopted by the Israelites from
the
Canaanites, who would have absorbed their legal tradition
from
ancient
Canaanite
law according to Alt was between the settlement
of
Canaan by
process
by which this body of law was adopted is uncertain;
but
in the early period during which the Israelites were com-
ing
into close contact with the Canaanites it is likely that the
individual
tribes, living in comparative isolation, each adopt-
ed
Canaanite customs in varying degrees. Later, at the foun-
dation
of the monarchy, the acceptance by the nation took
place.19
Is there a connection between the casuistic law of
mentally
different fashion in different ‘laws’; and scarcely any material provision
of
any law is later waived, or has a contradictory provision set up against
it."
17. R. A. F. MacKenzie, "The
Formal Aspect of Ancient Near Eastern
Law,"
in The Seed of Wisdom, Essays in honor of
T. J. Meek, ed.
1964,
p. 36. Concerning these casuistic laws in Deut., 0. Eissfeldt, op. cit., p. 224,
is
of the opinion, that, "though they are now divided up by other laws, they
originally
formed an independent code which was utilized by the compiler of D."
This
possibility is also seriously raised by G. von Rad, Deuteronomy, pp. 13, 14.
18. The literature on this subject
is vast, cf. A. Jirku, Das weltliche
Recht im
Alten Testament, 1927; A.
Jepsen, Untersuchungen zum Bundesbuch,
1927. One
of
the most influential essays came from the pen of A. Alt, who published Die
Ursprunge
des israelitischen Rechts, 1934 "The Origins of Israelite Law," in
Essays
on Old Testament History and Religion, 1966, pp. 81-132. Alt distin-
guished
between case law, paralleled in both form and content by the ancient
Near
East law codes and mediated to
law,
which he believed to be uniquely Israelite in origin. The latter conclusion has
been
challenged by T. Meek, Hebrew Origins,
19602, p. 72; L Rapaport, "The
Origins
of Hebrew Law," PEQ, 73, 1941,
pp. 158-167; G. Mendenhall, "Ancient
Oriental
and Biblical Law," BA, 17, 1954,
pp. 26-46. Cf. more recently J. Mac-
Kenzie,
op. cit., pp. 31-44; S. Gevirtz,
"West Semitic Curses and the Problem of
the
Origins of Hebrew Law," VT, 11,
1961, pp. 137-158; S. Paul, Studies in
the
Book of the
Covenant in the Light of Cuneiform and Biblical Law (SVT, 18),
1970,
pp. 112-124; E. Gerstenberger, Wesen and
Herkunft des Apodiktischen
Rechts, 1965.
19. A. Alt, op. cit., p. 101. 0. Eissfeldt, op.
cit., p. 28, also maintains that
the
remarkable parallels between the laws in
Babylonia,
influence
of the latter upon
meated
Canaan from the third millennium, and, despite the absence of a
Summarizing Considerations on the
Levirate 277
the
Book of the Covenant and the series of case laws scat-
tered
throughout Deuteronomy? Von Rad considers it possi-
ble
that the laws peculiar to Deuteronomy might go back to
an
unknown collection of laws, "and that this collection had
much
material in common with the Book of the Covenant,
but
possibly contained much of what we now find only in
Deuteronomy
and not in the Book of the Covenant."20 If so,
this
would indicate that the levirate law, even on a seventh
century
date for the Deuteronomy, must reach back to a far
earlier
time.
Alt's theory on the Canaanite origin
of casuistic law in
"mere
guesswork to speculate about the formulation of
Canaanite
law so long as we possess none of the legislative
texts
which embodied it.. . . The fact remains that the Meso-
potamian
codes are compiled in casuistic form, and part of
the
Israelite law closely resembles them in style."21
ite
law book, these laws were mediated to
law
is law regulating secular legal cases and, according to Alt, there is no
evidence
that
these laws contain any reference to national or religious exercises; the latter
would
be regarded as specifically Israelite. This opinion is disputed by I. Rapa-
port,
op. cit., p. 166, who argues from Ex.
21:2, 6; 22:7, 8, 10, that there is
"sufficient
evidence that the casuistic law does not lack that religious or national
colouring
which can establish the Israelite historical origin of the Book of the
Covenant."
G. Mendenhall, op. cit., p. 38,
maintains that though the Covenant
Code
seems to be secular, "nearly all the stipulations of the Decalogue are
here
protected."
20. G. von Rad, Deuteronomy, pp. 13, 14.
21. R. de Vaux, Ancient Israel, 1961, p. 146. See also, S. Paul, op. cit.,
pp.
117, 118: "Though his (Alt's) form analysis of biblical law is correct,
this
writer
does not share his view concerning the historical development of the casuis-
tic
material.... Casuistically formulated laws were part of
to
lawcode
which could be more at variance from what we know of Canaanite
culture,
than the Covenant Code." He mentions the Israelite patriarchs who came
from
Mesopotamia to
legal
material in the Book of the Covenant. Cf. also, A. van Se1ms, "Law," NBD,
1962,
p. 718: "But during their sojourn in
not
a nomadic society; one may suppose that they brought along when migrating
into
nant
therefore could be described as a codification of the rules prevailing among
the
Hebrews in
priestly
prophetic revelation. If that be true there is nothing against the assump-
tion
of Mosaic authorship."
278 Summarizing Considerations on the Levirate
In the light of a comparison with
Hittite treaties from the
fourteenth
century and treaties from Alalakh, Fensham asks,
"Would
it then be strange to expect the casuistic style with
the
covenant between Yahweh and his people at
we
accept the basic historical fact of the covenant at Sinai
and
if we accept the fact that the Hebrew peoples, who were
slaves
in
farfetched
to assume that they already had certain casuistic
laws
to protect their community and internal affairs, and that
these
laws were reinstituted at Sinai?" His answer to this
question
is in the affirmative. Fensham writes: "Some com-
mon
background with the Mesopotamian world is the only
explanation.
This contact might have been in the time of the
patriarchs,
which is an established fact according to the bibli-
cal
tradition and according to the parallels between Nuzi legal
material
and the legal practices of the patriarchs."22
Mace regards Burrows' observations
very highly and labels
his
approach an "attractive theory." He writes, "If the object
of
producing a son had been the sole purpose of the Hebrew
form,
and the inheritance of property the basis of the Ca-
naanite
custom, an attempt to unite the two might well have
produced
just such a picture as the Old Testament presents to
us."23
It is difficult to concur with this opinion despite the
considerable
learning brought by Burrows to this difficult
question.
We have noted earlier that the theory of Canaanite
22. F. C. Fensham, "The
Possibility of the Presence of Casuistic Legal Mate-
rial
at the Making of the Covenant at Sinai," PEQ, 93, 1961, p. 146. Cf. F. C.
Fensham,
"Aspects of Family Law in the Covenant Code in Light of Ancient Near
Eastern
Parallels," DI, 1, 1969, p. V,
who writes: "It is much easier to grasp the
legal
background of the Covenant Code in comparison to the Laws of Eshnunna
as
to the much more developed Laws of Hammurabi." Interesting are the remarks
of
W. F. Albright, Yahweh and the Gods of
Canaan, 1968, p. 91: "How shall we
explain
the fact that the Book of the Covenant contains such archaic material,
going
back long before the time of Moses? There is only one likely explanation—
that
the case-laws of early
the
Mosaic period and had probably been brought from
Hebrew
immigrants, presumably after a considerable body of Hebrews had al-
ready
settled in the West.... It was these laws which formed the basis for Mosaic
jurisprudence."
23. D. Mace, Hebrew Marriage, 1953, p. 105.
Summarizing Considerations on the
Levirate 279
origin
for casuistic laws had not been established. Indeed it is
more
likely that these laws must ultimately be traced back to
Hebrew
ancestors who came from
himself,
acknowledged that his case is weakened by the lack
of
any Canaanite legal texts which bear on the subject of the
levirate.
There are a few texts from
that
the levirate was known (cf. chap. 1, "
specifics
are lacking; thus we have no corroboration of the
view
that the levirate in Canaanite culture had its base in the
widow
as inheritable property. Finally, as Th. and D. Thomp-
son
suggest, "If the casuistic form
of law is originally non-
Israelite,
this says nothing about the practices legislated. If
the
Israelites had taken over some Canaanite laws, we might
expect
to find that later laws of Israelite origin are given in
the
same form as the earlier, originally Canaanite, ones, but
these
laws would be, nonetheless, specifically Israelite in con-
tent
and intention. A distinction in the origins of specific
laws
cannot be made merely on the basis of Canaanite
form."24
J. Morgenstern suggests that five
stages are clearly dis-
cernible
in the levirate in Israel.25 The earliest is that pre-
sented
in Genesis 38. At this point the obligation rests upon
the
brothers of the deceased, in order of age and ultimately
upon
the father, if the duty is not performed by the brothers.
The
relatives of the deceased have no option as to whether
they
will perform the duty which is considered to be impera-
tive
and inescapable. The first male child belongs by legal
fiction
to the dead man and perpetuates his name. It is ques-
tionable
whether, at this stage, there are property considera-
tions;
if so they are of minor significance.26
The next stage is that which is
referred to in Deuter-
onomy
25:5, 6. The duty is inescapable, as was the case in
24. Th. and D. Thompson, "Some
Legal Problems in the Book of Ruth,"
VT, 18, 1968, p.
82.
25. J. Morgenstern has extensively
discussed the levirate in "The Book of
the
Covenant," HUCA, 7, 1930, pp.
159-185.
26. Ibid., p. 180.
280 Summarizing Considerations on the
Levirate
Genesis
38, but is now restricted to brothers living together
in
one household, with the consequent exclusion of the
father
of the dead man from the obligation of the levirate.
The
purpose is the same as in the earliest stage with consider-
ations
of inheritance not involved or of little significance.27
Stage three is pictured in Deuteronomy
27:7-9a. The
advance
over the preceding stage is to be seen in the fact that
the
duty is no longer absolute. The duty is still limited to the
brothers
dwelling in the same household, but the levir may
make
affirmation, in the presence of the elders, of his refusal
of
the widow. At this stage, the levirate law regulates both a
duty
to the dead man as well as to the wife, with the latter
duty
being uppermost. Here, in addition to the original pur-
pose
of the levirate regulations seen in the first two stages,
another
one is emerging. The woman is passed to the brother-
in-law
as part of the dead brother's estate and it is from this
that
the woman is being freed, according to the regulations
laid
down in Deuteronomy 25:7-9a.28
Morgenstern sees the fourth stage
depicted in what he
defines
as the original section of Ruth. At this late point,
questions
of property and inheritance predominate. The insti-
tution
has been broadened so that the duties devolve succes-
sively
upon next-of-kin. The widow and property pass to the
redeemer;
the property eventually returns to the child of this
union.
The child is recognized legally as the child of the
deceased,
and as the one who perpetuates the name and who
accordingly
succeeds to the property when he is of proper
age.
Now there is not the same degree of necessity to perform
the
levirate as in previous stages. Thus no shame is attached
to
the refusal. It may be that there will be several successive
refusals
before one relative is found who will comply with
the
conditions of inheritance and levirate.29
27. Ibid., pp. 180, 181.
28. Ibid., pp. 181, 182.
29. Ibid., p. 182.
Summarizing Considerations on the
Levirate 281
The fifth and final stage30
is evident from two late inser-
tions
in the book of Ruth, namely, 4:11b-12 and 4:17b-22.
30. In a footnote Morgenstern, (p.
183 n. 235) states that there is probably
a
sixth stage when the levirate was legislated out of existence by the absolute
command
in Lev. 18:16 and 20:21 forbidding the union of brother and sister-in-
law.
In this connection he feels that the laws in Leviticus outlawing the levirate
were
older than the final editorial work on Deut. 25:5-10 or than the book of
Ruth;
this being an evidence that "at somewhat different moments and in various
legislative
circles different attitudes towards the institution obtained, attitudes
ranging
all the way from that of mild approval of and desire to see the ancient
institution
perpetuated to that of absolute disapproval and prohibition." How-
ever,
N. Snaith, "The Daughters of Zelophehad," VT, 16, 1966, p. 126, writes,
"The
passages [Lev. 18:16 and 20:211 have nothing to do with marriage, but only
with
illegal sexual intercourse.... There is thus no evidence that the P—tradition
did
not know of or disapproved of the levirate marriage." M. Noth, Leviticus,
OTL,
1965, p. 136, also sees no conflict between Deut. 25 and Lev. 18:16, and
simply
voices the possibility (p. 151) that Lev. 20:21 may be abrogating the
levirate
law. Cf. J. Murray, Principles of Conduct,
Appendix B, "Additional Note
on
Lev. 18:16, 18," 1957, pp. 250-256. His position is that Lev. 18:16 is
pro-
hibiting
marriage with the deceased brother's wife. This is not in contradiction to
the
levirate law since the latter law contains the specific exigency of no
children,
whereas
the law in Lev. 18:16 gives the general rule. Ms' argument is that Lev.
20:21
is dealing with a situation identical with 18:16. Lev. 20:21 has marriage in
view
(vyHx twx tx Hqy) since Hql, implies a
marriage. twx
can occasion no
difficulty,
since it is the word for widow elsewhere: Gen. 38:8; Deut. 25:5, 6;
Ruth
4:5, II Sam. 12:10. The penalty mentioned in Lev. 20:21 is childlessness
whereas
the penalty for sexual intercourse with a wife, if the brother were living,
would
be death. The mildness of this penalty is explainable since the brother is
not
living. It can also be explained in the light of the levirate passage. If the
widow
was childless marriage was required. Since it was required in those special
circumstances
it cannot be as grave an offense as the other violations within the
code.
We believe that
consideration.
What cannot be substantiated is his identification of the two pas-
sages,
Lev. 18:16 and Lev. 20:21. The wording is sufficiently different to pre-
clude
them from being identical. His conclusion that Lev. 18:16 has reference to a
marriage
with a dead brother's wife must be rejected. Cf. K. Elliger, "Das Gesetz
Leviticus
18," ZAW, 67, 1955, pp. 1-25,
and J. R. Porter, The Extended Family in
the Old
Testament,
Occasional Papers in Social and Economic Administration, 6,
1967,
pp. 1-21, for detailed discussions of Lev. 18. H. H. Rowley, op. cit., p. 191,
seems
to feel that there is no repudiation of the levirate law in Lev. 20:21 since
the
reference there is to marriage. The levirate law in Deut., however, contains in
Rowley's
opinion no evidence that it has full marriage in view under ordinary
circumstances.
We can see no abrogation of the levirate law in Lev. 20:21. We do
not
believe that the verse presupposes that the brother is still living and
according-
ly
must then be understood, following Snaith, (p. 140) as prohibiting adultery.
The
punishment of childlessness rather than the normal punishment for adultery
(death)
militates against this as well as the verb Hqy, which is the
usual word
signifying
marriage. Lev. 20:21 is best understood as forbidding a marriage with a
deceased
brother's wife when she has already borne a son to the deceased brother.
282 Summarizing Considerations on the
Levirate
At
this point the child born of the levirate relationship is
reckoned
as belonging to the actual father and perpetuates
his
family. This stage is also reflected in Genesis 46:12; Num-
bers
26:20; I Chronicles 2:4; 4:1; 9:4; and Nehemiah 11:4-6,
which
are late passages reversing the original and unique He-
brew
concept of the levirate, whereby the child of the levir-
ate
union is reckoned as belonging to the deceased first hus-
band
of the widow. Nothing remains of that point of view.
The
levirate has become finally, as in all other Semitic cul-
tures,
a mere matter of property inheritance.31
At the turn of the century, J. A.
Bewer devoted his ef-
forts
in four separate articles to the question of the levirate
and
the goel in Ruth and related passages.32 He sees the
development
of the levirate in
stage
is to be found in the book of Ruth. There "the Goël,
whether
brother or more distant blood relative, must marry
the
widow of his kinsman, whose heir he becomes."33
The second step brings the restriction
of the levirate to
brothers.34
This is followed by the stage
legislated in Deuteronomy
where
the responsibility is further restricted to brothers living
together.35
J.
R. Porter, op. cit., p. 19, writes,
"The use of the verb 'take' in this latter verse
[Lev.
20:21] certainly suggests that it is concerned with marriage, but the 'levir-
ate'
obligation to marry the deceased brother's wife only applied when the
brother
had left no sons, and hence the prohibition here may be aimed at forbid-
ding
such a marriage when there were sons of the former union. It may also be
envisaging
the case of a divorced wife of a brother...." So also K. Eiliger,
Leviticus, HAT, 1966, p.
277;
Deuteronomy, ICC, 19023, p.
285, W. H. Gispen, Het Boek Leviticus,
COT,
p.
297; L. Rabinowitz, "Levirate Marriage," EJ, 11, 1971, p. 125.
31. J. Morgenstern, op. cit., pp. 182, 183.
32. J. A. Bewer, "The Ge'ullah
in the Book of Ruth," AJSL, 19,
1903,
pp.
143-148; idem, "The Goel in Ruth 4:14, 15," AJSL, 20, 1904, pp. 202-206;
idem,
"Die Leviratsehe im Buch Ruth," ThStKr,
76, 1903, pp. 328-332; idem,
"Zur
Literarkritik des Buches Ruth," ThStKr,
76, 1903, pp. 502-506.
33. J. A. Bewer,
"Ge'ulläh," p. 144.
34. This is the stage exemplified in
the Gen. 38 narrative.
35. Ibid., pp. 143, 144.
Summarizing Considerations on the
Levirate 283
The final abrogation of this ancient
institution was legis-
lated
in Leviticus 20:21.36
The three authors we have examined on
this question
have
been selected to give a representation of the varying
views
on the development of the levirate custom in
Many
others have been cited in the course of our discussion
and
have made important contributions to the understanding
of
this complex legal and moral institution. When an institu-
tion
continues in existence over such a long period of time, as
was
the case in
of
its purpose.37 Our study has led us to conclude that the
levirate
in
this
involved the preservation of the family property within
the
immediate family. Through this procedure the protection
and
support of the widow was also ensured. The persons
performing
the duty have shifted, according to most writers
on
this subject, but there is no general agreement on the
actual
course of development. Several factors are involved in
any
consideration of the parties who were called upon to
perform
the levirate. One such factor is the place of the data
in
Genesis 38. If we may appeal to this data as the earliest
evidence
in the levirate development and
being
under obligation to perform the levirate in the event of
nonperformance
by the brothers, then the duty of levirate at
its
earliest, devolved not only upon brothers of the deceased,
but
also upon other members of the family. This is one rea-
son
then why the levirate incidents in Ruth and Genesis 38
are
spoken of as complementary and harmonious by
Rudolph.38
A factor which assumes top priority in
most discussions
of
the levirate is the law of Deuteronomy which presumably
36. Ibid., p. 144.
37.
ture in Honor of
Kaufman Kohler,
1913, p. 210.
38. W. Rudolph, Das Buch Ruth, Das Hohe Lied, Die Klagelieder, KAT, 17,
1962,
p. 63.
284 Summarizing Considerations on the
Levirate
restricts
the duty to "brothers living together." When this law
is
interpreted as providing the exclusive conditions under
which
the levirate functioned, it becomes of major impor-
tance
in discussions of the evolution of the levirate. It is
commonly
suggested that the levirate duty was increasingly
felt
to be a burden and thus the Deuteronomic legislation
restricted
its performance and required the levirate duty only
of
"brothers living together." Most scholars holding to the
seventh
century date for Deuteronomy develop their theories
of
the evolution of the levirate custom as though the levirate
law
therein formulated was applicable to that late period
alone.
We have, however, noted the acknowledgment of sev-
eral
scholars that the phrase "brothers living together" is
descriptive
of a very early phase of the family life.39 Yet
Burrows
and many others see the levirate marriage in Deuter-
onomy
as an affair only of the immediate family and place it
in
the final stages of the levirate.40 However, while that may
do
justice to the "brothers living
together" it does not ex-
plain
the "brothers living together,"
unless we presume that
the
lawgiver purposefully legislated an unreal situation.
Further
evidence for the restriction of the levirate is often
seen
in the halisah ceremony which is commonly interpreted
as
providing the opportunity for the brother to circumvent
his
responsibility. This ceremony, however, was intended as
much
for the widow's benefit as for the brother-in-law's.41
An
ordinance having as its purpose the well-being of the
widow,
however, should not be considered a late develop-
ment,
for such laws "protecting the
personae miserabiles can
be
located in the period before the establishment of a state
39. Cf. G. R. Driver and J. C.
Miles, The Assyrian Laws, 1935, p.
243. E.
Neufeld,
AHML, pp. 41, 42, writes,
"Although the Deuteronomic levirate law had
in
view a restriction of the levirate obligation, the way in which the law is
framed
leaves
little doubt that it bears the traces of an ancient custom of Hebrew family
law
which was no doubt out of date in Deuteronomic times." See chap. 2,
"The
Persons
Involved."
40. M. Burrows, "Levirate
Marriage in
41. See chap. 2, "The Ceremony
of Refusal."
Summarizing Considerations on the
Levirate 285
by
the Semitic people, a period when their living together
was
determined by the order of the families, clans and
tribes."42
In Morgenstern's discussion we saw a
division into histori-
cal
stages based to some extent upon the degree of responsi-
bility
involved in the levirate, ranging from a highly com-
pulsory
obligation in the very early period, represented by
the
data in Genesis 38, to the late period at the time of Ruth,
in
which there is no disgrace attached to a refusal of this
duty.
In between comes the stage represented by Deuter-
onomy,
where disgrace is involved, but no severe penalty
exacted.
While Morgenstern's discussion is intriguing, many
of
the specifics must be questioned. Onan's severe punish-
ment
is explainable in the light of his act of deception43 in
rejecting
the levirate duty, and it would be as unwise here to
generalize
and presume that all cases of refusal of the levirate
were
similarly dealt with as it would be to suggest that in the
early
Church all cases of lying were dealt with in the same
manner
as that of Ananias and Sapphira.
Morgenstern's fifth stage is
particularly unconvincing. To
talk
of a complete reversal of the original Hebrew concept of
the
levirate, and of a final stage, wherein the levirate is to be
explained
solely in terms of the widow as property, is not
very
plausible. It requires us to believe that at the very last
stage
of Old Testament history the woman was regarded as
property.
To conceive of her place in Hebrew society in these
terms
is debatable even in the earliest periods.44 Moreover, as
we
previously saw,45 there is no necessity to isolate a final
stage
based on the references reckoning the child, Obed, to
Boaz,
for there is no conflict between the genealogy and the
previous
story.
42. H. von Waldow, "Social
Responsibility and Social Structure in Early
43. See chap. 2, n. 21.
44. See chap 8, nn. 59 and 104.
45. See chap. 9, "Boaz'
Son."
286 Summarizing Considerations on the Levirate
Rowley combines arguments from the
dating of the
sources
where the levirate is found with a comparative study
of
the operation of the laws of blood-vengeance. Unlike
Morgenstern,46
he sees the book of Ruth as preserving a levir-
ate
custom which antedates that prescribed in Deuteronomy.
The
levirate law in Deuteronomy 25 restricts and limits the
earlier
practice mirrored in the book of Ruth. The once-wider
duty
which fell upon all the male family members has been
narrowed
in course of time and eventually becomes restricted
to
the brother-in-law in residence with the deceased.47 This
opinion
concerning the levirate development finds support,
he
feels, when the other duties of the goel are considered, in
particular
that of blood-revenge by the goel of blood. “What
seems
in very ancient times to have been a duty falling on
any
member of the clan of a slain man to slay any member of
the
clan of the slayer was doubly limited in
Old
Testament, in the earliest sources of which we have
knowledge,
the duty of blood revenge was the specific duty
only
of the next-of-kin, and it was his duty to kill the slayer
only."48
Rowley concludes, "It is possible
that there was a com-
parable
limitation of the duty of raising an heir to the dead,
so
that what began as an obligation on the next-of-kin, or
failing
him on others in order of nearness of kin, was limited
to
the next-of-kin only, and to him only if he were a full
brother."49
46. J. Morgenstern, (see nn. 25-29)
sees the development from a duty which
devolved
upon brothers in the earliest stages culminating in the postexilic period
with
the extension of such a responsibility to a more distant relative. G. R. Driver
and
J. C. Miles, The Assyrian Laws, 1935,
p. 245, argue similarly, that "the
custom
of the levirate has been extended from the levir
or his father to the
kinsman
of the deceased husband in order of proximity."
47. H. H. Rowley, op. cit., pp. 179-181. J. Bewer,
"Ge'ullah," p. 144; L.
Epstein, Marriage Laws in the Bible and the Talmud,
1942, p. 85; J. Mittelmann,
Der
altisraelitische Levirat, 1934, pp. 16-27 and W. Rudolph, op. cit., p. 63,
assume
a similar development.
48. H H. Rowley, op. cit., p. 179.
49. Ibid., p. 180.
Summarizing Considerations on the
Levirate 287
Epstein sees three motives which
account for the levirate.
In
the most ancient period, the woman is inherited by the
surviving
relative of the deceased. After this comes the pur-
pose
portrayed in the Judah-Tamar story. In the latest stage,
the
motive behind the practice is both to provide a "name"
for
the deceased as well as to care for his widow. He explains
the
historical development in terms of the changing motives.
"The
historic process of the levirate institution has been grad-
ually
moving further away from the first motive and closer to
the
third, until every motive is lost in oblivion and the insti-
tution
survives only by force of social habit."50
Recapitulation and
Conclusion
Thus far we have seen varying criteria
employed by schol-
ars
in an attempt to analyze the levirate development. These
include
the dating of the biblical documents, comparison
with
the development of other customs, and the differences
in
the motives or purposes behind the institution as means of
distinguishing
chronological stages in the custom. In addition,
chronological
stages are inferred from consideration of the
persons
involved, and from the degree of responsibility be-
lieved
to be attached to the involved persons. Such differ-
ences
provide tie criteria for assigning the levirate custom in
Ruth
to one period and in Deuteronomy to another. This
methodology
has dominated scholarly discussion but has pro-
vided
no consensus on the question of historical develop-
ment.
Neufeld diverges somewhat from the
usual approach. He
feels
that the final stage in the levirate can be isolated, based
on
the limitation of the levirate in Deuteronomy 25. The
Deuteronomic
law represents the custom at the culmination
of
a slow historical process. He goes on, however, to deny
that
the preceding stages of the levirate development can be
ascertained
through a consideration of the persons involved.
50. L Epstein, op. cit., p. 80.
288 Summarizing Considerations on the Levirate
"Apart
from the law of Deuteronomy, the cases referred to in
Genesis
38, and in the book of Ruth, reflect no historical
development
at all; they are only records of the practice in
different
circumstances and at a different time. These records
show
only the order of priority among the persons affected;
this,
however, not according to historical stages, but accord-
ing
to the male relatives available."51
A most significant contribution to
these matters and one
which
noticeably departs from the usual method of approach
has
been made by Thomas and Dorothy Thompson. They
begin
by stressing that which, as a matter of fact, is apparent,
but
the implications of which have been ignored: namely,
that
we have the legal text of the levirate in Deuteronomy 25
and
the application of this law in story form in Ruth and
Genesis
38. The ramifications of this are extremely signifi-
cant.
The most far-reaching are contained in the following
statements:
"Narratives, in which specific legal practices are
portrayed
(such as the book of Ruth and Genesis XXXVIII)
should
not be interpreted and evaluated on the basis of the
legal
texts (like Deuteronomy XXV 5 ff.), but rather the nar-
ratives
should be given the greater weight since they are con-
crete
examples of the custom as it was actually practiced."52
In the light of our previous
discussion it is clear that,
procedurally,
this approach runs counter to most of the
scholarly
discussions on this topic with which we have been
dealing.
The overwhelming majority of scholars operate from
51. E. Neufeld, AHML, p. 34.
52. Th. and D. Thompson, op. cit.,
p. 84. For sentiments approaching this
methodology,
cf. J. Schoneveld, De Betekenis van de
Lossing in het Boek Ruth,
1956,
pp. 2, 3: "Het lijkt ons minder juist om het boek Ruth niet te laten
meespreken
in het onderzoek aangaande de Tossing, maar het de maatstaf aan te
leggen
van en te beoordelen naar wat het O.T. overigens en elders zegt. Het boek
Ruth
wordt dan niet volwaardig als bron geaccepteerd. Het lijkt mij altijd min of
meer
zwak de schrijver aan te wrijven, dat hij niet op de hoogte was, of niet goed
begreep,
waarover hij schreef.... Er zijn bovendien heel wat voorbeelden te
geven,
waarbij de uitgeoefende praktijk niet overeenstemt met de ons bekende
voorschriften,
zonder dat we er aan denken ondeskundigheid van de schrijver aan
te
nemen."
Summarizing Considerations on the
Levirate 289
the
fixed point of Deuteronomy 25 placed in the critical
seventh
century setting. Every other piece of data must be
brought
to it from which it then receives its chronological
setting.
This methodology, however, is viewed as unaccept-
able
by the Thompsons.
An additional ramification of great
import arises from
their
main thesis. Not only should more weight be given to
stories
containing the levirate application than to the levirate
law
but "specifically because Ruth and Genesis XXXVIII are
stories
we should not expect them to be transparent applica-
tions
of Deuteronomy which gives only the general and ordi-
nary
circumstances of the customs, since it is a legal
text. A
straightforward
legal application of the levirate would not
provide
the suspense necessary in the making of a good story.
As
stories, the narratives of Ruth and Genesis XXXVIII main-
tain
a tension and suspense in the mind of the hearer by using
the
leyirate custom in situations where the outcome is not
obvious,
and is not discovered until the climax of the
narrative."53
Many times these two incidents are
found to be out of
line
with Deuteronomy; indeed some do not hesitate to speak
of
them as misunderstandings or contradictions of the law of
levirate.
Such an approach is unacceptable and arises from
the
fact that the "law has been considered to prescribe all,
and
only, the situations and limitations under which the cus-
tom
is to be effected."54 Such an approach is more legalistic
than
that of the Old Testament, from which we have ample
indication
that the interpretation of many of its own ordi-
nances
transcended the letter of the law.55 In the book of
53. Th. and D. Thompson, op. cit., p. 88. We concur with this
remark with
the
following reservation, that we ascribe to Gen. 38 and Ruth a greater histor-
icity
than Th. and D. Thompson appear to do.
54. Th. and D. Thompson, op. cit., p. 89.
55. The incident of Naboth's
vineyard provides us with an interesting case
of
how the term "murder" was interpreted in the Old Testament (I Kings
21:19).
The
same can be said of Saul's intent to slay David (I Sam. 18:17b) and David's
attempt
on the life of Uriah in which case the prophet Nathan remarks, "You
290 Summarizing Considerations on the
Levirate
Ruth,
there is nothing which is in contradiction to the law of
levirate
in Deuteronomy when that law is adequately under-
stood.
That law is best understood as giving a statement of
the
customary, though not exclusive, circumstances involved
in
the performance of the levirate.56 If, as modern studies
suggest,57
Deuteronomy contains legal instructions whose
language
is not that of law in an external-literal way, but that
of
the heart and conscience, then we can accept the divergent
details
in the stories as historically reliable without supposing
them
to be contradictory to the levirate law or thereby feel-
ing
that they can serve as decisive criteria for reconstructing
the
historical process. With the stress on love found in
Deuteronomy,
it is untenable to interpret its laws in terms of
an
external legalism. As Eichrodt remarks, "These laws,
which
can be so easily taken in a legalistic sense as individual
casuistic
definitions quite unrelated to one another, are to be
understood
as the application and practice in particular con-
crete
situations of the primary command of love. . . . The law
is
a practical guide for the man who wishes to set God up as
the
supreme director of his whole being."58 When due consid-
eration
is given to this guiding principle of
the law, the narra-
tive
in Ruth will no longer be seen as diverging from the
levirate
law in Deuteronomy and consequently on this basis
be
assigned to a pre- or post-Deuteronomic period. Rather
the
action of the goel in marrying the widow, Ruth, in
connection
with redeeming the property, will be seen as
one
of the spiritual applications which the central love com-
mand
in the Old Testament would have dictated. It serves as
an
important indication, as Ridderbos has remarked, of "hoe
de
wetten werden toegepast, nl. niet naar de letter alleen,
have
slain him with the sword of the Ammonites" (II Sam. 12:94 Other illustra-
tions
could be given, but the point to be observed is that the laws receive
clarifica-
tion
and explication through the actual cases cited in the Old Testament.
56. Th. and D. Thompson, op. cit., p. 89.
57. W. Eichrodt, Theology of the Old Testament, 1, 1961,
p. 91.
58. Ibid., pp. 93, 94.
Summarizing
Considerations on the Levirate 291
maar
naar den geest."59 Boaz exemplifies the true goel whose
concern
and compassion goes beyond the literal demands of
the
law.
59. N. H. Ridderbos, "Strekking
en Betekenis van het Bock Ruth," offprint
of
an article in SVU, 52, 1952, p. 3.
See chap. 8, nn. 121-124.
11
Summarizing Considerations
on the Goel Institution In
of the Book of Ruth
THE goel is the responsible
next-of-kin upon whom
devolves
various family duties. He acts to maintain
the
vitality of the family group by preventing any
breaches
from occurring within it. He acts to recover the
property
lost or about to be lost to the family (Lev. 25:25,
Jer.
32:7), to emancipate his fellow family member whose
economic
plight had necessitated a voluntary self-sale (Lev.
25:48,
49) and to "recover" the blood of a murdered kins-
man
and thus to avenge his death (Num. 35:19, 21). He
receives
as trustee the payment due to his kinsman in cases
which
call for restitution (Num. 5:8) when that kinsman is
no
longer living. These duties, which were all prescribed in
the
Old Testament laws, are only understandable from the
background
of the covenant in which
came
Yahweh's own unique possession (Ex. 19:5) among
whom
He dwelt (Ex. 25:8). The land was Yahweh's and was
given
to
ful
Lord of history. Therefore, the land was not to be sold in
perpetuity
(Lev. 25:23) but was rather to be redeemed (Lev.
25:24).
Yahweh had redeemed the people of
55).
Accordingly, an impoverished Israelite who had sold
292
Summarizing Considerations on the
Goel 293
himself
into slavery was to be redeemed by the goel (Lev.
25:55).
It is evident then that the responsibilities and privi-
leges
of the goel institution are derived from Yahweh's re-
demptive
action in delivering
and
by His bringing her into the Promised Land. Even in the
case
of a murdered man, the laws regulating the activity of
the
goel of blood are related to Yahweh, against whom the
sin
of murder had been committed. "You shall not thus pol-
lute
the land in which you live; for blood pollutes the land,
and
no expiation can be made for the land, for the blood that
is
shed in it, except by the blood of him who shed it. You
shall
not defile the land in which you live, in the midst of
which
I dwell; for I the Lord dwell in the midst of the people
of
is
an attack upon Yaliweh, himself, since the victim was made
in
the image of God (Gen. 9:6). The ultimate Seeker of the
blood
was therefore Yahweh (Ps. 9:13 [12] ) who worked
through
His agent, the goel of blood. The relationship of
Israelites
to each other in terms of the goel institution is
grounded
in the common covenantal relationship with
Yahweh.
"And I will walk among you, and will be your God,
and
you shall be my people" (Lev. 26:12). The emphasis in
the
Old Testament on the people of God as
a community
comes
to expression in the goel institution, which to a certain
extent
rests on a blood relationship, in other words, on the
solidarity
of the kinship group. Thus it is proper to say that
the
responsibilities of the goel are kinship responsibilities.
However,
in addition, it needs to be stressed that there is an
even
stronger and more demanding bond than that of physi-
cal
relationship. It is the bond of covenant loyalty.' "For to
me
the people of
take
you for my people and I will be your God" (Ex. 6:7).
"The
Lord has declared this day concerning you that you are
to
keep all his commandments" (Deut. 26:18). Ultimately,
1. See chap. 7, n. 7.
294 Summarizing Considerations on the Goel
the
difference between the goel institution in
the
surrounding peoples must be seen in the covenant by
which
all of life was directly related to Yahweh.
Our study of the book of Ruth has led
us to conclude
that
the role of the goel must be conceived of as going be-
yond
those responsibilities specifically legislated in the law.
The
goel in
his
fellow kinsman in all cases of need. This is clear not only
from
the activity of the goel portrayed in the story of Ruth,
but
also from the analogy of the Divine Goel, whose redeem-
ing
activity in at least one instance (Isa. 54:5) is described in
terms
of a marriage with a childless widow and in some cases
in
parallelism with the verb byr,"to take
up a cause," (Ps.
119:154;
Prov. 23:10, 11; Lam. 3:58).
In our study of the book of Ruth we
saw that Boaz as
goel
took upon himself the care and protection of the child-
less
widow, Ruth, and married her in the exercise of a levir-
ate-type
responsibility. This action is best explained, not in
terms
of the historical development of the levirate institution
(see
chap. 10), but as an example of a true goel whose life
is
governed by the covenant and by the loyal Israelite re-
sponse
to the covenant; in other words, 1iesed. The story of
Ruth
is that of hesed motivating and directing the life of an
ordinary
man within the covenant community to go beyond
the
demands of the letter of the levirate law.2
The linking of marriage to Ruth with
the redemption of
Elimelech's
property was in acccidance with Israelite cus-
2. The statement of J. J. Stamm,
"lxg,"
THAT, 1, p. 386, is worthy of
note:
"Boas geht mit Ruth, die hier an die Stelle der Naemi tritt, eine
Levirats-
oder
Schwagerehe ein. Weil das der einzige Fall dieser Art im AT ist, lässt
sich
nicht
entscheiden, ob das Levirat überhaupt zu den Pflichten des go'al gehörte
oder
nicht. Bei der wesensmdssigen Verwandtschaft von ge'ulla and Levirat—beide
suchen
die Sippe in ihrer Ganzheit zu erhalten-ist das erstere durchaus wahrschein-
lich."We
welcome Stamm's recognition of the essential similarity of the goel and
levirate
institutions but would object if in his phrase "Pflichten des go’el"
the
word
"Pflichten" were legalistically conceived. Cf. also H. Ringgren,s
"lxg,"
TWAT, 1, p. 886, who
remarks that marriage to Ruth "offenbar auch zu den
ge'ullah Verpflichtungen
gehörte."
Summarizing Considerations on the
Goel 295
tomary
law. The rationale for this combination is in the or-
ganic
unity of person and property which is an important
aspect
of the Old Testament outlook (chap. 8, n. 106). This
solidarity
of person and property is also reflected in the law
of
jubilee, which provides for the release of the land and its
owner
at the same time (Lev. 25:13, 28, 40, 41).
In our discussion of the purpose of
the book of Ruth, we
concluded
that it was best to interpret the book as having
multiple
purposes rather than in terms of one overriding pur-
pose
(chap. 5, "The Purpose of the Book of Ruth"). One of
the
central purposes of the book is to inform us of the ances-
try
of king David. In his ancestral background there flows
heathen
(Moabite) (blood. The heathen, through the trust of
the
Moabite widow, Ruth, in Yahweh (cf. Ruth 2:12b), par-
ticipated
in the formation of the Davidic house. The universal
purpose
of Yahweh toward Jew and Gentile, revealed in the
Abrahamic
covenant (Gen. 12:3b) and coming to clear ex-
pression
in the gospel of Jesus Christ, (Gal. 3:28, 29) was
foreshadowed
in the story of Boaz and Ruth. Moreover, as
we
realize that through the union of Ruth, the Moabitess,
and
Boaz ultimately the Messiah, Jesus Christ, came into the
world,
we see something of the selfhumiliation of Jesus
Christ
in the Incarnation (Phil. 2:7;
We also noted the important teaching
about the provi-
dence
of God which is found in the book of Ruth. Yahweh
cares
for and protects all those who come to trust under His
wings
(Ruth 2:12). This providential direction of Yahweh
may
even be seen in a wider context and related to the "Mes-
sianic"
aspect of the book. In a real sense the book of Ruth
may
be described as "messianic history." Ruth's apparently
accidental
(Ruth 2:3, see chap. 7, n. 5) coming to glean in
the
field of Boaz was part of the hidden plan of Yahweh to
bring
the Messiah into the world. There is adequate reason
therefore
to say that the Messianic character of the Old Tes-
tament
comes to clear expression in the book of Ruth, since
the
story provides us with the ancestral background of David.
296 Summarizing Considerations on the Goel
We
have concentrated in our study on the functioning of the
levirate
and goel institutions within the covenant community.
One
of the primary purposes of these institutions was the
preservation
of the family name in
seed.
It is possible that these institutions in their deepest
sense
accentuate the announcement of salvation through the
promised
seed (Gen. 3:15). When the name of a branch of an
Israelite
family perished out of
participate
in the Messianic kingdom. That the institutions
involved
had a "Messianic" significance becomes particularly
clear
from the book of Ruth, where the laws governing the
levirate
and goel institutions serve as the very means by
which
Jesus Christ, the son of David, is eventually born into
the
world. We may therefore say that, in an ultimate sense,
the
levirate and goel institutions found their purpose in
Christ
and in His kingdom.
When we enter finally into the
intriguing questions which
revolve
around the proper place of typological interpreta-
tion,3
we are entering into one of the most precarious areas
of
Old Testament study. In reality, in typology we are in-
volved
in the difficult question of the relationship between
the
Old and New Testaments. There is a danger of a far-
fetched
Christological exegesis of the Old Testament, but it is
also
possible that we may read less into the Old Testament
than
is really there.4 We must use the typological method
3. Cf. G. von Rad, "Typological
Interpretation of the Old Testament,"
pp.
17-39, W. Eichrodt, "Is Typological Exegesis an Appropriate Method,"
pp.
224-245 and H. W. Wolff, "The Hermeneutics of the Old Testament,"
pp.
181-186 in Essays on Old Testament
Hermeneutics, ed. C. Westermann, 1963.
Cf.
also the penetrating discussion of typological interpretation in G. von Rad,
OTT, 2, 1965, pp.
362-374, 382-387. See also N. H. Ridderbos, "Typologie,"
VoxT, 31, 1961, pp.
149-159; idem, "Het Oude Testament in de Prediking,"
GTT, 56, 1956, pp.
142-153, (hereafter cited as "Prediking"). G. Hasel, Old Tes-
tament Theology:
Basic Issues in the Current Debate, 1972, p. 73, rightly com-
ments,
"The importance of the typological approach is not to be denied, if it is
not
developed into a hermeneutic method which is applied to all texts like a
divining-rod."
4. G. von Rad, OTT, 2, p. 385, remarks, "It is a simple fact that Christian
faith
can express itself, and indeed elucidate itself, in material drawn from the Old
Summarizing Considerations on
the Goel 297
with
caution, however, and not pretend that the New Testa-
ment
reality (antitype) will correspond in a photographic
manner
to the Old Testament type.
In terms of the application of the
principle of typology
to
the book of Ruth, we consider it to be illegitimate to draw
elaborate
parallels between Boaz as Christ and Ruth as the
bride
of Christ. It is even questionable whether we may fol-
low
the somewhat more restrained approach of De Graaf
when
he writes, "Zoals door Boaz de losser, de naam en de
plaats
van Elimelech en zijn geslacht in
zoo
herstelt de Christus den naam der Zijnen in eeuwigheid
en
geeft Hij hun en eeuwig erfdeel."5
In discussing the limits of the
typology of the book of
Ruth,
we must remind ourselves of something which is clear-
ly
stated within the pages of the Old Testament, that is,
that
Yahweh is
ment
asserts that Yahweh is
Testament
as well as from the New. The patriarchal history, the stories of the
wanderings
in the wilderness, those of the Judges and Kings, and the ancient
prayers
and prophecies do in fact all have a point, an aspect, from which they can
be
made to speak quite directly of Christ." On typology as applied to Christ,
cf.
N.
H. Ridderbos, "Prediking," pp. 149, 150.
5. S. G. de Graaf, Verbondsgeschiedenis, 19352,
p. 359. His view is accepted
by
C. Goslinga, Het Boek Ruth, KV, 19522,
p. 125, but rightly criticized by N. H.
Ridderbos,
"Strekking en Betekenis van het Boek Ruth," offprint of an article in
SVU,
52, 1952, p. 5, for finding too many analogies between the action of Boaz
and
the work of Christ.
6. R. Sklba, "The Redeemer of
Israel," CBQ, 34, 1972, pp. 14,
18, writes:
"The
only feasible origin for so bold an image of Yahweh as 'redeemer' and 'next
of
kin' must have been that primordial event of revelation by which the people of
That
event was Sinai.... As a self-designated relative, He had freely bound Him-
self
by covenant loyalty (hesed) to show
concern for his family and had expressed
that
bond by liberating them from the oppression of Pharoah." Sklba seeks to
argue
that the Sinaitic covenant was not modeled after the structure of the Hittite
treaties.
The Sinaitic relationship between Yahweh and
through
the blood rituals which "served to create a family bond; the people of
accepted
them as His own relatives and kinsfolk"; op. cit., p. 11. At a post-Sinai
period
the relationship with Yahweh took on the form of the international
treaties
and there was a transformation from Yahweh as a Relative to King. Cf.
the
views of D. Daube, chap. 4, "Goel-Redemption of Property," and nn.
37-39, 167.
298 Summarizing Considerations on the Goel
attention
to the covenant, in which He bound himself to his
people.
"Thou hast led in thy steadfast love (jdsHb) the
people
whom thou hast redeemed (tlxg)" (Ex. 15:13). This
covenant
loyalty of Yahweh is seen in the experience of Ruth
and
Naomi (Ruth 2:20) and comes to expression in the life
of
Boaz. When Boaz shows covenant loyalty, he is acting as
an
agent of Yahweh and can as such be mentioned as a type
of
the great Agent of Yahweh, Jesus Christ. In the actions of
Boaz
as goel we see foreshadowed7 the saving work of Jesus
Christ,
his later descendant. As Boaz had the right of redemp-
tion
and yet clearly was under no obligation8 to intervene on
Ruth's
behalf, so it is with Christ. As Boaz, seeing the plight
of
the poor widows, came to their rescue because his life was
governed
by Yahweh and his laws, so also of the Messiah it is
prophesied
that his life would be governed by the law of God
and
that he would deal justly and equitably with the poor
and
with those who were oppressed (Ps. 72:2, 4, 12, 13; Isa.
11:4).9
7. G. von Rad, OTT, 2, p. 384, rightly states, "Even where the Old Testa-
ment
event is a close prefiguration of the saving event of Christ's coming ... it is
no
more than a shadow of the reality."
8. I.e., no legal obligation if the law is understood in an external, literal
way.
9. N. H. Ridderbos,
"Prediking," p. 152, quite properly remarks, "M.i. is het
onvoldoende
gemotiveerd om, zoals dat wel geschiedt, in de onwaardige Ruth een
type
van Christus' braid te zien, maar is het wel geoorloofd Boaz een type van
Christus
te noemen, omdat Boaz, evenals dat van Christus wordt geprofeteerd, het
`reche
der armen, der verdrukten gelden doet. En daarbij zullen we er alle nadruk
op
moeten laten vallen, dat Boaz zo handelt, niet omdat hij zulke edele karak-
tereigenschappen
heeft, maar omdat hij zijn leven laat bepalen door de Tora."
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ABBREVIATIONS*
AASOR
The Annual Of the American Schools of
Oriental Research,
AB The
Anchor Bible,
AHML
Ancient Hebrew Marriage Laws, E.
Neufeld,
AJSL
American Journal of Semitic Languages and
Literatures,
AJT American
Journal of Theology,
ALUOS
Annual of
ANET
Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to
the Old Testament, ed.
J. B. PritcharcI,
AOS American
Oriental Series,
ARM Archives
Royales de Mari. Transcriptions et Traductions, pub-
liées sous la direction de Parrot et
Dossin,
ArOr Archiv
Orientalni,
ARW Archly
fur Religionswissenschaft,
ATD Das
Alte Testament Deutsch, Göttingen.
BA The
Biblical Archaeologist,
BASOR
Bulletin of the American Schools of
Oriental Research, New
Haven.
BAT Die
Botschaft des Alten Testaments,
BBC Broadmans
Bible Commentary,
BDB Hebrew
and English Lexicon of the Old Testament, F. Brown,
S. R. Driver,) and C. A. Briggs, (
print, 1962).
BHK Biblia
Hebraica, ed. R. Kittel,
BiOr Bibliotheca
Orientalis,
BJRL
The Bulletin of the John Rylands Library,
BK Biblischer
Kommentar Altes Testament, Neukirchen.
BOT De
Boeken van het Oude Testament, Roermond and Maaseik.
BS Bibliotheca
Sacra,
BStN Biblische
Studien, Neukirchen.
BT The
Bible Translator,
BWAT
Beitrage zur Wissenschaft vom Alten
Testament,
BZAW
Beihefte zur ZAW,
CB Century
Bible,
CBQ The
Catholic Biblical Quarterly,
CH Codex Hammurabi.
COT Commentaar
op het Oude Testament, Kampen.
DI Dine
EB Encyclopaedia
Biblica, ed. T. K. Cheyne and J. Black,
1899-1903.
299
300 Bibliographical Abbreviations
EJ Encyclopaedia
Judaica, ed. C. Roth and G. Wigoder, Jerusa-
lem, 1971.
EvQ Evangelical
Quarterly, Exeter.
ExpT
The
Expository Times, Edinburgh.
GKC
Gesenius'
Hebrew Grammar as edited and enlarged by E.
Kautzsch (1909 edition = 28th German
edition), tr. by A. E.
Cowley (Oxford, corrected reprint
1960).
GTT Gereformeerd
Theologisch Tijdschrift, Kampen.
GUOST
Glasgow University Oriental Society
Transactions, Glasgow.
HAT Handbuch
zum Alten Testament, Tübingen.
HK Handkommentar zum Alten Testament, ed. W.
Nowack, Got-
tingen.
HL Hittite Laws.
HSAT
Die
Heilige Schrift des Alten Testaments, Bonn.
HTR The
Harvard Theological Review, Cambridge, Mass.
HUCA
Hebrew Union College Annual,
Cincinnati.
IB The
Interpreter's Bible, New York.
ICC The
International Critical Commentary, Edinburgh.
IDB The
Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible, ed. G. A. Buttrick,
New York, 1962.
ILR Israel
Law Review, Jerusalem.
IOT Introduction
to the Old Testament.
JAOS
The
Journal of the American Oriental Society, New Haven.
JBL The
Journal of Biblical Literature, Middletown.
JBR The
Journal of Bible and Religion, Boston.
JCS The
Journal of Cuneiform Studies, New Haven.
JE The
Jewish Encyclopedia, ed. I. Singer, New York, 1901-
1906.
JJS The
Journal of Jewish Studies, London.
JNES
Journal
of Near Eastern Studies, Chicago.
JPOS Journal
of the Palestine Oriental Society, Jerusalem.
JQR The
Jewish Quarterly Review, Philadelphia.
JRAS
Journal
of the Royal Asiatic Society, London.
JSS Journal
of Semitic Studies, Manchester.
JTS The
Journal of Theological Studies, London.
JurR Juridical
Review, London.
KAT Kommentar
zum Alten Testament, Leipzig, Gittersloh.
KB Lexicon
in Veteris Testamenti Libros, with suppl., L. Koehler
(Heb.), W. Baumgartner (Aram.),
Leiden, 1958.
KHC
Kurzer
Hand-Commentar zum Alten Testament, ed. Karl
Marti, Tubingen.
KJV King
James Version.
KV Korte
Verklaring der Heilige Schrift, Kampen.
LXX Septuagint,
ed. A. Rahlfs, Stuttgart, 19504.
MAL
Middle Assyrian Laws.
MT Massoretic Text.
NBC The New
Bible Commentary, ed. F. Davidson, London, 19542.
Bibliographical Abbreviations 301
NBCR
The New Bible Commentary Revised, ed.
D. Guthrie and J. A.
Motyer, London, 1970.
NBD The
New Bible Dictionary, ed. J. D. Douglas, London, 1962.
NEB New
English Bible.
NedThT
Nederlands Theologisch Tijdschrift,
Wageningen.
NKZ Neue
Kirchliche Zeitschrift, Erlangen, Leipzig.
NS New Series.
NThT
Nieuw
Theologisch Tijdschrift, Haarlem.
NV Nieuwe
Vertaling (op last van het Nederlandsch Bijbelge-
nootschap).
Or Orientalia.
Commentarii periodici Pontificii Instituti Biblici,
Rome.
OTL Old
Testament Library (series of commentaries and books
published by SCM Press).
OTS Oudtestamentische
Studiën, Leiden.
OTT Old
Testament Theology, G. von Rad, tr, from 2nd German
edition by D. M. G. Stalker, 1, 2,
Edinburgh, 1962, 1965.
PCB Peake's
Commentary on the Bible, ed. M. Black and H. H.
Rowley,
London, 1962.
PEQ Palestine
Exploration Quarterly, London.
RB Revue
Biblique, Paris.
RGG Die
Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, Tübingen.
RHA Revue
Hittite et Asianique, Paris.
RHPhR
Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie
Religieuses, Strasbourg, Paris.
RHR Revue
de l'Histoire des Religions, Paris.
RIDA
Revue Internationale des Droits de
l'Antiquité:, Brussels.
RSO Rivista
degli Studi Orientals, Rome.
RSV Revised
Standard Version.
RThPh
Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie,
Lausanne.
SAT Die
Schriften des Alten Testaments, in Auswahl tibersetzt und
erklärt von Hermann Gunkel
u.a., Gottingen.
SB Soncino
Bible, ed. A. Cohen, London.
SBT Studies
in Biblical Theology, London.
SKGG
Schriften der Königsberger Gelehrten
Gesellschaft, Halle.
SThZ
Schweizerische Theologische Zeitschrift,
Zurich.
StOr Studia
Orientalia, Helsinki.
SVT Supplements
to Vetus Testamentum, Leiden.
SVU Studentenalmanak
Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam.
TB Tyndale
Bulletin, London.
THAT
Theologisches HandwOrterbuch zum Alten
Testament, 1, ed.
E. Jenni and C. Westermann, Munich
and Zurich, 1971.
ThLZ
Theologische Literaturzeitung,
Berlin.
ThStKr
Theologische Studien und Kritiken,
Hamburg.
ThT Theologisch
Tijdschrift, Leiden.
ThZ Theologische
Zeitschrift, Basel.
TOT Theology
of the Old Testament.
302 Bibliographical Abbreviations
TOTC
Tyndale Old Testament Commentaries,
TU Tekst
en Uitleg,
TWAT
Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Alten
Testament, ed. G. J.
Botterweck and H. Ringgren,
TWNT
Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen
Testament, ed. G. Kit-
tel and G. Friedrich,
UT Ugaritic
Textbook, C. H. Gordon,
VT Vetus
Testamentum,
VoxT
Vox Theologica, Assen.
WestC
Westminster Commentaries,
ZA Zeitschrift
für Assyriologie und verwandte Gebiete, Leipzig.
ZAW Zeitschrift
für die Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft,
ZThK
Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche,
Tübingen.
In
some instances there is a difference between the numbers of the
verses
of the Hebrew and the English Bibles. In such cases, the number
of
the verse(s) in the English Bible is placed in parentheses after the
references
of the Hebrew Bible.
Except
for those instances otherwise indicated, quotations of the Bible
are
from the Revised Standard Version.
BIBLIOGRAPHY*
Literature on Ruth
Ap-Thomas,
D. R. "The Book of Ruth," ExpT,
79, 1968, pp. 369-373.
Baldwin,
J., "Ruth," NBCR.
Beattie,
D. R. G., "Kethibh and Qere in Ruth IV:5," VT, 21, 1971, pp.
490-494.
_______,
Studies in Jewish Exegesis of the Book of
Ruth from
the Ancient Versions to the Mediaeval
Commentaries,
unpublished
PhD dissertation,
Bertholet,
A., Das Buch Ruth, KHC, 17, 1898.
Bertman,
S., "Symmetrical Design in the Book of Ruth," JBL, 84,
1965, pp. 165-168.
Beam,
I., "The Book of Ruth," in The
Five Scrolls,
Bewer,
J., "Die Leviratsehe im Buch Ruth," ThStKr, 76, 1903, pp.
328-332.
_________,
"Zur Literarkritik des Buches Ruth," ThStKr, 76,
1903, pp. 502-506.
_________,
"The Ge'ullah in the Book of Ruth," AJSL, 19, 1903,
pp. 143-148.
_________,
"The Goel in Ruth 4:14, 15," AJSL, 20, 1903-04, pp.
202-206.
Brongers,
H. A., "Enkele Opmerkingen over het Verband tussen Lossing
en Leviraat in Ruth IV," NedThT, 2, 1947-48, pp. 1-7.
Burrows,
M., "The Marriage of Boaz and Ruth," JBL, 59, 1940, pp.
445-454.
Cannon,
W. W., "The Book of Ruth," Theology,
16, 1928, pp. 310-
319.
Carlebach,
J., "Ein1eitung in das Buch Ruth," in Jüdische Studien Jozef
Wohlgemut
zulseinem 60 Geburtstag,
Caspari,
W., "Erbtochter and Ersatzehe in Ruth 4," NKZ, 19, 1908, pp.
115-129.
*The following bibliography, which
is rather extensive, is all related to the
book
of Ruth. In this list of literature I have not sought to be exhaustive. The
literature
was divided into the four categories in order to help the reader, though
it
goes without saying that in some instances the placement of the individual
books
was problematic. Only the commentaries on the book of Ruth were includ-
ed
in this bibliography.
303
304 Bibliography
Cooke,
G. A., The Book of Ruth,
Crook,
M., "The Book of Ruth—A New Solution," JBR, 16, 1948, pp.
155-160.
David,
M., "The Date of the Book of Ruth," OTS, 1, 1941-42, pp. 55-63.
_________,
Het Huwelijk van Ruth,
Dijkema,
F., "Ruth 4:17-22," NThT,
24, 1935, pp. 111-118.
Eissfeldt,
0., "Wahrheit und Dichtung in der Ruth Erzählung,"
Sitzungsberichte
der S'achsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu
Fraine,
J. de, Rechters • Ruth, BOT, 3, 1955.
Gerleman,
G., Ruth Das Hohelied, BK, 18, 1965.
Glanzman,
G., "The Origin and Date of the Book of Ruth," CBQ, 21,
1959, pp. 201-207.
Goslinga,
C. J., Het Boek Ruth, KV, 19522.
Gray,
J., Joshua, Judges, Ruth, CB, 1967.
Gressmann,
H., Ruth, SAT, 1, 19222.
Gunkel,
H., "Ruth," RGG, 4, 19302,
pp. 2180-2182.
_________,
"Ruth," in Reden und
Aufsätze, Göttingen, 1913,
pp. 65-92.
Gurewicz,
S. B., "Some Reflections on the Book of Ruth," Australian
Biblical Review, 5, 1956, pp.
43-54.
Hajek,
H., Heimkehr nach
BStN, 33, 1962.
Haller,
M., "Ruth," in Die Fünf Megilloth,
HAT, 18, 1940.
Hals,
R. M., The Theology of the Book of Ruth,
Herbert,
A. S., "Ruth," in PCB.
Hertzberg,
H. W., Die Bucher Josua, Richter, Ruth,
ATD, 9, 19653.
Humbert,
P., "Art et lecon de l'histoire de Ruth," RThPh, n.s., 26,
1938, pp. 257-286.
Jepsen,
A., "Das Buch Ruth," ThStKr,
108, 1937-38, pp. 416-428.
Joüon,
P., Ruth,
Juynboll,
Th. W., "Het boek Ruth uit het oogpunt der vergelijkende
Rechtswetenschap,"
ThT, 40, 1906, pp. 158-180.
Keil,
C. F. Joshua, Judges, Ruth,
Edinburgh, 1887.
Kennedy,
J. H., "Ruth," BBC, 2,
1971.
Knight,
G. A. F., Ruth and Jonah,
Kohler,
L., "Die Adoptionsform von Rt. 4:16," ZAW, 29, 1909,
pp. 312-314.
_________,
"Ruth," SThZ, 37, 1920, pp.
3-14.
Labuschagne,
C. J., "The Crux in Ruth 4:11," ZAW,
79, 1967,
pp. 364-367.
Lacheman,
E., "Note on Ruth 4:7, 8," JBL,
56, 1937, pp. 55, 56.
Bibliography 305
Lamparter,
H., Das Buch der Sehnsucht, BAT, 16,
1962.
Lattey,
C., The Book of Ruth,
Levy-Bruhl,
H., "Le Mariage de Booz," Evidences,
17, 1951, pp. 29-32.
Loretz,
0., "The Theme of the Ruth Story," CBQ, 22, 1960,
pp. 391-399.
May,
H., "Ruth's Visit to the High Place at
1939, pp. 75-79.
McKane,
W., "Ruth and Boaz," GUOST,
19, 1961-62, pp. 29-40.
________,
Tracts for the Times: Ruth, Esther,
Lamentations,
Ecclesiastes, Song of Songs,
Meek,
T. J., "Translating the Hebrew Bible," JBL, 79, 1960, pp. 332-
334.
Morgenstern,
J., "The Book of the Covenant, Part II," HUCA, 7, 1930,
pp. 159-185.
Morris,
L., Ruth, TOTC, 1968.
Myers,
J., The Linguistic and Literary Form of
the Book of Ruth,
Nowack,
W., Richter, Ruth and Bucher Samuelis,
HK, 1902.
Rauber,
D., "Literary Values in Ruth," JBL,
89, 1970, pp. 27-37.
Ridderbos,
N. H., ‘Strekking en Betekenis van het Boek Ruth," SVU,
52, 1952, pp. 215-223.
Robertson,
E., "The Plot of the Book of Ruth," BJRL, 32, 1950,
pp. 207-228.
Rowley,
H. H., "The Marriage of Ruth," in The
Servant of the Lord,
Rudolph,
W., Das Buch Ruth, Das Hohe Lied, Die
Klagelieder, KAT,
17, 1962.
Saarisalo,
A., "The Targum to the Book of Ruth," StOr, 2, 1928,
pp. 88-104.
Schoneveld,
J., De Betekenis van de Lossing in het
Boek Ruth, 's-Graven-
hage, 1956.
Segert,
S., "Zum Problem der Metrischen Elemente im Buche Ruth,"
ArOr,
25, 1957, pp. 190-200.
Shearman,
S., and Curtis, J., "Divine-Human Conflicts in the Old Testa-
ment," JNES, 28, 1969, pp. 235-240.
Slotki,
J. J., "Ruth," in The Five
Megilloth, SB, 1946.
Smit,
G., Ruth, Ester en Klaagliederen, TU,
1930.
Smith,
L. P., "Ruth," IB, 2, 1953.
Staples,
W. E., "The Book of Ruth," AJSL,
53, 1936-1937, pp. 145-
157.
_________,
"Notes on Ruth 2,20 and 3,12," AJSL,
54, 1937-38,
pp. 62-65.
306 Bibliography
Stinespring,
W., "Note on Ruth 2:19," JNES,
3, 1944, p. 101.
Thompson,
Th. and D., "Some Legal Problems in the Book of Ruth,"
VT,
18, 1968, pp. 77-99.
Thornhill,
R., "The Greek Text of the Book of Ruth," VT, 3, 1953,
pp. 236-249.
Vellas,
B., "The Book of Ruth and its Purpose," Theologia Athens, 25,
1954, pp. 201-210.
Vesco,
J. L., "La Date du Livre de Ruth," RB, 74, 1967, pp. 235-247.
Verhoef,
P. A., "Die Genealogie van Dawid," Ned. Geref. Teologiese
Tydskrif, 5, 1964„ pp.
114-117.
1939, pp. 44-54.
Vriezen,
Th. C., "Two Old Cruces," OTS,
5, 1948, pp. 80-88.
Waard,
J. de, "Translators Handbook of Ruth," BT, 21, 1970, pp. 157-
168.
Wambacq,
B. N., "Le Mariage de Ruth," in Mélanges
Eugene Tisserant,
1,
Weinfeld,
M., "Ruth," EJ, 14, 1972.
Weiss,
D., "The Use of hnq in connection with Marriage," HTR, 57,
1964, pp. 244-248.
Wolfenson,
L., "Purpose of the Book of Ruth," BS, 69, 1912, pp. 329-
344.
_________,
"The Character, Contents and Date of Ruth," AJSL,
27, 1911, pp. 285-300.
________,
"Implicatons of the Place of the Book of Ruth in
Editions, Manuscripts and Canon of the
Old Testament," HUCA, 1,
1924, pp. 151-178.
Würthwein,
E., "Ruth," in Die Fünf Megilloth, HAT, 18, 1969.
Literature on the Levirate Marriage in
Ancient Near East
Belkin,
S., "Levirate and Agnate Marriage," JQR, 60, 1969-70,
pp. 275-329.
Burrows,
M., "Levirate Marriage in
________,
"The Ancient Oriental Background of Hebrew Levir-
ate Marriage," BASOR, 77, 1940, pp. 2-15.
Coats,
G., "Widow's Rights: A Crux in the Structure of Genesis 38,"
CBQ,
34, 1972, pp. 461-466.
Cruveilhier,
P., "Le levirat chez les Hebreux et chez les Assyriens," RB,
34, 1925, pp. 524-546.
Daube,
D., "Consortium in Roman and Hebrew Law," JurR, 62, 1950,
pp. 71-91.
Bibliography 307
Driver,
G. R., and Miles, J. C., The Assyrian
Laws,
pp. 240-249.
Epstein,
L. M., Marriage Laws in the Bible and the
Talmud,
Gordon,
C., "Status of Women Reflected in the Nuzi Tablets," ZA, 43,
1936, pp. 146-169.
Koschaker,
P., "Zum Levirat nach hethitischen Recht," RHA, 10,
1933, pp. 77-89.
Mace,
D. R., Hebrew Marriage,
Mattuck,
Literature in honor of Kaufman Kohler,
Mittelmann,
J., Der altisraelitsche Levirat,
Muntingh,
L. M., "The Social and Legal Status of a Free Ugaritic
Female," JNES, 26, 1967, pp. 102-112.
Neufeld,
E., Ancient Hebrew Marriage Laws,
Porter,
J. R., "Legal Aspects of Corporate Personality," VT, 15, 1965,
pp. 361-375.
Praag,
A. van, Droit matrimonial
assyro-babylonien, Archaeologische-
Historische Bijdragen, Allard Pierson
Stichting, 12,
1945.
Price,
Laws," "in Orienal Studies dedicated to Paul Haupt,
ed. C. Adler
and A. Ember, Baltimore,-1926, pp.
268-271.
Puukko,
A. F., "Dip Leviratsehe in den altorientalischen Gesetzen,"
ArOr,
17, 1949, pp. 296-299.
Rabinowitz,
L.
pp. 121-130.
Scheftelowitz,
J., "Die Leviratsehe," ARW, 18, 1915, pp. 250-256.
Tsevat,
M., "Marriage and Monarchial Legitimacy in
JSS,
3, 1958, pp. 237-243.
Vine,
C. F., de, "The Sin of Onan—Gen. 38:8-10," CBQ, 4, 1942,
pp. 323-340.
Literature on
the Goel in
Baltzer,
D., Ezechiel und Deuterojesaja,
(BZAW, 121), 1971, pp. 84-99.
Daube,
D., Studies in Biblical Law,
________,
The New Testament and Rabbinic Judaism,
1956.
________,
The Exodus Pattern in the Bible,
Holmgren,
F., The Concept of Yahweh as Go'el in
Second Isaiah, un-
published PhD dissertation, Union
Theological Seminary, New
308 Bibliography
Jepsen,
A., "Die Begriffe des Erlösens im Alten Testament," in Solange
es Heute heisst, Festgabe für
R. Hermann, 1957, pp. 153-163.
Johnson,
A. R., "The Primary Meaning of lxg ," SVT, 1, 1953, pp. 67-
77
Neufeld,
E., "Ius Redemptionis in Ancient Hebrew Law," RIDA, 8,
1961, pp. 29-40.
North,
C. R., "The Redeemer God," Interpretation,
2, 1948, pp. 3-16.
Oeveren,
B. van, De Vrijsteden in het Oude
Testament, Kampen, 1968.
Patton,
W., "Blood Revenge in Arabia and
pp. 703-731.
Phillips,
A., Ancient
Procksch,
0., "lu<w," TWNT, 4, 1942, pp. 3297336.
Ringgren,
H., "lxg,"
TWAT, 1, pp. 887-890.
Schaeffer,
H., The Social Legislation of the
Primitive Semites, New
aven, 1915.
Sklba,
R., "The Redeemer of
Snaith,
N. H., "The Hebrew Root G'L (1)," ALUOS,
34,. 1972,
pp. 60-67.
Stamm,
J. J., Erlosen und Vergeben im Alten Testament,
_________
“lxg,"
THAT, 1, pp. 388-392.
Stuhlmueller,
C., Creative Redemption in
Deutero-Isaiah, Analecta Bib-
lica, 43,
Tolluck,
J., Blood Vengeance among the Israelites
in the light of its
Near Eastern Background, unpublished
PhD dissertation, Vander-
Westbrook,
R., "Redemption of Land," ILR,
6, 1971, pp. 367-375.
Yaron,
R., "The Redemption of Persons in the Ancient Near East,"
RIDA,
6, 1959, pp. 155-176.
________,
"A Document of Redemption from
1960, pp. 83-90.
Additional Literature (excluding
commentaries)
BT,
20, 1969, pp. 29-39.
Boecker,
H. J., Redeformen des Rechtslebens im
Alten Testament,
Neukirchen, 1964.
Bracker,
H. D., Das Gesetz
Gesetzen der Babylonier, der Hethiter
und der Assyrier,
1964.
Brongers,
H., Oud-Oosters en Bijbels Recht,
Nijkerk, 1960.
Brown,
A. M., The Concept of Inheritance in the
Old Testament, un-
published PhD dissertation,
Bibliography 309
Buhl,
F., "Some Observations on the Social Institutions of the
ites," AJT, 1, 1897, pp. 728-740.
Burrows,
M., The Basis of Israelite Marriage,
AOS,
Daube,
D., "Direct and Indirect Causation in Biblical Law," VT, 11,
1961, pp. 246-269.1
_________,
"The Culture of Deuteronomy," Orita,
3, 1969,
pp. 27-52.
Driver,
G. R., and Miles, J. C., The Babylonian
Laws, 1, 2,
1952, 1955.
Dronkert,
K., Het Huwelijk in het Oude Testament,
Eissfeldt,
0., "Sohnespflichten im Alten Orient," Syria, 43, 1965,
pp. 39-47.
Ellison,
H. L., "The Hebrew Slave: A Study in Early Israelite Society,"
EvQ,
45, 1973, pf:, 30-35.
Falk,
Z., "Sociological Notes on Deuteronomy," DI, 3, 1972,
pp. XXXVII-XLIII.
________,
Hebrew Law in Biblical Times,
Fensham,
F. C., "The Possibility of the Presence of Casuistic Legal
Material at the Making of the Covenant
at Sinai," PEQ, 93, 1961,
pp. 143-146.
_________,
"Widow, Orphan, and the Poor in Ancient Near
Eastern Legal and Wisdom
Literature," JNES, 21, 1962,
pp. 129-139.
________,
"Aspects of Family Law in the Covenant Code in
Light of Ancient Near Eastern
Parallels," DI, 1, 1969, pp.
V-XIX.
Ginzberg,
E., "Studies in Biblical Economics," JQR, 22, 1931-32,
pp. 343-408.
Glueck,
N., Hesed in the Bible,
Gottschalk from Das Wort Hesed im Alttestamentlichen Sprach-
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Greenberg,
M., "The Biblical Concept of Asylum," JBL, 78, 1959,
pp. 125-132.
_________,
"Some Postulates of Biblical Criminal Law," Yehezkel
Kaufmann Jubilee Volume ed. M. Haran,
pp. 5-28.
Haase,
R., Der privatrechtliche Schutz der
Person and der einzelnen
Vermögensrechte in der
hethitischen Rechtssammlung,
1961.
Hardy,
M. J. L., Blood Feuds and the Payment of
Blood in the Middle
East,
Harris,
R., "The Archive of the
pp. 31-88, 91-120.
310 Bibliography
Henrey,
K. H., "Land Tenure in the Old Testament," PEQ, 41, 1954,
pp. 5-15.
Hoffner,
H., "Some Contributions of Hittitology to Old Testament
Study," TB, 20, 1969, pp. 27-59.
Horst,
F., "Das Eigentum nach dem Alten Testament," in Gottes
Recht,
Jackson,
B., "Reflections on Biblical Criminal Law," JJS, 24, 1973,
pp. 8-38.
_______,
"The Problem of Exodus XXI 22-5 (IUS TAL-
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Jacobson,
D., The Social Background of the Old
Testament,
1942.
Koch,
K., "Gibt es ein Vergeltungsdogma im Alten Testament?,"
ZThK,
52, 1955, pp. 1-42.
________,
"Der Spruch ‘Sein Blut bleibe auf seinem Haupt' and
die israelitische Auffassung vom
vergossenen Blut," VT, 12, 1962,
pp. 396-416.
Lewy,
J., "The Biblical Institution of Deror in the Light of Akkadian
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MacDonald,
E. B., The Position of Women as Reflected
in Semitic
Codes,
Meek,
T. J., Hebrew Origins,
Meissner,
B., Beiträge zum altbabylonischen
Privatrecht,
Mendelsohn,
________,
Slavery in the Ancient Near East,
________,
"The Family in the Ancient Near East," BA, 11,
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S., Studies in the Book of the Covenant
in the Light of Cuneiform
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Pedersen,
J.,
Phillips
A., "Some Aspects of Family Law in Pre-Exilic
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Bibliography 311
Porter,
J. R., The Extended Family in the Old
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E. W. Dicken from Gesammelte Studien zum Alten Testament,
Reventlow,
H. G., "Sein Blut komme über sein Haupt," VT, 10, 1960,
pp. 311-327.
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Gebot und Predigt im Dekalog,
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N. H., "Het Oude Testament in de Prediking," GTT, 56,
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E.,
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R., The Laws of Eshnunna,
TRANSLATION
Following
is the translation of the foreign language passages
which
appear throughout this book. "p."=page and "n."=note
I wish to thank Rev. J. Vos for the
translation of the
Dutch,
Mr. Dowling for the translation of the French, and Mr.
Pointner,
Dr. V. Adrean and Miss P. Brearley for the transla-
tion
of the German.
INTRODUCTION
p.
1, n. 2—Stamm
Pdh is a term of commercial law,
which simply expresses the redemption
through
the payment of something of equal worth.
G’l is a concept of family law,
which presupposes a relationship, which exists
constantly
before the individual legal transaction between the one who redeems
and
the one who has bean redeemed, based upon the family bond.
p.
2—Jepsen
The goel was the one who was to
restore property, freedom and life to the
family
and its member ... The verb ga'al means
therefore, 'to restore the life,
freedom
and property which the kindred had lost' ... The means of the restora-
tion
are various: blood revenge, marriage and redemption.... The aim is always
the
same, that is, to win back the lost lifestrength of the kindred.
CHAPTER 1
p.
18, n. 33—Bracker
Therefore in
p.
18, n. 34—Bracker
The bride was not being bought or 'adopted'
for a special member of the
family,
but for the whole family.
p.
19—Ring
The difference however, is that in
Assyrian law the regard for the dead person
and
the rightful demand that his name should not be extinguished does not find
any
place at all. Assyrian law only concerns itself with the right of the survivors
to
inherit
the property. The Assyrian-levirate purposed certainly to keep the prop-
erty
within a family, but its regulations do not, as was the case in
the
same time it was pursued, bind the name with the property causing it to live
on
in this way. In Assyian law it was only the interests of the survivors and
their
demands
of inheritance which received attention.
p.
20—Braken
If one turns from the non-Israelite
levirate to the Israelite, it is like entering a
completely
different world.
p.
20, n. 40—Ring
In
313
314 Translation
of
the care or maintenance of the widow as the purchased property of the family,
but
rather that an heir be produced for the sonless deceased husband, whose
property
should be inherited in his own family.... The widow therefore, was not
transferred
as merchandise from one hand to another but she acted independently
in
honor of her deceased husband and his family.
p.
21, n. 41—Cruveilhier
If we compare the Levirate law of
the Hebrews and that of the Assyrians we
conclude
that their resemblance is more apparent than real. In specifying that it is
only
when there is no son that the LL must be applied, Deut. indicates clearly
that
the aim of the institution is to assure the continuance of the name of the
dead
and the heritage of the deceased. On the opposite hand, neglecting the
question
of the existence of children the collection of
aim
in any way preoccupied the author of its levirate law.
p.
21, n. 44—Friedrich
If a man has a wife, and the man
dies, his wife takes his brother; then she takes
his
father. If his father also dies and the wife which he had takes his brother,
there
is
no offence.
p.
22, n. 48—Ring
A special peculiarity is the
explicit rule that a married brother, when so
required,
can fulfill the levirate duty. Through this, he comes into the situation of
living
in bigamy, and probably bigamous relationships were not regarded as being
permissable
within Hittite law, because it is especially stated that in this case there
should
be no punishment. The new relationship is viewed as one which arose
through
special circumstances, an extraordinary measure, a pure exception which
the
law therefore can tolerate.
p.
22, n. 51—Notscher
The Hittite levirate is optional,
but goes further than the Israelite levirate. The
Hittite
levirate follows the succession of brother, father-in-law and even the
brother
of the father-in-law.
p.
23, n. 56—Koschaker
It is much more plausible, if the
levir also has the task of caring for the
continuance
of the family and the name of his deceased brother. Hittite law 193
does
not, however, assert this principle. In my opinion, this way of understanding
the
levirate is highly probable.
p.
23, n. 60—Ring
Therefore, it is not likely, as in the
case of Israelite law, that the primary
concern
was for the continuation of the name of the dead.... Probably the
arrangement
with the Hittites was based upon the total general purpose, in-order
that
through it, even as in Assyrian law, certain guarantees should be given that
the
property be perpetuated in the family as their possession and did not need to
be
delivered into alien hands.
p.
24, n. 61 Brongers
We meet here the institution of the
levirate which is also known to us from
biblical
law, (Dt. 25:5 ff.). But there are differences of nuance. For example, the
question
whether the marriage was childless is here not raised while for the
Translation
315
biblical
law of the levirate this is an indispensable condition. Furthermore, the
explicit
announcement that a levirate marriage is not punishable seems to suggest
that
it was not a legal obligation.
p.
25, n. 67—Nougayrol
His house will not flourish.
p.
26, n. 73—Muntingh
On the basis of this text, we cannot
state that the levirate would be the rule
for
the majority of the population. The royal family could refer in matrimonial
matters
to different customs from that which applied to the rest of the popula-
tion.
If one could reason by analogy with the Hebrew institution the marriage of
the
widow of the older could play a role in the inheritance of the crown.
CHAPTER 2
p.
29, n. 1—Mittelman
Modern jurisprudence, however, uses
the expression levirate for all cases in
which
the widow falls to a relative of the husband, whether he be the brother or
any
other relative of the deceased.
p.
29, n. 1—Dronkert
In the strict sense We only meet the
practice of the levirate marriage in Gen.
38
and in the legal regulation in Deut. 25:5-10. In the book of Ruth we are not
confronted
with a levitate marriage.... In essence the case of Ruth does not have
much
to do with a levitate marriage.
p.
32, n. 9—Boecker
In the adultery proceedings against
pronounced
the verdict over the accused woman: Let her be burned.
p.
33, n. 11—Jepsen
Noteworthy is the occurrence of the
root in the historical books where it is
predominently
applied to the relationship of people toward each other. However,
there
are only a few places which direct themselves to a relationship with God,
where
the differences of men are determined only in relation to their righteous-
ness.
Above all it is clear that righteousness has something io do with God.
p.
33, n. 11—Gerstenberger
In the family, clan or tribe, the
father is the person of authority, who stands in
the
center of the social structure.... The family head is therefore to be viewed as
the
originator and guarantor of the prohibitions and laws regulating the clan life.
The
limitation of the father's rights is nevertheless given through this, that he
too
moves
within the God-protected laws which are over him and which express
themselves
in the family order. Therefore,
himself
convicted through the 'higher justice.'
p.
33, n. 11—Boecker
Therefore,
however,
was unjust.
316 Translation
p.
34, n. 11—Koch
She is righteous, I am not.
p.
34, n. 12—Scheftelowitz
Onan, who wished to continue to hold
the inheritance of his dead brother,
thereupon
thought that his brother should remain childless.
p.
35, n. 13—David
This does not preclude the
possibility that, after the death of the older
brothers,
sons born later were obligated to marry Tamar.
p.
35, n. 14—Wyngaards
Very likely the obligation to father
a male heir originally rested not only on
the
brothers but even on the father-in-law and other relatives.
p.
35, n. 15—Horst
Whether with the failure of the
brother as in the Hittite law the father-in-law
was
obligated to perform the levirate, cannot be certainly ascertained from Gen.
38.
p.
37, n. 19—Rudolph
Both accounts are to be harmonized
in this way: when Shealtiel died without
a
son, Pedaiah entered into a levirate marriage with his widow, so that Zerub-
babel,
his first-born, was physically his son but legally the son of his brother.
p.
38—Gunkel
God, himself, severely punished this
sin of uncharitableness against the de-
ceased
brother.
p.
38, n. 21—Rudolph
In the very old story of Genesis 38
the levirate duty was very strict. This is to
be
seen in this: that Onan, even though he would have liked to, could not escape
the
duty and instead he secretly practiced sabotage and was punished with death
by
Yahweh.
This difference in the degree of
responsibility depends apparently upon the
difference
in the relationship. The brother must perform the levirate, the distant
relative
could; that there is no contradiction between Genesis 38 and Ruth
follows
also from Ruth 1:11 ff, where Naomi obviously presupposes that if she
would
have sons these would be required to marry her daughter-in-law. On the
other
hand, Genesis 38 does not dismiss the view of an optional levirate by distant
relatives,
only there was no reason to speak of it.
p.
38, n. 22—Gunkel
One observes the view of God which
this incident presupposes. Yahweh's eyes
see
the most secret things which no human eye can see; and He protects the one
who
cannot help himself: the deceased whose rights are violated.
p.
40, n. 26—Mittelmann
Furthermore, we find in the Old
Testament, that in none of the places which
mention
the levirate is there a prohibition against the continuation of intercourse
after
the conception of a levirate son.
Translation
317
p.
42, n. 29—Van PraagI
If in Deut. 25:5-10 "the fundamental
law of the levirate," the term brother
had
a general meaning, the clause which says that brothers must live together
must
be more obviously a relic of the patriarchal period when the different
married
sons of a patriarch would continue to live with their wives in their
father's
house; then the sons of these sons growing up together were regarded as
brothers.
p.
42, n. 30—Ehrlich
Ysh (dwell) can only mean, in this
place: to exist, live, and the expression
excludes
the case where the deceased brother was not contemporary with the
living
one.
The reason for this limitation of
the levirate is obvious. In the case where the
deceased
brother died before the living one was born the widow of the first, by
natural
process of time, is too old to bear children and to fulfill the purpose of
the
levirate marriage vrhen the latter reaches sexual maturity. At the same time
another
factor enters. The feeling toward a brother whom one had never seen nor
could
see is too weak for such a great sacrifice, for indeed the levirate marriage
was
a very great sacrifice on the part of the man.
p.
43, n. 32—Mittelmann
The expression here concerns one
living in the local community with the
relatives,
to which belong all the brothers and their families, and out of which the
widow
was not to be dismissed.
p.43,
n. 32—Merendinp
The word (outside, Deut. 25:5) puts
a sharp line between the family and those
who
do not belong to it.
p.
43, n. 33—Vesco
If the book of Ruth uses the word
without giving it its precise meaning but
according
it a wider significance is it not the indication that the book was written
at
a period when the levirate legislation was no longer in frequent usage and when
the
vocabulary dealing with the relationship was becoming broader.
p.
44—Mittelmann
Since the law only required the
fulfillment of the levirate duty from brothers
that
dwelt together, the assumption is justified then that according to the will of
the
lawgiver the later-born brother is not subject to the levirate duty, since he
could
not have dwelt with the deceased. Furthermore, brothers who live in
different
places, countries or continents are also not subject to the levirate duty.
p.
45, n. 41—Puukko
The phrase is the same as Deut.
25:5, when brothers dwell together (i.e., in an
undivided
estate).
p.
46, n. 45—Noordtzij
The supposed law-givers were
certainly no archeologists! They wrote for their
own
day; they wanted to see their laws obeyed by their contemporaries. And did
they
then prescribe regulations which in their own day could in no way be carried
out?!
318 Translation
p.
46, n. 46—Mittelmann
The lawgiver, in the formulation of
the law, thought in the first place of
brothers
who, as farmers, lived together on the father's property after his death.
p.
49, n. 51—Mittelmann
The consequence of the exilic
law-assimilation process was a standardization
and
reformation of Judean-Israelite law, which left many traces in the P docu-
ment
of the Hexateuch.... The fact that particularly P, a source from the late
6th
century, preaches with much emphasis the right of daughters to inherit allows
us
to conclude that in this case it deals with something new for the Jewish
exiles,
which
had to be ordered with great emphasis in order to take root.
p.
51, n. 53—Rudolph
The importance attached to the
continuation of the name can be understood
by
the absence of a resurrection-hope, so that it is not necessary for us to look
for
another
motive in the Old Testament for the levirate.
p.
52, n. 57—Rudolph
Now besides the preservation of the
name the thought of the maintenance of
the
property also plays a role.
p.
59, n. 72—Nystrom
Probably there existed some
connection between the customs of the Bedouins,
and
the Israelites.
Originally, the one concerned took
off the shoe from his foot quite contemp-
tuously,
and threw it away with the words, 'She is my shoe; I have discarded
her....
Finally, the meaning of this custom was completely forgotten and now, it
was
suddenly the woman who took the shoe from off the man's foot and the
whole
ceremony became one of scorn on her part.
p.
60, n. 78—Boecker
The function of the gathering of the
Hebrew law-forum in the gate consists
not
only in the arbitration and settlement of controversies of various kinds. With
cases
of family, inheritance and liability proceedings it was often necessary that
an
official confirmation of proper proceedings in a lawsuit be given. As the
official
representation of the community the law-forum had to exercise also a
notarial
function.
This renunciation declaration (Ruth
4:6) is to be compared with Deuterono-
my
25:8, where a similar formulation is communicated, in which the one
duty-bound
to the levirate marriage could be dismissed from his duty by the local
law-forum.
The widow's words are understood as
an accusation speech. For the widow
regards
the behaviour of the brother-in-law as an incorrect action against her
deceased
husband, which must be settled by the court.
The elders have to fulfill their responsible
function in a family or liability
process,
and act as witnesses and guarantors of a legal settlement between two
parties.
p.
61, n. 79—Boecker
Because this ceremony is performed
before the elders, the brother-in-law loses
legally
all inheritance rights to the ground and property of his brother.
Translation
319
p.
61, n. 79—Scheftelowitz
The shoe is removed from him as a
sign that his right to his brother's property
is
also taken.... The shoe is a symbol of the right to the property.
CHAPTER 3
p.
63—David
The biblical law, and in particular
Lev. 25:25 ff.., does indeed acknowledge a
right
of redemption ... for immovable goods and therefore also for houses. But
this
right is absolute and unconditional and not, as in Par. 39 of the newly
discovered
law, dependent on the buyer's plan to resell the purchased field or
home.
p.
64, n. 4—Brongers
We have here an instance that
vaguely reminds us of the biblical idea of
redemption
and is nevertheless not the same. First, no family concerns need as yet
be
involved. The regulation is of an entirely social nature.... An important
difference
with Lev. 25:25 ff. is, however, that there the right is absolute and
unconditional
and therefore not, as in this article, dependent on the buyer's plan
to
re-sell the purchased house.
p.
65—Meissner
Because of 28 Gan of the field of
the domain of the city Amurri, the
possession
of Ibni-Ramman, the merchant, complained Arad-Sin before the judges
thus:
The field, which I acquired from my father's house, have Ibku-Sala and his
brother,
the sons of Samas-Nasir, sold foi: money to the merchant Ibni-Ramman.
Addatu
and Basisu, the sons of the merchant Ibni-Ramman, were brought before
the
judge.... Arad-Sin will receive his house and add it to his field.
p.
66, n. 11—Meissner
Now Arad-Sin declares that this
field in reality belongs to him, and in the
court
session it is actually conceded to him; however, as is usual in such processes,
there
is no reason given for the action of the judge.
p.
67—Stamm
The geullah, as a right or duty to
buy back lost family property or slaves, was
not
limited to
was
sold, as well as persons. In
takes
the place of the Hebrew g'1.
p.
68—Schorr
Dusubtum, the sister of the god, the
god Suzianna, the daughter of Dugga,
granted
freedom to Israr-rabiat her slave. She cleansed her forehead. The release
from
her slavery she declared. A document concerning the cleansing she did issue.
Istar-rabiat
paid Dusubtum, her mistress, 10 shekels of silver.
p.
68, n. 18—Stamm
The peculiarity of the Israelite
geullah (redemption), in contrast to the
Babylonian,
lies in its relationship to Yahweh.
P.
69—Schorr
1/3 mine 4 shekel (silver), Kisusu did borrow from (god) (Sama).
To Anum-abi
320 Translation
he
did give it for his redemption. At the time of the harvest he will give grain
to
(god)
Samas.
p.
70—Boyer
Hatni-iluma citizen of .... , coming
from Sinmustal whom Napsi-Dagan, his
brother,
has liberated, Gahsu, citizen of Sasran, whom Talli, his father, has
liberated.
The redemption money Bunuma-Addu has received.
p.
72, n. 37—Brongers
... who restores with "nearest
kinsman." He feels that it is clear that "here
the
punishment of a murderer is not yet within the jurisdiction of the judge but is
left
to the nearest kinsman.
p.
73—Kohler and Ungnad
Siri is the owner of the dead whom
Silim-illi did kill. Before them (e.g. the
above-mentioned
people) will either his wife, or his brother, or his son—(whoever
it
may be who arises) replace the dead.
p.
74—Hattusilis
Concerning that which my brother has
written to me: My merchants were
being
killed in the
nobody
kills a soul. If the king hears that someone killed a soul, he catches the
murderer
of this soul, and hands him over to the brothers of the murdered one.
p.
74, n. 46—San Nicolo
The reprisal against the blood-deed
lies in the hands of the 'lord of the blood'
(the
head of the family or the heir of the murdered person). He determines if the
murderer
must die or if he can atone for the deed by paying the blood-money.
The
intervention of the state in this is expressly rejected.
p.
74, n. 46—Matter
According to the Edict of Telepinus
there existed a high court, at the head of
which
as president stood the 'lord of the blood.' The king also had to bow to the
decisions
of this court and no one could come to him for intervention.
p.
75, n. 49—Nystrom
A full explanation of the strength
of the duty of blood-vengeance, and light on
the
dark points in the exercise of this duty is given to us through a comparison
with
the laws of blood-vengeance among the Bedouins.
p.
77 —Procksch
So we can say that blood-vengeance,
according to the rule, was the business of
the
family; therefore it was family vengeance and so the nearest kin is also the
nearest
avenger.... The avengers were therefore, even at that time, family
members.
Only if these would not assume the duty of vengeance did it become
the
duty of the clan. The clan's actual business is war, the family's business
blood-vengeance.
p.
77, n. 56—Procksch
Hence for the brother primarily
there arose the duty of blood-vengeance.
Translation
321
p.
78, n. 63—Attema
People felt this as a law which had
to be unconditionally obeyed, and as an
obligation
they might at no cost neglect.
p.
78, n. 65—Nystrom
However, it is customary, in most
cases, with the Arabs as well as the
Israelites,
that the blood-avenger announces for whom he demands blood-
vengeance
before giving the death blow to the victim.
p.
78, n. 66—Attema
They had to see to it that the
murderer or one of his nearest relatives was
punished
by death.
p.
79, n. 70—Attema
We notice clearly here what
blood-vengeance led to. It often gave rise to
blood-feuds
between tribes, and sometimes whole clans were exterminated.
p.
80, n. 78—Van Oevfren
If the murderer could not be
reached, then a member of his family would have
to
be killed. This last was expressly forbidden in the law of Moses, Deut. 24:16.
CHAPTER 4
p.
84, n. 4—Reventlow
which possess only a logical
relationship to the arrangements of the Jubilee
law....
Here we find regulations of a social nature, which on the one hand are
concerned
with the redemption of land (v. 25 ff) and of person (v. 47 ff), and on
the
other hand with covenant-appointed social behavior toward the poor citizen
(v.
35 ff) and indebted slaves (v. 39 ff).
p.
85, n. 14—Horst
As important and noteworthy as this
religious view of property is, it is not the
exclusive
or governing one in the Old Testament. Another, purely secular concep-
tion
of property, stands beside it.
p.
87, n. 19—Elliger
Commenting on the verb ‘to be’ in
the phrase ‘If there is no goel,’ Elliger
writes,
"Hardly meaning in general ‘to be present,’ rather meaning 'one who is
able.'"
p.
87, n. 20—Gisden
g'l means here a relative, who is
rich enough to redeem someone.
p.
88, n. 21—Jirku
The thought of the Jubilee in
into
p.
89—Buhl
Indeed the usual conception lies
here, according to which Leviticus 25:25
deals
with the repurchase of a property already sold, in as much as one could
point
to the analogy of Leviticus 25:47 f, where an already sold slave is bought
back.
Nevertheless, this view is inaccurate here, as the context clearly teaches. For
322 Translation
it
means, naturally, that the goel should come to the poor Israelite in order to
fulfill
his goel-duty, while on the contrary, it should naturally be: he shall go to
the
one who bought the field. Only verse 26 deals with the situation where the
poor
Israelite actually sold his property.
p.
89, n. 23—NV translation
Son of man, these are your brothers,
your brothers your kinsman and the
entire
house of
remain
far from the Lord, this land is given to us for a possession.
p.
90—Buhl
If your brother becomes poor and he
must sell something of his possession,
then
his next of kin shall come to him and redeem that which he was going to sell.
p.
90, n. 27—Kohler
If your brother becomes poor and
sells something (will sell) of his property,
his
redeemer, the relative, shall come to him and redeem the purchase (the thing
to
be sold) of his brother. That means: he shall promptly appear and through his
purchase
preserve the family inheritance, which is in danger of being lost.
p.
91—Rudolph
From the wording of Leviticus 25:25
it is not clear if the property is already
sold
or up for sale, that is, whether it is a question of purchase or repurchase.
I
believe
that the expression is deliberately unclear in order to include both
possibilities....
The normal procedure was preemption, but in case none of the
redeemers
were in a good financial position at that moment, a repurchase was not
excluded.
p.
94—Sikkema
The final goal is that the man who
became poor and consequently had to sell
would
have his property returned to him. This is effected by the Jubilee and
possibly
even earlier by the redemption. It appears to me, therefore, that the
redeemer
redeems the land for the sake of his impoverished relative; the redeemer
restores
him to the land which he had to sell.... It does not appear likely that
the
redeemer redeems the land and keeps it to the jubilee. That would not be
‘redemption,’
for to the seller it would make little difference whether the buyer
or
the redeemer had the benefit of the land.
p.
95—Sikkema
Would it be possible that the
redeemer redeems his relative from slavery for his
own
benefit so that the slave is set free from his creditors only to become the
slave
of his relative? This would be no redemption and would conflict with vs. 54,
‘And
if he is not redeemed by these means (that is, if he is redeemed neither by
his
relative nor by himself) then he shall be released in the year of jubilee.’
What
neither
the redeemer nor the slave himself does is done by the jubilee: it sets the
slave
free. This verse states that the result of redemption either through a relative
or
oneself is the same as the result of the jubilee: he is set free. The
redemption of
land
and home by a relative must then also have the same result as one's own
redemption
or the jubilee, namely the return of the seller to his own property.
p.
96—Sikkema
... The sale of land in Lev. 25 is
to be understood as a "sale due to debt"
Translation
323
whereas
that in Jer. 32 is an example of "a voluntary sale." In Jer. 32
Hanamel is
not
selling the land out of need. He receives the selling price whereas "in
Lev.
XXV
the redeemer pays the price to the buyer to whom the land has been sold
because
of debt." The deed of purchase is lacking in Leviticus as is to be
expected
in
a debt sale. "In a voluntary sale the land exchanges hands; this is
recorded in a
bill
of sale signed by witnesses; and these bills of sale are carefully preserved.
At
the
next jubilee the purchaser must be able to demonstrate that the field belongs
to
him and ought not to be returned to the seller."
p.
96, nn. 47 and 50—Sikkema
Nothing suggests that Hanamel has
become poor and sells because of dire
need.
The concluding words show that Hanamel was not forced to sell his
property
because of debt. On the contrary, Hanamel himself receives the money
which
Jeremiah weighs out to him.
These considerations make it appear
likely that the jubilee did not annul a
voluntary
sale.
p.
97—Sikkema
By differentiating sharply between a
"sale due to debt" and "a voluntary
sale"
... "redemption is the duty of the nearest relative in the case of a sale
of
home
or land due to debt or in case of slavery due to debt. In a voluntary sale the
same
relative has the privilege to buy the field for himself." The question may
be
raised,
How it is possible in the case of 'a voluntary sale' to speak of the buyer as
a
redeemer. Sikkema comments, "In a voluntary sale the redeemer redeems the
property
insofar that he protects it from falling into the hand of a stranger; he
takes
over the property of a descendant of the original owner and keeps it as a
descendant
of that same original owner whose name he perpetuates.
p.
98, n. 54—Weiser.
The reason why the cousin of
Jeremiah offered him his field for preemption is
not
stated; however, the supposition lies near, that the extended presence of the
Babylonian
occupation army brought much pressure upon the inhabitants of the
vicinity
of
p.
98, n. 54—Rudolph
What drove the cousin to sell,
Jeremiah does not find it necessary to explain; it
is
clear, that the nearness of the Chaldean occupation army brought much distress
to
the villages around
p.
104, n. 78—Sikkema.
The letter of the text strongly
suggests this idea, the meaning of redemption
opposes
it. Is the stranger to grant the Israelite the right of redemption while his
own
people would deny it to him? This can hardly be true.
Furthermore,
it is unconvincing to state that "the many particulars about
redemption
which now follow in the vss. 49-52 rather create the impression that
they
refer to both instances rather than only to the last one."
p.
104, n. 78—DeMoor
The Israelite master was not at all
allowed to treat his fellow-Israelite as a slave
(Lev.
25:39-40, 43, 46). From a stranger living in
such
a thing, and for that reason the obligation existed to redeem a Hebrew slave
held
in the service of a stranger....
324 Translation
p.
105—Gispen
That the possibility of the
Israelite slave to redeem himself is mentioned here
proves
that he continued to have a fairly independent position and had to be paid
wages
(see vs. 50). In addition there was of course the possibility that he came to
possess
money or property by inheritance or gift.
p.
105, n. 84—Sikkema
By the purchase of the land the
creditor is buying a number of harvests; by the
purchase
of a slave the creditor is buying the work of a number of years.
p.
108—Böhl
A tribe, a clan has no more valuable
possession than its men. The loss suffered
through
the murder of a man must be brought into balance again by inflicting on
the
clan of the murderer the same loss. The third motive is the desire for revenge
which
is emphasized too one-sidedly in our word 'blood vengeance.'
p.
113, n. 106—Koch
Where blood is shed, it forms a
blood-sphere, which envelops the perpetrator
of
the deed; above all it cleaves to his hands and head, but also reaches to the
people
with whom he dwells.
p.
114, n. 108—Koch
So behind this custom of
blood-vengeance stands a two-fold idea of shed
blood.
On the one hand this blood-sphere works evil on the person which it now
surrounds;
on the other hand, however, this blood—of the slain—is under strange
dominion
and cries for return to the ancestral community.
p.
114, n. 109—Koch
It should be noted that the
preposition b is usually found with the singular,
blood,
the preposition 1, on the other hand, is found with the plural, bloods.
Apparently
one thinks in the first case of a closed circulation, which should not
leave
the body of the murdered man and gush out, but should solidify within: In
the
second case, however, the speaker has the blood in view, which has flowed out
and
entered the sphere of blood vengeance, and he wishes that it would return to
its
true owner (or to tire guilty murderer).
p.
115 —Koch
This phrase (your blood be upon your
head) has the purpose of precluding the
transfer
of the sphere of blood-vengeance in connection with a violent killing.
Each
avenger presumably pronounced this sentence either before or after he
downed
his opponent. By means of such an invocation, similar to a curse, the
executioner
or the one who commissioned him (e.g., in the cultic command
rituals)
prevented the blood of the victim from spilling not only visibly onto the
executioner,
but also invisibly, imparting the sphere of blood-vengeance to him.
p.
115—Reventlow
Also the formula, 'his blood be upon
him,' is a cultic law disqualification
formula,
with self-working consequences, pronounced by an authorized cultic
officer
over a cultic participant.
p.
115, n. 112—Boecker
The phrase "His blood be on
him," is a verdict-formula, and indeed is to be
viewed
as a declaration of guilt: he has blood-guilt.
Translation 325
p.
116, n. 114—Koch
In the Old Testament there is not so
much the concept of a revenging God but
rather
of a fate-effecting deed.
The thought that a fate-effecting
deed is here (Judg. 9:24) connected with the
other,
that in a murder the blood of the slain goes over to the murderer and
remains
on him.... The death of the murderer removes his surroundings from the
sphere
of his fate-effecting deed. The expression, 'his blood be upon his head,'
pronounced
in the slaying of a murderer assures that this death will not again turn
to
murder and, at the same time, lifts it to a sphere which protects from
blood-violence.
p.
116, n. 114—Reventlow
The curse formula "his blood be
upon him" presupposes a living Lord as the
power
standing behind it and executing the punishment which follows.
Yahweh is the real power who brings
about the due punishment for a deed.
The
prayer takes the place of a curse.
In the prophetic proclamation, the
form of the divine I comes out as the
actual
central point, we can observe how the I of Yahweh powerfully breaks into
the
picture and the divine judge presents Himself as the one who has everything in
hand
and powerfully directs all things.
p.
116, n. 114—Reventlow
What has become clear to us as the
Israelite thought of the fate-effecting
deed-sphere
and the insoluble connection of an action and its consequences
presents
only one stratum, and to be sure a very ancient one in the unconsciously
buried
original structure of Israelite thinking... . Another sphere is that of cultic
law,
in which the declaratory proclamation of the cultic official, 'his blood be
upon
him,' is at home: a culticly powerful action, which, in itself carries the
power
to
set in motion secret connections.... Cultic ritual and cultic law, all are
directed
to the God who reveals his personal being and will at the covenant feast.
p.
117, n. 115—Reventlow
The expression "in order to
shed blood" in Ezekiel 22:6 serves there as a
heading
for a whole list of crimes of which none actually have to do with
blood-shedding.
‘His guilt come upon him.’ The
consciousness that originally it was the
designation
for blood-guilt disappeared more and more.
p.
118—Van Oeveren
Only the murderer must die, not
through the arbitrary vengeance of an
individual
but in the interest of the community and on basis of divine authority.
This
'blood vengeance' is then also more than a right, it is a God-given duty.
p.
119, n. 122—Van Oeveren
The OT report exceptionally few
instances of the carrying out of blood-
vengeance.
But we wilI have to accept as certain that blood-vengeance was carried
out
in
p.
119, n. 123—Aalders
For that reason we may undoubtedly
accept that Gen. 9:6 gives us the
rudiment
of the exercise of public authority. God's legal demand of death for the
murderer
leads inevitably to the exercise of public authority.
326 Translation
p.
121, n. 131—Lohr
The formula, 'he shall be put to
death,' is to be considered as an official
sentencing;
here, probably, stoning by the community members. This is certain in
Ex.
21:15-17, therefore it must also apply in Ex. 21:12.
p.
124, n. 142—Van Oeveren
The word 'place' in Ex. 21:13
"is a vague reference to the institution of cities
of
refuge."
p.
124, n. 143—Van Oeveren
(a) Moses singles out three cities
in
conquered
Joshua sets another three apart West of the
refuge
were able in the main to function as such approximately from the time of
the
Judges to the dividing of the kingdom. As long as the cities were in Canaanite
hands
the rule could not yet go into effect, and after the dividing of the kingdom
the
rule could no longer be enforced. (c) Although the cities of refuge have been
more
an ideal than a reality, this fact need in no way undermine the historicity of
the
institution. (d) The pericopes in the Pentateuch which deal with the cities of
refuge
(Ex. 21:12-14; Num. 35:6, 9-34; Deut. 4:41-43; 19:1-13) are in the main
Mosaic.
p.
126—Noordtzij
The ‘eda is best understood as the legal representatives of the
district within
which
the city of refuge was located.
p.
126, nn. 146 & 148—Van Oeveren
The elders as quickly as possible
inform the ‘eda of the fact that in
their
judgment
an unintentional murderer has fled to the city of refuge. Then the ‘eda
meets
further to investigate and to make a definitive decision.
... The stipulations of Num. 35 are
here very short and briefly summarized.
We
must as it were read between the lines: the last stipulations hold only then
when
the congregation also judges the unintentional nature of the proven and has
made
the manslayer return to the city of refuge.
Deut. 19:12, however, states only
that the ziqne ha'ir (these are the
local
authorities
of the city where the murderer has his home) fetch the intentional
murderer
from the city of refuge so that he may receive his just punishment. This
presupposes
that a sentence has already been passed: the evil intent of the
murderer
has been proved. In our opinion the stipulations of Deut. 19 comple-
ment
those of Num. 35. The ziqne ha’ir now
have nothing other to do than to
give
the go’el haddam the opportunity to
carry out the sentence which has been
passed.
p.
127, n. 149—Van Oeveren
Deut. 19 emphasizes that the
Israelites must take care that reaching a city
of
refuge will not be made too difficult for an unintentional manslayer, vss. 3, 6
f.
p.
128—Delekat
The high priest, as a patron, could
originally guarantee security to the
manslayer
who had fled to the altar and the manslayer could now settle in the
levitical
city as a protected citizen. It is conceivable that after the death of the
high
priest—whose taking over of the patronage as a duty would be quite
possible—the
successor, perhaps to clear the asylum city, generally did not extend
Translation
327
the
guarantee, and this was not necessary because public opinion viewed the
blood-deed
as atoned for by the long separation from the homeland.
The refugee goes to the holy place,
asks Yahweh for protection, at the same
time
dedicating himself to him, and is taken or, rather, released by the high priest
into
a paramone relationship after a hearing or trial in his homeland. He is given a
position
in the lower service of the
prospect
of receiving his complete freedom at the death of the high priest or
perhaps
even sooner.
Paramone—According to Liddell and
Scott p. 1318 this has reference to the
obligation
to continue in service; particularly of a slave whose manumission is
deferred.
p.
128, n. 154—Delekat
In whose house he must remain and be
willing to perform all the jobs given to
him....
The paramone-master, in return gives housing, clothing and food.
p.
128, n. 155—Delekat
The manslayer must remain in asylum
until the death of the high priest, who
had
anointed him with holy oil.
p.
129—Gispen
With this death and through it such
a murderer receives a freedom because the
highpriest
was the great servant of the altar that offered refuge.
Living in one of the cities of the
Levites he enjoyed the hospitality of the tribe
which
substituted for
who
had been anointed with holy oil.
p.
129—Van Oeveren
When the head of the tribe dies,
i.e. the high priest, the tie with the city of
refuge
is also cut and the unintentional murderer may return to his home and
relatives.
p.
131, n. 160—Reventlow
In both places (Numbers 35:27, 30)
the punishable deed of the blood-avenger,
with
which he avenges the crime on the murderer (rsh)
is designated 'with the
expression
rsh. "The avenger shall slay (rsh) the- murderer (rsh). There is no
blood."
Therefore also the slaying which answers now in the course of blood-
revenge
for the first slaying is rsh, and at the end of the sentence it is expressly
laid
down, in a declaratory formula, that this does not bring blood-guilt ... rsh is
the
first blow and the counter-blow upon which, according to the original
institution
a new blow can follow, against which the affected party can answer.
Where
blood-revenge stands in unbroken recognition, there is a chain without end.
There
is only one escape, asylum.... The expression rsh remains intact also for
these
cases; it expresses the accidental as well as the premeditated deed; the
redeeming
deed as well as the deed of revenge. It always marks a deed which in
the
chain of blow and counter-blow falls in the domain of blood-vengeance.
P.
132—Van Oeveren
First of all, it affirms the just
exercise of the function of the go'el
when he
must
let someone undergo his just punishment. In the second place, it restrains
the
misuse of that function. The unintentional murderer received protection
328 Translation
through
this institution while this same institution increased the likelihood that
the
guilty would indeed receive his just punishment.
p.
133—Van Oeveren
Also when the avenger would not be
in a position personally to exercise blood
vengeance,
they must have acted when he requested them to. For, apart from the
avenger's
fulfilling his duty, the community was under obligation to see to it that
a
man guilty of intentional murder paid for it with his life. Otherwise
blood-guilt
would
come upon the people.
p.
137, n. 177—Van Oeveren
Exodus 21:12-14 is generally dated
early. This pericope seems to fit best in
the
time prior to
it
promises in relatively vague terms the designation of a place of asylum, of a
city
of
refuge. He further remarks, (p. 221), "It seems likely to me that the pericopes
in
the Pentateuch (Ex. 21:12-14; Deut. 19:1-13; Num. 35:9-34) which deal with
cities
of refuge originate in the main from the time of Moses. These regulations
were
made with a view to living in
position
that they were made during the journey through the wilderness and the
stay
in
p.
138, n. 179—Gispen
The intention is probably not that
this is a pledge or something borrowed but
that,
particularly in uncertain times, a man gives it to someone for safe-keeping.
The
neighbor asks to have it returned, and then he denies that it was ever given to
him.
p.
139, n. 182—Jepsen
On the other hand it seems to belong
also to the duties of the goel to receive
misappropriated
property for the clan and with this to strengthen their property
position.
p.
139, n. 182—Ringgren
In one place only, Numbers 5:8, the
goel appears as the recipient of the
atonement
money, here naturally in his role as responsible head of the family.
CHAPTER 5
p.
145—Gerleman
One could no longer talk about David
and his lineage in the exilic or
post-exilic
period in such an unbiased fashion as it happens in the story of
Ruth....
It must have been a very definite and compelling reason which caused
the
writer of Ruth to tell his story. This reason cannot be anything else than an
old
tradition about David's descent from
with
Boaz and Ruth, is no secondary addition to an old story. On the contrary,
this
seemingly casual notice is to be viewed as an original kernel for which reason
the
Ruth story was written.
p.
146, n. 8—Goslinga
Perhaps Solomon himself assisted
directly or indirectly in the recording of the
events
contained in this book.
Translation
329
p.
146, n. 8—Aalders
Perhaps it was written at the time
of David himself or immediately thereafter.
p.
146, n. 10—Vesco
literary, legal, and theological
arguments.
p.
148, n. 12—Wurthwein
This purpose was readily determined
in this; that the author with his story of
the
faithful and capable Moabitetess wishes to protest against the rigorous
practice
of Ezra and Nehemiah in the question of mixed marriages (Ezra 9; Neh.
13:1
ff. 23 ff.). However, this tendency does not appear strongly enough at any
place
that one could declare Ruth to be a novel written for this purpose.
p.
149—Gunkel
Therefore, scholars have searched
for a hidden intention and through it—we
are
convinced—horribly mistreated the charming story.... This story does not
really
have a hidden intention.
p.
149, n. 16—Gressmann
Most scholars search for a hidden
tendency.... Thus this search for a specific
tendency
is regarded as extraneous, even tasteless. The narrator wants nothing
more
than to relate and delight, and receptive hearts will still be gladdened by the
beauty
of this tale, which is surrounded by the gentle fragrance of poetry.
p.
149, n. 16—Gunkel
The current and often expressed
position that the purpose of the book of
Ruth
was to take part in e battle at the time of Ezra and Nehemiah concerning
the
dissolvement of mixed marriages with foreigners misses the point. Such mixed
marriages
are not defended in the story but only presupposed as occasional
happenings.
Ruth had to be a Moabitetess because only in this way could the
narrater
display a truly heroic faithfulness which extended even beyond the
covenant
nation.
p.
149, n. 17—Gunkel
To the person who simply must find a
'moral' other than the simple truth of
the
rewarding of loyalty, we would like to recommend the following one: that
men
would do well to be wary of beautiful and intelligent women who want to
get
their own way.
p.
150, n. 20—Hertzberg
The goel does not decline the
marriage for the reason that Ruth was a
Moabitetess—although
that was told him by Boaz. If the purpose of the book lay
in
this direction here to use it. The goel would have found a better reason for
his
refusal
than the one now mentioned and Boaz would have made it clear that it is
proper
and good to disregard such prejudices.
P.
152, n. 24—Schoneveld
There does not appear to be anything
of an opposition which must be
overcome.
Furthermore, why should the writer have chosen a subject in which
redemption
and the levirate are the center of attention.
330 Translation
p.
153—Rudolph
If we add also that in the prophets
targum, the so-called Targum Jonathan,
Ruth
and Lamentations were missing; that they were not counted with the
Prophets,
then we have an unbroken tradition from the first century after Christ
which
places Ruth and Lamentations in the Hebrew canon among the Writings.
p.
156—Gerleman
It is neither the Aramaic particle
therefore ‘ (Dan. 2:6, 9; Dan. 4:24) nor a
faulty
writing for hlhm, but a feminine plural with a neuter meaning referring to
the
condition just mentioned by Naomi. 'Could you wait on it,' that is, that all
these
unsure and improbable things would really come about.
p.
158, n. 52—Rudolph
A pre-Deuteronomic time is indicated
also by the fact that in Ruth 1:4 the
marriage
of the sons of Elimelech with the Moabitetesses is recorded without
censure.
How would this be possible if Deut. 23:4 were in force? ...
p.
160, n. 57—Mittelmann
This is one of the reasons which
prevents us from dating the book of Ruth in
the
time between Deuteronomy and the Talmud as the prevailing opinion has
done
so far, but causes us to accept a pre-Deuteronomic origin, since the words of
Naomi
(Ruth 1:11-13) can only have been uttered at a time in which the
Deuteronomic
levirate law with the words 'if brothers dwell together' was not in
operation.
p.
160, n. 57—Rudolph
For the chronological dating of Ruth
it is critical to perceive that the views of
the
Levirate which are here presupposed are older that the Levirate law of the
Deuteronomy,
which originated around 700 and became public in 622.
His deduction from Ruth 1:11 is that
Ruth is older than the Deuteronomic
law-giving.
p.
160, n. 59—Mittelmann
We accept Mittelmann's contention
that the narrator of the book of Ruth
possessed
excellent legal knowledge.
p.
160, n. 60—Joüon
The necessity of the explanation is
better understood if the author is writing
after
the Exile in which case the long stay in
obliterated
the knowledge of ancient customs.
p.
161 —Mittelmann
Even though the Jews in the
Babylonian Exile knew of the shoe ceremony of
the
Deuteronomic levirate marriage law, they nevertheless could not understand
what
the handing over of the shoe in the book of Ruth meant.... To avoid
misunderstandings
for the readers of the book of Ruth the glossator intervened
and
gave for the legal historian the very interesting explanation of Ruth 4:7.
p.
161, n. 63—Rudolph
It is hardly thinkable that this
symbolic legal custom could have been forgot-
ten
so soon, and there is not the slightest basis for seeing 4:7 as a later gloss;
it
cannot
be denied that the flow of a narrative is interrupted when an explanation
Translation
331
is
inserted.... In my opinion, we have no foothold from which to pin down the
origin
of Ruth more exactly within the period from 1000-700, except that taking
4:7
into account means 1eaning more toward the later boundary....
p.
165, n. 76—Würthwein
a story exemplifying true hesed
(covenant loyalty).
p.
165, n. 80—Carlebach
The book of Ruth As the only one
which gives us some insight into the inner
life
style of our people in their classical time.... Here we are led in a lively way
to
the
influence and education of the Torah, yea the most secret stirrings of their
souls
are revealed here in true clarity.
p.
166—Rudolph
Ruth, like the major part of the Old
Testament literature, does not speak of
men
but of God; its purpose is not that we should admire a gallery of noble
people,
but that we should learn how God acts.
p.
166—Jepsen
Therefore, the book of Ruth is
actually a book of comfort for despondent and
discouraged
people, because it speaks in all hesitating reserve precisely after all of
God's
actions.
p.
166, n. 82—Rudolph
Certainly the narrator exercises all
care in the portrayal of the individual
characters....
That Ruth arrives at the right field, however, is Yahweh's leading;
that
the clever plan of Naomi comes to fruition is Yahweh's mercy and that the
desired
son is produced from the marriage with Boaz is Yahweh's gift.
p.
166, n. 82—Humbert
God is the supreme actor.
p.
166, n. 83—Jepsen
And when it is now recorded how
contrary to despair and despondency, a new
heir
is presented to Naomi, this was for the exiled in their despondency a word
which
comforted them and filled them with new courage. So it cannot be denied
that
the book of Ruth with this interpretation is understandable especially in the
time
of the exile.
expect
from the future, just like the widow Naomi, who was robbed of her
children.
p.
167—Jepsen
Thus the essential thoughts and
images of the book of Ruth can be traced to
Deutero-Isaiah.
With that it will be clear that the meaning of the book could
easily
be understood by the listeners of the exile as a word of comfort for the
people
in all their hopelessness through the reference to a goel who takes
responsibility
for the forsaken.
p.
167—Gerleman
The Ruth story furnishs the evidence
that the Moabite background in the line
of
David was willed and effected by Yahweh himself.
332 Translation
They are prehistories of both great
redemptive principles upon which the
whole
existence of
Davidic-Covenant.
p.
167, n. 87—Lamparter
What Ruth experienced is not only a
piece of family and tribal history. Her
individual
fate is encompassed by the high plan of the Lord, which in the Davidic
Covenant
(II Sam. 7) comes to its redemptive fulfillment. The narrator wants to
show,
by the fortune of Ruth how the Lord, the God of Israel, on the basis of his
free
grace, chooses the despised and makes people the instruments of His redemp-
tive
plan which aims at the return of all, Israelites and Gentiles.
p.
168, n. 89—Verhoef
The genealogy of David is absent in
the book of Samuel and elsewhere in the
OT
it is given only incompletely, that is to say, with the omission of his Moabite
mother,
because these data were already fully mentioned in the book of Ruth.
First,
the authors of the books of Samuel and Chronicles were acquainted with
the
book of Ruth, and the content of the latter book had become generally so
well
known that the authors in question thought it superfluous to provide the
same
detail in recording the genealogy of David. Secondly, the book of Ruth must
have
been written before the books of Samuel and Chronicles.... Thirdly, the
primary
purpose of the book of Ruth was thus indeed to present the genealogy of
the
great king David.
p.
169, n. 89—Goslinga
It has already been observed that
the purpose of the book of Ruth is to show
from
what noble parentage king David originated, and how therein one of pagan
origin
was not rejected by God but taken up into the ancestry of David.
p.
169, n. 89—Gerleman
This presupposed tradition was soon
found to be a heavy burden. In this
situation
the story of Ruth arose as an euphemism. The attempt has been made
here
to beautify the harmful and stubbornly existing Moabite tradition which
dung
to the Davidic line, and to make it harmless.
p.
169, n. 89—Joüon
The book of Ruth is an edifying
history related to the origins of David.
p.
170—Brongers
A careful study of the content of
this chapter can lead to no other conclusion
than
that the author here attempts to make—acceptable that under certain
circumstances
the concept of redemption ought to include the obligation to
levirate
marriage even in its most extensive form. An extension of the obligation
to
redeem is propagated here, an extension which according to the author always
existed
in earlier times but which in his day had fallen into disuse.
In
Ruth 3:13 the go’el must here do what
belongs to the levir. That contains
an
extention of the concept of both redemption and the levirate. In the first
place,
levirate is included in redemption. And in the second place the obligation
of
levirate is extended to include a distant relative.
p.
171—Brongers
He wanted to see the levirate not
only as a means to maintain the name of the
Translation
333
dead,
but also as a guarantee for the social care of the widow. The combining of
these
two concerns which lie on completely different planes is the new element
which
the author wants to propagate.
p.
172—Lévy-Buhl
The story of the love of Boaz and
Ruth is not simply a graceful pastoral; it is a
document
presenting the significance of community institutions of Biblical an-
tiquity.
CHAPTER 6
p.
173—David
that the author of the book of Ruth
was unacquainted with the institution of
goel marriage and
that the redemption in the book of Ruth can only have referred
to
the procuring of property.
p.
173, n. 1—David
But from the above quotation of
Naomi's words in chapter 1:11 ff., in
which
she advises her daughters-in-law to return to their parental home, some-
thing
else becomes clear. Naomi does not even reckon with a marriage of her
daughters-in-law
with relatives of her husband (or of her deceased sons). This is of
great
significance. For there is thus room for doubt whether at the time that the
book
of Ruth was written there existed, as is generally assumed, an institution not
elsewhere
mentioned in the sources according to which a childless widow was to
be
taken as wife by a blood relative other than the man's brothers.
p.
174, n. 2—David
No matter which view one prefers,
these words contradict the supposition of
Naomi
that also brothers born later were obligated to a levirate marriage.
p.
174, n. 3—David
For one can conclude from the words
of Naomi in question that she holds also
children
born from another father obligated to a levirate marriage. Such children,
however,
were to Mahlon and Chilion, the deceased husbands of Orpah and Ruth,
actually
only step brothers from the mother's side. As such they could never have
been
reckoned as member of Elimelech's family.
p.
175, n. 4—Würthwein
It was obviously the intention of
the narrator to emphasize the hopelessness
and
senselessness which lies in joining together with Naomi. Therefore in contrast
with
the previous brief description, he permits Naomi in this place to speak and to
elaborate.
p.
176—Rudolph
That there is no contradiction
between Genesis 38 and Ruth follows also from
Ruth
1:11 ff. where Naomi naturally assumes that if she were to have sons these
would
have to dutifully marry her daughters-in-law.
p.
177 —Mittelmann
Naomi, by the men mentioned in Ruth
1:12, is not thinking merely on any
men
but on one of the kinsmen of Elimelech. However, to be sure, in considera-
tion
of her age she instantly refuses the thought.
334 Translation
p.
177, n. 7—Nowack
Obviously Naomi has the duty of
levirate marriage in mind which reaches back
into
the oldest time in
tially
the custom in its oldest form before her eyes.
p.
178—Bertholet
It must be striking to all that
according to the context Naomi is only
interested
in the happiness of her daughter-in-law and not in maintaining the line
of
the deceased and yet this is the real meaning of the levirate.
p.
178, n. 11—Joüon
Naomi is here not thinking of
levirate marriage, in hoping for sons to be given
a
legal descent from Elimelech. For if Naomi herself remarried, this would itself
act
as a levirate marriage and the sons issuing from this marriage would be legally
the
sons of Elimelech.
p.
179, n. 16—Würthwein
Naomi is one against whom the Deity
has decided, one marked and struck
down
by the Deity. According to a wide spread recognized opinion even within
as
not to be drawn into his sphere of misfortune.
CHAPTER 7
p.
181—NV
a very influential man.
p.
181, n. 1—KB
a distant relative.
p.
182, n. 5—Gerleman
Here the meaning of ‘chance’ is,
something that happens outside of the will or
action
of the person involved, and it expresses the conviction of the narrator that
the
individuals cannot determine the course of events. On the other hand, it is
clear
to him that the guidance of Yahweh stands behind even this coincidence.
p.
183, n. 7—Würthwein
Even if the reference to Boaz in
Ruth 2:20 is not certain, there can be no
doubt
that that which Boaz is doing for the two women and the deceased as well
as
the unknown redeemer falls under the concept of hesed.... In the hesed of
Boaz,
however, one may see the hesed of Yahweh at work who in Boaz procures
an
instrument for himself.
p.
183, n. 7—Van Daalen
hesed is one of the keywords for the
right understanding of the story.... The
word
‘steadfast love’ is constantly used in connection with other words like ‘the
living
and the dead,’ ‘bless,’ ‘blessed’ and ‘redeemer.’ This clarifies for us the
structure
of the story: the steadfast love which Yahweh wants to show Ruth is
shown
through Boaz, a man blessed by Yahweh. He sees Ruth's steadfast love,
and
as a result he views the Moabitess as a non-stranger. That Boaz is blessed is
evident
from his being the redeemer. This being the redeemer is special, is a true
redemption
since it is there for
Translation
335
book
of Ruth, is given and received there where blessed people are who show
steadfast
love to the living and the dead, recognize each other, and see each other
as
non-strangers.
p.
183, n. 8—Joüon
His good toward the dead, for since
Boaz is a goel Naomi hopes and forsees
that
he would marry Ruth and thus raise up a posterity for her deceased husband.
This
statement by Naomi very clearly prepares for what is to follow.
p.
184, n. 8—Hajek
the theme of the story.
p.
184, n. 8—Rudolph
Rudolph explains the reference to
the dead in terms of the idea of the
retribution
doctrine. .. The death of the three men in the unclean foreign
country
was not only for Naomi but for the three as well a witness of Yahweh's
being
against them (Ruth 1:21); when Yahweh now shows himself gracious to the
widows
who remained behind, then the dead men also were rehabilitated.
p.
184, n. 8—Hertzber
The blessing for the dead concerns
at the same time the living; according to
the
Old Testament view divine grace could not come to the deceased in any other
way
than through encountering the living.
p.
184, n. 9—Hertzber
The concept of the goel stands out
from here on until the end of the book as
the
decisive one.
p.
187, n. 22—Joüon
I would read simply, "and now
indeed I am goel," in spite of the difficulty
that
there is in explaining the presence of the double ky and the 'm.
p.
188—Hertzberg
Hertzberg sees in Naomi's remark in
Ruth 2:20 a first indication that there is
property
at hand from Elimelech's side.
p.
188, n. 25—Rudolph
The potential goel can just as well
be called goel as the actual goel (cf. 4:4,
6a).
p.
188, n. 26—Hertzberg
The reader should, however, take
leave of this chapter with the realization that
the
Lord has taken care of these widows in an astonishing way, and also with the
hope
that, thanks to the gracious leading of God, something was begun here
which
will find its continuation and for which this very concept of a redeemer
offers
a definite and concrete reference point.
p.
189—NV
My daughter, shall not seek rest for
you?
p.
189, n. 30—Gerleman
What he has to say now discloses,
however, that he knows the young Moabit-
ess
quite well.
336 Translation
p.
190, n. 31—Hertzberg
At the beginning the important word
'resting place' occurs again. As in Ruth
1:9,
it means concretely marriage.
p.
190, n. 33—Hertzberg
Ruth presents herself to Boaz for
marriage and comes to him, so to say, as a
bride.
p.
192, n. 37—Hertzberg
Obviously through the double
meanings of the words which were employed
the
danger of the situation which arises through Naomi's suggestion and Ruth's
obedience
becomes visible.
p.
192, n. 38—Gerleman
turns himself around.
p.
192, n. 38—Hajek
When Boaz awakes in the middle of
the night because of the cold and is
startled
he obviously only recognizes a figure lying near to him and he has 'to
bend
forward' and only then recognizes that 'a woman lies at his feet.' Therefore,
Ruth
could not have been lying down immediately beside Boaz as perhaps was
intended
in the plan of Naomi.
p.
192, n. 38—Rudolph
The usual translation ‘to bend
forward’ is not found in the literal wording of
the
text but corresponds directly to the situation.
p.
193—David
Now we do not believe that Ruth
desired from Boaz that he marry her, yes,
that
she held this before him as more or less his obligation to her. This would be
hard
to harmonize with the picture of the modest and charming character
ascribed
to her in the rest of the text.
p.
193—David
If on the basis of this data we
attempt to interpret the words of Boaz, then the
plans
which he considers in favour of Ruth can only refer to his meeting his
financial
obligations to her, and that in connection with the sale of the prop-
erty....
In particular, this redemption cannot refer to the obligation to contract
a
marriage.
p.
194—Gunkel
That Ruth involves herself in such a
painful situation is the heroism of
faithfulness.
She desires nothing for herself, only an heir for her husband.
p.
194, n. 41—de Fraine
Ruth calls Boaz' attention to his
duty as redeemer, that is, as protector in
general....
Boaz grasps very well what Ruth desires from him, namely, the
protection
of a redeemer (and not marriage as such).
p.
194, n. 42—Gunkel
Boaz is worldly-wise enough to
rightly understand the motive which brought
her
there and he is very touched by it that she could overcome so much feminine
shyness.
Translation
337
p.
195—Würthwein
Ruth does not follow her own
interests (even though this is included according
to
the design of Naomi, Ruth 3:1), above all not her passions, but the interests
of
the
family. This the narrator portrays especially through Boaz: had passion been
the
motive behind her action, then she would have decided for the young men.
She
is concerned however now as before, that hesed (loyalty) takes place, that is
the
faithfulness which she owes to the family of her husband since her marriage
and
from which, as her w ole behaviour until now shows, she did not view herself
as
released by the death o her husband.
p.
196—Schoneveld
These matters must not be related to
a proper and modest character.
p.
196—David
But, though it is true that I am a
redeemer, yet there is a redeemer nearer than
I.
Remain here for the night and in the
morning, if he will redeem (for) you,
good,
let him do it; if he does not desire to redeem (for) you, then, as God lives, I
will
redeem (for) you.
p.
196—David
To determine which obligations Boaz
is referring to it is necessary to subject
to
further scrutiny the words 'redeemer' and 'to redeem' (Hebrew GO'EL,
GA'AL)
on the basis of the existing material.
p.
197—David
Boaz must merely have had in mind
the meeting of financial obligations to her
(Ruth)
and that in conned ion with the sale of a piece of land.
p.
197, n. 51—David
Generally speaking, would it
nonetheless be justified to conclude on the basis
of
this one source, in this instance the book of Ruth, the existence of a marriage
of
relatives of which else here we find no trace?
p.
197, n. 52—Schoneveld
We question whether or that Ruth
needed to look up Boaz at night and to lie
down
under the covering for his feet? Furthermore, if it only concerned the land
of
Elimelech, Naomi herself was the person to have contacted Boaz.
p.
198—David
David inserts in parenthesis the
word "for." "If he will redeem (for) you ...
to
redeem (for) you, then I will redeem (for) you."
p.
198—NV
If he will redeem you, good, let him
redeem you; if he does not wish to
redeem
you, then I will redeem you.
p.
198—Jepsen
Only on the presupposition that the
goel has a completely far-reaching
responsibility,
does it become understandable that Boaz can redeem Ruth, 3:13.
p.
199—Jepsen
The goel is always the nearest
member of the family who is able to render the
338 Translation
necessary
assistance. This help extends to all, therefore not only for the lawfully
regulated
cases of murder and manslaughter, the sale of property and sale into
slavery
but for all emergencies which the nearest of kin encountered.
It
is the "not only for the cases regulated by law, but for all cases of
need"
which
is subject to dispute and which, according to David, "lacks any
evidence."
p.
199, n. 57—Goslinga
His penetrating argument is too
juridical, misconceives the great significance of
custom
as the norm for action, and betrays in addition the tendency to date the
origin
of the book of Ruth as late as possible.
p.
199, n. 58—Ringgren
Moreover, several places in which
goel is used in a metaphorical sense (Pro.
23:11;
Isa. 50:34; Lam. 3:58; Ps. 119:154; job 19:25) show that the goel was to
appear
as a helper in lawsuits so that his protege receives his rights. He who did
not
leave behind a goel and a friend did not have anyone to care for his rights and
his
honor.
p.
200—Schoneveld
The redeemer did not have to confine
himself to the limits of codified law.
p.
200—David
the obligation to contract a
marriage.
obligation
obligation
obligation to contract a marriage
p.
201—Schoneveld
It is expected from a redeemer that
he will not only meet the written
obligations
but also that, under such circumstances, he will show his hesed, that
is,
his preparedness to help on basis of an existing relationship. The greater his
resources,
the more the redeemer could do; and
the more hesed he had, the more
he
wanted to do.
p.
202 n. 67—Goslinga
("If he is willing to redeem
you."), for if the redeemer would not interpret his
duty
too narrowly, he would not only redeem the family property but also
‘redeem’
Ruth herself by marrying her.
p.
202, n. 67—Brongers
However, in Ruth 3:13 g'l means
without any doubt 'marry.'
p.
203—Rudolph
Yahweh had graciously said Yes to
her plan.
p.
203, n. 70—Würthwein
marriage pledge
p.
203, n. 70—Haller
A marriage pledge or bride present.
Translation
339
p.
203, n. 70—Bertholet
Bertholet sees it as a sign of Boaz'
favour, which, however, would also serve to
safeguard
Ruth's action from misinterpretation.
p.
203, n. 71—Hertzberg
Here the divine leading to which the
book especially testifies is accentuated
anew.
p.
203, n. 71—Gerleman
It bears the mark of a complete
secularism and yet even this event in all its
temporalness
is under the divine leading. Everything is included by God in His
work.
EXCURSUS
p.
206—Haller
a marriage of duty.
p.
207—Smit
In her plan Naomi connects
redemption with the levirate, but the latter is
conceived
of in a much broader sense than is mentioned in Deut. 25:5.
p.
207, n. 7—Rudolph
Boaz obviously was no longer the
youngest, maybe he was already married and
also
Ruth was a Gentile so that in spite of his affection It was difficult for him
to
make
this decision especially since the first son of this marriage was not reckoned
as
his.
p.
208, n. 8—Goslinga
But apparently the redeemer was not
obligated to offer himself. Boaz was no
doubt
willing to do this, but he could not because he was not the nearest
kinsman.
And the nearest one was not particularly inclined so that he let the
matter
take its own course. For that reason Naomi was forced to take the first
step,
cf. Deut. 25:7.
p.
208, n. 11—Haller,
Boaz knows, what has escaped Naomi's
quick eye.
p.
208, n. 11—Würthwein
what Naomi had overlooked.
CHAPTER 8
p.
209, n. 2—Hertzberg
Evidently the view is this, that
Boaz, who as farmer and family member knows
the
situation, would obviously have to relate the request of Ruth to be redeemer
to
the settlement of the property ownership matter.
p.
210, n. 4—Rudolph
At the gate he waits for the goel
whose name the narrator does not know or
does
not consider important enough to mention.
340 Translation
p.
210, n. 4—Hertzberg
The name was known, but was
deliberately suppressed so that the head of a
family
was not exposed in this somewhat disgraceful situation.
In the other cases where the expression
is found there is intentional silence, so
that
here also such may be the case.
p.
211, n. 8—Gunkel
It delights the narrator now to
present an involved law case and to show how
it
was decided according to the old law; for this reason there is so much
amplification
in this scene.
p.
211, n. 8—Gerleman
If the incorporation of Ruth into
the people of
there
were other means necessary than pious words and wishes. The decisive proof
for
the connection of the Moabitess Ruth with
a
solid legal action. The final extended scene of Ruth 4:1-12 served this
purpose.
p.
212—Caspari
I obtain today, all which Elimelech,
Kilion and Mahlon possessed from the
hand
of Naomi. Accordingly, Elimelech received his possession by marriage.
p.
212—Jepsen
Otherwise these words, as in Ruth
4:5, are to be understood thus, that the
goel
receives from the hand of the daughter who is heir the right of redemption;
and
thereby after the purchase the ownership. Then Elimelech is probably the
proprietor
of the field, Ruth 4:3, but not the owner.
p.
212, n. 9—Caspari
For the rest, the
inheritance-daughter is the only woman who is legally capable
of
property ownership. Such a property ownership is presupposed by Ruth 4:3
and
4:9; only it is not Ruth but Naomi who owns the property.
p.
213—Jepsen
A sale could only have taken place
after Naomi's return on the supposition
that
Naomi was the heiress: for as a widow she would in no way have been able to
inherit,
rather after the death of Elimelech and his sons the possession would have
gone
immediately to the next male relative, thus probably to the unnamed goel.
p.
213, n. 14—Joüon
This theory is without foundation in
the text and actually does violence to it.
p.
214—Mittelmann
Naomi, it is true, is not the owner
of the property, but she has the right to
regulate
the succession of the inheritance with the heirs.
p.
214, n. 16—Joüon
We say the field of Elimelech. After
the death of the latter, his heirs, Mahlon
and
Chilion, became the legal owners of the field but on their death the field is
considered
to belong again to the former owner. His widow, Naomi, only
possesses
it in order to transmit it to a legal descendant of Elimelech.
Translation 341
p.
214, n. 17—Rudolph
But if the redemption, where also
the widow had to be taken over, was
voluntary,
and therefore according to such circumstances, could take a longer
time
until the goel decided for the widow, she in the meantime had to have a
certain
right of disposal over the property of her husband.
p.
215, n. 20—Ridderbos
"We must apparently understand
Num. 27:8 in this way that when there is no
son
and none is to be expected from out of a remarriage because, for example, the
widow
is past age, the daughters or the brother are heirs.
p.
217—Schoneveld
It is not impossible to consider
that Naomi, as widow, had the right to dispose
of
the estate of her husband, so that the heirs could not claim it.
p.
218, n. 30—Joüon
It is a present of instantaneous
action. Naomi sells, that is to say, puts up for
sale
by the very declaration that I am making to you.
p.
219, n. 31—Jepsen
Rather it has to be assumed that the
property was already sold when Elime-
lech
left; for otherwise Naomi could not have been presented as so poor. Also she
would
have not waited so long to sell the field.
p.
219, n. 31—Gunkel
Therefore Naomi, if she had sold the
field, would have been a well-to-do
woman,
which is completely contradictory to the meaning of the story.
p.
219, n. 33—Rudolph
Farming land is too valuable for it
to be left to lie waste for years.
p.
219, n. 35—Hertzberg
The word helkat hassada (piece of
land, Ruth 4:3) seems so to be used as if
halek
(share) was written. This makes it immediately clear why this land was not
more
saleable for all practical purposes for Naomi and Ruth. Naturally, land
properties
which have several owners are rented in order to be used. Therefore,
for
Naomi this legacy meant as good as nothing.
p.
220—Jepsen
Above all, however, a purchase by a
relative would hardly have been a geullah.
The
entrance of the god presupposes an earlier sale, The reading of the Massoretic
Text
has to remain therefore, "Naomi had sold."
p.
220, n. 36—Smit
The return of the field does not
remove the poverty of
cannot
cultivate that field. That requires the labour of men.
p.
220, n. 38—Nowack
Obviously Naomi, destitute of all
means, sold the property which it is now the
duty
of the goel (Lev. 25:25) to buy back from the hand of the buyer. Whether
Naomi
sold the land from
certainty.
.
342 Translation
p.
220, n. 40—Stamm
It cannot be determined with
certainty whether preemption or redemption is
implied
in Ruth 4:3.
p.
221—Bertholet
Bertholet's explanation that the
property settlement money of the goel to the
strange
buyer had to go through the hand of the original possessor is strained.
p.
221, n. 41—Mittelmann
Also the owner of the property has
to be present to deal with the relatives.
Furthermore,
a third person would not give away the property without payment
of
which however, in chapter 4, nothing is said.
p.
223, n. 48—Nowack
In addition to the preceding myd is
exceptional.
p.
224—Kohler
On the day when you buy the field
from the possession of Naomi, the wife of
the
deceased, you buy it....
Why is Ruth mentioned as "the
wife of the deceased" but not Naomi? For the
remark
did not concern Ruth's husband but rather the husband of Naomi, "our
brother
Elimelech" (Ruth 4:3). Furthermore, "when you buy the field you are
buying
Ruth" is peculiar even though the suitor pays the purchase money for the
bride.
When you buy the field you are
buying Ruth.
p.
224, n. 50—Kohler
It is the over-cleverness of a
reader who held the opinion that Ruth also has
something
to say concerning the sale.
p.
224, n. 51—Würthwein
Of
preserved
since no children could be expected from her anymore (Ruth 1:14).
p.
224, n. 51—Rudolph
A common formulation in such
substitution cases.
p.
225, n. 53—Wambacq
The day that thou hast acquired the
field from the hand of
deceased
thou hast acquired Ruth the Moabitess, the wife of the deceased.
The
expression 'Naomi and the dead' repeats what had been said in the
preceding
verses. The piece of land which belonged to Elimelech our brother (the
dead)
p.
225, n. 54—LXX
... the field out of the hand of
Naomi and from Ruth, ... also you must
acquire
Ruth.
p.
226, n. 58—Joüon
Here qnh certainly isn't taken with
the restricted meaning to acquire at the
price
of money, to buy. The goel who will marry Ruth will have nothing to pay to
the
parents of Ruth (in
Translation
343
p.
227—Bornstein
The actual meaning of qnh is
therefore not 'to buy' but 'to acquire,' `to
rightfully
obtain' as this expression is prevalent also in the Mishnah and related
literature.
p.
227—Rudolph
Boaz does not buy Ruth and cannot
buy her, for in this case then the mohar
(bride
price) (Gen. 34:12, Ex. 22:15 f.) would have to be paid to himself.
p.
227, n. 59—Plautz
Marriage in
wife
was no purchasable commodity. In the marriage, the father of the bride did
not
receive a payment which may be called a purchase-price in our sense.
One can only speak of a purchase
which is similar to the purchase of great
possessions
in a formally legal sense. Only in this sense is the woman the object of
a
business transaction. For her place in marriage is positive. Her personal worth
is
not
impugned in this act of marrying. Just as she is not bought for marriage as a
commodity,
so also is she not dealt with in the marriages as an object. The
payment
of bridal money does not degrade her. It is necessary as a compensation
since
the family of the bride loses one of its members, a future mother. The
family
tie is so solid and strong that a member cannot be so simply removed
without
receiving a counter compensation.
p.
227, n. 61—Plautz
It was a marriage without the mohar
(bride price). The marriage that Boaz
concluded
with Ruth is a levirate marriage where the paying of bride money is not
necessary
because the particular woman is already part of the family of her
husband.
qnh means therefore in this place (v.
5b) by the way of exception not
‘to
purchase’ in the fullest sense, but is to be rendered by 'to acquire.'
p.
228—Rudolph
This duty to support the widow takes
the place of the purchase price.
p.
228, n. 62—Rudolph
The verb in 4:5b means acquire and
not buy. Therefore also mkr in v. 3
cannot
mean an actual sale, but is to be translated by 'transfer.'
p.
229, n. 67—Tamisier
The goel gives an answer which is
neither firm nor definite as the use of the
future
suggests. He declares himself simply disposed to redeem the property of
Elimelech.
p.
229, n. 67—de Fraine
There is a positive answer, but it
is so indefinite that it is little more than a
slight
wish. The imperfect 'eg'al is much
less sharp than the perfect ga'alti (which
could
leave the impression that the matter is settled).
p.
232, n. 74—Wambacq
If Boaz seems to be sure of the
success of his enterprise was it not because he
foresaw
that the goel for reasons unknown to us would never undertake the
purchase
in the given circumstances?
344 Translation
p.
237, n. 89—Rudolph
But apart from this that qn' never
has the asserted meaning, the whole
situation
becomes unintelligible.... V. 10 remains the decisive commentary for v.
5.
p.
238, n. 91—Humbert
This is a combination which cleverly
prepares and justifies the retreat of the
goel.
p.
238, n. 92—David
Arbitrary insofar as this condition
(to marry the widow) is not legally
prescribed.
p.
238, n. 93—Goslinga
He has yet one arrow for the bow.
p.
238, n. 93—Tamisier
All the skill of Boaz consists of
irrevocably linking the two things.
p.
239, n. 94—Rudolph
Against it speaks the categorical
nature of the speech, completely apart from
the
question whether Naomi was entitled to make such demands.
p.
239, n. 94—Goslinga
Because it concerns the land of a
family that is dying out, and because one of
the
owners is a woman young enough to have a child, a moral obligation rests on
him
to take her in marriage.
p.
241, n. 98—Levy-Bruhl
The antiquity of the levirate in the
book of Ruth is therefore shown first of all
in
that it concerns agnate relatives whereas only brothers are referred to by
Deut.
p.
241, nn. 99 and 101 —Wambacq
He that wishes to succeed the
deceased must acquire the entire property
including
the wife. The wife changes owner along with the rest of the possession.
If
therefore the case presented itself where a dead man left property and a
childless
widow the one who acquired the property was to satisfy the needs of the
levirate.
This was because the woman who was part of the inheritance became his
property.
p.
242—Wambacq
In this remote period the levirate
could be an annex of a purchase because
then
a wife was regarded as part of the deceased goods; whoever acquired the
property
acquired it completely, including the woman, but in this case with the
obligation
of continuing the deceased's name.
p.
242, n. 102—Wambacq
If the attention of the lawgiver had
been devoted first of all to the observance
of
the law would he not have envisaged all these eventualities. If he had not done
so
is it not an indication that it is the halisah which interested him first of
all? The
possibility
is not therefore excluded that those who collected the old traditions of
levirate
that had since become obsolete.
Translation 345
p.
243, n. 105—Rudolph
What Boaz says certainly corresponds
to justice and custom.
p.
243, n. 105—Gressmann
These circumstances, which appear
complicated to us, were so common for
the
old Israelites that the narrator of the book of Ruth does not waste a word
about
it at all.
p.
243, n. 105—Nowack
That law concerning the redemption
of the field sold under distress in Lev.
25:23
ff. does not know anything of the demand made here upon the goel to
marry
the surviving childless widow in order to raise up the name of the deceased
upon
his inheritance. It is clear that we have before us here a combination with
levirate
marriage probably based upon custom.
p.
244, n. 106—Cruveilhier
According to the text the goel had
the double duty of redeeming his deceased
relative's
land and marrying the widow. It should not be thought, however, that
the
two obligations are of an entirely different nature. They were, on the
contrary,
essential to one another. Boaz declares in effect that the redemption of
the
property and the marriage of the widow are necessary for reviving the
deceased's
name upon his heritage, Ruth 4:5, 10. This declaration proves there-
fore
that in
The
family could not be conceived of devoid of its landed patrimony. If the goel
only
married his relative's widow without going to the extent of redeeming his
patrimony
he would in vain have congratulated himself in reviving the deceased's
name.
The children resulting from the new marriage would not have had any land
attaching
them to the first husband of their mother and enabling them to revive
his
name. One perceives, moreover, that the continuation takes on a completely
different
character of importance when it is attached simultaneously to persons
and
to property.
p.
244, n. 106—Lévy-Bruhl
The fact is, in a sale of this
nature it is not economic considerations that
predominate
but much rather the concern to continue the family of which the
patrimony
is in one way the material aspect. In buying the land of a relative as in
accepting
his inheritance, one acquired, at least partially, his personality.
p.
244, n. 106—Ringgren
Not only the fellow members of a
family, but also their property, form an
organic
unity and every breach of this unity is intolerable and must be repaired.
p.
245, n. 107—Cruveilhier
There is no real contradiction
between the legislation formulated in Deut.
25:5-10
and that which is applied in the book of Ruth. However, the case
envisaged
in the historical book is more complex than that which the Deutero-
nomic
code legislated. Whereas the latter speaks simply of a widow without
children,
the book of Ruth presupposes furthermore that this person is dispos-
sessed
of the land which had belonged to her husband. To raise up posterity
uniquely
for a deceased man no one is more qualified than his own brother. For
this
reason one understands that this law in Deut. 25:5-10 has no other subject
than
the brother-in-law. But when to this obligation there is added that of
346 Translation
redeeming
an alienated patrimony, it is quite natural that recourse should be
made
successively or in order of proximity to the different relatives to undertake
this
double duty. Thus the substitution of the goel for the brother-in-law ought to
be
no surprise in the book of Ruth.
p.
245, n. 107--Rudolph
Boaz takes Ruth for a wife (that it
is a levirate marriage is obvious according
to
that which has previously taken place; therefore the technical term ybm, Gen.
38:8,
Deut. 25:5, 7, is superfluous, especially since Boaz is not ybm).
p.
249—Schoneveld
The greater his resources the more
the redeemer could do, and the more hesed
(covenant
loyalty) he had, the more he wanted to do.
p.
249, n. 121--Carlebach
Should someone wish to deduce from
the book of Ruth laws of purity and
impurity,
the permissible and forbidden, he would go completely astray. He
would
probably seek to establish validity for the levirate duty in cases where that
law
certainly no longer exists or he would misunderstand the procedure of the
goel
and believe that each goel has to assume at the same time a marriage duty
with
the purchase of land. All this, however, in the book of Ruth, does not have a
legal
character but simply expresses simply the voluntary act of love, pure
thankfulness,
and deep humanness. The law is only the schoolmaster, the pointer,
which
sensitively is made for the predicament of human life and teaches measures
which
derive their justification from hesed, the final love of God and man.
p.
249, n. 124--Brongers
In Ruth 3: l 3 the goel must here do
what belongs to the levir. That contains an
extension
of the concept of both redemption and the levirate. In the first place,
levirate
is included in redemption. In the second place, the obligation of levirate is
extended
to include a distant relative.
p.
250, n. 126--Boecker
A declaration of preparedness or a
renunciation declaration from the right of
redemption.
p.
251, n. 1:33--Spait
Thus the shoe is a symbol of power,
and it is easy to understand how in legal
transactions
the transfer of the shoe became the proof that a man forfeited his
power,
his right.
p.
251, n. 133--Mittelmann
The transfer of the shoe was a means
of publicity in a law transfer.
p.
252, n. 140—Bertholet
Ht'wdh is the attestation and not
the custom.
p.
253, n. 145--LXX
and gave it to him.
Translation 347
CHAPTER 9
p.
257—Caspari
Hsbyt could for once in this place
stand with the dative (Jer. 48:35), and g'l
could
be applied to the subject, Yahweh: he did not permit you to die today
redeeming
you: the absence of an object for g'l is acceptable in light of the central
position
of 1k between the two verbs. A dative lk
behind g'l would be confusing;
therefore
it is preferable that the women call Yahweh the Goel.
p.
257, n. 9—Hajek
Blessed are you of the Lord, who as
(your) redeemer did not permit you today
to
be brought to an end. If Yahweh Himself is the God, then indeed comfort
comes
from Him (v. 15).
p.
258—Gressmann
Yahweh gives the young pair an heir,
who is considered as the son of the
deceased....
Now the family of Naomi is truly redeemed because its name is not
extinguished.
p.
258—Vincent
Blessed be the Lord, who today has
caused that a close relative be not lacking
to
the deceased for continuing his name in
p.
258, n. 13—Joüon
I would read lmt, which is
graphically not far removed and of which the
alteration
to lk could easily have taken place with a scribe carried away with the
thought
of
p.
258, n. 13—Fischer
Who did not refuse you today a goel,
so that your name be remembered in
p.
259—Schoneveld
How large a terrain the word
'redeemer' or 'to redeem' can cover is evident
of
from the conclusion of the book of Ruth. The women of
Yahweh
because He has not withheld from Naomi a redeemer. This redeemer is
the
child born to Ruth.... Naomi can now be at peace, for she has someone who
will
stand up for her and not leave her to her lot when she needs help.
p.
259, n. 15—Smit
He speaks of Obed, the goel, as the
defender of the rights of Naomi.
p.
259, n. 15—Mittelmann
The goel marriage would not only
produce a male heir for the deceased men
Elimelech
and Mahlon to secure their name from extinction, but would also serve
as
a provision for the now living women,
p.
259, n. 15—Goslinga
The word here has the wider meaning
of deliverer or helper.
p.
259, n. 16—Rudolph
Since goel (4:14a) is explained by
v. 15, it is obvious that the strict legal idea
348 Translation
of
the 'redeemer' is not intended here, but rather the word has the general
meaning
of 'protector.'
p.
259, n. 16—Lamparter
The word (goel) is not used here in
the specific sense which it possessed in
Israelite
family law. The redeemer is the boy insofar as Naomi, in her old age,
shall
have in him a comforter and a provider.
p.
260—Bertholet
What Naomi is doing signifies a kind
of motherly adoption.
p.
260, n. 18—Gunkel
tender picture.
p.
260, n. 21—Kohler
It is not a tender picture which is
presented but rather a legal transaction.
p.
260, n. 22—Gressmann
Naomi lays the child on her bosom,
doubtless to adopt it and as grandmother
gladly
cares for the child.
p.
260, n. 23—Dijkema
For with the adoption the son of
Ruth and Boaz becomes completely Naomi's
son
and eo ipso son of Naomi and Elimelech. This is clearly
indicated in the
conclusion,
4:14-17a: Ruth and Boaz are eliminated and only Naomi remains
with
her adopted son. And to my mind the interpolation ... wishes to show
nothing
other than this, that David is thus the descendant of a true Israelite and
Bethlehemite
couple, Elimelech and Naomi. His true Israelite origin is guaranteed.
p.
261—Jepsen
The adoption would have been
unnecessary if Obed had already been recog-
nized
as a son of Mahlon and therefore as grandson of Namoi, so that also from
this
consideration a levirate marriage seems impossible.
p.
261—Würthwein
Though Ruth entered into the
marriage with Boaz in Naomi's place as the one
from
whom descendents could be expected, nevertheless Naomi remained the
legal
partner by the acquisition of the property through Boaz (Ruth 4:9).
Therefore
it is readily understandable that Naomi by the adoption formally
received
the child into the family and made him heir to the possessions of his
fictitious
grandfather Elimelech and his fictitious father Mahlon.
p.
261—David
We may therefore not attach any
juridical significance to Naomi's taking Obed
into
her lap. We should merely see it as an expression of tender love and care to
which
the former wife of her son has given birth.
p.
261, n. 23—Gerleman
To the narrator, it is not
sufficient to incorporate Ruth into the Jewish
community.
He takes pains yet through a special act of adoption to give the
new-born
child a real Jewish mother.
Translation 349
p.
261, n. 23—Dijkema
... a later redactor thoughtlessly
and without analysis appended the genealogy
from
Chronicles, not sensing that in the previous verses Obed was through
adoption
no longer the son of Boaz.
p.
262—Rudolph
This general designation is the
clearest proof that the passage concerns the care
of
a grandmother for her grandson and not a legal action.
p.
262, n. 31—de Fraine
From a legal point of view Ruth's
son is Naomi's descendant; therefore no
adoption
needs to take place.
p.
263—Smit
Throughout all this final scene,
love expresses itself, not the law.
p.
263—Dijkema
Now that Naomi adopts the child it
is no longer the privilege of Boaz and
Ruth
to name it, and the neighboring women assume this task.
p.
263—Ehrlich
Neighbours had no right to give a
name to a strange child.
p.
263, n. 32—Joüon
The gesture is not to indicate the
adoption of the child by Naomi. She does
not
have to adopt the child: he is already hers.
p.
263, n. 36—Würthwein
In the role which Naomi (4:16) plays
as adoption mother, it is probable that
she
was thought of as the one to give the name.
p.
263, n. 36—de Fraine
The legal mother, Naomi, is better
qualified to give the name than the
neighbor
women.
p.
264—Eissfeldt
Such alterations proceed from the
silent and most likely unconscious presup-
position
that the emphasis in the words of the neighbor women is upon ‘No'omi’:
a
son is born to No'omi. But this is not the case. The stress is much more upon
'a
son':
to No'omi a son is born. The name ‘Obed’ connects back to this ‘son’: it is
not
bound to ‘No'omi’ by sound, but in its meaning, brings out and even deepens
the
word 'son,' since 'supporter' or ‘maintainer’—the meaning of 'obed—says even
more
than ben—'son.' ... In 4:17 the ben (`son') reminds one not by sound, but
all
the more by meaning of 'obed' (‘supporter’)....
p.
264, n. 41—Eissfeldt
The son, physically born of Ruth but
ethically ascribed to Naomi, receives
therefore
the name Obed (servant or guardian) because he will demonstrate the
service
of love of a son to his grandmother. Between the expression of the
neighbour
women: 'a son is born to Naomi' and the name Obed given by them to
the
son, there exists a close connection of meaning. This is already touched on in
Ruth
4:14, 15, where the women congratulate Naomi because Yahweh gave her a
350 Translation
redeemer
(Goel) which means at this place the same as Obed who will bring joy to
her
and care for her in her old age.
p.
265—Goslinga
His task and purpose was to serve,
namely for the preservation of his family
which
would otherwise have died out.
p.
266—Goslinga
Proceeds from a doctrinaire
conception of levirate marriage and its conse-
quences.
Even if Obed could assume the rights of Ruth's first husband, that
cannot
remove the fact that Boaz had begotten him, as v. 21 says. This could not
be
said of Mahlon.
p.
266, n. 45—Goslinga
Most important in the book, when
carefully examined, is not the family of
Elimelech
but that of David. Among the latter's ancestors Boaz must, according
to
God's plan, play an honoured role. Even more than Ruth herself, he is the main
figure.
However, he is that as ancestor of David.
p.
267, n. 47—de Fraine
Perhaps Boaz was a childless
widower. It is somewhat strange that the
perspective
of the 'house' of Elimelech was lost sight of at this point.
CHAPTER
10
p.
288, n. 52—Schoneveld
In the research on the subject of
redemption it seems to us incorrect not to
give
the book of Ruth its own voice, and to judge and evaluate it according to
what
the OT says in other places. This would mean a failure fully to accept the
book
of Ruth as a source, To suggest that the author was not up-to-date or did
not
fully understand that about which he was writing appears to me to be a weak
position....
Furthermore, many examples can be cited in which the actual
practice
does not harmonize with the prescriptions known to us while we would
not
think of judging the author to be uninformed.
p.
290—Ridderbos
It serves as an important indication
of how the laws were applied, that is not
in
terms of the letter alone but in terms of the spirit of the law.
CHAPTER 11
p.
294, n. 2—Stamm
Boaz enters into a levirate, or
brother-in-law marriage with Ruth, who takes
the
place of Naomi. Since this is the only case of this kind in the O.T. it cannot
be
decided,
therefore, if the levirate law belonged to the duties of the goel or not.
Considering
the essential relationship of geullah law and the levirate—both are
seeking
to keep the family in its totality together—the first is quite probable.
duties of the goel.
‘duties’
p.
294, n. 2—Ringgren
Apparently marriage to Ruth belongs
also to the geullah obligations.
Translation
351
p.
297—De Graaf
Just as through the redeemer Boaz
the name and place of Elimelech and his
family
was preserved in
and
gives them an eternal inheritance.
p.
298, n. 9—Ridderbos
There is to my mind not adequate
ground to view the unworthy Ruth as a
type
of the bride of Christ as some do. But it is proper to view Boaz as a type of
Christ
because Boaz maintains the 'rights' of the poor and the oppressed, like it is
prophesied
of Christ. Thereby it will have to be strictly emphasized that Boaz acts
this
way not because he has such a noble character but because he lets his life be
governed
by the Torah.
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